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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR POST-TRIAL ACCESS TO ANTI-
RETROVIRAL DRUGS FOR PARTICIPANTS AND HOST POPULATIONS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A GLOBAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
By 
Evaristus Chiedu Obi, MA, MSW, MPA 
December 2014 
 
Dissertation supervised by Gerard Magill, PhD 
The pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS in developing countries engenders global 
health emergency which establishes the urgent need to address the issue of affordable 
access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. The dissertation discusses an 
ethical justification for post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host 
populations in developing countries within the context of global justice, stressing the 
combination of national and global responsibilities in realizing this objective. Drawing on 
the strengths of Rawls’s statist and Pogge’s cosmopolitan theories and on the 
International Human Rights Law, the dissertation proposes a paradigm of Global Health 
Justice involving a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the realization 
of the right to health in general and access to drugs in particular. 
 v 
Every nation has the primary responsibility for realizing the right to health, 
including affordable access to drugs for its citizens. However, poor nations that have 
demonstrated their best efforts by spending at least 3% of their average Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) on national health should be assisted in realizing this objective by the 
global community. 
International human rights law was argued as providing a theoretical framework 
for national and global responsibilities for realizing the core obligations that stem from 
socio-economic rights and for addressing global health inequalities. The obligation to 
provide international assistance in realizing the minimum essential level of the right to 
health which includes access to drugs was argued as imperative. 
The dissertation proposes an international agency such as Global Health Fund for 
the distribution of health-related goods that would rectify the injustice stemming from the 
current global system. Expanding the mandate of the current Global Fund to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria in order to include interventions for other diseases as well as 
addressing the weakness of the public health systems in developing countries was 
proposed as a good start for establishing the Global Health Fund. An effective Global 
Health Fund rooted in the concept of financial sustainability would significantly enhance 
the realization of the right to health and affordable access to drugs, including anti-
retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries.      
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: ETHICAL ISSUES IN GLOBAL HEALTH INEQUALITIES AND  
 
GLOBAL HEALTH RESEARCH   
 
A. Introductory Comments: The Context of the Debate 
 
The pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS in developing countries results in global 
health emergency which creates the urgent need to address the issue of affordable access 
to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. The dissertation focuses on the ethical 
justification of post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host 
populations in developing countries by combining national and international 
responsibilities in realizing this objective. The dissertation argues for a paradigm 
involving a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the right to health in 
general and access to drugs in particular. 
The implication is that every nation has the primary responsibility for providing 
affordable access to drugs for its citizens. However, when developing countries exhaust 
their domestic resources and still are not able to provide affordable access to drugs for its 
citizens, developed countries should intervene to exercise their global responsibilities in 
realizing this objective. Providing affordable access to drugs in developing countries is 
defended in this dissertation within the context of realizing the minimum essential level 
of the right to health which includes access to drugs. 
Global inequality in health and wealth between developed and developing 
countries continue to be a challenge for the global community. No place is this inequality 
felt more than in the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS in developing countries, where 
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those living with HIV/AIDS lacked access to anti-retroviral drugs. Global health crisis 
created by HIV/AIDS results in many clinical trials in developing countries in search of 
anti-retroviral drugs for combating the disease. Some of the clinical trials conducted in 
developing countries were marred by allegations of violation of rights of research 
participants and host populations.  
A related issue discussed by some scholars was the availability of successful 
products, e.g. anti-retroviral drugs at the end of clinical trials.1 In spite of the fact that the 
industrialized world shoulders very few research burdens, it enjoys most research benefits 
because, unlike the developing world it can buy a proven intervention. On the other hand, 
poor inhabitants of developing countries who serve as research subjects assume the vast 
burdens of research but rarely share economic reach of both research subjects and their 
governments.2 The problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing 
countries has been exacerbated by Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Agreement (TRIPS) and TRIPS-plus measures. TRIPS agreement and TRIPS-plus 
measures ensure strong patent protection which drive up the price of drugs through 
monopoly pricing system and block generic alternatives.3 Forman notes, “The price 
impact of excluding access to generic medicines is particularly acute, since generic 
competition is a critical factor in reducing drug prices.”4 Trade agreements currently 
being negotiated by United States and other western governments may severely limit 
production of generic drugs which is considered the primary source of affordable 
medications in developing countries.5 
A related issue regarding the problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs 
in developing countries was discussed by some authors as the demand factors that 
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influence access to HIV/AIDS drugs in Africa.6  Schuklenk and Ashcroft observe that on 
the demand side that the health care infrastructure needed to make use of these drugs 
effectively is lacking in developing countries.7 Three factors were identified as impeding 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries, highly strong legal 
protection of patents, lack of or slow third world government focus on the crisis and 
economic programs that have largely reduced funding for public health.8 
However, some scholars advocate for the social responsibility of pharmaceutical 
companies as a way of dealing with the affordable access issue.9 Private donation of 
drugs, differential pricing, price reductions, prior agreements, public-private partnerships 
and manufacture of generic copies of patented drugs and compulsory licensing were 
highlighted as strategies for dealing with affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries.10 Private donations, differential pricing and price reductions are 
improvised solutions that merely rely on the generosity of pharmaceutical companies and 
they do not go far enough in dealing with affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries. These strategies are considered substandard in both preventing 
avoidable death and in relation to the sustainability of the policy and the recognition of 
the social responsibilities of companies and states.11 Compulsory licensing is considered 
more effective because it helps the countries to fulfill the duty of meeting the health 
needs of their populations in national health emergencies. 
The debate for the affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing 
countries has been dominated by two approaches, John Rawls’s statist approach and 
Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach. Rawls’s statist approach relies on humanitarian 
assistance from the perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to drugs in 
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developing countries. In contrast, Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach adopts a much more 
international perspective to global justice to justify access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries. The dissertation introduces a paradigm which combines Rawls’s 
national responsibilities and Pogge’s emphasis on international responsibilities for global 
justice to address the ethical problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries. The discussion on ethical justification for post-trial access to anti-
retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries begins with 
the issue of global health inequalities. 
 
B. Global Health Inequalities  
1. Global Health Inequalities between Developed and Developing Countries 
The global inequality in health is morally alarming. The gap between developed 
and developing countries is increasingly widening. A child’s birth either in a developed 
country or a developing country determines the life’s chances and opportunities of the 
child.12 Ruger acknowledges wide and growing global health inequalities in relation to 
life expectancies and child mortality rates between developed and developing countries. 
For example, a child born today in Afghanistan is 75 times as likely to die by age 5 years 
as a child born in Singapore. Furthermore, in Africa the number of children at risk of 
dying is 35% higher today than it was 10 years ago.13 The global health inequalities exist 
between developed and developing countries in several areas, health outcomes, supply of 
health care services and funding of such services by public and private agents.14 We will 
examine some aspects of global health inequalities, inequalities of life and death between 
countries and causes of death and disability. 
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1a. Inequalities of life and death between countries 
The global burden of disease is disproportionately borne by developing countries, 
which has resulted in significant different health outcomes between developed and 
developing countries.15 An abundance of data exists that shows vast disparities in life 
expectancy, child mortality, adult mortality and maternal mortality among rich and poor 
countries. Average life expectancy in Africa is nearly 30 years less than in the Americas 
or Europe.16 World Health Organization reports vast disparity in average life expectancy 
between inhabitants of Africa, America and Europe. The disparity is also significant 
between the rich and the poor relative to the number of years of healthy life.17 Life 
expectancy in Zimbabwe or Swaziland is less than half that in Japan.18 WHO reports that 
“A person born in Zimbabwe can hope to live only to age thirty-four for men or thirty-
three for women, whereas a person born in Japan is expected to live to age seventy-nine 
for men or eighty-six for women.”19 A child born in Angola is 65 times more likely to die 
in the first few years of life than a child born in Norway.20 A woman giving birth in sub-
Saharan Africa is 100 times more likely to die in labor than a woman in a rich country.21 
Although life expectancy has increased in developed countries in the past five decades, it 
has been decreasing in developing countries.22 Infectious disease epidemics, especially 
HIV/AIDS which kills over 5,800 African, but only 49 North Americans, each day,23 and 
increased chronic disease have been instrumental in the decline of life expectancy in 
developing countries.24 
  Other key health status indicators that are used to measure the global health 
inequalities are child mortality rate or under five mortality rate and infant mortality rate. 
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Child mortality rate or under five mortality is “the probability that a newborn baby will 
die before reaching age five, expressed as a number per 1000 live births.”25 This rate 
varies to a great extent with the wealth of a country. In developed countries the rate is 
about 20 per 1000 live births, while, in developing countries the rate can be as high as 
170 per 1000 live births, as in the African region of the World Health Organization 
(WHO).26 In many developing countries, child mortality rates can be twenty-five to thirty 
times higher than the rate in developed countries.27 Statistics available indicate that of the 
10.8 million children under five who die each year, 10 million are from low-income 
countries more- than twice the number of children born annually in the United States and 
Canada combined.28 Infant mortality rate which is another health status indicator is the 
“the number of deaths of infants under age 1 per 1000 live births in a given year.”29 The 
infant mortality rate varies largely with the income status of a country.30 Some of the 
poor countries, such as Niger, have infant mortality rates as high as 150 infants deaths for 
every 1000 live births, whereas Sweden has only about 3 infants for every 1000 live 
births.31 Data provided by the World Bank on the global health gap between the rich and 
the poor indicates that in one year alone, 14 million of the poorest people in the world 
died, while only 4 million would have died if this population had the same death rate as 
the global rich.32 
The health gap between developed and developing countries is consistently 
increasing. In richer nations, the population is increasingly healthy and living longer, 
while in the least developed countries, the population is getting sicker and dying 
younger.33 In countries with the highest child and adult mortality rates, people suffer 
multiple deprivations when compared with their low-mortality counterparts. They are 
 7 
four times more likely to live on less than one dollar per day, have twice the female 
illiteracy rate, and a twenty-fold for adults or sixty-five fold for children difference in per 
capita health spending.34 
 
1b. Causes of Death and Disability 
  The causes of death and disability differ significantly between developing and 
developed countries. Leading causes of death and disability in developed countries are 
chronic, non-communicable diseases because they have technologies to prevent and treat 
most communicable diseases.35 Gwatkin and Guillot write, “Among the global rich, all of 
the top five causes of death and of disability-adjusted life year (DALY) losses are non-
communicable diseases, with ischaemic heart disease and malignant neoplasms at or near 
the top.”36 The DALY is defined as a measure of premature deaths and losses due to 
illness and disabilities in a population. A DALY measures the number of healthy years of 
life lost between the population being measured and the healthiest possible population.37  
On the other hand, communicable diseases are the leading causes of death and 
disability in developing countries.38 Infections defy geographical boundaries especially in 
an age of advanced innovation in transportation which makes for easy transmission of 
infectious agents.39 In developing countries, chronic diseases are also becoming more 
widespread, thus, producing a double burden of disease.40 In poor developing countries, 
communicable diseases account for majority of deaths (58.6 percent) and DALY loss 
(63.6 percent).41 Similarly, non-communicable diseases are responsible for more than 
half the disease burden in low and middle income countries.42 However, in rich 
developed countries, communicable diseases are responsible for 7.7 percent of all deaths 
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and 10.9 percent of DALY loss.43 We will examine the preventable and treatable diseases 
prevalent in developing countries usually classified as diseases of poverty. 
 
1c. Diseases of Poverty 
Infectious diseases of poverty are defined as “an umbrella term used to describe a 
number of diseases which are known to be more prevalent among poorer populations, 
rather than a definitive group of diseases.”44 It is a concept that acknowledges the need to 
focus on the poor and vulnerable, which have less power to intervene. A good number of 
such diseases are regarded as “neglected tropical diseases”, as defined by WHO.45 
Griffiths and Zhou acknowledge that many other infectious diseases have not been high 
on the global agenda except tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS.46 Diseases such as 
diarrhea, elephantiasis, guinea worm, malaria, measles, river blindness, schistosomiasis, 
and trachoma are largely unheard of in rich countries, but in contrast are leading causes 
of sickness and death in poor countries.47 
Data shows that diseases of poverty are responsible for 54% of deaths in high-
mortality poor countries, compared with 6.2% of deaths in high-income countries.48 
Diseases of poverty are as well leading causes of child mortality in poor countries.49 
Eighty-five percent of the 2.1 million deaths each year from diarrheal disease are in low-
income countries, primarily among infants.50  
A large proportion of diseases in low-income countries are preventable and 
treatable with current medicines or interventions.51 A clear majority of the disease burden 
in low- income countries is rooted in the consequences of poverty, such as poor nutrition, 
indoor air pollution and lack of access to proper sanitation and health education.52 
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Malaria can be prevented through various interventions, spraying dwellings with DDT, 
using insecticide treated mosquito nets and taking prophylactic medicines such as 
mefloquine, doxycycline and malorone.53 Tuberculosis can be prevented with improved 
nutrition and treatment with DOTS therapy. About 95% of infectious patients in poor 
countries can be detected and cured.54 Education is necessary for the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS and this requires involvement of civil society. Combining anti-retroviral drugs 
and good nutrition can help in controlling the viral load and suppressing the symptoms of 
HIV/AIDS.55  Macklin highlights the staggering figures of HIV infection in Africa and 
India, but, with very limited access to anti-retroviral drugs for a very few population in 
those countries and most other developing countries with exception of Brazil. On the 
other hand, most HIV infected individuals in United States and other industrialized 
countries are treated.56 Vast inequalities between poor and rich countries relative to 
access to health care and essential drugs are clear indications of increasing global health 
inequalities. 
Apart from affecting morbidity and premature mortality of populations in poor 
regions of the world, the diseases of poverty also result in physical anguish.57 People who 
suffer from these diseases are often stigmatized and ostracized from the society.58 
Diseases of poverty impose a heavy health and economic burdens on poor populations in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America.59 For example, malaria which is one of the leading 
causes of mortality in children under five years of age in Africa accounts for 40% of 
public health expenditure in areas with high malaria transmission.60 These diseases 
perpetuate the cycle of poverty by decreasing earning ability and economic 
productivity.61 Griffiths and Zhou articulate, “Lost labor time due to illness often means a 
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reduction in household capacity to earn income, particularly at a time when the household 
needs additional money to pay for treatment.”62 The social and economic conditions of 
poor populations support poverty which can affect health status and health outcomes 
either directly or indirectly. 
 
2. Social Determinants of Health Inequalities 
      
The commission on social determinants of health recognizes that the global 
burden of disease and the major causes of health inequalities, which are found in all 
countries, stem from the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age.63 
Daniels also articulates, “Health is produced not just by having access to medical 
prevention and treatment but also, to a measurably great extent by the cumulative 
experience of social conditions across the life course.”64 These conditions are generally 
referred to as social determinants of health including early year’s experiences, education, 
economic status, employment and decent work, housing and environment, and effective 
systems of preventing and treating ill health.65   
Social disadvantages are linked with inequalities in socio-economic status, 
gender, ethnicity and geographical area.66 On the other hand, social advantages result 
from socio-economic development, and are associated with cultural, political and 
historical factors. They are natural and “built in” environments as well as public 
policies.67 In a nutshell, the structural determinants and conditions of daily life form the 
social determinants of health as well as account for a substantial part of health 
inequalities between and within countries.68  
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2a. Health and Socio-economic Status 
  Many studies have documented a strong correlation between health outcomes and 
socio-economic status. Daniels describes each increment up the socioeconomic hierarchy 
as associated with improved health outcomes.69 Gostin also articulates, “If residence in a 
poor country significantly increases a person’s risk of illness and premature death, it is 
only more disadvantageous to be a member of a low-income, low-status population in 
that country.”70 Poverty and ill-health are regarded as interwoven. Poor countries are 
usually predicted to have worse health outcomes than better-off countries. There is also a 
prediction that within countries, poor people have worse health outcomes than better-off 
people.71 However, the wealth of a country does not solely determine the health outcomes 
of the particular country. There are other mediating factors certainly involved. For 
example, Costa Rica’s life expectancy is nearly the same as that of the United States, 
despite about $21,000 large difference between the Gross Domestic Product per capita 
(GDPpc) for Costa Rica and the United States.72 Daniels et al. contend that factors such 
as culture, social organization, and government policies contribute significantly to the 
determination of population health, and that variations in these factors go a great length 
to explain the differences in health outcomes between nations.73 
Strong epidemiological evidence shows that individuals of low socioeconomic status live 
much shorter and less healthy lives than individuals of high socio-economic status.74 
There is a consensus among numerous authors that the level of economic inequality in a 
society adversely affects population health.75 The implication is that societies with wide 
inequalities between rich and poor tend to have worse health status than societies with 
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smaller inequalities after controlling for per capita income.76 Scholars who give credence 
to this line of thought argue that social justice is good for our health.77 
Disparities in socioeconomic status show differently in both developed and 
developing countries. For example, in United States, “Persons of poverty, non-white race, 
and or menial position are more likely to experience significant health problems decades 
before their more privileged fellow citizens.”78 In developing countries, health and 
longevity of individuals are severely affected if they are poorer, less valued and less 
powerful.79 
Furthermore, vulnerable populations consisting of women, children and 
indigenous persons in developing countries are less healthy than their counterparts. 
Women have very limited control over their social, political and economic lives, which 
are best indicators of poor health.80 Such living conditions result in worse health 
outcomes for women. For example, in Angola, the maternal mortality ratio is 1,700 
deaths per 100,000 live births, compared with 7 deaths in Switzerland.81 HIV infection 
rates in sub-Saharan Africa are 5-16 times higher among young girls than boys.82 
Women’s physical health and mental health are also affected by gender-based violence 
such as rapes, forced pregnancies and sexual assaults.83 In developing countries, children 
experience worse health outcomes than in developed countries. For example, in 
developing countries, 33 out of 1,000 infants die during the neonatal period, compared 
with 4 out of 1,000 in developed countries.84 Studies have also shown that “indigenous 
groups historically have faced worse health outcomes due to low socioeconomic status 
(SES) and marginalization within states and communities.”85 
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Discrimination against various racial, ethnic or religious groups in both 
developing and developed countries usually has severe social and health consequences. 
For example, in Bulgaria, the life expectancy of the Roma people at any age is five to six 
years below the rest of the population, while their infant mortality rate is six times the 
national average.86 Among the non-Tagalog speaking population of the Philippines, child 
mortality rates were 33 percent above those of Tagalog speakers. Child mortality rates for 
non-Christians were 47 percent above those of Christians.87 In Latin America, the 
prevalence of child diarrhea and maternal mortality is much higher among indigenous 
people than among non-indigenous.88 In United States, “the life expectancy of African-
Americans in the District of Columbia is 63 years, compared with 80 years for whites in 
neighboring Montgomery county Maryland.89 We will further examine the components 
of Socio-Economic Status (SES) including income, education and social class, and how 
they affect health outcomes differently in both developing and developed countries. 
 
I.          Relative Income and Health 
 Studies have shown that there is a correlation between the income distribution 
in a society and the level of health achievement of its members.90 Succinctly put, “It 
is not just the size of the economic pie but how the pie is shared that matters for 
population health.91 Variations in life expectancy between countries were associated 
with income distributions. Countries with more equal income distributions have 
higher life expectancies than countries with lesser income distributions. For example, 
Japan and Sweden have higher life expectancies than U.S. that has higher GDP per 
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capita.92 Countries with lower GDP per capita, such as Costa Rica also enjoy high life 
expectancy due to a more equitable income distribution.93 
 Individual mortality rates are also associated with income distributions.94 
Wilkinson describes far reaching impact of income on mortality.95 For example, a 
study “estimated that a move from household income of $20,000-$30,000 to a 
household income greater than $70,000 was associated with a halving of the odds of 
adult mortality.”96  
 Parental income has strong effects on children’s health. Family income is 
clearly associated with various measures of child health.97 The association continues 
to be large after controlling for household composition, race, parental education, and 
parental labor force status.98 Health, on the other hand has an effect on income and 
wealth. “Health improves one’s ability to participate in the labor market and earn a 
decent wage.”99 Illness increases spending on health and consequently reduces 
wealth. The negative effect of poor health on income and on wealth accounts for the 
correlation between financial resources and health especially among adults.100 
 
II. Education and Health 
  Education plays a central role in any discussion and analyses of the SES-health 
gradient. Educational attainment has been used as the primary indicator of SES.101 
Education is a significant determinant of health for several reasons. “First, it brings with 
it knowledge of good health practices. Second, it provides opportunities for gaining 
skills, getting better employment, raising one’s income, and enhancing one’s social 
status, all of which are also related to health.”102  
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Studies show that the best predictor of the birth weight of a baby is the mother’s 
level of educational attainment.103 There is a strong and positive correlation between the 
level of education and all key health indicators.104 For example, in United States more 
educated individuals report better health and suffer lower mortality risk.105 Birn points 
out that people who are better educated have lower levels of infectious diseases and non-
communicable diseases such as hypertension, emphysema, diabetes, anxiety and 
depression. They also show improved physical and mental functioning; health behaviors 
such as lower rates of smoking, heavy drinking and drug use. They as well have higher 
rates of exercise and better management of stress and chronic health conditions.106   
The implication is that more educated individuals engage in more healthy behaviors 
because they are more informed. They are more inclined to comply with prescribed 
therapies and to utilize modern medical technologies to deal with their health 
problems.107 Furthermore, studies have shown that education affects cognition, which 
invariably affects the ability to process information relative to healthy behaviors.108 
Studies also support that health affects education.109 For example, in Britain, adolescents 
who were born with low birth weight or suffered health insults in childhood have worse 
schooling outcomes.110 In developing countries, children with poor health have worse 
schooling outcomes. 
Access to education and quality of education are significantly compromised in 
developing countries. Millions of children are excluded from formal education due to 
costly fees involved. Investing on education for girls is endangered when families prefer 
to have them focus more on household work rather than pay their school fees. The 
perception that boys benefit more from education also constitutes an impediment in 
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educating girls. In many countries, deregulation and decrease in social sector spending 
result in a marked decline in the quality of education.  Furthermore, factors such as high 
rates of migration to developed countries, civil conflict and HIV/AIDS have destroyed in 
recent decades the ranks of educators in some settings.111 There are indications that those 
developing countries that invest heavily in human capital, for example in education, have 
better health outcomes. In developing countries, adult literacy is one of the best 
predictors of life expectancy.112 
 
III. Social Class and Health 
Individuals attain social class through their educational attainment and their levels 
of income and wealth. Cutler et al., articulate, “Education, income, and wealth 
characterize individuals who are separated from the society in which they live.”113 There 
is a positive correlation between an individual’s position in a social hierarchy and better 
health outcomes. Individuals of greater wealth and education enjoy better health for a 
greater extent, because of the individual’s position in a social hierarchy not because of 
some process affecting the individuals in isolation.114  
The Whitehall studies of British civil servants report that civil servants with lower 
prestige jobs experience higher rates of mortality from cardiovascular causes.115 The 
studies report variations in behavior patterns based on the rank of the civil servants. For 
example, higher ranking officials show a lower obesity rate, a lower tendency to smoke 
and higher propensities to exercise and eat fruits and vegetables.116 The rank or position 
in employment is positively associated with a sense of control over one’s health and 
one’s work, job satisfaction, social support, and the absence of stressful life events.117 
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Apart from sources of international health inequalities that focus on disparities in global 
disease burden between developing and developed countries and marked variations in 
status, we will further explore other factors such as international practices that undermine 
the population health of developing nations. 
 
2b. International Practices Affecting the Health of Developing Nations. 
 Benatar identifies increasing poverty in most parts of the world as a primary 
factor preventing sustainable control of population growth, which invariably threatens 
physical and mental health as the necessary conditions for a decent human life and global 
survival.118 He further traces the current global inequalities in health status and access to 
health care to poverty in developing countries resulting from the world expenditures on 
military goods and services.119 As at 1990, “the world spends almost $1 trillion a year on 
military goods and services.”120 Developed countries spend an average of 5.4% of their 
Gross National Product (GNP) on the military and a meager 0.3% on aid to developing 
countries.121 Similarly, United States spend 0.15% of its GNP on defense support for 
Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Parkistan and the Philippines.122 Militarization and the associated 
militarism have been identified as compromising the health of individuals and nations in 
a variety of ways including killing, maiming, torture, refugeeism, destruction of 
livelihoods, diversion of resources, crime, terrorism, black markets, poverty, starvation, 
environmental damage, and destabilization within developing countries.123 
Modern international economic policies and market driven health care also 
contributed to the poverty in developing countries, which undermines the population 
health. Some scholars describe the impact of such economic policies as removal of great 
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quantities of material and human resources from poor developing countries to rich 
industrialized nations.124 The debt burden of developing countries threatens the health of 
those nations. In 1990, total developing country world debt was $1.3 trillion, that is, 
double the level in 1980, and it had grown further to $1.9 trillion by 1995.125 International 
lenders such as World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed 
structural adjustment programs on developing countries as a condition for lending money 
to them. The implication is that these poor countries were forced to embark on severe cut 
back on their publicly funded health systems and to take other necessary steps to cut 
spending deficit.126 For example, in the 1990’s Cameroon adopted Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) measures which include suspension of health worker recruitment, 
mandatory retirement at age fifty or fifty five, suspension of promotions, and reduction of 
benefits.127  
The brain drain of health care workers from developing to developed countries 
also harms the population health. Daniel argues, “Rich countries have harmed health in 
poorer ones by solving their own labor shortages of trained health care personnel by 
actively and passively attracting immigrants from poorer countries.”128 Data shows that 
23-34 percent of physicians in developed countries such as New Zealand, The United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada are foreign trained.129 WHO reports 
that, “Over 60 percent of the doctors trained in Ghana in the 1980s emigrated 
overseas.”130 International efforts to reduce poverty, lower mortality rates and treat 
HIV/AIDS patients as articulated in the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) are 
jeopardized by the loss of health personnel in sub-Saharan Africa.131   
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The global enforcement of intellectual property rights which resulted in 
impediment to access to essential drugs threatened the health of poor developing 
countries. The globalized patent regime raised the prices of essential drugs that poor 
patients in developing countries could not afford them. Furthermore, bilateral free trade 
agreements negotiated currently by United States made the problem of access to essential 
drugs worse, with the extension of 20 year patent and the suppression of generic 
production of drugs. In the wake of HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries, millions of 
people have died due to the suppression of manufacture and trading of generic drugs.132  
 
C.    Impact of HIV/AIDS on Developing Countries 
1.    Data on the Scope of HIV/AIDS Epidemics                
Statistics on the spread of HIV/AIDS across the countries shows an upward trend. 
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and WHO reported that, 
an estimate of 39.4 million (35.9 million- 44.3 million) people were living with HIV at 
the end of 2004. About.4.9 million (4.3 million-5.4 million) people were infected in 
2004. An estimate of 3.1 million (2.8 million-3.5 million) people died of HIV/AIDS in 
the past year.133 The data on the magnitude of HIV/AIDS shows that Africa has been 
hardest hit by the epidemics. Sub-Saharan Africa is the worst devastated region, with 
25.4 million at the end of 2004, which is an increase of one million since 2002. Sixty four 
percent of all people living with HIV, that is, about two thirds are in sub-Saharan 
Africa.134 Most severely affected regions are Southern and Eastern Africa. Seven 
countries have an estimate of adult (15-49) HIV prevalence of 20 percent or greater: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.135 Other 
 20 
countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Malawi 
and Mozambique, have adult HIV prevalence levels higher than 10 percent.136 
  The onslaught of the HIV/AIDS epidemics was underestimated initially, mostly in 
South Africa due to the debate on the reliability of the data. The scope and the scale of 
the epidemics were undermined. Malan, a South African journalist argues that in as much 
as AIDS is a serious issue for Africa, the size of the problem and its long-term effects on 
society and economy have been blown out of proportion.137 The denial is made worse 
when the former president of South Africa Mbeki used Malan’s perspective to argue that, 
“AIDS is not a serious problem as we think.”138 
The data and data collection on the full extent of HIV/AIDS are plagued by many 
problems, high refusal rates, inadequate testing and reporting facilities, poor access to 
individuals who were selected and lax use of numbers by the press and AIDS activists. 
There were high refusal rates of people who would not be interviewed, provide 
specimens or who were not contactable in both Kenya and South Africa. The data of the 
prevalence of HIV in Swaziland for 2002, which stood at 38.6 percent, was loosely 
presented as if 38 percent of the adult were living with HIV.139 There are indications of 
limitations relative to data and data collections but the overwhelming impact of the 
HIV/AIDS should not be undermined. Whiteside acknowledges the debate about the 
exact number of people currently living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa, but highlights 
increasing number of people being infected, continuing high prevalence and no sign of 
downturn. There is also a prediction of an astronomical rise of the number of people 
falling ill and dying, the number of orphans growing and a greater impact of the disease 
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yet to be fully felt.140 The devastating impact of HIV/AIDS has been felt in two areas, 
demographic and economic. 
 
2. The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS 
 
The population dynamics is generally altered by unusual levels of death. 
Demography focuses on populations and their dynamics. It deals with the numbers, 
growth rates and structure of populations. It evaluates and predicts size and growth rates, 
structure by gender and age, and important indicators like birth, death and fertility rates, 
life expectancy and infant and child mortality. The demographic data is derived from two 
sources, the census and vital registration statistics.141 Censuses are generally conducted in 
most countries every ten years. A census is defined as the total process of collecting, 
compiling, evaluating and publishing or otherwise disseminating demographic, economic 
and social data pertaining at a specific time to all persons in a country or a well 
delimitated part of a country.142 On the other hand, vital registration deals with 
information about births, deaths and marriages. In developed countries, registration of 
these events is compulsory, while, in poor developing countries these statistics may not 
be recorded or collected.143  
Exploring the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS presents some problems. There 
is a concern that what is finally recorded regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS is an event 
such as the death and its effects on household composition and dependency ratios rather 
than a process. The impacts of the events culminating to the death and stemming from it 
are not recorded.144 The demographic impact of HIV/AIDS does not account for the 
process. Whiteside et al. write, “The impact of AIDS is felt as a process: a person begins 
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to feel unwell and so, perhaps, does not grow as much food, the family has less to sell 
and can’t afford to send children to school. When the person dies, the household 
composition changes.”145 Another problem is that demographic indicators may focus on 
nations, provinces or areas, while the impact of the epidemics may be felt more in 
households and among specific groups.146 Another concern deals with demographic 
changes which are measured only after several years, as in the case of census which is 
usually done every ten years. The implication is that the impact of a new disease may not 
be tracked in most of the national and international statistics for a very long time.147  
The demographic consequences of HIV/AIDS are experienced through increased 
mortality and decreased fertility in developing countries severely affected by the 
epidemics.148 Furthermore, mortality increases among infected adults and those infants 
infected through mother to child transmission and adults.149 The significant increase in 
the death toll from HIV/AIDS in developing countries has resulted in changes to the 
population structure. In South Africa, mortality of young adult women between 25 to 29 
year range increased sharply by 3.5 times higher in 1999/2000 than in 1985. Mortality of 
young men between 30 to 39 year range increased nearly twice in 1999/2000 when 
compared to the 1985 rate.150 The rapid increase in adult mortality and child mortality in 
developing countries has been attributed to HIV/AIDS epidemics. The South African data 
prove convincingly that there is increased mortality in the country. AIDS is blamed in the 
absence of any other reasonable explanation. In 2000, about 40 percent of adult deaths 
aged 15 to 49, were attributed to HIV/AIDS. An estimate of about 25 percent of all 
deaths was due to AIDS, making it single biggest cause of death.151  
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The decreased fertility among childbearing age women due to HIV/AIDS 
contributes to population changes. Women who are infected with HIV may have 
difficulty getting pregnant and carrying a child to term, resulting in premature mortality. 
There will be fewer childbearing age women, which significantly affect fertility.152 For 
example, in Uganda the number of births was decreased by about 700, 000, which is 
about 5.9 percent of all births that would have occurred during the last two decades.153 
The astronomical increase in the number of orphans constitutes a demographic 
impact as well as social and economic consequences.154 In 2003, The United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) projected that by 2010 an estimated 20 million children in 
Africa will have lost one or both parents to HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS accounts for over 80 
percent of orphans in the worst affected countries. These children suffer severe stress and 
they are more likely to drop out from school and to be exploited. They may likely 
experience premature mortality and as well have a more pessimistic view of life.155   
 
3. The Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS 
A research presented at a meeting of economists at the XIII International 
Conference on AIDS indicates that, “HIV/AIDS is already starting to have immense 
impact on the economies of hard-hit countries, hurting not only individuals, families and 
firms, but also significantly slowing economic growth and worsening poverty.”156 An  
Increasing evidence shows that national wealth of the hardest hit countries of South 
Africa will be reduced by 15-20 percent over the next ten years as a result of 
HIV/AIDS.157 UNAIDS and World Bank press release note, “Lower economic growth 
and increased poverty threaten to form a vicious cycle, in which HIV/AIDS drives many 
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families into deepening poverty, and at the same time poverty accelerates the spread of 
HIV.”158  
There is an enormous economic impact of HIV/AIDS on households in countries 
severely affected by the epidemics. The impact on the household begins to be felt 
whenever a member of the household begins to suffer from HIV-related illness. The first 
major impact is the loss of income of the patient who is likely the main breadwinner. This 
may be followed by substantial increase of household expenditures for medical expenses. 
Another ripple effect indicated is that daughters and wives of the patient may miss school 
or work less in order to care for the sick person. Finally, death results in a permanent loss 
of income, from less labor on the farm or from lower remittances, funeral and mourning 
costs and the removal of children from school so as to save on educational expenses and 
increase household labor, resulting in a severe loss of future earning potential.159 Studies 
in African countries decimated by the epidemic highlight the significant burden of loss of 
income, large health care expenditures and draining of savings to pay for funeral and 
mourning costs.160 For example, in Ethiopia, a study of 25 AIDS-afflicted rural families 
discover that the average cost of treatment, funeral and mourning expenses equaled to 
several times the average household income.161 Steinberg et al., present the findings of a 
survey of household in South Africa on the impoverishing nature of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic: “two thirds reported loss of income as a consequence of HIV/AIDS; half 
reported not having enough food and that their children were going hungry; and almost a 
quarter of all children under age 15 had already lost at least one parent.”162  
HIV/AIDS has a significant impact on firms. AIDS-related illnesses and deaths to 
employees affect a firm in two different ways, increasing expenditures and reducing 
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revenues. Factors that lead to increased expenditure include, health care costs, burial fees 
and training and recruitment. On the other hand, factors that lead to decreased revenue 
consist of absenteeism due to illness, time-off to attend funerals, time spent on training 
and labor turnover. Labor turnover may result in a less experienced labor force that is less 
productive.163 A study that examines several firms in Botswana and Kenya reveals that 
major factors in increased labor costs were absenteeism due to HIV/AIDS and increased 
burial costs.164 The increased mortality and morbidity as a result of HIV/AIDS epidemics 
reduces labor supply in key sectors of the labor market. For example, in South Africa 
about 60% of the mining workforce with age range of 30 and 40 years is predicted to fall 
to 10% in 15 years.165 Labor productivity also reduces as a result of a long period of 
illness associated with HIV/AIDS. The annual costs associated with sickness and reduced 
productivity as a result of HIV/AIDS per employee ranged from $17 to $300.166 These 
costs adversely affect competitiveness and profits. 
The situation results in a decline to government income. Dixon et al. articulate, 
“Government incomes also decline, as tax revenues fall, and governments are pressured 
to increase their spending to deal with the rising prevalence of AIDS, thereby creating the 
potential for fiscal crises.”167 The economic effects of HIV/AIDS which lead to lower 
domestic productivity reduce exports and increase imports of expensive health care 
goods. The significant decrease in export earnings and the increase in export expenditure 
may result in budget crises for the government. This could result in the government 
defaulting on debt repayments as well as requiring economic assistance from the 
international community.168 
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The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS has been documented by several 
studies. Studies in Tanzania, Cameroon, Zambia, Swaziland, Kenya and other sub-
Saharan African countries discover that the rate of economic growth could be decreased 
by about 25 percent over a 20 year period.169 The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS 
varies across countries. The impact of HIV/AIDS on the macro-economy is felt in several 
areas, loss of experienced workers, reduced productivity, higher domestic production 
costs, and loss of international competitiveness, lower government revenues, reduced 
private savings and slower employment creation. Initially, the overall impact of AIDS on 
the macro-economy is minimal, but increases significantly over time.170 Several studies 
show significant effects of HIV/AIDS in some African countries. A study focusing on the 
macro-economic impacts of AIDS in Zambia discover that as a result of HIV/AIDS 
epidemics, the GDP would be five to ten percent lower by 2000.171 The macroeconomic 
impact of AIDS in Tanzania assessed in 1991 shows that total GDP will decline by 15 to 
25 percent in 2010 due to the impact of AIDS.172 A study conducted on the impact of 
AIDS on the Kenyan economy projects that GDP will decrease by 14 percent in 2005 
than it would have been without AIDS.173 The impact of AIDS creates a global health 
emergency, since anti-retroviral drugs are not accessible to the majority of infected 
individuals in developing countries. 
 
D. Distributive Justice in Global Research 
Addressing the catastrophic impact of the HIV/AIDs in developing countries has 
given rise to many clinical trials, resulting in the discovery of anti-retroviral drugs. There 
are on-going debates regarding what justice requires when developed countries sponsor 
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or conduct research in developing countries. Some scholars argue that global health 
inequalities and the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS can be redressed through 
biomedical research by providing access to anti-retroviral drugs resulting from clinical 
trials.174 Concerns about justice in international clinical trials have shifted from focusing 
on the exploitation of research subjects or entire population in developing countries in the 
process of recruiting subjects and conducting the study to providing beneficial products at 
the end of the trials.175 The Belmont report emphasizing the need for justice in research 
writes, “Research should not unduly involve persons from groups unlikely to be among 
the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of the research.”176    
 
1.     The Concept of Distributive Justice in Global Research 
Research in developing countries needs to fulfill the requirement of distributive 
justice which mandates a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research.177 The 
two ethical concerns in any research are identified as an imposition of undue burdens and 
the absence of expected benefits. Despite the lasting concern about risks to research 
subjects, a major shortcoming in research sponsored by industrialized countries and 
conducted in resource-poor countries that has been recognized is the failure to share in 
the benefits of research when successful products or contributions to knowledge result.178 
There have been debates regarding the use of the term distributive justice for the 
interactions between countries. A perspective on the issue argues that the scope of 
distributive justice lies within a single country.179 The implication of this perspective is 
that the fair distribution of social benefits and burdens applies only among individuals 
living together in a society. A related perspective argues that distributive justice applies 
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to group of collaborators in international research, regardless of any geographical 
distance that separates the countries involved.180 A report published by the Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences writes, “Beneficiaries of the research 
outcomes must include people in the developing countries where the research is 
conducted, as well as in the developed country that sponsors the research.”181  
  Researchers in developed country usually establish a relationship with their 
collaborators in developing country and with the research subjects in the country where 
the research is conducted. The multinational clinical research is not regarded as 
interaction between countries. The research may be sponsored by several stakeholders, 
governmental agencies such as the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH), U.K. Medical 
Research Council, private industry, private foundation, and international organizations 
such as WHO.182 
The concept of distributive justice is broad, and it covers not only social benefits 
and burdens but also other benefits such as health benefits, financial benefits etc. all of 
which may be regarded as social benefits.183 Macklin argues, “There is nothing inherent 
in the concept of distributive justice that requires those benefits and burdens to result and 
arise from a group of people living together in a society.”184 The criteria for a fair 
distribution in the concept of distributive justice vary according to the context.185 For 
example, equity is the core concept of fair distribution in the context of research 
involving human subjects.186 “Equity requires that no one group-gender, racial, ethnic, 
geographic, or socio-economic receive disproportionate benefits or bear disproportionate 
burdens.”187 A glaring example of global inequity is seen in the disparity between the 
distribution of the global disease burden and the allocation of research funding. Less than 
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10% of global expenditures for health research by private and public sectors is devoted to 
addressing 90% of the world’s burden of disease shouldered by developing countries. 
This is usually called “the 10/90 gap.”188 Resnik argues that 10/90 gap exists because of 
two reasons: (1) multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies do not view 
research and development (R&D) investments on the health problems of developing 
nations to be economically advantageous; and (2) government biomedical research 
agencies encounter limited pressure to allocate funds for the problems of developing 
nations.189 He argues further that developed nations have a moral obligation to address 
the disparities in connection to biomedical research funding.  He proposes that developed 
countries should establish a trust fund in the form of Global AIDS Fund to sponsor 
research on the health problems of developing nations.190  
Documented evidence shows that people in developing countries 
disproportionately shoulder the burden of research risks without enjoying corresponding 
benefits that may arise from it. Macklin articulating a similar view writes, “Residents of 
developing countries lack access to the products of research carried out in their countries 
if the medications are too expensive for individuals or the ministries of health to 
afford.”191 Some scholars stipulate two conditions for fulfilling the requirements of 
distributive justice in international research: (1) applying the same standards used in a 
research conducted in the sponsoring country in the evaluation of the design and 
determination of acceptable risk-benefit ratios; (2) beneficiaries of research results must 
consist of people in the developing countries where the research is carried out, as well as 
in the United States.192 These conditions imply that determining equity in international 
clinical trials requires that not only that the research participants bear the burdens and 
 30 
benefits from the research, but also the larger community needs to have opportunity to 
enjoy the successful products. Many of the HIV/AIDS clinical trials in developing 
countries have encountered a similar problem, because the participants were allowed to 
disproportionately bear the burden of the research without sharing equally in the benefits. 
In order to resolve this issue, with emphasis on satisfying the requirement of distributive 
justice, a solution has been proposed for developed countries to make a commitment to 
provide an affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs to host developing countries at the 
end of international clinical trials.193 The discussion of the distributive justice principle 
which focuses on the fair distribution of burdens and benefits of research for participants 
and the larger community draws from two different interpretations of the distributive 
justice principle. 
   
2. Theoretical Approaches to Distributive Justice 
 Cooley refutes critics who attacked HIV clinical trials in developing countries 
on the ground that they were not based on a distributive justice principle found in the 
commentary of the Council of International Organization of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 
guidelines for international research on human subjects.194 The Guideline stipulates that 
the sponsoring agency should guarantee that at the end of the trial, any successful product 
will be made reasonably available to inhabitants of the underdeveloped community in 
which the research was conducted. All parties involved in any research should justify and 
agree to exceptions to this general requirement before engaging in the research.195 Critics 
of HIV clinical trials in developing countries argue that some researchers have violated 
the distributive justice principle and consequently exploited the poor in developing 
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countries, because they did not ensure that successful products developed in the trials 
were made reasonably available to the community where the trials were conducted.196 
 Scholars offer two different interpretations of distributive justice principle with 
their foundations on the opposing theories of Capitalism and Marxism.197 Cooley 
explains that distributive justice requires that each social member receives a just 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of society, i.e., what he or she deserves from 
being a member of the society. The implication is that members of the community who 
did not participate in the trial and consequently did not shoulder any burden will also 
receive a huge benefit at no real cost to themselves. This interpretation cannot be based 
on capitalism, for capitalist justice requires that only those who have contributed to 
realizing their group’s goals may receive benefits.198 Cooley argues that an idea of 
distributive justice that would require that successful products be made reasonably 
available to the community or developing country that hosted the trial is “more closely 
aligned with Marxism, which requires that people work according to their abilities, while 
they receive according to their needs, than it does with capitalism.”199 He argues further 
that critics of HIV clinical trials in developing countries employed a notion of distributive 
justice that requires that goods be distributed according to need, but leaves out the part 
that emphasizes that abilities should determine contributions.200 He contends that the 
principle is more extreme than Marxism, because it requires no contribution from those 
receiving benefits, regardless of whether or not they are able to contribute.201 He argues 
that, “It is not clear that people in the country who do not receive any benefits are 
exploited when they did not share the burdens to obtain the benefits, especially since both 
capitalistic and Marxist justice require that they contribute in some way.”202 He argues 
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further that human subjects were exploited for the benefit of non-participants who did not 
contribute anything to deserve the benefits. He points out that those who do not 
contribute to a research have no reasonable expectation of a benefit. They will require a 
justification for such a desert in order to have a reasonable expectation of a benefit. 
Simply indicating that you are a member of the community in which the research is 
conducted is not adequate to enable one to get benefits.203 Cooley argues that need alone 
does not justify a desert but claims that justifying a desert requires individuals to make 
some contributions to the effort.204  
 An opposing view in the UNAIDS Guidance Document for preventive 
HIV/AIDS vaccine research argues that dire human need can justify the requirement of 
distributive justice. UNAIDS Guidance Document indicates that the severity of the 
epidemic makes it crucial that adequate incentives exist, both through financial rewards 
in the marketplace and through public subsidies to promote development of effective 
vaccines while also guaranteeing that vaccines are produced and distributed in a way that 
really makes them available to the population at greatest risk.205 Cooley does not defend 
clinical trials conducted in developing countries on grounds of distributive justice 
principle which he considers too vague and ambiguous. Rather, he defends them based on 
utilitarian considerations, Kantian principle to treat people as ends in themselves and 
autonomy of the subjects to choose to participate in the trials.206 Cooley argues that, “If a 
medical experiment in the Third World intended to help the citizens of those areas fails 
either to serve utility or not treat anyone as a mere means, it is unethical.”207  
 Benatar disagrees with Cooley’s utilitarian approach to clinical research in 
developing countries that disregards the principle of distributive justice in CIOMS 
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guidelines and describes it as superficial for several reasons.208 First, it is not proper to 
overlook the extent of injustice in health and health care research. Second, the belief that 
the principle of justice can be applied in a simple deductive manner, indicates lack of 
acknowledgment for the nature of principles and the need for interpreting how these 
should be applied in specific contexts. Third, there is a failure that the limited form of 
utility proposed has been linked with exploitative practices with far reaching effects on 
health and disease, and that such exploitation is perpetuated by some trials in developing 
countries. Fourth, a hidden form of paternalism underlies the author’s proposals. Finally 
the important notion of informed consent is applied naively to clinical trials in developing  
countries.209 Benatar argues further that, “These shortcomings serve only to entrench 
further a neo-liberal economic mind-set deeply inimical to the progress required to rectify 
some of the widening disparities in wealth and health that characterize an increasingly 
unstable world.”210 
 A further discussion on distributive justice for clinical trials in developing 
countries explores other candidates for principle of justice or equity. A perspective 
termed equity as maximization describes a notion of justice or equity that focuses on 
maximizing health benefits for a population. In this context, some people regard it as self-
evident that health policy should aim to produce as much health as possible for a given 
population.211 Some scholars argue for maximizing principles as candidates for principles 
of justice or equity. Marchand et al. point out that the basic moral assumption for 
maximizing principles focuses on expressing equal respect for each person by according 
the same importance to every person’s interests. The principle of equality emphasizes 
that each person’s interests, in this case their health is considered a priority just as much 
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and no more than anyone else’s.212 The implication is that “an improvement in health for 
the well-off is just as valuable and carries the same moral weight as an improvement in 
health for the worse off.”213 Health benefits matter equally both for the well off and the 
worst off. Contrary to Cooley’s interpretation of distributive justice, the concept of equity 
as maximization does not demand contributions from individuals in order to be entitled to 
their improved health status. The idea of justice supported by this perspective requires 
that both the entire population in need and the research subjects who have contributed to 
development of a successful product are entitled to the benefits of research.214 
 Another perspective for a principle of justice or equity which applies some 
criteria of urgency to levels of health is known as equity as priority to the sickest.215 This 
perspective focuses on the urgency of people’s needs, “those who are threatened with the 
worst harms – who have the shortest life expectancy and most serious diseases and 
injuries – should count as the worst off.”216 Based on this account, we should give 
priority to those with the greatest urgent need, the sickest people. In clinical trials, this 
creates a problem because the research subjects who have received the benefits during the 
research of a successful product are no longer the sickest. Those who are the sickest are 
people who were not recruited in the research and as a result did not have access to any 
treatments because none of the treatments were available outside research.  
 The implication of this principle of priority to the sickest is that the rest of the 
populations who did not participate in the research and did not receive any beneficial 
product deserve priority for receiving the product. The principle did not fully account for 
the research subjects who may still need the product when the research is concluded. It 
points to the fact that no single principle of justice accounts for all situations. There is a 
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consensus that research subjects should not be left worse off after a clinical trial is 
concluded than they were, while they were participating in the trial. In this context, 
another principle of justice is needed which accounts for a situation where the research 
subjects will continue to require a successful product that they received during their 
participation in the clinical trials. 
 The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report situates post-
trial obligations to research subjects in the principle of justice as reciprocity which re-
echoes Cooley’s line of thought earlier discussed. The NBAC report articulates that 
justice as reciprocity in the context of clinical trials could imply that something is owed 
to research participants at the conclusion of the trial, because their shouldering of 
research risks and burdens made it possible for the researchers to generate findings 
necessary to advance knowledge and develop new medical interventions.217 The NBAC 
report indicates that the principle of reciprocity relate to research subjects who 
participated in a clinical trial that yielded successful products or not. In both instances, 
the subjects bore burdens and risks of the research. 
 Another notion of justice that may also apply to clinical trials in developing 
countries is compensatory justice. The concept of compensatory justice can be applied to 
the research context in two situations. The first situation refers to compensating research 
subjects for the injuries they sustained in course of the research. The second situation 
relates to research subjects who have lost time due to their participation in the research or 
have spent some money out of pocket for research related expenses like travel to the 
research site and childcare. Macklin contends that “in both situations, compensation is 
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owed or provided to research subjects for something they did or that happened to 
them.”218  
 Compensatory justice has also been applied to a broader context to encompass 
situations that have happened in the past. The idea of compensatory justice has been 
broadened to go beyond fairness in distribution and to include an attempt to remedy or 
redress past wrongs. An example usually cited is the monetary payments made to 
survivors of the Tuskegee syphilis study or to their relatives, to compensate them for the 
harm or wrong done by the study.219 Paying the survivors of the Tuskegee syphilis study 
for the harm they incurred is in line with the concept of compensatory justice that 
compensates the subjects for something that happened to them, although in this case the 
events occurred in the past. On the other hand, there has been a debate whether 
compensating the relatives of Tuskegee syphilis study participants was a stretch in the 
idea of compensatory justice. Macklin argues that, “a case could be made for benefiting 
developing countries or the communities where research is conducted today as 
compensation for past research from which no benefits flowed to those communities or 
countries.”220 In this context, compensatory justice calls for providing benefits from 
current research because of injustices of the past. The inability of the host population to 
access successful products, e.g. anti-retroviral drugs at the conclusion of trials, has been 
acknowledged as a problem with the clinical trials in developing countries. 
  
E. Responsiveness of Research to the Needs and Priorities of the Host Population 
1.  Ethical Issues Related to Responsiveness Requirement in Clinical Trials in 
Developing Countries 
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 Responsiveness of research to the needs and priorities of the host population 
has been hotly debated especially with regard to clinical trials in developing countries. 
Grady expresses concerns about exploitation and double standard in international clinical 
research. She contends that “research participants and populations in developing 
countries may be particularly vulnerable to exploitation due to poverty; illiteracy; limited 
resources, education, and access to health care; and lack of familiarity or experience with 
research.”221 In the past, communities in developing countries who have participated in 
research have too often not enjoyed the benefits of the research. Instead, the benefits of 
research hosted in developing countries have been primarily enjoyed by developed 
countries.222 London argues that international collaborative research “must be conducted 
in such a manner as to leave the host community better off than it was, or at least not 
worse off.”223 
 The requirement for responsiveness of research to the health needs and 
priorities of the host population is supported by several groups who have grappled with 
how to minimize exploitation in international clinical research. For example, the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission recommends clinical trials conducted in developing 
countries that are only responsive to the health needs of the host country.224 The World 
Medical Association’s 2000 version of the Declaration of Helsinki also stipulates that the 
justification for a medical research will be based on the reasonable likelihood that the 
populations involved in research will benefit from the results of the research.225 The 
United Kingdom’s Nuffield Council on Bioethics advises national priority-setting for 
health care research so that it will be, “easier for host countries to ensure that research 
proposed by external sponsors is appropriate and relevant to its national health care 
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needs.”226 The Council of International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in 
their international guidelines recommends two essential requirements before engaging in 
a research in a population or community with limited resources. First, the sponsor and 
researcher must make every effort to guarantee that the research is responsive to the 
health needs and the priorities of the population or community in which it is conducted. 
Second, any intervention or product developed or knowledge generated will be made 
reasonably available for the benefit of that population or community.227 There is a general 
consensus among scholars regarding the support for the requirement of responsiveness in 
international clinical research, but the interpretation of what it entails in actual practice 
varies. 
 
2.   Different Interpretations of the Responsiveness Requirement in International Clinical 
Trials. 
 Different perspectives have emerged in the debate about the responsiveness 
requirement in international clinical research. One perspective stresses that research is 
responsive to the health needs of the population whenever it addresses health problems of 
the population.228 Grady articulates, “The requirement to be responsive suggests that 
research should address a question that is relevant and important to a host country and 
that the answer should be of potential benefit to that country.”229 For example, a study of 
a less toxic malaria treatment or a strategy for preventing malaria is responsive to an 
important health need, in a country where malaria is prevalent and a major cause of 
mortality in children.230 London describes health needs as, “concerns that are particularly 
important or urgent because of their close relationship to the ability of persons to be free 
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from medical conditions that shorten their lives or prevent them from functioning in ways 
that are basic or fundamental to their pursuit of a reasonable life plan.”231 Developing 
countries have been ravaged by diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV, and 
finding new strategies for treating these diseases would constitute health needs that are 
also health priorities of such countries. Disease burden or prevalence is not the only 
criterion for defining the requirement of responsiveness in international clinical research. 
 Another perspective defines the criterion for responsive research as ensuring 
that successful products, e.g. anti-retroviral drugs are available at the conclusion of the 
research.232 This perspective is in line with CIOMS guidelines that requires that the 
research project should not leave low-resource countries or communities worse off. It 
should be responsive to their health needs and priorities in such a way that any product 
developed is made reasonably available to them, and as much as possible leave the 
population in a better position to obtain effective health care and protect its own health.233 
This statement attests to the fact that medical research can play a significant role in 
assisting communities protect their own health by finding new therapies. London argues 
that, “the requirement to ensure reasonable availability seems most appropriate when  
combined with the requirement that such research actually focus on health needs that are 
also health priorities of that community.”234 The results of research should be made 
reasonably available in such a way that maximizes their value and usefulness.235 
Collaboration with host country researchers, institutions, health policy makers, 
community groups, and others all through the phases of research will guarantee 
dissemination of results and assimilation of important new knowledge.236 
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 In some situations, research may not yield successful products but may ensure 
that other benefits are provided for host communities. Some scholars argue that 
something is owed to the community or country at the end of the research, but it may not 
be necessarily successful products of the research.237 
 In line with this notion, another perspective links other benefits of the research 
with responsiveness. CIOMS guidelines indicates that the ethical requirement of 
responsiveness can only be realized if successful interventions or other kinds of health 
benefits are made available to the population.238 Grady argues that if the goal is to 
minimize potential exploitation of research participants, benefits are certainly critical but 
the emphasis is on the level, not the type, of benefits that participants receive.239 She 
further suggests several types of possible benefits associated with clinical research, 
therapeutic benefits to research participants, useful and generalizable knowledge for the 
community, infrastructure and capacity building, the inclusion of required public 
measures, training of research and clinical staff, ancillary medical benefits to participants 
or others, the post-trial benefits of new drugs and other products, economic benefits and 
increased business employment.240 Similarly, Emmanuel et al. argue, that guaranteeing a 
type of benefit, the proven intervention instead of a fair level of benefits does not 
necessarily prevent exploitation.241 They proposed what is usually referred to as “the fair 
benefits framework.”242  
 Proponents of the fair benefits framework contend that it “Supplements the 
usual conditions for the ethical conduct of research trials, such as independent review by 
an institutional review board or research ethics committee and individual informed 
consent.”243 The fair benefits framework builds upon three background principles that are 
 41 
generally considered as requirements for ethical research. First, the research should have 
social value by focusing on a health problem of the developing country population. 
Second, fair subject selection guarantees that the scientific objectives of the research 
itself, not poverty or vulnerability, support a strong justification for carrying out the 
research in a specific population. Third, the research must have a favorable risk-benefit 
ratio, which entails that benefits to participants outweigh the risks, or the net risks are 
appropriately low.244 The fair benefits framework emphasizes additional three principles 
such as fair benefits, collaborative partnership and transparency that are specified by 
multiple benchmarks.245 
 
Principle 1: Fair Benefits 
 This requires a complete outline of tangible benefits that may accrue to the 
research participants and the population from the conduct and results of the research. 
These benefits comprise of three types: “(1) benefits to research participants during the 
research, (2) benefits to the population during the research, or (3) benefits to the 
population after completion of the research.”246 Since, exploitation is a major concern in 
international clinical research; the emphasis is on providing a fair level of benefits rather 
than types of benefits. Emmanuel et al. write, “… it would seem fair that as the burdens 
and risks of the research increase, the benefits should also increase. Similarly, as the 
benefits to the sponsors, researchers, and others outside the population increase, the 
benefits to the host population should increase.”247 The fair benefits framework tackles 
the issue of exploitation by allowing the host population that bears the burden of the 
research to receive benefits as well as determine their fairness. Nevertheless, every 
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benefit of research may not directly flow to research participants but may also benefit the 
entire community. For example, capacity development realized through improving health 
care infrastructure, training of health and research personnel and training of personnel in 
research ethics could be provided to the community.248  
 
Principle 2: Collaborative Partnership 
 It is important to note that only the host population can determine the adequacy 
and fairness of the level of benefits for itself. Emmanuel et al. articulate, “outsiders are 
likely to be poorly informed about the health, social and economic context in which the 
research is being conducted, and are unlikely to fully appreciate the importance of the 
proposed benefits to the population.”249 The choice of the host population to participate in 
research must be free and uncoerced, and refusing to participate must be a realistic 
alternative.250 
 
Principle 3: Transparency 
 Transparency similar to the full information requirement for ideal market 
transactions allows the host population to compare benefits agreements in similar 
transactions. An independent body, for example, WHO should establish and operate a 
publicly accessible repository of all formal and informal benefits agreements. A central 
repository allows independent assessment of the fairness of benefits agreements by 
populations, researchers, governments and others, such as non-governmental bodies.251 A 
series of community consultations are required in order to inform populations in 
developing countries about previous benefits agreements in other research projects.252 
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Emmanuel et al., argue that the three background conditions and the three principles of 
the fair benefits framework guarantee the realization of essential requirements of 
research. The essential requirements of research include (1) the selection of the 
population based on good scientific reasons; (2) the research presenting limited net risks 
to the research participants; (3) presence of adequate and long lasting benefits to the 
population; (4) ensuring that the population is not subject to a coercive choice; (5) 
guaranteeing that the population freely determines whether to participate and whether the 
level of benefits is fair given the risks of the research; and (6) ensuring that the repository 
offers the opportunity for comparative assessments of the fairness of the benefit 
agreements.253 They further argue that in comparison with reasonable availability 
requirement, the three principles – fair benefits, collaborative partnership, and 
transparency – are more inclined to guarantee that populations in developing countries 
are not exploited, benefit from clinical research, and retain decision-making 
responsibility.254 
 
F. Summary of Dissertation Chapters 
The dissertation presents an ethical argument for post-trial access to antiretroviral 
drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries based on the 
obligation of justice. Humanitarian assistance is not sufficient in itself because it has a 
limited term and lacks the capacity to regulate the relevant inequalities between societies. 
The analysis contrasts two dominant perspectives that address the issue of post-trial 
access to antiretroviral drugs: the statist approach of Rawls and the cosmopolitan 
approach of Pogge. In contrast to the approaches of Rawls and Pogge, the dissertation 
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argues for a paradigm involving a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for 
the right to health. A summary of the dissertation’s chapters presents the argument in 
more detail, as follows. 
Chapter one presents a general introduction to the analysis focusing on ethical 
issues in global health inequalities and global health research. Chapters two and three 
present the context of the ethical problem under discussion: the process of international 
clinical research that tends to inadequately respect the health rights of local populations 
(chapter two); and the right of local populations that undergo clinical research to have 
affordable access to resulting drugs, such as anti-retroviral drugs (chapter three). 
Chapters four and five present two contrasting but inadequate approaches to global 
justice that address access to anti-retroviral drugs for host populations in developing 
nations. Chapter six presents a paradigm that combines national and international 
responsibilities for global justice to address the ethical problem of affordable access. 
Chapter seven concludes the dissertation with a discussion on the significant role of a 
landmark intergovernmental document, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights adopted by United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) on biomedical research. The UNESCO Declaration aims at 
setting global minimum standards in biomedical research and clinical practice. As the 
first international legal, non-binding instrument, it grapples with linking human rights 
and bioethics. It resorts to international human rights law as a means of protecting 
responsible biomedical activities. The UNESCO Declaration emphasizes the principles of 
human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedom in its efforts to promote 
responsible biomedical research and clinical practice. It further stresses the priority of the 
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individual over science or society. A more detailed explanation of the argument in the 
main chapters follows. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REGULATORY INFRASTRACTURE AND ETHICAL OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH   
 
 
A. Introduction 
          
The first highly publicized violation of the rights of research subjects was the 
atrocities committed by Nazi research physicians with non-consenting subjects under the 
pretense of medical experimentation. The startling revelations of such abuses of human 
rights at the Nuremberg war crime trials led to global outrage and the urgent need to craft 
a code of conduct for human research known as the Nuremberg code.1 The Nuremberg 
code established in 1947 was the first international code of ethics for research involving 
human subjects. The code was prepared in response to inhuman attacks on the rights and 
welfare of human subjects by Nazi research physicians. The code established the 
standards of carrying out research on human subjects with strong emphasis on the 
voluntary consent of the participants and minimization of risks. The Belmont report 
refers to this code as the “prototype of many later codes intended to assure that research 
involving human subjects would be carried out in an ethical manner.”2  
The World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964, 
which further addressed the issue regarding rights of research subjects. The Declaration 
of Helsinki emphasized basic principles for the conduct of human biomedical research.3 
The major purpose of the declaration initially was to protect the interests of the research 
subjects over the interests and benefits of science and society. Baum articulates that, “the 
Declaration stated that to be ethically justifiable, clinical research must protect both the 
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rights and welfare of the participants. It also stated that scientific research must serve the 
purpose of healing.”4 The Declaration of Helsinki has undergone many controversial 
revisions and some authors argue that these revisions have eroded and undermined the 
document’s commitment to protect the rights of the research subjects.5 For example, the 
1964 version of Helsinki Declaration assures every subject in a medical research 
including those in the control arm a guaranteed access to the best proven therapy 
available anywhere, while in the revised version, he or she only receives therapy that is 
available to him or her in a particular country.6 The implication is that the standard of 
care in the revised version of the declaration is local standard, that is, treatment available 
in the host country, instead of the universal standard, that is, the best treatment available 
anywhere in the world.  
Furthermore, the revised version of the Helsinki declaration broadens the role of 
placebos in research. It allows the use of placebo to test the efficacy and safety of an 
intervention, whenever it is justified by a compelling and scientifically sound research 
protocol and when the patients who receive placebo are not subjected to any risk of 
serious or irreversible harm.7 The opponents of the revised version of the declaration 
emphasized a change in the tone of the declaration from principalism to utilitarianism. 
They argued for incoherence between the revised articles of the declaration and the need 
to protect the principles of human rights.8 The principles established in the Helsinki 
Declaration were in large part physician oriented and did not precisely deal with the issue 
of research in developing countries.9 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights in 1966 which emphasized free consent to medical or scientific 
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experimentation.10 The issue of research in developing countries was finally addressed by 
the council for International Organization of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in collaboration 
with the World Health Organization (WHO). In 1982, CIOMS and WHO proposed 
international guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects. The 
guidelines were additionally revised in 1993.  The guidelines were aimed at establishing 
ethical principles that should guide the conduct of biomedical research involving human 
subjects in the international arena. The document also explored ethical issues relating to 
clinical trials of vaccines and drugs as well as human experimentation among vulnerable 
populations.11 
Despite the extensive publication of these guidelines and the recognition by the 
agencies engaged in biomedical research, the implementation and adoption of these 
guidelines were for the most part voluntary. The indication regarding the laxity of 
researchers in implementing the guidelines was evident in the case, where medical 
researchers deliberately withheld treatment from African American patients with syphilis 
in Tuskegee, Alabama, in the United States of America.12 The wide publication of these 
abuses in human research triggered establishment of a national commission in the United 
States of America to develop principles and guidelines for the protection of human 
subjects of biomedical and behavioral research. The Belmont Report which was the 
outcome of the national commission identified three basic ethical principles that should 
guide the conduct of research involving human subjects, respect for persons, beneficence 
and justice.13 Similar complimentary efforts in developed countries aimed at protecting 
the human subjects of biomedical research were made by the consultations of the 
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Nuffield Council for Bioethics in the United Kingdom,14 and the National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission in the United States of America.15 
The rights of research subjects are protected by the requirement of two 
safeguards, voluntary informed consent and review of research. Both safeguards are 
required by U.S. regulations and International declarations and guidelines for research.16 
The requirement of voluntary informed consent and review of research are extensively 
discussed in the reports of the US National Bioethics Advisory Commission and UK 
Nuffield Council. Regarding protection of the rights of research subjects, current U.S. 
regulations require that Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) approve a research when, 
“risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and 
the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.”17  
Current U.S. regulations also emphasized the requirement of informed consent, in 
such a way, that an investigator can only involve a human subject in research after 
obtaining the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative.18 The code of federal regulations on protection of human 
subjects further indicated that an informed consent whether oral or written may not 
contain any excusable language that allows the subject or the representative to waive any 
of the subject’s legal rights or to release the investigator, the institution or its agents from 
liability for negligence.19  
Similarly, international ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving 
human subjects prepared by the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences in collaboration with the World Health Organization emphasize review of all 
proposals to conduct research involving human subjects for scientific merit and ethical 
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acceptability.20 CIOMS guidelines stipulated that if the ethics review committee finds the 
research proposal to be scientifically sound, it will further explore whether the balance of 
risks to anticipated benefits is reasonable. The ethics review committee is also charged 
with the responsibilities to determine whether research methods will minimize harm and 
maximize benefits, as well as, to determine whether the procedures proposed for 
obtaining informed consent are satisfactory.21 CIOMS highlights that, “the ethical review 
committee is responsible for safeguarding the rights, safety, and well-being of the 
research subjects.”22 Despite the general consensus regarding the need for these two 
safeguards of voluntary informed consent and review of research, enough evidence 
abounds that they are sometimes faulty, insufficient or even non-existent in the conduct 
of clinical trials in developing countries.23  
NBAC offers justification for the need for obtaining informed voluntary consent, 
when it argues, “the use of human beings as a means to the ends of others without their 
knowledge and freely granted permission constitutes exploitation and is therefore 
unethical.”24 There is a general agreement for the need to provide the subjects of research 
with adequate information in order for them to make an informed decision whether or not 
to participate in clinical trials. Many people also agree that it is relevant to convey the 
information in such a way that the potential subjects can easily comprehend especially in 
developing countries where many of the research subjects are educationally 
disadvantaged. Another area of universal agreement in voluntary informed consent is that 
consent should be obtained without putting pressure on the potential subjects and without 
exerting undue influence or coercion.25  
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Obtaining informed voluntary consent needs to be sensitive to cultural differences 
especially in developing countries without infringing on the standards of informed 
consent. Current guidelines for research ethics should be adapted to embrace the 
operational flexibility of applying the informed consent process in developing 
countries.26 Mystakidou et al. observes that, “the application of standards for consent can 
be daunting for researchers when they face the pragmatic constraints of the field and the 
reality of cultural beliefs about consent in the developing nations.”27 The implementation 
of consent in developing countries which is one of the core responsibilities of ethics 
review committee must take  into account their cultural values and cultural diversities. 
In developing countries, inadequate resources may create barriers to effective 
independent review of research protocols. The research ethics committee is charged with 
the responsibilities of assessing the risks and benefits of proposed research as well as the 
review and approval of the consent forms for the study.28 Many of the clinical trials 
conducted in developing countries struggle with issues of inadequate protection of 
participants. Allegations of violations of informed consent and review of research have 
been reported regarding some of the trials conducted in developing countries.29 
There have been concerns as well about the capacity of ethics review committees 
in developing countries to adequately review clinical trials. The ethics review committees 
in developing countries have major limitations with regard to capacity to review clinical 
trials.30 Collaboration among research partners from developed and developing countries 
is a desideratum for the successful completion of international clinical research. A more 
detailed discussion of these two safeguards follows. 
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B. Informed Consent 
B.1. Meaning of Informed Consent 
Informed consent is an important aspect in discussing the ethical conduct of the 
clinical trials. The requirement to obtain voluntary informed consent from individuals 
before enrolling them in clinical trial is a fundamental principle of research ethics.31 The 
requirement for informed consent in clinical trials reflects the ethical principles of respect 
for persons, human dignity, and autonomy.32  
Two different senses of informed consent are presented by authors in literature 
and practices.33 In the first sense, the informed consent is explained within the context of 
autonomous choice. An autonomous action refers to “normal choosers who act (1) 
intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that 
determines their actions.”34 The first of these three conditions dealing with acting 
intentionally does not accommodate any degree, because acts are either intentional or 
unintentional. On the other hand, the two other conditions of understanding and absence 
of controlling influences can be met by acts to a greater or lesser degree.35 Beauchamp 
and Childress articulate, “for an action to be autonomous in this account, it needs only a 
substantial degree of understanding and freedom from constraint, not a full understanding 
or a complete absence of influence.”36 
  Informed consent is an autonomous authorization by an individual for 
participation in research or to receive medical care. In this sense, informed consent 
entails that a patient or a subject must authorize a professional to do something through 
an act of informed or voluntary consent.37 The implication is that health professionals or 
researchers will explain the purpose, risks, benefits and alternatives of medical 
 66 
intervention or research to patients or subjects and ensure they understand before 
voluntarily consenting. 
The doctrine of informed consent prescribes that research subjects should 
participate in research voluntarily and with adequate information about the research. 
Noteworthy, is that only a competent individual gives an informed consent, after 
receiving necessary information, adequately understanding the information and 
considering the information in order to arrive at a decision without being subjected to 
coercion, undue influence, inducement or intimidation.38 Informed consent recognizes 
that, “individuals have the right and the ability to make decisions in their own interest and 
to act upon them.”39 
The second sense of informed consent is explained within the context of the social 
rules of consent in institutions that require obtaining effective consent legally or 
institutionally from patients or subjects before initiating medical or research procedures.40 
In this sense, informed consent as an effective consent is a policy oriented approach 
whose conditions are not deducible from analyses of autonomy and authorization, or 
from extensive ideas of respect for autonomy.41 Informed consent in this context deals 
with institutional requirement and practices of informed consent in health care or in 
research which mandates group of patients and subjects to be treated in accordance with 
rules, policies, and standard practices.42 
Professionals are required according to the social and legal practice to obtain 
informed consent in institutional settings. Conforming to such policies and procedures 
satisfies the conditions of informed consent in the second sense. From this perspective, 
informed consents are not usually autonomous acts or meaningful authorizations. The 
 67 
second sense of informed consent focuses on regulating the behavior of the professional 
seeking the consent and on establishing procedures and rules for the context of consent. 
The requirements of such professional behavior and procedure are easily tracked and 
implemented by institutions.43 
Informed consent in the second sense deals with effective authorization of either a 
patient or a subject as governed by institutional rules such as federal and state regulations 
and hospital policies. In this sense, “a patient or subject can autonomously authorize an 
intervention, and so give an informed consent in sense one, and yet not effectively 
authorize that intervention in sense two.”44 The code of regulations for medical and 
research interventions as well as case law develop models of consent that are outlined in 
a sense two informed consent. A typical example is disclosure criteria for informed 
consent which are integral to the history of informed consent. The disclosure requirement 
constitutes a necessary condition of effective informed consent. The legal doctrine of 
informed consent is clearly articulated in a law of disclosure, since the fulfillment of 
disclosure rules devour informed consent in law. The rules of informed consent in sense 
two concentrate on disclosure, comprehension, the minimization of potentially 
controlling influences and competence.45 
Faden and Beauchamp also discuss the relationship between informed consents in 
both sense one and sense two.46 Informed consent in sense one may not meet the criteria 
to be an informed consent in sense two due to a lack of compliance with relevant rules 
and requirements. Likewise, an informed consent in sense two may not be an informed 
consent in sense one. The rules and requirements that regulate informed consents in sense 
two may not necessarily result in autonomous authorizations in any way, in order, to be 
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considered as informed consents.47 There is a general consensus among some scholars 
that the model of autonomous choice which reflects informed consent in sense one need 
to serve as the standard for the moral adequacy of institutional rules.48 The rules and 
requirements of informed consent in sense two should be devised to comply with the 
standards of informed consent in sense one. This reinforces the fact that the objective of 
informed consent or the purpose for obtaining informed consent in both medical care and 
in research is to allow potential patients and subjects to make autonomous decisions 
relating to whether to participate or not in medical or research interventions.49 Three 
conditions are essential to informed consent: disclosure of information, comprehension of 
information and voluntary participation.50 
 
B.2. Key Components of Informed Consent 
B.2.a. Disclosure of Information 
NBAC indicates that requirements for disclosing information in research settings 
generally surpass those for disclosing information in clinical contexts.51 Most codes and 
regulations of research outline critical elements of disclosure in order to guarantee that 
potential subjects are given adequate information. NBAC highlights four principal types 
of disclosures that are crucial to the process of informed consent in the research setting: 
“(1) disclosure of diagnosis and risk; (2) disclosure of the use of placebos and 
randomization; (3) disclosure of alternative treatments and (4) disclosures about possible 
post-trial benefits.”52 Related to the issue about specific and detailed items for disclosure, 
the Belmont report gave a different list of important types of disclosures: the research 
procedure, purposes, risks and anticipated benefits, alternative procedures, and a 
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statement that gives the research participant the opportunity to ask questions and to 
withdraw from the research at any time.53  
The disclosure requirement also grapples with the standard of how much 
information and what type of information should be provided to potential subjects. Two 
competing standards of disclosure have emerged, the professional practice standard and 
the reasonable person standard.54 The professional practice standard maintains that 
adequate disclosure is determined by a professional community’s customary practices. 
The implication is that professional custom determines the amount and kinds of 
information to be disclosed.55 In research, the professional practice standard that is, the 
information usually provided by professionals in the field is insufficient because research 
occurs when a common understanding does not exist.56 The reasonable person standard 
requires the professional to divulge adequate information that reasonable persons would 
wish to be aware of in order to make informed decision regarding their medical care. The 
reasonable person standard is also considered inadequate in the research setting. This is 
supported by the reason that the research subject is typically a volunteer, who may wish 
to know a lot more about risks undertaken voluntarily than patients who are seeking 
needed care from a clinician. A third standard was also proposed as the reasonable 
volunteer. The reasonable volunteer standard requires that the nature and extent of 
information should entail that such persons aware that the procedure is neither necessary 
for their care nor fully comprehended, can decide whether they wish to participate in 
advancing of knowledge. More so, the subjects should understand clearly the range of 
risks and the voluntary nature of participation in research settings, when some direct 
benefit to them is anticipated.57  
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A related issue pertinent to the disclosure of information is that some types of 
research involve incomplete disclosure. A typical example of such type of research is the 
therapeutic use of placebos. The therapeutic use of placebos usually entails intentional 
deception or incomplete disclosure. A placebo is a substance or intervention considered 
by the health care professional as biomedically or pharmacologically inactive for the 
condition being treated.58 
Data also shows that an improvement in the patient after use of a placebo usually 
referred to as the placebo effect can occur in some situations without nondisclosure, 
incomplete disclosure, or deception. However, in many cases a placebo is less probably 
to be effective, if utilized with the knowledge of the patient.59 In such cases informing 
subjects of some relevant aspects of the research is more likely to weaken the validity of 
the research. It is enough in such cases to notify subjects that they are being invited to 
participate in research of which some aspects will not be disclosed until the research is 
finished.60 In all cases of research, incomplete disclosure should only be justified under 
the following conditions: (1) it is important to obtain vital information; (2) no significant 
risk is involved; (3) subjects are informed that deception or incomplete disclosure is part 
of the research, and (4) subjects consent to participate under these conditions.61 
Information regarding research risks should never be withheld for the purpose of 
obtaining the cooperation of subjects. Attention should be paid to differentiate cases in 
which disclosure would damage the research from cases in which disclosure would 
simply inconvenience the researcher.62 A related issue in the discussion of disclosure 
requirements focuses on the impact of cultural differences in determining the scope of 
information to be disclosed to potential subjects of research in developing countries.  
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B.2.a.i. Cultural Barriers Related to Disclosure Requirement 
Cultural barriers relating to disclosure requirement can constitute a challenge in 
obtaining informed consent in developing countries. Macklin acknowledges challenges 
encountered by researchers who conduct clinical trials in developing countries, in dealing 
with cultural practices that depart from the requirements of informed consent expressed 
in international and national research guidelines and regulations.63 Ethical relativists 
argue for the need to withhold key information from potential research subjects. They 
contend that departures from substantive ethical standards of voluntary informed consent 
are justified by the cultural context in the country or community hosting the research. 
They further argue that cultural relativity justifies ethical relativism.64 On the contrary, 
the type of relativism supported by many other scholars is the increasing need to adapt 
the form and content of procedures for obtaining informed consent to the educational 
level and understanding of the potential research subjects. The justification of this 
perspective stems from the fact that the method and type of informed consent must be 
relative to the literacy level of the subjects, their ease with signing documents and other 
cultural conditions.65 
Deviating from the accepted standard of disclosure of information in the 
voluntary informed consent process has sometimes been justified by cultural 
considerations especially in developing countries. It is still accepted in some developing 
countries for physicians to withhold certain information such as diagnoses and prognoses 
of cancer and other serious medical conditions from patients. Professionals prefer to 
provide such information to family members.66 Sugarman et al. articulate, “in one 
country, complete information about medical diagnoses and prognoses are withheld 
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routinely from patients with certain diseases, such as cancer. Consequently, valid 
informed consent for either treatment or research participation can be difficult or 
impossible.”67 Such cultural practices of withholding information from patients in clinical 
care are pertinent to research subjects who are involved in similar circumstances. 
NBAC report recommends that “research should not deviate from the substantive 
ethical standard of voluntary informed consent.”68 The commission refutes the assertion 
that cultural standards about the inappropriateness of providing diagnoses and prognoses 
to patients or research subjects justify deviation from the substantive ethical standard of 
informed consent in research. The commission further argued that lack of information 
regarding diagnoses and prognoses by potential subjects impedes understanding of the 
purpose of research, any potential benefits, the risks of not participating or the 
alternatives to participation. The potential subjects cannot make an informed decision to 
enroll in the research without an understanding that they may not receive a proven 
therapy. It is a departure from the substantive ethical standard of disclosure required for 
adequate informed consent to enroll individuals in research without giving them the 
opportunity to understand essential features of the information regarding the research. 
The practice of disclosing information in different ways in the clinical context does not 
change the requirements for such disclosure in the research context.69  
  
 B.2.a.ii. Cultural Barriers Related to Disclosure of Risks and Research Study Design 
Another issue presented by cultural differences is the disclosure of potential risks 
and harms associated with treatment or research. International guidelines for informed 
consent require that all potential risks including the possibility of death must be disclosed 
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to potential subjects in the informed consent process. Marshall acknowledges that 
disclosing all potential risks associated with research in a direct way may be alarming and 
frightening for many individuals. She further describes frustrations of Nigerian 
researchers regarding the lengthy and complex disclosure requirements of informed 
consent which included information that were considered irrelevant and culturally 
inappropriate for potential subjects. One of the researchers indicated that in Nigerian 
cultural norms, disclosing all possible risks would unnecessarily scare potential research 
subjects associated with the research.70 
Furthermore, the language utilized to communicate risks in informed consent 
documents may be difficult to understand because of different views that researchers and 
the general public have regarding the idea of risks. Researchers, unlike the general public 
usually understand risks in terms of statistical probabilities. More so, it may be hard to 
communicate potential risks that cannot be easily measured or that may be difficult for 
individuals to comprehend or realistically anticipate. For instance, the risks of side-
effects from taking medications utilized in a protocol may raise some concerns among 
some people, but there is a clear connection between the procedure, that is, taking the 
medicine and the possibility of risk, that is, getting sick from the drug.71 On the other 
hand, it may be difficult to communicate the potential for group risks that might occur in 
the future in genetic epidemiological research as genetic research findings are reported.72 
A related issue in the discussion of the communication of risks is cultural and 
social factors that impact beliefs about what really constitutes a risk or potential harm. 
For example, in developed countries drawing a sample of blood is depicted usually in 
consent documents as only posing a minimal risk for individuals. But, in developing 
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countries blood and other bodily fluids or tissues are considered to have great symbolic 
power. There are sometimes concerns that they may be used in sorcery practices or in 
other means to harm people. This belief heightens the perception of risks among potential 
subjects that it affects their understanding and signing of informed consent in HIV/AIDS 
clinical studies.73 Researchers from Nigeria that conducted community based studies on 
diabetes and hypertension reported the concerns of patients regarding the amount of 
blood drawn and the possibility that blood samples could be utilized in sorcery 
practices.74 Concerns among Kenyan parents regarding the amount of blood drawn from 
their children for research were reported. Furthermore, there were indications that some 
parents were perplexed about the blood samples, due to their belief that blood drawn 
from their children might be combined and given to other patients.75  
Cultural barriers are also experienced in clinical trials in developing countries 
regarding the requirement of disclosure of information about the use of placebo, the 
randomization of subjects and uncertainty about the efficacy of an experimental 
intervention. Sugarman et al. describe ideas of local population regarding cultural barriers 
to randomization and use of placebos. For example, investigators deliberately omitted the 
use of randomization in their research in one of the cases because they felt it would have 
posed a major obstacle in obtaining valid informed consent for a randomized trial. 
Investigators in another case utilized placebos, despite their conception that research 
subjects did not understand the implication of doing so.76 NBAC articulates, “despite 
these barriers, cultural differences do not provide adequate justification for foregoing the 
requirement to disclose key elements of the nature of the clinical trial, such as the use of a 
placebo or the randomization of participants into different trial arms.”77 The commission 
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further indicated that the challenges of cultural differences in clinical trials in developing 
countries for obtaining informed consent do not adequately justify foregoing the 
requirement for disclosure of alternative therapies available to potential subjects.78 
Cultural differences make it more imperative for investigators to explore innovative 
strategies for presenting information to participants in order to enhance understanding of 
disclosed information to research participants. 
 
B.2.b.  Comprehension of Information 
           Comprehension is a key element of informed consent process. The notion of 
informed consent in clinical trials stems from the fact that research subjects giving the 
consent understand the purpose and nature of the study, what is expected of them and the 
potential benefits and risks resulting from the study.79 There are concerns regarding 
research subjects consenting to participate in clinical trials without adequate 
understanding about the nature and purpose of the research. The comprehension issue is 
further exacerbated in international clinical trials where subjects have different language 
and culture from researchers. The situation is even worse in developing countries where 
high poverty and low literacy levels and poor access to quality health care services make 
them vulnerable to exploitation in biomedical research.80  
 
B.2.b.i.    Language Barriers and Lower Level of Literacy 
  Communication between researchers and potential subjects may be difficult to 
attain when they are from different cultures. Misunderstandings and miscommunication 
about biomedical research are more likely to happen when researchers and potential 
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subjects speak different languages.81 Language barriers create significant concerns 
regarding adequate understanding of the nature and purpose of the research by potential 
subjects. In most developing countries, people speak and live for the most part of their 
lives in a different language from the language of the researchers and practitioners, and 
with an educational level far below desired standard.82 Interpretation of study purposes 
involves not only the translation of language, but also cultural.83 Dawson and Kass 
observe that potential subjects may lack education or exposure to western scientific 
concepts in biomedical research and their language might lack terminology for these 
concepts.84  
  In international clinical trials, informed consent documents are generally 
translated into the host country’s national language and in some instances to the local 
community language or dialect. Translating sophisticated scientific or medical concepts 
presents a serious challenge in the comprehension of informed consent. There are some 
concerns that some local dialects do not have written form. For example, the Bambara in 
West Africa do not have written form. Furthermore, some scientific or medical concepts 
do not have direct translation in local languages or dialects. Some examples are 
randomization, placebo and clinical trial. Attempts by researchers in some cases to 
explain what one word in a foreign language means in a local language may need a 
lengthy paragraph, causing the consent document to be too long and not user friendly. 
The prevalence of low literacy levels among potential subjects in developing countries 
may make them not to be able to read and understand what they are consenting to.85 
Language barriers may be significantly reduced by the use of native language   
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 interpreters. Elementary language should be utilized in communicating with research 
subjects, rather than the technical or high level language used in informed consent forms 
of developed countries. Dialects that adequately accommodate scientific or medical 
concepts can as well be used.86 The training of translators in research methods may assist 
in eradicating or decreasing the introduction of personal interpretations and attitudes.87       
However, potential problems continue to exist in the use of an interpreter. 
Marshall identifies a dual problem for health researchers created by a clinical trial 
requiring a translator. First, the researcher relies on the translator for communicating the 
research objectives correctly and effectively. Second, the researcher as well relies on the 
translator to follow through with the consent, which entails presenting the information 
and consenting to participate in the research. Consent can only be assumed if the 
respondent agrees to participate, especially in cases where a translator is used.88 
Generally, there is an assumption that translators are straightforward interpreters 
of information exchanged between health researchers and subjects. The implication is 
that this perspective underestimates the complexities of the process of interpretation, 
which requires the translator to negotiate not only language, but also cultural and 
contextual factors.89 Putsch observes that there may be inclination for family members or 
friends to conceal, overstate, or minimize information, if they are used as translators.90 
Research shows that interpreters have a significant influence on medical interactions and 
their outcomes. It shows further that native interpreters, apart from mediating the 
explanatory models of illness held by clinicians and patients, they also usually introduce 
their own beliefs and personal agendas into the interaction.91 
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It is evident that interpreters wield some degree of influence over the 
communication between researchers and potential research subjects. Their influence on 
communication between researchers and potential subjects is clearly shown through the 
function of gatekeeping, where interpreters make critical decisions regarding the 
selection of information to communicate the terminology to express concerns, and the 
clarification of information to fit particular interactions.92 There are also indications that 
interpreters impact the communication process by acting as cultural brokers, patient 
advocates and counselors.93 
 
B.2.b.ii.   Cultural Beliefs about Health, Disease and Biomedical Procedures 
Another major barrier to comprehension of information for potential research 
subjects is their belief system about health, disease and biomedical procedures. In some 
cultures, the belief system of potential research subjects does not explain health, and 
disease utilizing the concepts and terms of modern science and technology.94  Kass and 
Hyder acknowledge the overwhelming challenge of obtaining voluntary informed 
consent when people do not comprehend or accept scientific and western explanations of 
health and disease.95 Marshall also indicates that in some circumstances cultural beliefs 
regarding the cause and treatment of disease may differ completely from western views 
about underlying disease etiology which are consistent with medical and scientific 
explanations.96 She further cites a physician’s perspective on the potential subjects’ 
understanding of the nature of the research thus, “... Indeed, what I worry about is 
whether we are really informing them. We are talking to a society that does not believe in 
the germ theory of disease so it’s difficult to explain.”97 There is a pervasive belief in 
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most cultures of developing countries that a person’s death is usually as result of sorcery, 
rather than an underlying disease. Potential subjects also believe that illness and disease 
can be inflicted on individuals by the use of sorcery.98 Marshall quotes a physician 
reflecting on patient’s belief about the cause of hypertension as follows: “some people 
ask us what causes hypertension… whether it’s inherited or whether it’s caused by 
someone thinking something as in sorcery.”99  
Researchers from developed countries should respect the culture and the belief 
system of the local population involved in research in developing countries. They need to 
refrain from attacking their belief system, and focus on explaining the safety and efficacy 
of the interventions being tested. Sommer articulates a similar view thus, “we do not want 
to fight a belief system. We simply say we have this pill. We believe it is safe. We think 
it may reduce the recurrence of the following thing. We would like you to take it.”100 
A related issue in the discussion of barrier to comprehension is the cultural belief 
about the biomedical procedures, especially with regard to blood drawn for laboratory 
tests. There are grave concerns that some potential subjects believe that blood drawn for 
tests could be used for sorcery practices against them. Marshall cites a research 
assistant’s view regarding this issue, “there are concerns about drawing too much blood. 
People are worried about the effect on their health, and also what you are going to do 
with it, some might think it could be used for sorcery.”101 Beliefs about the potential 
harm linked with the misuse of blood specimens play a major role in informed consent 
process. It affects potential subjects’ comprehension of research goals and their decision 
to participate. Potential subjects should be educated and reassured about the purpose of 
drawing blood and how it might be used.102 Their fears should be allayed about the 
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potential harm that may result from their involvement in the research. The 
comprehension of research goals and procedures can also be impacted by problems, 
linked with the misunderstanding of potential subjects that participating in clinical trials 
is the same as receiving routine medical care or treatment. 
 
B.2.b.iii. Therapeutic Misconception 
A key feature of informed consent to participate in biomedical research is the 
understanding of the difference between clinical research and ordinary treatment. In some 
cases, research subjects fail to appreciate the difference between research and treatment, 
and this condition is dubbed therapeutic misconception.103 Confusion regarding the 
purpose of research is critical in any definition of therapeutic misconception. Therapeutic 
misconception is prevalent when a subject is primarily motivated by a desire for personal 
benefit to enroll in a research, even in studies with minimum chance of benefit.104 
Applelbaum et al., define therapeutic misconception as “when a research subject fails to 
appreciate the distinction between the imperatives of clinical research and ordinary 
treatment, and therefore inaccurately attributes therapeutic intent to research 
procedures.”105 In the same vein, the NBAC defines therapeutic misconception as “the 
belief that the purpose of a clinical trial is to benefit the individual patient rather than to 
gather data for the purpose of contributing to scientific knowledge.”106 
Applebaum and Lidz documented a study in which the patients interviewed were 
enrolled in clinical trials that involved randomization, placebo, non-treatment control 
groups and double blind procedures. The study showed that 69% of the research subjects 
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did not know that their allocation to control and experimental groups would be 
randomized. Furthermore, 40% of the research subjects thought that treatment 
assignment’s decision would be made based on their therapeutic needs. Finally, 44% of 
the research subjects did not appreciate that the use of placebos and non-treatment control 
groups implied that some subjects who wanted experimental intervention would not 
receive it.107 Literature highlights some essential features which indicate the prevalence 
of therapeutic misconception in clinical research; people often overestimate the benefit of 
enrolling in a study, 108 underestimate the risks,109 are muddled regarding how treatments 
will be allocated either to control or experimental group,110 and usually inclined to 
confuse research with ordinary treatment.111 
However, some authors do not agree that overestimation of direct benefit or 
underestimation of risk or both together constitutes an essential feature of therapeutic 
misconception. Horng and Grady contend that there is a clear distinction between 
therapeutic misconception and therapeutic misestimation. They argue that therapeutic 
misconception focuses on the nature or intent of clinical research, while therapeutic 
misestimation deals with misunderstanding the probability of direct benefit or risk that 
may result from participating in research. They further contend that the heterogeneity of 
clinical trial design makes inferences about realistic expectation of direct benefits very 
challenging.112 Some authors have identified five draft dimensions of research that trial 
participants should understand before enrolling in clinical research including scientific 
purpose, study procedures, uncertainty, adherence to protocol and clinician as 
investigator. They indicate that specific questions to assess therapeutic misconception 
should be developed within the scope of five draft dimensions of research already 
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outlined.113 Potential subjects who lack adequate understanding of the purpose and 
methods of research are not equipped to evaluate risks and benefits of research 
participation. They also may not be able to appreciate how personal care may be 
compromised by research procedures such as randomization and use of placebos.114  
The prevalence of therapeutic misconception in clinical trials conducted in 
developing countries is exacerbated by the severity of the disease. Study conducted by 
Schaeffer et. al, shows that disease severity affects comprehension of information, and 
that the most severely sick research subjects are likely to attribute therapeutic intent to  
research that has remote chance of benefit as in phase 1 trials. They postulate that a 
subject with an immediate life-threatening disease and no therapeutic alternative might 
retain less information from a consent document, than a subject with less severe disease 
and more therapeutic options. In the same vein, research subjects with life-threatening 
conditions are less autonomous than healthy volunteers in their decision making. Their 
motivation for enrolling in the trials is care of their health condition and may consent 
without considering the potential risks involved. The study shows that healthy volunteers 
retained the most information about risks and side effects, while severely ill subjects 
retained the least. Furthermore, more sick subjects than healthy volunteers reported that 
the informed consent document had no effect on their decision to participate in the trial. 
Subjects with severe health conditions like cancer and HIV/AIDS may enroll in clinical 
trials with goals that are different from the goals of the research. Research subjects with 
advanced disease conditions rate the consent document as less relevant in their decision 
to participate in a trial which was primarily motivated by expectations and hopes of 
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recovery. They have poor retention of disclosed risk information probably due to denial 
of unpleasant realities, or avoidance of disturbing thoughts related to risk information.115 
The onslaught of HIV/AIDS and lack of adequate access to anti-retroviral 
treatments in developing countries for most of the population result in desperation for 
potential subjects. In most developing countries, potential subjects are usually not able to 
access adequate and quality treatment outside the research context. The implication is 
that potential subjects in resource limited countries count solely on being enrolled in 
clinical trials in order to access better health care. NBAC affirms, “it is not a 
misconception to believe that participants probably will receive good clinical care during 
research. But, it is a misconception to believe that the purpose of clinical trials is to 
administer treatment, rather than to conduct research.”116 Despite potential barriers to 
adequate comprehension of information for research subjects in clinical trials conducted 
in developing countries, there is an indication that those barriers can be surmounted by 
innovative ways of presenting information to potential subjects. 
 
B.2.b.iv.   Innovative Strategies to Enhance Comprehension of Information 
 Comprehension of information by research subjects can be enhanced when 
researchers engage the community in which research is conducted in active discussions of 
project goals and procedures through meetings with community leaders or public forums, 
and when information is provided to potential subjects prior to obtaining informed 
consent.117 Woodsong and Karim indicate that community involvement is a prerequisite 
to achieving high quality informed consent especially in circumstances in which the 
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cultural norms of the researchers and participants differ significantly. They proposed a 
model designed to enhance informed consent process that occurs during three phases of 
the research period, pre-enrollment, enrollment and post-enrollment, and at two levels, 
individual and community. Individual participants are familiarized with a study before 
enrollment, and the larger community in which participants are drawn are also involved 
in order to be cognizant of and support the research effort.118 Respecting the community 
and its values is essential. More so, the research protocol should start and end with the 
community.119 In another study of HIV-1 transmission in Haiti, Fitzgerald et. al report 
that the understanding of the content of the consent forms by research participants 
increased considerably after meetings with a counselor in which information was 
provided concerning the study. In this study, 80% of the 30 individual participants passed 
an oral examination before enrollment in the research project.120  
 Comprehension of information by research subjects can also be enhanced 
through consultation with cultural experts and local representatives concerning the most 
effective ways of communicating with potential research participants regarding the 
purpose of the study and the importance of obtaining consent.121 Researchers can conduct 
focus groups with representatives of potential subjects for comprehending issues and 
concerns related to preparing the consent form and developing approaches to obtaining 
consent.122 
 Comprehension may be increased using a continuous consent process. Vallely 
et al. write, “providing information to trial participants in a focused, locally appropriate 
manner, using methods developed in consultation with the community, and within  a 
continuous informed consent framework resulted in high levels of comprehension and 
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message retention in this setting.”123 They describe a study aimed at investigating the 
effectiveness of a continuous informed consent process adopted during microbicide trial 
in Mwanza, Tanzania. In this study, participatory community research methods were used 
to develop a locally-appropriate pictorial flipchart in order to communicate key messages 
regarding the trial to potential participants. Pre-recorded audio tapes were also used to 
promote understanding and compliance with instructions pertinent to the trial. A 
comprehension checklist was also administered to all participants at different stages of 
the trial. In depth interviews were used to measure how well participants internalize and 
retain key messages provided in a continuous informed consent process.124  
 Researchers also facilitate comprehension by using concepts and terms 
understandable to the community hosting the research, to explain complex issues in 
biomedical research. For example, the principle of randomization and the possibility that 
one of the vaccines might fail were explained with a familiar agricultural example, the 
analogy of testing fertilizers or new seeds on randomized plots, a procedure familiar to 
farmers in the area.125 The concepts of immunology and immune cells were explained 
with familiar analogy, people who guard houses, but it’s a particular kind of watchman in 
your body.126 Pertinent to note also is that adequate comprehension of information by 
research participants facilitates either voluntary informed consent or refusal. 
 
B.2.c. Voluntary Participation in Clinical Research 
 The requirement of voluntary participation in clinical research is a critical 
component of informed consent. Clinical research in developing countries is confronted 
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with several challenges especially with regard to voluntary consent. Marshall highlights 
four major challenges to voluntary consent, (1) the ability of a person to understand study 
objectives and the risks involved; (2) the vulnerability of potential subjects to incentives 
including money, drugs or medical treatment; (3) the power and authority of researchers 
to impact a potential subject’s decision to participate due to their professional background 
and social status; (4) the influence of community pressure to participate in a study 
especially when community elders give permission.127 In developing countries, 
diminished autonomy for research participants is prevalent. There are concerns that due 
to high levels of poverty in developing countries that payment provided to research 
participants may unduly induce them to enroll in HIV/AIDS clinical trial.128 Payment is 
possibly viewed as coercion when those recruited are very poor or if the benefits are 
considerable.129  
 Furthermore, voluntary participation in research is more challenging for 
potential participants when no other treatment options are available. In developing 
countries, people may feel unduly induced to enroll in HIV clinical research because of 
limited affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs. They consider enrolling in clinical 
research as the only option to receive anti-retroviral treatment which makes voluntary 
informed consent or refusal more difficult. However, we need to resist the line of 
argument that   one’s consent is not voluntary just in case one has no acceptable 
alternative.130  Voluntary participation in research requires conditions free of coercion 
and undue inducement or influence. A detailed analysis of the impact of coercion and 
undue inducement in voluntary choice to participate in clinical research follows. 
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B.2.c.i. Coercion and Undue Inducement 
 Coercion occurs when one person intentionally uses a credible and severe 
threat of harm or force to control another or to compel him or her to do something.131 
Coercion is also defined as the presence of a threat of harm or force that could make the 
coerced person worse off in some way.132 On the other hand, undue influence deals with 
an offer that is considered excessive, unwarranted or inappropriate or improper reward or 
other overture for obtaining compliance.133 Beauchamp and Childress identify three 
forms of influence, coercion, persuasion and manipulation that can void autonomous 
decision to participate in clinical research.134  
 Most decisions that individuals make, including the decision whether to 
participate in a research study, are affected by multiple influences. Generally, people 
choose and act in consonance with their wants and needs, which are usually influenced 
by their physical, psychological, social, economic, and cultural experiences and 
circumstances.135 In a similar vein, Faden and Beauchamp acknowledge that influences 
on peoples’ decisions can come in many forms, and from many sources. They can differ 
significantly in degree of influence actually exercised.136 Some influences may be 
adequately strong to constitute inducements, motivations, or stimuli for action. It is also 
pertinent to note that inducements do not necessarily invalidate or preclude voluntary 
choice. We encounter and respond to inducements all of the time in various areas of life, 
including selecting employment, making purchases, participating in research, and other 
choices. There is usually no single reason for doing something, since human motivation 
is complex and most times entails multiple considerations.137   
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 Coercion in the sense of researchers threatening to make anyone worse off for 
refusing to participate in a research study is not a common problem. Coercion may be an 
issue in relation to research conducted with prisoners or other captive populations, in 
which refusal to participate in research could result in punishment or retaliation. 
However, most institutional review boards (IRBs) ban threats of harm for refusal, 
whenever a power differential exists between researcher and participant. Even in 
circumstances when there is no threat, people may sometimes fear they will be treated 
worse. Both perceived and real coercion do not have any link to payment because 
payment should never be a threat itself. There may be possibility of a third party coercion 
in some cases, if the spouse of someone refusing to participate in a paid research study 
threatens the refusing spouse. But, in such cases researchers should not be held 
responsible for coercion. Payment may decrease perceived coercion in doctor-patient 
relation by completely changing the exchange into one that is less personal and unrelated 
to medical care.138  
 There is an ongoing debate as to what makes certain offers undue. Generally, 
offers are considered unduly influential if they are so enticing that they lead individuals 
to participate in clinical research they would otherwise preferred not to participate.139 
Certain conditions may raise concerns for the possibility of undue inducements to 
participate in clinical research, even if they pose significant risk of harm. Such conditions 
may include offers of medical care not otherwise available or offers of money. CIOMS 
guidelines document recognizes that, “it may be difficult to distinguish between suitable 
recompense and undue influence to participate in research… someone without access to 
medical care may or may not be unduly influenced to participate in research simply to 
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receive such care.”140 This situation is prevalent in developing countries, in which most 
people living with HIV/AIDS have limited or no access to anti-retroviral treatments. In 
general terms, the provision of medical care or treatment that would not otherwise be 
available to research participants should not be interpreted as an undue influence to 
participate.141 Researchers from developing countries surveyed by Kass and Hyder 
supported this conclusion. In the survey, 64 percent of the researchers indicated that 
participants joined research projects in order to obtain compensation, medical care or 
other benefits.142 Most researchers interviewed in focus groups for this same study were 
of the opinion that it was satisfactory, given the general risk/benefit ratio of the research. 
Some focus group respondents mentioned that providing significant benefits basically 
gave potential participants no reasonable choice except to participate, but they did not 
construe this as undue inducement.143 NBAC indicates that even though the potential 
benefits of participation in research for those in developing countries who lack access to 
medical care may be an inducement to participate in research, this does not adequately 
diminish the voluntariness of their decision in a way that would make their consent 
ethically invalid.144 
 On the other hand, being attracted to the money offered for participation in a 
research does not necessarily exclude the possibility of other influential motivations and 
considerations. Research subjects may participate in research for numerous reasons other 
than money.145 Grady argues, “if inducements can be compatible with voluntary choice, 
then money, as an inducement, does not inherently obviate or compromise 
voluntariness.”146 Apparently, most subjects who are attracted to participate in research 
partly because of money, still have the freedom to refuse. Potential subjects are usually 
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advised of their right to exercise this freedom in the process of obtaining voluntary 
informed consent. They are reminded about their voluntary choice to participate and that 
they have the right to refuse or withdraw at any time without punishment.147  
 Furthermore, many people who are attracted to research because of money 
usually have other options for acquiring money, generally from other full or part-time 
unskilled jobs. Potential subjects may choose research participation because of other 
considerations such as flexible hours, limited time, or that it seems more interesting and 
easier. More so, subjects who volunteered to participate in research can exercise their 
freedom to refuse when they decide that participating in the particular research study is 
not in their advantage.148 Concerns about potential for money serving as an undue 
inducement in the sense of making research an irresistible offer have been acknowledged 
for persons who are poor and have no other means of obtaining comparable amounts of 
money. Eliminating the option of obtaining money through research participation which 
has been propounded by some people does not resolve the issue. In the process of 
obtaining informed consent, the emphasis is better focused on more appropriate and 
effective strategies such as, a subject’s reason for participating, his or her understanding 
and expectations of research, and his or her impression of freedom to choose whether to 
participate or not.149  
 The ethical concern about money being an inappropriate motivating factor for 
research participation has been identified. Money is known for getting people to do things 
they would prefer not to do, and in some instances for getting people to do something 
they know is wrong. Money is as well considered capable of inappropriately distorting 
people’s judgments and motivations.150 The U.S. Office of Protection from Research 
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Risks (OPRR), currently known as the Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) 
points out the problematic nature of money as a possible undue inducement for research 
participation. In this context, money can diminish or weaken an individual’s judgment 
about what is at stake in the research or blind him or her to the potential risks of research 
participation. OPRR also indicates that offers of money could influence potential 
participants to distort something about themselves in order to acquire or maintain 
enrollment in a research study and receive the money. Distortion may not only endanger 
the informed consent of participants, but perhaps also their well-being as well as the 
integrity of the study.151  The vulnerability of potential subjects to distorted judgment 
because of money is relative not only to their particular circumstances but more 
importantly to their values. The implication is that even in very desperate situations, 
some people cannot be bought. Nevertheless, the bigger the sum of money involved, the 
greater the tendency for altering judgment or prompting potential participants to lie or 
ignore risks.152 CIOMS notes, “the payments should not be so large … or the medical 
services so extensive as to induce prospective subjects to consent to participate in the 
research against their better judgment.”153 There is a consensus among some scholars that 
limiting the amount of money paid for research participation decreases the possibility that 
money will alter judgment and induce people to engage in deception.154  Payment to 
research participants as acknowledgement for their contribution which may be calculated 
according to locally acceptable standard is probably more modest. The implication is that 
modest payment is less likely to alter judgment than amounts designed exclusively to 
attract subjects and exceed the competition in relation to recruitment.155 Random or huge 
amounts of money intended clearly to attract, to overpay other studies, or to compensate 
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for risk should not be allowed. Modest payment considered as compensation for the 
participant’s contribution decreases the likelihood of undue inducement, because the 
offer of money is neither excessive nor inappropriate.156 Voluntary participation in 
clinical research can also be enhanced or impaired by influences related to decisional 
authority for consent to research in developing countries. 
 
B.2.c.ii.   Decisional Authority for Consent to Clinical Research in Developing Countries    
  Freedom of choice and personal decision-making are usually emphasized in the 
discussion of voluntary informed consent. Marshall articulates that, “beliefs about 
individual autonomy and decisional capacity are embedded within the social and cultural 
patterns of community obligations and family ties.”157 Personal autonomy is highlighted 
in western industrialized countries. The implication is that individuals are anticipated to 
make decisions about research participation for themselves or through chosen surrogates. 
On the other hand, in numerous non-western countries, family members, or community 
leaders may play a major part in decisions regarding medical care and medical 
research.158 There are two points to be considered, first, influences from community 
leaders; and second, influences from family members in the decision to participate in 
clinical research. 
 In most cultures in developing countries researchers must seek permission from a 
community leader or village council before any interactions with potential research 
subjects. A clear distinction should be made between obtaining permission to enter a 
community for conducting research and for acquiring individual voluntary informed 
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consent.159 CIOMS highlights, the importance of meeting with community leaders, 
councils of appointed or elected elders or other designated authorities to seek formal or 
informal approval of a study in some contexts, but also emphasizes that it does not 
replace obtaining individual voluntary consent.160 In meeting with community and village 
leaders, researchers explain and discuss the details of the proposed study with them. The 
leaders are given opportunity to discuss and ask questions regarding the proposed study, 
before reaching a consensus whether to approve or reject permission for the research to 
be conducted in their community. When the permission has been granted by community 
and village leaders, the researcher could easily approach individuals for their 
participation. Individuals have the choice to decline participation in the research despite 
their village or community leader’s approval of the study.161   
 While researchers are encouraged to obtain permission from community leaders 
or designated authorities before engaging in research, an ethical problem is encountered 
when the community leader wields undue influence on the community in a way that 
impedes the voluntariness of individual consent.162 In some situations, the head of the 
village or a group of elders makes a joint decision for the village. The implication is that 
almost everyone will participate if they make decision to approve participating in the 
research. The people in the community are very unwilling to withdraw from the research 
because of the shared nature of community activities.163 Marshall acknowledges that in 
some settings, authorization by the community leader is consistent with individuals’ right 
to decline and authorization in a context in which the chief has the final say.164 One 
researcher articulated two levels of consent or permission: “One is community and the 
other is individual…. When you leave the chief, the chief is expected to open households, 
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so there is really another level of consent in between…the chief and council, the 
household head, then the individual.”165 The impact of the approval of the study by a 
chief on the community response was explored. One researcher indicated that community 
members for the most part consent to participate when researchers obtain prior approval 
from the chief or household heads. There were also some doubts regarding the degree to 
which individual consent to participate is voluntary.166 
 There were also discussions on differences between the rural and urban settings 
concerning the significance of obtaining permission from local community leaders. The 
strict requirement of community consent is stronger in rural setting than urban setting.167 
One physician commenting on the difference between the process of obtaining consent in 
urban and rural settings indicated: “In the rural area, community consent is stronger than 
the urban area. In Ibadan, some neighborhoods have traditional leadership, some modern, 
some have a traditional chief and the community structure still holds.”168 In some 
cultures, the processes for recruiting participants include community leaders who use 
their authority to prevent individuals from refusing to participate in research for which 
permission has been granted. Furthermore, authoritarian governments in some countries 
may restrict autonomous decision-making by their citizens, which may influence their 
participation in research.169 A related issue with regard to decisional capacity for the 
consent to participate in research in developing countries is the influences from family 
members in personal decision-making. 
 In developing countries, family-centered decision-making is customary than 
individual decision-making.170 Family members of potential research participants are 
usually involved in the informed consent process. Potential research participants 
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generally seek permission from a family member in order to be enrolled in clinical 
trials.171 In most cases, the need to include the family is not intended as a replacement for 
individual consent, but rather as an additional step in the process. For example, 
researchers in one country pointed out that research participants frequently become 
doubtful of researchers who attempt to enroll participants in a biomedical study without 
involving the family in the decision-making process.172 Sugarman et al. also described a 
research project in another country that involves a multistep consent process which starts 
with community consent and followed by individual parental consent for research 
involving children. Lastly, village elders were involved in sessions with children, due to 
community worries that children might be kidnapped and used as servants or be subjected 
to harvesting of their organs.173  
 Loue, Okello and Kawuna acknowledge the importance of involving family 
members in the informed consent process in Uganda. Even though Ugandan civil law 
requires an 18 year old male residing at home to make his decisions, it is normal for the 
son to seek his father’s consent before engaging in any obligation or contract, including 
research participation. Furthermore, some Ugandan women seek the approval of their 
husband prior to making a decision concerning their participation in research. In 
numerous traditional societies in developing countries, obtaining approval from one’s 
husband may be routine.174 In another study of anti-malarial drugs conducted in Kenya, 
the research assistants indicated that the women were hesitant to discuss with the 
researchers before obtaining approval from their husbands.175 
 Researchers in developing countries emphasize the need to involve the family 
members in the informed consent process, without compromising the requirement of 
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individual voluntary informed consent. For example, Marshall indicated that obtaining 
the approval of a woman’s husband before enrolling her in a research might be a 
requirement in Nigeria, where traditional cultural norms are strong. A Nigerian physician 
engaged in a breast cancer study described that cancer patients frequently require the 
permission of their husbands to participate in clinical research. Nevertheless, the 
physician also stressed that in such cases, the individual consent of the woman is still 
crucial. It is also pertinent to note that most researchers have devised strategies that 
accommodate and encourage discussion about study participation with family members. 
In the hypertension study, for instance, the study is explained to patients and they are 
handed over the information to take home. The patient is given an appointment for a later 
date in order to obtain his or her consent.176 
 Marshall also explained the difficulties involved in the negotiation of permission. 
For example, in one case, a woman described different strategies she can use in order to 
convince her hesitant husband to grant her an approval to participate in a clinical 
research. She listed strategies such as cooking him a good meal before asking him again, 
giving him time to think about it, and  bringing it up again and seeking the assistance of 
individuals he respects.177 In this context, persuasion can be an effective instrument. It 
implies also that obtaining approval does not essentially indicate a loss of personal 
autonomy. In some cases, outcomes of interviews conducted with women in Nigeria 
indicate that they differentiate between their experience of self-determination and their 
need, to persuade their husband of the relevance and significance of the research to them 
personally.178 It is also pertinent to acknowledge the changeability that occurs not just 
across cultures, but within specific social settings. A study focusing on informed consent 
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in genetic research conducted in Nigeria, reported that all the women interviewed were 
not required to obtain approval from their husbands to participate in the study.179 
 Various international guidelines and recommendations such as CIOMS, 2002; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002, 2005; National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 
2001, emphasized the significance of individual consent to research.180 For example, 
CIOMS guidelines indicated that the woman’s informed consent is the only thing 
required for her participation in research. The permission of either a spouse or a partner 
will not on any occasion substitute for the requirement of individual informed consent. 
Women were highly encouraged on their own to consult with their husbands or partners 
before making a decision to enroll in research. It was also made categorically clear that a 
strict requirement of authorization of spouse or partner, infringes on the substantive 
principle of respect for persons.181 The implication is that CIOMS guidelines give a 
stronger defense of women’s autonomy than NBAC recommendations, which allow a 
research ethics committee to make determination on the need for spousal authorization 
with appropriate documentation.182 Macklin expresses her uncertainty regarding allowing 
exceptions that would involve approaching a woman’s husband or father before speaking 
to her. She strongly supports not permitting any exceptions, so as not to perpetuate or 
reinforce the practice prevalent in developing countries where women are considered 
subservient or inferior, which violates the principles of respect for autonomy and equal 
respect for women. Macklin also acknowledged that spousal authorization could be 
justified from the utilitarian perspective, if the consequences of not conducting the 
research would be serious.183 The discussion of informed consent process also calls 
attention to legal requirements of documentation and enforcement of voluntary informed 
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consent, which will hold researchers and sponsors responsible for their unethical 
practices especially in developing countries. 
 
B.3. Legal Requirements of Documentation and Enforcement of Voluntary Informed 
Consent in Clinical Research in Developing Countries 
B.3.a. Documentation of Informed Consent in Clinical Research 
        Requirements for documentation of informed consent by U.S. funding agencies 
present serious challenges in clinical trials conducted in developing countries. Major 
concerns regarding documentation of informed consent stem from the length and 
complication of informed consent documents and the necessity of written and signed 
consent. These problems may constitute impediments not only to obtaining consent from 
potential subjects, but also to subject’s comprehension of the study.184 Requirements for 
signed consent forms stress the legal aspect of the consent as a signed contract rather than 
a social process. From this perspective, critics argue that the purpose of informed consent 
is more to protect the interests of institutions and researchers rather than those of the 
subjects.185  
        In some developing countries, obtaining written and signed consent from research 
subjects may be considered very challenging and inappropriate. One clear situation is that 
of illiterate subjects, who may be comfortable with oral consent, but unsettled with 
written consent, because they didn’t understand the content of the consent documents. 
Furthermore, people are suspicious of any signing process in some cultures, especially in 
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countries where they have lived under oppressive regimes and dread that signing a 
document could put them in danger.186 Sugarman et. al gave two examples of the 
challenges of  obtaining written and signed informed consent documents in some settings. 
In one project that includes many illiterate subjects, local researchers did not use 
thumbprints, even though it was regarded as an appropriate means of documenting 
individual consent, because it was very closely associated with past police tactics and was 
believed to alarm potential research subjects. In another setting, where guerilla warfare 
was continuing, using written informed consent presented a risk to research subjects 
because these documents connected them to specific institutions.187  A site visitor 
abridged this point clearly, “signing a form in this country means asking for trouble, 
whereas signing a form in the United States means self-protection.”188  
        In Marshall’s research conducted in Nigeria, researchers in that setting indicated that 
individuals may have some concern in connection to writing their signature or putting 
their thumbprint on a formal document because of suspicions regarding how the 
document may be used against them.189 A Nigerian researcher pointed out that, “even if 
they use a thumbprint, they can get suspicious. They can’t read so they wonder why you 
need their thumbprint. It’s a big fear…the issue has to do with government documents. 
It’s threatening because they don’t know what they are signing or what they might be 
giving away.”190 Similarly, Upvall and Haswani also compared informed consent in 
Pakistan and Swaziland and indicated that some subjects might find it menacing to sign a 
document when they are uneducated or do not comprehend its contents, especially if 
signing or utilizing a thumbprint might only be utilized for marriage documents or for 
other important life events.191 Kass and Hyder established that researchers working in 
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developing countries were worried about the need for signatures. A respondent in the 
focus group noted that in Latin America, those with inadequate reading capacity are very 
undecided about signing things. The researchers’ emphasis on informed consent is 
understood as culturally insensitive but was accepted out of understanding of their needs 
to fulfill requirements of their funding agency and government regulations.192 
        International guidelines acknowledge the validity of verbal consent when written 
consent is either unsuitable or improper but only when it is appropriately documented.193 
For example, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics endorses that if asking for a person’s 
signature is inappropriate, at that point other ways should be designed for documenting 
consent, such as an audio-taped recording, or an independent witness for verbal 
consent.194 NBAC also recommends that U.S. research guidelines should be revised to 
allow ethics review committees to waive requirements for written and signed consent 
forms to be adaptable enough to local cultural norms.195 Another critical issue that 
requires attention is the legal enforcement of informed consent through the court, which 
allows research subjects whose rights have been violated in clinical trials to seek 
compensation. 
 
B.3.b.   Legal Enforcement of Informed Consent through the Court 
 The story reported by Washington Post regarding clinical trial conducted by 
Pfizer researchers in Kano, Nigeria during a major meningitis epidemic set the stage for 
the enforcement of violations of rights of research participants through U.S. court, under 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).196 The story sparked an outrage, with the description of the 
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gradual death of a 10 year-old girl identified as Subject 6587-0069. The Pfizer 
researchers observed her dying for days without adjusting her treatment, in a protocol 
designed to test an oral form of the antibiotic trovafloxacin, with a trade-name Trovan in 
children.197 The Washington Post also reported that its inquiry into drug experiments 
sponsored by corporations, “in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America reveals a 
booming, poorly regulated testing system that is dominated by private interests and that 
far too often betrays its promises to patients and consumers.”198  
 In the protocol designed by Pfizer researchers, two hundred sick children were 
enrolled and assigned into two groups. One group was treated with Trovan, the 
experimental drug, and the other group was treated with low dose ceftriaxone, an FDA 
approved drug which is the best standard of care for treatment of bacterial meningitis.199 
The children’s blood was supposed to be monitored during the course of the trial, but it 
was not followed through as result of insufficient number of medical staff.  As a result of 
such laxity on the part of Pfizer, they didn’t identify the children who were not doing 
well with the experimental drug, Trovan in order to switch them to standard intervention. 
This violation in standard procedure apparently resulted in severe brain damage or death 
for several children. Pfizer also left Kano after two weeks without any plans for 
implementation of follow up interventions.200 Specifically, eleven children died, five who 
had received Trovan and six who had been administered a low dose of Ceftriaxone. Many 
others suffered blindness, deafness, brain damage and paralysis.201 
 Due to alleged violations of the rights of the subjects who were enrolled in Pfizer 
trial conducted in Kano, their families filed lawsuits against Pfizer in Nigeria and United 
States. Pfizer was primarily charged with conducting medical experiments without 
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obtaining voluntary informed consent from the subjects in the Nigerian law suit. In 2006, 
the report from Ministry of Health in Nigeria established that the trial breached Nigerian 
law, the Declaration of Helsinki and the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the 
child. At this juncture, the Nigerian government brought both a criminal and a civil 
lawsuit against Pfizer in Nigeria. A resolution to the case was reached, but the details of 
the agreement were not made public.202  
 The first lawsuit in United States against Pfizer, filed by the families of the dead 
and injured subjects, under the ATS in the Southern District Court of New York occurred 
in 2001. The ATS was approved in 1789 as a Judiciary act, and provides U.S. district and 
federal courts with jurisdiction to handle claims by foreigners for civil offenses 
committed “in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”203 Many 
allegations were leveled against Pfizer. The plaintiffs claimed that Pfizer failed to obtain 
informed consent from the subjects or their parents/guardians and precisely failed to 
divulge and describe the experimental nature of the trial and the potential risks and side 
effects of Trovan and Ceftriaxone. The subjects were not offered or read informed 
consent documents either in English or Hausa, the subjects’ native language. Pfizer also 
failed to offer the subjects the option of an alternative treatment, by not furnishing them 
with the information that Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) a non-
governmental organization was offering more conventional and effective treatments for 
bacterial meningitis, at the same location, for free. There was no prior review of the 
study, because the ethics review committee was non-existent at the research site. The 
backdated authorization letter for the study from the nonexistent hospital ethics review 
committee which was presented was a forged document.204 The implication is that two of 
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the safeguards usually established to protect research subjects were either absent or faulty 
in the trial conducted by Pfizer in Nigeria.205  
 The claims of Nigerian families involved in the Pfizer trial built on four sources 
of international law that prohibited bio-medical experimentation on human subjects 
without their consent, the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the CIOMS 
Guidelines, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  The 
district court acknowledged that conducting medical experimentation without the consent 
of human subjects violates the laws of nations and invariably, the laws of the United 
States. Nevertheless, the court argued that the law of nations does not authorize an 
obligation for plaintiffs’ compensation.206 The court indicated that the “ law of nations 
does not create private causes of action to remedy its violations, but leaves to each nation 
the task of defining the remedies that are available for international law violations.”207 
The court addressing the issue of claims of violations of international law based on the 
Code and Declaration that endorsed jurisdiction under the ATS, argued that the non-
binding nature of these international documents, “does not create a private right of action 
in US federal courts and is unlikely to give rise to obligations in any strict sense.208 
Therefore, the court dismissed the claims of plaintiffs for failing to offer a justification 
for ATS jurisdiction.    
 The precedent case which is far more important in our discussion of legal 
enforcement of informed consent is the January 2009 opinion of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit. The opinion reversed the district court’s decision and 
sent the case back to the same court for another trial. The Second Circuit agreed that the 
prohibition of nonconsensual medical experimentation on human subjects constitutes a 
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norm of customary international law. It allows the Nigerian families to file a lawsuit 
against Pfizer in the United States.209 This landmark decision offers a significant solution 
to the enforcement problem of informed consent. In the first place, it recognized 
informed consent as a universal legal norm. Secondly, it allows a lawsuit against a 
pharmaceutical company based in America, for violation of human rights.210 Lee argues 
that “in doing so, the court articulated a legally enforceable framework for a foreign 
country’s nationals to pursue clinical trial violations.”211  
 The court also recognized that apart from the universal nature of the informed 
consent as a customary international law norm, the norm also has requirements that is 
specific and is of mutual concern among nations.212 The Second Circuit court argues that, 
“The American tribunal’s conclusion that action that contravened the Code’s first 
principle constituted a crime against humanity is a lucid indication of the international 
legal significance of the prohibition on the nonconsensual medical experimentation.”213 
The implication is that the court raised the issue of the medical experimentation on 
human subjects without obtaining voluntary informed consent from them, to the status of 
an international human rights violation and a crime against humanity that can be enforced 
in the international court. Related to the issue of enforcement of informed consent is the 
protection of the rights of potential human subjects with an adequate and thorough 
independent review of research protocol by a well constituted ethics review committee. 
 
C.     Ethics Review Committee  
C.1. Preamble  
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 U.S. federal regulations generally referred to as the “Common Rule” require that 
research funded by U.S. government or conducted by a government agency or institutions 
that comply with common rule or intended for submission to the Food and Drug 
Administration must be reviewed by a U.S. Institutional Review Board (IRB) and also by 
a local, regional, or national committee in the country where the research is conducted.214 
International ethical guidelines and declarations also emphasized the requirement of 
review of research involving human subjects. For example, CIOMS stipulates that, “all 
proposals to conduct research involving human subjects must be submitted for review of 
their scientific merit and ethical acceptability to one or more scientific review and ethical 
review committees.”215   
 Allegations of violations regarding ethical review of research protocols for trials 
conducted in developing countries abound. Macklin reported two cases that involved U.S. 
researchers from U.S. institutions that violated the requirement of review of research in 
conducting international collaborative research. In one case, a researcher from the 
Harvard School of Public Health conducted a series of epidemiologic genetic studies in a 
rural province in China. The studies recruited vulnerable subjects who were poor and 
illiterate. The studies entailed taking subjects’ blood samples and carrying out lung 
function tests and x-rays. One of the violations reported about this research was that the 
researcher failed to submit some studies to the IRB at Harvard School of Public Health 
and to obtain approval from the committee before conducting the study. The researcher 
also made changes in the research in some of the studies after the initial approval, but 
failed to obtain approval for the changes he effected. Informed consent violations were 
also reported. The informed consent documents were considered insufficient, both 
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because they had no information about the right of subjects to refuse to participate, and 
because they were too complicated for rural Chinese farmers to comprehend. There was 
also another concern about the subjects risking being discriminated against in the area of 
job, if their employers discovered health problems diagnosed in the studies. No 
information was furnished regarding the level to which the subjects’ confidentiality could 
be sufficiently protected in China.216  
 The second case of violation involved a professor of microbiology at the 
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), who failed to obtain IRB approval for a 
research he conducted in collaboration with another researcher in China. The study 
involved analyzing data and blood samples of research subjects. The study also involved 
injecting malaria-infected blood into Chinese AIDS patients which has been confirmed 
by many scientists as fraudulent medical practice.217 These violations more prevalent in 
research conducted in developing countries, where subjects are more vulnerable calls for 
safeguarding their rights. Protecting the rights of research subjects requires a properly 
constituted ethics review committee, so that it will be adequately equipped to discharge 
its responsibilities. 
 
C.2.   Composition and Responsibilities of Ethics Review Committee  
 C.2.a. Composition of Ethics Review Committee             
 The composition of Ethics Review Committee or IRB has direct relationship 
with its function, because function which is usually regarded as what an entity does, can 
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as well in this context be defined in terms of structure. The implication is that proper 
composition of ethics review committee directly influences the quality of the ethical 
review of research protocols. For example, it will be hard for an ethics review committee 
to adequately deliberate on the needs and viewpoints of adults with diminished capacity 
for decision making, if none of the members has expertise or experience dealing with this 
particular population.218 Lo articulates, “as a group, IRB members must have the 
expertise, experience, and diversity of backgrounds needed to review the typical types of 
research conducted at an institution. Diversity of backgrounds should include not only 
areas of scientific or professional expertise but also culture, race and gender.”219  
 U.S. federal regulations stipulate the composition of an IRB to be a minimum 
of five members from diversified backgrounds, whose primary responsibility is to 
promote complete and adequate review of research carried out by the institution.220 The 
ethics review committee must have at least one member who focuses mainly on scientific 
themes. The ethics review committee is required to comprehend the science fundamental 
to the studies it usually reviews, in order to conclude whether the study will generate 
valid, generalizable knowledge, and whether minimized risky methods could be utilized 
without compromising the science. The ethics review committee must also have at least 
one member whose emphasis is on issues related to nonscientific themes. At least one 
committee member must not be affiliated with the institution conducting the research.221   
In general, ethics review committee members may include physicians, scientists, and 
other professionals like nurses, lawyers, ethicists and clergy, also lay persons qualified to 
stand for the cultural and moral values of the community and to guarantee that the rights 
of the research subjects will be esteemed. The committee members should consist of men 
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and women. When a study focuses on illiterate persons, they should be recruited as 
committee members or given opportunity for their perspectives to be represented.222  
 A national or local ethics review committee charged with reviewing and 
approving protocols for research sponsored by developed countries should recruit 
members who are very acquainted with the customs and traditions of the population or 
community involved. Ethics review committees that usually review research protocols 
focusing on particular diseases or diminished mental or physical abilities, such as 
HIV/AIDS or paraplegia, should recruit members who are knowledgeable and 
experienced working with such populations or pay attention to the perspectives of 
individuals or organizations advocating for patients with such diseases or impairments. 
On the other hand, committees should call or listen to the perspectives of people who 
represent or advocate for vulnerable subjects such as children, students, elderly persons 
or employees involved in research.223 Members of ethics review committee should not 
participate in any review of protocols in which they have conflict of interest and they are 
required to offer background information to the committee.224 
 
C.2.b.  Responsibilities of Ethics Review Committee 
 There is a consensus among most scholars that the primary responsibility of an 
ethics review committee is to protect the rights of research participants.225 Marshall 
articulates that, “the primary aim of ethical review committees (ERCs) is to ensure the 
protection of human participants by safeguarding their rights and determining that the 
risks associated with participation in the study do not endanger the safety of individuals 
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and are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits.”226 Guillemin et. al cautioned 
regarding ethics review committees’ sometimes being overprotective and paternalistic 
toward research participants.227 Ethics review committee accomplishes its task of 
protecting the rights of research participants through providing oversight, review and 
approval of research protocols. Before the approval of any research study by ethics 
review committee, the following criteria must be fulfilled, “ (1) the risks of the study are 
minimized; (2) risks are reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits; (3) selection of 
participants is equitable; (4) informed consent is obtained; (5) confidentiality is 
maintained; (6) data are adequately monitored.”228 Ethics review committee must also 
determine that research participation is voluntary and that withdrawing from the research 
will not lead to any adverse consequences for the participants.229  The ethics review 
committee in the host country must also determine whether the goals of the research are 
responsive to the health needs and priorities of the identified host country.230    
 Ethics review committees especially in developing countries encounter many 
significant challenges in their oversight and review of research. For instance, there may 
be structural obstacles that are essentially inherent in their institutions that make it hard to 
satisfy international ethical regulatory requirements. Some of these obstacles include lack 
of resources, inadequate training among ethics review committee members, and 
insufficient infrastructure.  Accomplishing adequate ethical review of protocols requires 
well equipped and trained ethics review members, which comprehend the necessity of 
ethical review of protocols and the responsibilities linked with it. Furthermore, it requires 
that institutions possess the technological resources that will enable them to carry out 
effective reviews including funds for photocopying materials and staff for managing and 
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tracking protocols. Nevertheless, it may be predominant in many developing countries 
that there are no ethics review committees or that they are not well equipped to 
implement adequate reviews due to inadequate resources or the absence of trained 
professionals.231 Hyder et al. reported their findings from a survey that involved 670 
health researchers in developing countries, which focused on the role of IRBs in 
guaranteeing the adequacy of ethical standards in research carried out in those countries.    
Forty four percent of the researchers surveyed indicated that their studies were neither 
reviewed by an IRB from a developing country nor by ministry of health and one third of 
these studies received their funding from organizations in the U.S. Their findings also 
revealed that IRBs in the U.S. were significantly more likely to raise issues related to the 
need for consent forms in the local language and approval letters from developing 
country representatives, and the protection of confidentiality than by IRBs in the host 
country.232  
 There were also significant concerns regarding conflicts of interests for IRBs in 
developing countries. Kass and Hyder reported that some respondents indicated that local 
review committees in some countries stress scientific, political, or funding issues rather 
than ethical considerations.233 The political nature of decisions made by local IRB was 
highlighted by some respondents. One respondent commented, “it is a political approval. 
It is not an approval that is about ethics. It was more about whether we would be spies or 
we would be real researchers that would benefit Asian Country.”234 In developing 
countries with limited resources, corruption and bribes for government officials constitute 
major concerns in the establishment and implementation of standards for research ethics 
at the national level. Some respondents felt that external organizations exploited 
 111 
resource-poor countries, and imposed their wishes on them through controlling some 
government officials.235 Some respondents also mentioned power differences between 
United States and developing countries, which established a paternalistic situation for 
negotiating the terms of research. The disparities in power unfairly impacted decision 
making about research. One respondent remarked that, “the biggest problem in 
developing countries is that our poverty puts us in a situation where the beggar has no 
choice.”236     
 Ethics review committees in developing countries also encounter difficulties 
regarding essential features required for their proper establishment and functioning. 
Macpherson discusses the uncertainties that confronted the establishment of a research 
ethics committee in Grenada. Some of the unanticipated issues focused on specific 
guidelines and procedures to adopt and the appointment and training of members.237 In 
another work, Macpherson indicates that international guidelines do not deal with issues 
such as the connection between the IRBs and the governments that do not mandate them, 
and what kind of procedures or documentation will function in a developing country. She 
discusses doubts related to whether ways of guaranteeing confidentiality and obtaining 
informed consent will be effective due to socio-cultural impacts in local circumstances, 
and whether departures from western standards are justifiable. International guidelines 
are considered beneficial in dealing with these issues, but they are prone to diverse 
interpretations. She reports that the Grenada experience shows that it is possible for IRBs 
in developing countries to adopt international standards. She further contends that there is 
a significant need for educational programs not only to improve the capacity of IRBs, but 
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as well to guarantee that leaders of developing countries are knowledgeable regarding the 
importance of international research guidelines for their nations.238 
Most national and international guidelines recommend dual independent ethical 
review of research protocols both in the host country and sponsor country, for externally 
sponsored research conducted in developing countries.239 Review of externally sponsored 
research conducted in developing countries with poor resources poses several ethical 
challenges. One problem identified in this area deals with the responsibilities for research 
oversight when multiple ethics review boards are involved.240 Adhering to strict U.S 
regulations by host country IRBs may present a significant challenge. Researchers from 
Nigeria explained administrative concerns about the process of securing approval from 
ethics review committees. Some researchers described the problems related to responding 
to the requirements of U S funding agencies and at local institutions in Nigeria. A 
physician researcher from Lagos, expressed frustrations regarding fighting with 
Washington to change the consent form and adapting the form to be useful and suitable 
for his Nigerian patients. He expressed frustrations also regarding the administrative 
aspects of the process, comprising of paperwork and committee negotiation.241 
Discrepancies between ethics review committees in the developed and developing 
countries should be resolved. Mechanisms for effectively dealing with such conflicts 
between multiple ethics review committees are currently nonexistent. In situations where 
ethics review committees cannot resolve differences between themselves, a committee 
may decide not to approve the research. The implication is that when a committee from 
sponsor’s country decides not to approve the research, the sponsor cannot fund it. 
Conversely, when an ethics review committee from a developing county chooses not to 
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approve the research, at that point the research cannot be carried out within that 
country.242  
Apart from ethics review committees’ primary responsibility to protect the rights 
of research participants, they also have responsibilities to society and to researchers. 
Ethics review committees have a responsibility to society, since it provides the resources 
for carrying out the research and it can be significantly influenced by research findings.243 
This entails that ethics review committees have a responsibility to evaluate the scientific 
merit of research protocols. Any research that does not possess potential benefit to 
society should not be approved.244  Kent reports divergent views among local research 
committee members, researchers and the public regarding the role of the ethics review 
committees in assessing and maintaining the scientific merit of research.245 Some 
scholars argue that there is a clear distinction between assessing the ethics of a proposal 
and evaluating the scientific merit of a proposal.246 Researchers contend that the scientific 
value of a research is usually recognized before requesting for ethical review and 
approval, and that it is not within the scope of the ethics review committee’s 
responsibility to evaluate scientific merit. Ethics review committees may consider 
scientific aspects of research, but it has not been determined to what extent this 
constitutes part of their function.247 
CIOMS international guidelines stipulate that ethics review committees in both 
sponsor country and host country have obligation to carry out both scientific and ethical 
review of research protocols. They are also vested with the authority to refuse approval of 
research protocols that did not satisfy criteria for their scientific and ethical standards.248 
Gelling articulates that ethics committee is discharging its obligation to society, if it 
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refuses to grant approval to research proposals that did not meet criteria for scientific 
standards. The implication is that ethics committee is protecting society from research 
that is not beneficial, so that available limited resources would not be squandered on it.249 
Benatar describes this function of ethics review committees to the society as monitoring 
and auditing research, as well as providing accountability to the public.250 
Ethics review committees as well have responsibility to researchers. Kent 
acknowledges researchers’ right to have their protocols treated with respect and due 
consideration.251 Researchers expect ethics review committees to avoid unnecessary 
delays in the review and approval of their protocols, since they are compelled to produce 
outcomes.252 Benatar identified this role of ethics review committees to researchers as 
educating and assisting researchers and the community in comprehending and 
appreciating the ethics of research.253 
 
C.3. Capacity Building in Clinical Research in Developing Countries 
Ethics review committees in most developing countries have inadequate training 
in research ethics, experience in reviewing complex protocols and resources to execute 
their task. For instance, copying documents or transmitting them electronically to other 
committee members may not be possible.254 Capacity building assists in empowering 
local institutions in order to carry on the provision of interventions considered to be 
effective at the end of the clinical research. Furthermore, strengthening local health 
infrastructure helps to narrow global health disparities.255  
Capacity building in developing countries may involve variety of activities such 
as, “(1) establishing and strengthening independent and competent ethical review 
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processes/committees; (2) strengthening research capacity; (3) developing technologies 
appropriate to health care and biomedical research; (4) training of research and health 
care staff; (5) educating the community from which research subjects will be drawn.”256 
Building infrastructures such as clinics, hospitals etc. are also regarded as another area of 
capacity development. Respondents in the survey conducted by Kass and Hyder indicated 
that they regarded providing physical structure and technological equipment as a means 
of giving something back to the communities where the study was conducted at the end 
of the study.257  
Capacity building must constitute an essential part of any study in developing 
countries. Respondents in Kass and Hyder’s survey express the need for training people 
in developing countries during every collaborative research in order to be able to 
competently accomplish tasks such as grant writing, study design, data collection and 
data analysis. The objective of researchers from the sponsoring country should be to 
foster capacity development in such a way that studies in developing countries will be 
staffed by greater number of local people.258 Kass and Hyder articulate, “researchers 
should conceive of their role as facilitating host countries’ capacity to eventually conduct 
most of their research independently and should aim for such capacity development as 
one of the most significant benefits a study can provide.”259  
Strengthening the capacity of ethics review committees or IRBs to carry out 
rigorous independent review of protocols has been identified as a critical component of 
capacity building initiative in clinical research. Educational programs for committee 
members in developing and developed countries should focus on the significance of 
comprehending ethical principles and their expression in guidelines for research. There is 
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also emphasis on the necessity to acknowledge the impact of local social and cultural 
contexts on the implementation of research and the utilization of ethical guidelines.260 
Many national and international ethical guidelines stress the importance of 
capacity building in international clinical research. NBAC highlights responsibilities of 
sponsors of research from developed countries in developing countries as offering help in 
building local and national capacity for designing and carrying out clinical trials, and for 
the ethical and scientific review of research protocols, and for implementing the 
outcomes of the research at the end of a trial.261   
Various governments and organizations have established programs to offer 
support and training on ethical guidelines for international research and the formation of 
ethics review committees or IRBs. The established programs also develop expertise in 
bioethics and carrying out independent and competent ethical review of research 
protocols.262 For example, the Forgarty International Center of the National Institute of 
Health (NIH) in the US is presently sponsoring international research and training 
programs in bioethics for the purpose of building research capacity in developing 
countries. The programs help in building the capacity of faculties from developing 
countries to become competent local investigators who can effectively address ethical 
and scientific challenges in international research. The Wellcome Trust established a 
funding initiative for supporting research in ethical and social aspects of carrying out 
biomedical research in developing countries.263 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/ World Bank/ WHO 
Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) is currently 
dealing with the importance of strengthening the procedures for ethical review of 
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research protocols in developing countries through the training of important individuals 
in main research institutions. The UNDP/United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA)/WHO/World Bank Special Programme for Research, Development and 
Research Training in Human Reproduction are presently organizing regional workshops 
for training researchers and members of ethics review committees. The Strategic 
Initiative for Developing Capacity in Ethical Review (SIDCER) organizes networks 
within regions whose task is to identify needs for training and education.264 Enhancing 
the capacity of ethics review committee members and researchers in developing countries 
results in greater collaborative partnership in international clinical research.  
 
C.4. Collaborative Partnership in Clinical Research in Developing Countries 
Building collaborative partnerships between the host and sponsor ethics review 
committees from the planning phase of the research is a crucial part for successful 
completion of multinational clinical research.265 Research partners from the host country 
can assist researchers from developed countries to comprehend the needs and priorities of 
the host country, risks linked with circumstances in the country, issues that potential 
subjects might have regarding the research and barriers to informed consent process. The 
input of host country partners can help to resolve identified challenges and design an 
ethically appropriate consent process.266 In contrast, researchers and sponsors from 
developed countries should contribute to the infrastructure of the host country by 
providing training for local health care workers and ethics review committee members.267    
International guidelines for biomedical research emphasize the significance of 
collaborative partnerships in international clinical research. The Nuffield Council on 
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Bioethics acknowledging the necessity for developing local expertise in developing 
countries, advises that sponsors of research promote collaborative partnerships between 
researchers from developed and developing countries.268 The NBAC recommends that, 
“researchers and sponsors should involve representatives of the community of potential 
participants throughout the design and implementation of research projects.”269 
  Clinical research in developing countries is considered as a partnership between 
researchers and sponsors from developed countries and stakeholders in the host country. 
The stakeholders will comprise of scientists, clinicians, public and patient 
representatives, community groups and government representatives. Preferably, involving 
these stakeholders in the research from the planning phase is highly encouraged.270 WHO 
and UNAIDS strongly advise researchers and sponsors from developed countries to 
actively involve the developing countries’ communities where the research is conducted, 
“in an early and sustained manner in the design, development, implementation, and 
distribution of results of biomedical HIV prevention trials.”271 Participation of the local 
communities in international clinical research should be “an open, iterative, collaborative 
process that involves a wide variety of participants and takes place under public 
scrutiny”272  
Lack of effective engagement of local communities in multinational research from 
the initial stages of research planning may lead to failure to successfully carry out and 
complete some relevant international clinical trials. More so, active involvement of the 
community may enhance not only local community ownership of the research, but as well 
the bargaining power of communities and the expertise of local researchers. Communities 
influenced by research should effectively participate in all stages of research including 
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planning, implementation and dissemination of results. Effective participation in research 
is attained by recognizing structural power differences between local communities on the 
one hand and researchers and sponsors on the other hand, as well as making concerted 
efforts to resolve them. This implies establishing practical strategies for outreach and 
engagement of communities in order to bolster participation.273  
Researchers must be thoughtful and sympathetic in relation to how community 
power and authority are shown in different cultural environments.274 Adebamowo 
explains the negative influence of local community dynamics on scientific research 
conducted in sub-Saharan Africa. In the case study, researchers involved in international 
collaborative research project focused on genetics, unintentionally endangered meddling 
with the local power structure through the establishment of a community advisory 
board.275 Researchers involved in collaborative partnerships in multinational clinical 
research are encouraged to obtain sufficient knowledge regarding local community 
dynamics and important power structures before engaging in a research.276 
The notion of community engagement in clinical research transcends the 
participation of the community. It encompasses the process of engaging in collaborative 
partnerships with important research stakeholders who share common goals and 
interests.277 In practical terms, this entails “building authentic partnerships, including 
mutual respect and active, inclusive participation; power sharing and equity; mutual 
benefit or finding the win-win possibility”278 in the collaborative enterprise. Different 
models for collaborative partnerships have been utilized in international clinical research 
comprising of community advisory boards and working with existing civil society 
organization.279 In the same vein, active engagement of developing countries’ 
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communities in international clinical research has been described in various ways 
including community engagement, community participation, community involvement, 
community consultation, and collaborative partnership.280 For instance, a tool box for 
community participation in HIV trials was created by HIV Prevention Trials Network. 
The tool box focuses on promoting collaborative and participatory efforts of both 
researchers and community members in order to guarantee that the research activities are 
responsive to the needs and priorities of the host community.281 
Community consultation is also another example of community engagement in 
clinical research, which can be realized by establishing community advisory boards.282 
Ouinn contends that community advisory boards “provide a mechanism for community 
consultation that contributes to protecting communities and fostering meaningful 
research.”283  
  Another way of explaining community engagement is collaborative partnership. 
Emmanuel et al. identify collaborative partnership as one of the required ethical 
principles for clinical research in developing countries.284 They proposed six important 
benchmarks for realizing collaborative partnership in multinational clinical research. The 
first benchmark focuses on the importance of representing all parties and stakeholders in 
developing countries. The second benchmark deals with collaboration, which entails 
sharing responsibility for evaluating the significance of the health problem, the 
importance of the research to the community, for planning and carrying out the research, 
overseeing the research, publishing the results, and incorporating research into the health 
care system. The third benchmark emphasizes mutual respect, which involves 
acknowledgment and respect for the values, culture, traditions, and social practices of the 
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community hosting the research, which should be integrated into the plan and conduct of 
the research. The fourth benchmark stresses the importance of reducing inequalities in 
relation to the research project between researchers and sponsors from developed 
countries on the one hand, and the host community on the other hand. This is realized 
through capacity building of research stakeholders in the host community. The fifth 
benchmark places emphasis on guaranteeing that participants and host communities 
receive fair benefits from the conduct and outcomes of research. The sixth benchmark 
discusses the importance of a fair distribution of financial profits, intellectual property 
rights, royalties and other rewards of research, among all parties involved in research.285 
Clinical trials in developing countries are still plagued by the inability of participants and 
host populations to access successful drugs at the end of the trials.      
 
D. Conclusion 
Concluding reflections on the regulatory infrastructure and ethical oversight of 
international clinical research emphasize the priority of safeguarding the rights of 
research participants and host populations in the design and implementation of research 
protocols. Obtaining voluntary informed consent from research participants and thorough 
review of research protocols by well constituted and competent ethics review committee 
were considered desiderata in conducting clinical trials in developing countries. 
Cultural and language barriers were highlighted as challenges in conducting 
clinical research in developing countries. They also posed serious challenges in 
conforming to the substantive ethical standard of voluntary informed consent in clinical 
research, but did not justify deviating from it. However, researchers and sponsors from 
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developed countries were encouraged to respect the local culture and values of research 
participants and host populations and to adapt standards of informed consent to the 
cultural norms and practices of developing countries. 
The prominent roles of the family and the community in personal decision-
making for consenting to research participation in most cultures of developing countries 
were acknowledged. Research participants were highly encouraged to discuss their 
participation in clinical research with their family members before giving their consent. 
The role of community leaders in the process of obtaining consent from research 
participants in developing countries was seen as an initial step in the series of steps 
involved in obtaining voluntary informed consent in clinical research. Creative strategies 
for presenting information to research participants in developing countries were strongly 
recommended as effective means of improving comprehension of essential information 
regarding research study goals and procedures. 
A landmark achievement in the legal enforcement of informed consent was 
elevating the violation of rights of research participants in developing countries by 
researchers and sponsors from developed countries to crime against humanity. A broad 
and global application of this legal provision was emphasized. 
There was an acknowledgment that clinical research in developing countries 
encounters many problems with regard to inadequate material and human resources. It 
was prevalent in developing countries to lack well equipped physical structures and 
adequately trained personnel in ethics and science, which will conduct independent 
review of research protocols. Building the capacity of developing countries for 
conducting international clinical research was considered imperative. 
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Similarly, collaborative partnership between developed and developing countries 
in the design and conduct of international clinical research was seen as a critical 
component for the successful completion of international clinical research. However, 
clinical trials in developing countries are still plagued by the inability of participants and 
host populations to access successful drugs at the completion of the trials. A related issue 
in the discussion of international clinical research is the significant impact of the 
intellectual property law and international trade agreements on affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs in poor developing countries as discussed in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
    AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO DRUGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
A.   Introduction 
 
The pandemic nature of HIV/AIDS which decimates millions of people in 
developing countries creates an urgent need for affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs. 
Conducting clinical trials has been defended as a major means of providing medical 
benefits to poor populations in developing countries through development of cheaper and 
affordable drugs.1  Lavery articulates that, “it has become increasingly well-recognized in 
recent years that an equitable distribution of the benefits of research is an important 
component of international research ethics.”2  
International guidelines such as CIOMS, Declaration of Helsinki and the United 
Nations Joint Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) Ethical Considerations in HIV Preventive 
Vaccine Research allocate to researchers and sponsors the job of guaranteeing and 
accomplishing benefits of research for participants and the host communities.3 These 
obligations can be realized through three major requirements: (1) the negotiations of 
agreements regarding the conditions for conducting the research before initiating the 
research; (2) the guarantee of post-trial access to effective research interventions to 
research subjects; and (3) instituting efforts for building the capacity of researchers and 
their institutions in the host countries in order to participate in the research as full 
partners.4   
In the past decade, there has been a huge expansion in international clinical 
research, especially clinical drug and vaccine trials sponsored by high-income countries 
(HIC) and carried out in low-and middle-income countries (LMIC).5 There is an 
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acknowledgement of the presence of thousands of researchers from institutions, agencies, 
and private companies in HIC at any specified time in various places around the world, 
carrying out research in LMIC.  International clinical trials sponsored by private industry 
have significantly increased. Private pharmaceutical companies represented about forty-
four percent of global spending on health research in 1992,6 but after a decade the share 
has been projected at about half of the seventy billion dollars globally spent on health 
research.7 
The history of international clinical research is marred by poor record with regard 
to the transfer of benefits to the communities in LMIC which have helped in producing 
interventions, especially novel drugs and vaccines.8 Most research privately sponsored 
engage in clinical trials of drugs and interventions that will be solely marketed in HIC 
and consequently, further broaden disparities in global health and health research 
funding.9 Data shows that Africa which has estimate of about fourteen percent of the 
world’s population and its greatest disease burden, which includes a little bit less than 
thirty million people living with HIV/AIDS,10 represents about less than two percent of 
the world market for drugs.11 On the other hand, North America, Europe, and Japan, 
together with less than 1.5 times the population of Africa, represent more than forty times 
more, or eighty percent, of the global market.12  
The use of placebo controls in clinical research has been identified as a viable 
way of developing cheaper drugs in developing countries, where majority of the 
populations get nothing as the standard of care. There was disagreement among scholars 
regarding the use of placebo-controlled research design in HIV clinical trials in 
developing countries. The proponents of placebo-controlled research argue that it is 
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ethically acceptable and contextually pertinent because the healthcare system of the 
subjects offers nothing at the moment.13 They further argue that the standard of care in 
developing countries is no treatment at all and that no harm was inflicted on the subjects 
for participating in the research because they were not left worse off.14  They further 
contend that comparing the experimental drug with the best current effective therapy 
usually called equivalency trial provides the answer that is less reliable scientifically than 
results obtained from a research design utilizing placebo controls.15 They indicate that a 
placebo-controlled research can be carried out with fewer research subjects and 
completed within a shorter period than an active-controlled trial. The implication is that 
reliable and useful scientific information and effective interventions relevant to 
developing countries will be available more rapidly.16  
The proponents argue that testing the short course of anti-retroviral regimen 
against nothing was the appropriate research design that was responsive to the health 
needs of the developing countries. They also contend that this design does not disturb the 
clinical equipoise, that is, uncertainty about the likely research study result.17 Varmus and 
Satcher defending placebo-controlled trials argue that they address an urgent need in the 
countries in which they are carried out and that they have been designed by extensive and 
active participation of the scientific and public health communities of developing 
countries. They further emphasize that such trials are carried out in accordance with 
widely recognized principles and guidelines in bioethics.18 A placebo-controlled trial in 
developing countries cannot be likened to a trial that treat research subjects as a means to 
an end, and it does not mirror “a callous disregard of their welfare.”19    
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On the other hand, critics argue that the research was asking the wrong question 
of whether the experimental drug was better than nothing. They contend that based on the 
findings and efficacy of AIDS Clinical Trials Group (ACTG) 076 regimen the correct 
question was whether the long course of anti-retroviral regimen which has become 
established effective therapy in developed countries was better than the short course, 
which is the experimental regimen.20 They argue that the question has been clearly asked 
in the research conducted in Thailand which states: “Can we reduce the duration of 
prophylactic (zidovudine) treatment without increasing the risk of perinatal transmission 
of HIV, that is, without compromising the demonstrated efficacy of the standard ACTG 
076 (zidovudine) regimen?”21 The critics contend that such “equivalency studies of 
alternative anti-retroviral regimens usually provide more useful results than placebo-
controlled trials, without the deaths of hundreds of newborns that are inevitable if placebo 
groups are used.”22 They further argue that data from ACTG 076 zidovudine regimen 
provides researchers with adequate knowledge regarding the rate of perinatal 
transmission and consequently, that they have no need to compare the short anti-
retroviral regimen to nothing, rather the effective thing to do was to compare the long 
course anti-retroviral regimen to short course anti-retroviral regimen. The researchers 
should have been convinced that well-designed shorter anti-retroviral regimens would be 
more effective than placebo.23  
The critics further argue that the standard of care in developing countries which is 
not providing research subjects, that is, HIV-positive pregnant women with zidovudine is 
not determined by a consideration of alternative effective treatments or clinical data, but 
is rather decided on economic grounds that the poor developing countries cannot afford 
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the exorbitant prices of anti-retroviral drugs established by drug companies.24 Critics also 
charged that placebo-controlled HIV research conducted in developing countries when 
there is established effective therapy violated international ethical guidelines as well as 
US regulations.25 Angell charged that the placebo-controlled research conducted in 
developing countries violated the ethical guidelines provided by Declaration of Helsinki. 
She articulated that a placebo may not be used when established effective intervention 
exists. In this context, research subjects assigned to the control arm of the trial must 
receive the best known intervention available globally, rather than locally. Researchers 
are entrusted with the responsibility of all subjects enrolled in a trial, not just some of 
them. Furthermore, the goals of the research are always subordinate to the welfare of the 
subjects.26 CIOMS guidelines specify that, “the ethical standards applied should be no 
less exacting than they would be in the case of research carried out in the sponsoring 
country.”27 Similarly, U.S. regulations governing research conducted with federal funds 
both within and outside the United States stipulate that research procedures must “not 
unnecessarily expose subjects to risk.”28  
Despite the controversy regarding placebo-controlled research, the search for an 
affordable treatment for HIV in developing countries is the most important justification 
for conducting the research.29 However, it is pertinent to note that conducting placebo-
controlled trials is no longer the only or best strategy for providing affordable drugs to 
poor developing countries, especially given other reasonable alternatives that currently 
exist.30  
The lack of access to essential drugs has three components. First, pharmaceutical 
research neglects drugs for diseases that have high prevalence among the poor.31 This 
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occurrence is usually referred to as 10/90 gap, which implies that only 10 percent of 
global health research is dedicated to diseases that represent 90 percent of the disease 
burden globally.32 Diseases of poverty such as pneumonia, diarrhea, tuberculosis and 
malaria, which represent about 20 percent of the global disease burden, get less than 1 
percent of all private and public funds dedicated to global health research.33 Diseases 
prevalent in the tropics are usually most neglected. Data shows that 1556 new drugs were 
approved between 1975 and 2004, but only 18 were for tropical diseases and 3 for 
tuberculosis.34  
The second component of the access problem of the poor highlights that existing 
drugs are priced out of reach for buyers in developing countries during the patent years 
on the market. For example, Sanofi-Aventis a pharmaceutical company priced its drug 
Clopidogrel 60 times more than the generic version and 250 times more costly than the 
first-line counterpart, Aspirin. Similarly, the exorbitant prices of two important anti-
retroviral drugs manufactured by two different pharmaceutical companies impeded 
Thailand’s ability to guarantee HIV treatment for current 80, 000 patients, and to extend 
more treatment to another 20,000 patients that urgently need care.35 High prices of drugs 
are enabled by patents, which offer pharmaceutical company the sole right to produce and 
distribute drugs for many years. Patents are granted in most national jurisdictions in order 
to incentivize and reward innovation. A pharmaceutical company that enjoys such market 
exclusivity is allowed to price its drug in order to maximize profit and consequently make 
it out of reach for poor people in developing countries.36 The profit-maximizing price for 
essential medicines in many poor countries usually excludes a majority of the national 
population.37 Data shows that in South Africa, about more than four million people 
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infected with HIV, only 10,000 are able to afford access to anti-retroviral drugs at current 
exorbitant prices. In Malawi, the figure stands at about 30 out of one million people 
infected with HIV. In Uganda, an estimated 1.2 percent of about 820, 000 people infected 
with HIV can afford anti-retroviral drugs.38 The same bleak picture is reported regarding 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in most developing countries, except in a few 
countries that do not strictly enforce patent laws. Brazil is identified as one of such 
countries. It began production of generic versions of essential AIDS medications in the 
mid-1990s, which has resulted in significant decline of about 50 percent in AIDS 
mortality rate.39 
The third component of lack of access to essential drugs by poor people in 
developing countries is lack of adequate local health infrastructure. Pogge, Rimmer and 
Rubenstein articulate that, “In most of the less-developed countries, there is great scarcity 
of clinics and hospitals, of diagnostic equipment, as well as of doctors and nurses who are 
often very actively recruited to move to more affluent countries.”40 Data shows that in the 
year 2000 about 65,000 physicians and 70,000 nurses born and mostly trained in Africa 
were working in a developed country,41 which results in enormous gaps in covering 
health care as well as in education budgets in developing countries. The affordable access 
to anti-retroviral drugs must be discussed within the broader context of the impacts of 
intellectual property law and international trade agreements. The non-patent factors must 
also be explored in our discussion of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries. 
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B. Intellectual Property Law and Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing 
Countries 
B.1. Origin and Meaning of Intellectual Property Rights 
The publication of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government42 emphasizes 
the priority of individual rights to property, and specifically private property, as one of 
the tenets of philosophy of rights theory and one of the bases for justifying Western-style 
free enterprise. The Western thinking developed the notion of intellectual property rights, 
proprietary rights to what one invents, writes, paints, composes, or creates, from the idea 
of property in Locke.43 Intellectual property is defined as “creations of the mind, that is, 
intellectual creations, such as literary and artistic works, inventions and more.”44 
Property rights regardless of how they are socially defined by a particular society, 
establish obligations both for others and the state to protect property interests.45 The 
advent of industrial revolution ushered in an era that emphasized the protection of ideas 
as well as material property.46 There is recognition that patent protection promotes 
invention and creativity by safeguarding ownership of new ideas, as well as authorizing 
the inventor or creator to obtain benefits from that idea, in the same way the farmer 
benefits from good agricultural practices on his or her land.47 However, distinguishing 
farm land from ideas, Jefferson writes, “… ideas should freely spread from one to another 
over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his 
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature …. 
Inventions, then, cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”48 In contrast to the farmer, 
the inventor is encouraged to publicize her or his innovation while at the same time 
safeguarding the right to copy or reproduce the invention.49 
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Intellectual property has been defended from two different foundations, a standard 
rights-based defense and utilitarian justification. The rights-based perspective is derived 
from Locke’s theory of rights, which stresses that inventors have rights to what they 
create. The utilitarian justification associates rights with utility, which implies that 
inventors may not be likely creative without intellectual protection, since they will not 
essentially reap honor or the benefits of their inventions.50 A more detailed discussion on 
two different grounds for intellectual property follows. 
 
 B.1.a. Rights –Based Defenses of Intellectual Property 
The perspective that intellectual property is a type of ownership which entitles 
one to exclusive rights to use, copying, or distribution is usually the way intellectual 
property is considered, especially in countries and companies that sponsor the 
development of new processes or products. The implication is that from this point of 
view, if a person or company creates a patentable process or product, due to the creativity 
and work involved, the person or organization has exclusive rights to that creativity.51 
Governments grant specific rights to the creators of intellectual property, in order to 
motivate the continuous and useful enhancement of society with such creations. These 
rights are termed intellectual property rights (IPRs), and entitle the holders to avert 
misuse of their creation for a specified period of time by others.52 
Although intellectual property (IP) rights are considered as time-limited protected 
claims, they are in some situations especially Western countries conceived as perfect 
rights in such a way that violations of copyrights, trademarks, or patents are always 
wrong without exception.53 Rand captures this view when she writes, “patents and 
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copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property rights: man’s right to 
the product of his mind… patents are the heart and core of property rights, and once they 
are destroyed, the destruction of all other rights will follow automatically, as a brief 
postscript.”54 Rand argues that intellectual property rights are the most fundamental 
rights, and the implication is that without them all other rights are endangered. This 
implies that intellectual property rights might forestall other significant rights such as 
right to life and right to liberty. This perspective supports that one’s liberty is given up 
when one gives up control or some control over products of one’s mind.  
There is a contention that some fundamental liberty rights are given up when our 
intellectual agreements are violated. A pertinent distinction is relevant here between 
liberty and creativity usually considered as acts of the mind, and the productivity or 
products of the mind.55 Werhane and Gorman articulate, “I can sell, give away or 
sacrifice my property or my creation, but I cannot, without being enslaved, give up my 
entitlement to liberty and free choice.”56 There is a consensus that without intellectual 
property rights we may not acknowledge our creativity and the fruits or our labor, but it is 
rather more debatable whether we are forfeiting all our fundamental liberties. Locke’s 
perspective indicates that we have rights to our bodies and to liberty and consequently we 
can claim ownership of our own labor and its productivity, and are in position to use and 
entitled to property rights. Locke contends that life, labor, and liberty are the grounds for 
property rights and not the opposite.57 Werhane and Gorman argue that, “without rights 
to liberty, I can be enslaved, and slavery erodes the justification for the natural or human 
right to private ownership and thus for ownership of products of the mind.”58 
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It may be questionable to argue as Rand implies that intellectual property rights 
are the foundation for liberty, because that will entail that those without property are less 
free. It may also be considered a stretch to argue that intellectual property rights can 
override rights to life in some circumstances. In the past, it has been argued that liberty 
rights can override rights to life, but it is not plausible to argue that property rights, 
including the right to the product of our minds, override rights to life or liberty. It is 
rather more defensible to argue that property rights grow out of, but are not the 
foundation for, rights to life and liberty.59 
 
B.1.b. Utilitarian Defenses of Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection of intellectual property rights from utilitarian perspective has been 
defended with a number of strong arguments. It is usually argued that protection of 
intellectual property is crucial for the ongoing innovation, creation, and development of 
novel ideas. Inventors and companies contend that they have rights to protect the patent 
of their process and product and invariably control the access, because without such 
protection there will be very limited incentives for new product or development of 
innovative ideas.60 Werhane and Gorman argue that, “few people will write new material, 
create new art, or invent new products without such protections, because there is little in 
the way of honor, recognition, or profit in such activities.”61 
A second argument in defense of intellectual property from utilitarian point of 
view focuses on the importance of patent protection. Patent protection is built on the 
notion that patents are private property rights that grant unconditional rights over 
inventions and discoveries.62 Patent protection is critical to the survival and innovation of 
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pharmaceutical companies that usually require big amounts of money for research and 
development. It helps pharmaceutical companies and other patent holders to recoup profit 
on their investments in research and development. The provision gives them the incentive 
to continue investing in research and development for new drugs.63  
A third argument regarding the utilitarian defense of intellectual property 
emphasizes consumer benefits. There is a contention that consumers would benefit more 
in the short term, if patents on drugs are removed, which will result in increase in the 
competition with generic products. Implementation of this strategy will lead to lowering 
of costs of all drugs. Nevertheless, in the long run consumers would be worse off. This 
stems from the fact that pharmaceutical companies would not be able to recoup adequate 
revenues in order to continue to invest in research and development which is crucial for 
the development of new drugs. The implication is that the development of new drugs 
would decline slowly, and new life-saving and life-enhancing interventions would not be 
accessible to future generations.64  
The fourth argument for the utilitarian defense of intellectual property argues that 
in the absence of intellectual property protection, pharmaceutical companies such as 
Pfizer, which relies on patent protection to earn profits and develop products, will not 
enter countries such as India where patents are not strictly enforced. In countries such as 
India, reverse engineering of the product development is allowed and it is not illegal 
under Indian patent law for companies to copy other companies’ products, resulting in 
decreased market share and hindrance from recouping company research and 
development (R&D) investments.65 Data from World Bank’s early 1990s survey of 
international executives shows that tax rates and intellectual property protection were the 
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major factors in making decisions regarding global corporate investment.66 The World 
Bank survey further indicates that lack of IP protection harms investment in less 
developed countries, since companies such as Pfizer will not want to invest in countries 
where patent protections are not enforced.67 Bale articulates that, “without strong and 
effective global intellectual property rules, the gap between developed and developing 
countries will only grow in the future.”68 The same line of argument was supported by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In a new book sponsored by WIPO, 
Idris contends that altering natural resources and products of indigenous populations into 
intellectual property as well as safeguarding those ideas and others with a patent law can 
significantly contribute to the affluence of any nation.69 There are two major 
classifications of IP namely industry property and artistic and literary property. These 
properties were formerly governed by the Paris Convention (1883) and the Berne 
Convention (1896) respectively. Both conventions have undergone many revisions and 
are currently administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization which is 
based in Geneva.70  The emphasis in our discussion of affordable access to anti-retroviral 
drugs is on the industry property. Rewarding pharmaceutical innovation through strict 
enforcement of patent protection and ensuring affordable access to essential drugs for the 
poor especially in developing countries stand in some tension with each other. The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has been a major actor in the debate concerning patent law 
and access to essential medicines.71 The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights Agreement (TRIPS) established by WTO was a significant attempt to deal with 
the issue of global enforcement of patent protection for pharmaceutical products, which 
adversely impacted affordable access to essential drugs in poor developing countries. 
 152 
B.2. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) and 
Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing Countries. 
B.2.a. Background on TRIPS Agreement 
The end of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations resulted in the 
establishment of the WTO, with the signing of the Marrakesh Agreement on April 15, 
1994. TRIPS Agreement was also included in the new international trading regime, 
governed by the WTO.72 All the members of WTO are required to be signatories and are 
also obliged by TRIPS Agreement, which is managed by the TRIPS Council located in 
Geneva. Members are required to conform to the TRIPS provisions, but with certain 
exceptions and emphasis on the way they are implemented. Currently, TRIPS represents 
a global indication that stresses the protection and enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs) at national levels for WTO members.73 
Before the establishment of TRIPS Agreement, the protection of IPRs in various 
countries differed significantly. In developed countries such as U.S. there was effective 
protection,74 while in many developing countries, protection was either nonexistent or 
enforcement was tepid.75  There was a consideration by developed countries such as U.S., 
that this situation was militating against their interests and consequently with U.S. at the 
forefront they fought hard and succeeded in incorporating TRIPS in the Marrakesh 
Agreement.76   
The TRIPS Agreement includes a variety of intellectual property issues outside 
patents, such as trademarks, industrial designs, and copyright applicable to any sector.77 It 
offers minimum standards for intellectual property law, procedures and solutions and 
grants rights’ holders exclusive rights to effectively enforce their rights. The chief rule of 
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TRIPS for patents encompasses their availability for any invention, either product or 
process, in all fields of technology with exception. Inventions included under the patent 
law have to fulfil the standards for novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.78 
Article 7 of TRIPS makes provision for the global effective protection and enforcement 
of IPRs, with emphasis also on easing technological innovation and diffusion of 
technology.79  
Some scholars contend that the primary objective of establishing TRIPS was the 
promotion of the global protection and enforcement of IPRs.80 However, other relevant 
provisions of TRIPS, such as Articles 8, 30 and 73, as well as the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration of November 2001, attest to the fact that the primary objective of TRIPS 
goes beyond the protection of IPRs.81 Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement makes provision 
for members to adopt measures essential to promote public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in important areas relevant to their socio-economic and 
technological development, as far as such measures conform to the provisions of this 
Agreement.82 More so, at Doha representatives of various countries agreed that the least 
developed country members classified by United Nations based on several indicators 
comprising income, nutrition, health, education, literacy, and economic vulnerability, 
were not required to implement patent law for pharmaceuticals until January 1, 2016. 
Among the 50 least developed countries, 32 of them are WTO members.83  
Article 27 (1) of TRIPS Agreement obliges all members to broaden patent 
protection for a minimum period of twenty years to any invention in all fields of 
technology. It encompasses pharmaceutical patents, which grant the holders exclusive 
rights recognized globally to manufacture, use, sell and import patented medicines.84 
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These developments are unprecedented. Before TRIPS, the Paris Convention did not 
mandate the broadening of patents to any area of technology, neither did it require the 
transfer of exclusive patents, nor stipulate a minimum duration for such rights.85 For 
example, more than forty countries did not patent pharmaceuticals, several others such as 
India patented only pharmaceutical processes, and others offered shorter patent periods.86 
Countries such as Thailand granted pharmaceutical patents only for three years, while 
South Africa limited the duration of patents to only sixteen years. Some countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, Angola, Ghana and Malawi did not patent pharmaceutical products 
before the introduction of TRIPS.87 Forman articulates that “introducing patents where 
there were previously none drives up drug prices by enabling monopoly pricing and 
excluding cheaper generic alternatives. Given how price sensitive drug access is in poor 
countries, higher prices can significantly limit access for the poor.”88 
However, the TRIPS Agreement makes provisions for protecting public health 
and for governments to effectively respond to national health emergencies. Article 31 (f) 
authorizes governments to issue a compulsory license for a patented drug without the 
permission of the patent holder whenever it can be justified on the grounds of public 
interest.89 The implication here is that in the event of a national health emergency, a 
government who is a member of WTO is allowed to break a patent by authorizing a third 
party to produce a generic version of patented drug without the permission of the patent 
holder.90 For example, the threat of avian bird flu pandemic resulted in the pressure for 
Roche to relax patent restrictions on a drug effective against bird influenza known as 
oseltamivir.91 In another instance, during the fall of 2001 anthrax attacks, the US 
government under pressure decisively stepped in to break Bayer’s patent on ciprofloxacin 
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for the benefit of increasing availability of the drug.92 TRIPS also makes provision for 
parallel imports in the interest of public health and social welfare. Parallel importing 
authorizes countries to import cheaper priced patented drugs without any restrictions.93        
Conforming to the TRIPS provisions is mandatory for all WTO members, and is a 
requirement for the membership of the Organization. Members are sanctioned if they do 
not comply with the provisions. A member who violates trade agreements could receive 
summons from another aggrieved member for dispute settlement enforced by WTO 
dispute panel known as Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). DSU is a method 
devised by WTO for resolving IP and other trade disputes among members. WTO 
authorizes a member to use retaliatory trade measures against another erring member, 
which usually have severe adverse effects on the domestic economy of the latter. The 
erring member could also be impacted by other consequences such as negative 
international publicity and poor perception as an untrustworthy trade partner, 
inappropriate for foreign investment.94 For example, South Africa passed an amendment 
to its Medicines and Related Substances Act, which permitted the utilization of 
compulsory licensing and parallel importing in order to provide cheap priced medications 
to South Africans in need.95 The amendment was not fully implemented due to the 
pressure from the U.S. government and the multinational pharmaceutical companies 
opposing the overruling of patents in order to enhance affordable access to essential 
drugs in the world capital of the HIV/AIDS crisis.96 The United States utilized trade 
sanctions against South Africa as a retaliatory measure by including it in the infamous 
section 301 watch list. Section 301 which permits the United States to utilize unilateral 
trade sanctions was a retaliatory measure against any trade partner that violates patents 
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established under TRIPS Agreement.97 It has been argued that extremely strong legal 
protection of patents realized through TRIPS Agreement under the auspices of WTO 
plays a critical role in limiting access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs 
for the developing countries.98   
 
B.2.b. Implications of TRIPS Agreement for Access to Antiretroviral Drugs in 
Developing Countries 
There has been an ongoing vigorous debate on the impact of strict patent 
protection on affordable access to Anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. Two 
major perspectives emerged. The first perspective championed by Pharmaceutical 
companies and developed countries is articulated by supporters of strong patent 
protection. The second perspective defended by human rights activists and developing 
countries is articulated by critics of strict patent protection. Ferreira writes, “The United 
Nations (U.N.) and non-governmental human rights organizations claim that patents are a 
major factor in the lack of access to HIV/AIDS drugs, a point hotly disputed by the drug 
industry and its proponents.”99 Pharmaceutical companies and developed countries 
promote strong patent protection, disapprove of compulsory licensing and parallel 
importing, and blame developing countries such as South Africa of violating their legal 
obligations under TRIPS Agreement for adopting the stalled Medicines Act 
Amendment.100 Supporters of strict patent protection contend that patents are not 
responsible for lack of affordable access to HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries, 
rather, they attribute it to non-patent factors such as poverty, poor or inadequate health 
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infrastructure, the lack of political will and commitment on the part of government to 
fighting HIV/AIDS, and cultural barriers.101 
On the other hand, developing countries and human rights activists strongly 
advocate for the use of compulsory licensing and parallel importing in order to enhance 
affordable access to HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries. They also contend that 
laws created to increase affordable access to drugs are legal under various public and 
social welfare exceptions of TRIPS Agreement.102 They blamed lack of affordable access 
to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries on extremely strong legal protection of 
patents. Donald argues that despite the impact of non-patent factors, the broadening and 
strengthening of IP protection under TRIPS, especially patents, would further 
significantly impede lack of access to essential drugs such as anti-retroviral drugs in poor 
developing countries.103 A detailed analysis of the role of patent and non-patent factors in 
impeding access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries follows.  
 
B.2.b.i. Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing 
Countries 
Research and Development costs in pharmaceutical industry are very exorbitant 
and high, as well as the risk of failure. Pharmaceutical companies would not be able to 
recover their costs and make profit without patents.104 The primary objective of patents is 
to offer a temporary monopoly to rights holders as a motivation to innovations and their 
commercialization.105 The implication is that the monopoly rights enshrined in patents 
enable pharmaceutical companies to recoup research and development costs and generate 
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profit. Therefore, patenting pharmaceutical drugs would motivate them to engage in more 
research in order to manufacture new drugs for the benefit of the society106  
However, it is debatable whether pharmaceutical patents offer incentives also for 
research on drugs for the treatment of diseases predominant in developing countries, 
considering their small market and weak purchasing power. It has been estimated that 
averagely, pharmaceutical companies require about a minimum profit of $1 billion in 
order to embark on any risk of researching a particular disease.107 To this extent, 
pharmaceutical patents offer very limited commercial incentive to pharmaceutical 
companies to engage in research relevant to the diseases affecting majority of the poor 
people in developing countries. For example, the amount of money invested globally on 
pharmaceutical R&D for diseases prevalent in developing countries is estimated to be 
less than 5%.108  
Furthermore, out of the 1393 drugs approved from 1975 to 1999, only 13 were 
related to diseases prevalent in developing countries.109 There is very limited research on 
malaria, tuberculosis and sleeping sickness.110 Conversely, the story is completely 
different for diseases such as HIV/AIDS affecting both developed and developing 
countries. For example, in the U.S. as at 2002, there were 64 approved drugs for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS, while 103 are still in the process of development.111       
Critics of patent protection have charged that monopoly pricing which has been 
made possible by patents impedes affordable access to drugs to those who need them 
most especially in developing countries.112 Proponents of pharmaceutical patents 
countered that “poverty rather than patents is the main problem, and activists should 
focus their energy on poverty alleviation rather than IPR protection.”113 They reframed 
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the debate on two grounds. First, that very few drugs are patented in developing countries 
and they cannot constitute a significant impediment in accessing drugs. Second, that even 
if many more drugs are patented that they do not become a determining factor in pricing, 
but rather that there are other superseding factors that impede access to drugs by the 
poor.114   
The prevalence of patenting pharmaceutical products was explored as driving the 
debate. There was an indication that pharmaceutical companies do not usually seek to 
patent their products in developing countries because they have small markets and limited 
technological capacity. Pharmaceutical companies do not consider it lucrative to patent 
their drugs and enforce the patent when the potential market is small and the risk of 
infringement low.115  
The International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), a pro-intellectual property 
think tank established in 1999, and currently located in Washington, D.C. was among the 
first to argue for lack of correlation between strong patent protection and impeding access 
to essential drugs especially by the poor in developing countries. In 2000, IIPI published 
a report that explores the prevalence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa from three 
different perspectives. First, it examined the international community’s response, with 
particular reference to the levels of foreign aid offered by Western countries such as the 
United States.116 Second, it analyzed patent systems in various countries in Africa. Third, 
it explored the number of HIV/AIDS drugs patented in these countries.117 The report’s 
conclusion was that access to essential drugs comprises “numerous and complex issues, 
including healthcare infrastructure, international pricing mechanisms, financing, debt, 
tariffs and patents.”118  
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Furthermore, the report came to a conclusion that the TRIPS Agreement does not 
constitute a barrier to the distribution of HIV/AIDS drugs based on three reasons. First, 
the TRIPS Agreement was not implemented in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Second, the TRIPS Agreement allows adequate flexibility for countries to circumvent 
negative effects. Third, most pharmaceutical companies have not sought patents for their 
products extensively in Africa.119 The report did not attribute the primary barrier to 
access of HIV/AIDS drugs to poverty, but rather stressed that the core issue stems from 
sufficient financing of the overall health system as well as the development of healthcare 
infrastructure. The report gave an indication for the need to do more research in order to 
conclusively establish whether or not patents and TRIPS Agreement played any critical 
role regarding access to affordable drugs.120 
Two recent studies by Attaran and Gillespie-White have been cited to support 
proponents’ argument. The first study examined the extent of patenting of 15 vital anti-
retroviral drugs in 53 African countries. They found that most of the anti-retroviral drugs 
for treatment of HIV/AIDS were patented in only a few African countries estimated at 
about 21.6 %. There were no patents at all on these drugs in 13 of the 53 countries. They 
concluded that because the patenting rate was very small, patents generally do not 
constitute a significant barrier to treatment access in Africa. However, it acknowledged 
that there would be an issue when TRIPS becomes fully implemented by all WTO 
members.121 
The second study authored by Attaran explores the extent of patenting for 
essential medicines in low-income and middle-income countries. The study reveals that 
patenting for 319 drugs classified by WHO as essential drugs is infrequent in sixty five 
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low and middle income countries, with estimated population of four billion people. 
Patents exist for only seventeen essential drugs, but most of them were not actually 
patented. The estimated rate of patent is as low as 1.4 percent and it was focused on 
countries with larger markets and adequate technological capacity. There was a 
conclusion in the study that patents for essential drugs are usually not common in poor 
countries and consequently cannot easily explain why access to those drugs is frequently 
lacking, indicating that poverty, not patents, accounts for more limitation on access.122  
Both studies have been criticized on various grounds. The first study authored by 
Attaran and Gillespie-White fails to recognize that not all existing antiretroviral drugs are 
important to the same degree in treating the disease. Critics contend that the quantitative 
method employed by Attaran and Gillespie-White is deceptive because the most effective 
combinations of anti-retroviral drugs are usually obstructed in many of the African 
countries.123 Another criticism is that the study did not recognize the significant impact 
patents in one country can have on other countries. For example, South Africa has about 
13 out of 15 antiretroviral drugs patented. Therefore, South Africa as the most affluent 
country in Africa would have been in the best situation with its strong technological 
capacity to manufacture and distribute generic drugs to its neighbors.124 
Critics indicated that the first study conducted by Attaran and Gillespie-White has 
fundamental scientific limitations. The study did not consider extraneous variables such 
as levels of wealth and size of market and consequently it weakens any deduction that 
was made regarding correlation of geographic patent coverage with anti-retroviral 
treatment access in Africa. To examine whether patents cause lack of access to drugs in 
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developing countries, it will be important to compare countries with the same 
characteristics such as equally wealthy or equally large markets.125 
The second study was also found to have fundamental limitations. Attaran utilized 
WHO’s essential medicines lists for examining the patency prevalence of drugs. The 
WHO considers the cost when preparing this list, which implies that cheap drugs are 
favored. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that so few essential drugs are 
patented.126 Selgelid and Sepers argue that “if patents increase prices and thus make 
medicines less likely to appear on the list, then it should be no surprise that few drugs on 
the list turn out to be patented.”127 This view undermines the significance of Attaran’s 
finding that so few essential drugs are patented.128 Critics also contend that Attaran and 
Gillespie-White did not recognize the apparent failure of patents to provide incentives 
that usually result in the global development of drugs. Patents provide slight incentive to 
develop medical technologies precisely needed by the poor. Patents facilitate price 
increases, but this does not result in profits if those in need are not able to pay high prices 
for the products.129 
There is extensive evidence from developed countries that prices fall fairly 
sharply once drugs patents expire, and if there are generic competitors. The price fall 
appears to be larger with entry of more generic competitors into the market.130 
Governments can promote price reductions by easing generic producers’ early entry into 
the market. For example, the 1984 Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act in 
the United States popularly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act accomplished this 
objective, which lead to a significant increase in the delivery of generic versions of 
prescription drugs from 19% in 1984 to 47% in 2000. The size of market for generic 
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drugs is even larger in other developed countries such as the United Kingdom.131 
Pharmaceutical companies have instituted law suits in order to delay or block generic 
entry of producers and to defend or extend a monopoly on a successful drug.132 A recent 
study conducted in the US revealed that prices sharply fall when there is intense generic 
competition in the market, but a minimum of about five generic competitors are required 
to drive down prices to an extent.133  
Developing countries can also mitigate the impact of patent protection for their 
population by easing generic entry and generic competition. However, in most instances 
their choices are strictly limited by the small size of their markets and lack of local 
technological, productive and regulatory capacity.134 Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights articulates, “It is this lack of capacity to create a competitive 
environment for both patented and generic products that makes the existence of patents 
more contentious than in developed markets with greater capacity to enforce a strongly 
pro-competitive regulatory environment.”135 
Evidence abounds in the international arena that drugs patented in countries with 
strong patent protection are much cheaper in markets which do not provide patent 
protection. For example, the Indian market which does not offer product protection at a 
time has the cheapest drugs in the world.136 Nevertheless, with the introduction of drug 
product patents in India in 2005, there were expectations of significant increase in drug 
costs. For example, a case study of the influence of introducing patents on four domestic 
antibiotics projected that the total annual welfare losses to the economy of India 
stemming from increases in price and limits in access would be about $305 million or 
around 50 percent of the sales of the whole systemic antibacterial section in 2000.137  
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Furthermore, introducing global drug patents result in a systemic influence on the 
production and export of generic versions of new drugs. The implementation of TRIPS 
will ultimately results in phasing out the generic production of patented drugs entirely, 
unless this is completed through compulsory licensing. This will restrict domestic 
production of generic drugs, especially in India, which has been a principal source of 
generic antiretroviral drugs for other developing countries.138 The full implementation of 
TRIPS by 2016 will specifically influence developing countries that depend on 
importation of generic copies of drugs currently patented.139 There was an urgent need to 
develop measures that will continue to guarantee that the patent system supports the right 
of every country to protect human health and to enhance access to essential drugs in 
accordance with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and WTO General 
Council Decision of 30 August 2003.140 
 
B.2.b.ii. Implications of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
The TRIPS Agreement made provisions for parallel importation in Article 6 and 
compulsory licensing in Article 31 as tools for protecting public health and increasing 
access to essential drugs especially anti-retroviral drugs.141 However, some members of 
WTO did not interpret and implement TRIPS in a way that promotes public health. Two 
divergent interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement emerged at the special section of the 
TRIPS council held in June 2001. The purpose of this special section was to clarify the 
relationship between intellectual property rights and access to essential drugs under 
TRIPS Agreement.142  
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The objective of the African group and other developing countries was to 
elucidate the degree to which TRIPS Agreement permits members to promote and 
safeguard public health and other all-embracing public policy goals.143 Furthermore, 
developing countries stressed that restrictive interpretation of TRIPS as advanced by the 
United States and other developed countries would excessively restrict their ability to 
tackle public health emergencies such as AIDS.144 Developing countries emphasized that 
the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public 
health.145 The implication is that “TRIPS does not remove a member’s sovereign power 
to address public health emergencies within its own borders.”146  
The United States and other developed countries argue that strict patent protection 
would offer benefits to all countries, but at the same time recognizing the interests of 
developing countries in access to essential drugs. They further argue that the TRIPS 
Agreement strikes a balance between incentives for innovation and affordable access to 
essential drugs.147 Developed countries contend that the most effective strategy for 
tackling public health emergencies involves economic, social and health policies. These 
policies need strong patent protection to support the development of new drugs.148 
  Despite these divergent perspectives in the interpretation and implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was released by a broad 
unanimity of all WTO members at the Doha Ministerial meeting in Qatar in November 
2001.149  Sell and Odell articulated that the Doha Declaration was enabled by a shared 
and united efforts from a coalition of civil society organizations, developing countries 
and mid-tier countries, such as Thailand, India and Brazil.150 Sridhar indicates that 
although the Declaration may be imperfect and far from being an ideal document from 
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moral view point, compromise was arguably essential to realize agreement on it, which 
was extremely more desirable to no Declaration at all.151   
The Doha Declaration affirming support for public health clearly articulates, “We 
agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the 
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and 
in particular to promote access to medicines for all.”152 The Declaration acknowledges 
that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics are grave public health 
problems afflicting developing and least developed countries. It also reasserts, “the right 
of the WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which 
provide flexibility for this purpose.”153 Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration confirms 
Members’ right to grant compulsory licenses, as well as the right to determine the 
grounds for granting such licenses. Paragraph 5(c) stresses members’ right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency, or other circumstances of extreme urgency, such 
as, but not limited to HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB. The Declaration also emphasized that 
members were free to establish their own regimes for parallel importation without 
challenge.154 The implication is that the Doha Declaration made provisions for TRIPS 
Agreement to be responsive to the healthcare needs of developing countries and to 
underscore how members could utilize its flexibilities to achieve that purpose.155 
The Doha Declaration also acknowledged the problem presented by the TRIPS 
requirement which specifies that compulsory licensing shall be “predominantly for the 
supply of the domestic market.”156 This implies that developing countries without 
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domestic manufacturing capacity will not be able to access generic drugs for their 
population. Consequently, in paragraph 6, the Doha Declaration acknowledged the need 
for an expeditious solution to the problem encountered specifically by developing 
countries without local manufacturing capacity.157   
 
B.2.b.iii. Post Doha - The WTO Decision of August 2003 
Arriving at a consensus on what was dubbed the paragraph 6 problem resulted in 
protracted debate among TRIPS council members. The US headed a relentless effort to 
limit the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration to particular diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases resulting in epidemics.158 
Apart from restricting the use of compulsory licenses, the US intensified efforts to restrict 
the number of countries that could benefit from the importation of generic drugs.159 
In August 2003, the WTO General Council issued the decision on the 
implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which specifies that countries 
without local manufacturing capacity could issue compulsory licenses and on that 
foundation legally import generic drugs.160 The export solution is aimed at authorizing 
developing countries without local production capacity to import generic drugs made 
under compulsory licensing in accordance with strict conditions.161 For example, some 
conditions outlined include:  both importing and exporting countries must declare 
compulsory licenses; eligible importing members other than least-developed countries 
must establish insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector 
for the products in question; such drugs are restricted to the amount required to fulfill the 
needs of the importing country and must be entirely imported to the member; the drugs 
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must be clearly identified as manufactured under this system through labeling, marked by 
packaging and/or shaping and coloring; and importing countries must utilize reasonable 
measures to prevent re-exportation of products.162 
However, the WTO August 2003 decision was only a temporary waiver, pending 
a consensus on a permanent amendment.163 Efforts to reach a consensus on a permanent 
amendment to TRIPS were accompanied by further disagreement among WTO members. 
The US and other developed countries forcefully argued for formal approval of the 
temporary waiver as a permanent amendment. Conversely, developing countries, led by 
the African Group, contended that the temporary waiver contained too many procedural 
problems that would still impede access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs 
for countries without local manufacturing capacity.164 Furthermore, Medecins Sans 
Frontieres objected to making the temporary waiver permanent arguing that it would be 
imprudent because no country had really used it.165 So far, the export solution has been 
scarcely used. As of 2009, Rwanda is the first and only country to utilize the WTO 
General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 with its application for the importation of 
inexpensive generic drugs from Canada.166  Several factors contributed to failure of the 
WTO members especially developing countries to utilize the export solution, including 
constant threats of legal or economic sanctions from pharmaceutical companies and 
developed countries especially US, and the difficulty, cost and limited duration and scope 
of the rules.167  
Regardless of protracted debate on the status of the temporary waiver for the 
export solution, WTO members reached a consensus in early December 2005, just before 
the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, to make it permanent if at least two-
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thirds of the 148 WTO members formally approved the amendment by December 1, 
2007.168 Moreover, there have been concerns that the United States Trade Representative 
has negotiated TRIPS-Plus bilateral and regional trade agreements that undercut the goal 
and effect of the Doha Declaration and the WTO General Council Decision of the 30 
August 2003.169    
 
B.3. US Trade Policy and Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing Countries  
In January 2003, President Bush announced in the State of the Union address to 
Congress his five-year initiative for the United States to support the global effort to fight 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The proposed allocation fund for the initiative now known as 
the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was $15 billion in order to 
provide AIDS drugs for 2 million people living with HIV/AIDS, to provide education to 
prevent 7 million new infections, and to support care for 10 million AIDS patients and 
orphans.170  
Eight months after the implementation of the US HIV/AIDS plan, significant 
progress report was given by PEPFAR in accomplishing its goals. By March 2005, 155, 
000 people were receiving anti-retroviral drugs, 1.2 million women and babies had 
benefited from measures preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV, and 1.7 people 
infected or affected by HIV/AIDS were receiving supportive care with the help of 
PEPFAR.171 Furthermore, at the 2005 Summit of the Group of Eight Nations (G8), the 
heads of state of the eight affluent countries pledged extra aid for combating HIV/AIDS 
in Africa, and projected the possibility of universal access to HIV treatment by 2010.172 
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In spite of the aforementioned initiatives to promote universal access to anti-
retroviral drugs especially for developing countries, recent US negotiated trade 
agreements threaten to undermine these gains in improving access to anti-retroviral 
drugs.173 MSF writes “One by one, countries are trading away their people’s health in 
free trade agreements with the United States. These countries are being pushed to accept 
extremely restrictive intellectual property provisions that could put an end to competition 
from generic medicine producers and to countries’ ability to make use of existing 
safeguards against patent abuse.”174 The United States’ failure to promote free trade in 
the hemisphere and the globe resulted in its engaging in a forceful campaign to liberalize 
trade through bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements. These recent 
negotiated trade agreements by the United Sates have been based on the extension of 
Intellectual Property (IP) law for multinational pharmaceutical companies that hold 
patents for anti-retroviral drugs.175 Forman articulates that the intellectual property rules 
in TRIPS are significantly less strict than the rules developing countries are more and 
more accepting in free-trade agreements with the United States and other developed 
countries. These TRIPS-plus measures require greater limitations on the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities.176 The implication is that these Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) considerably 
restrict generic competition and consequently affordable access to essential drugs 
including anti-retroviral drugs.177  
The United States plays a leading role in establishing bilateral and regional trade 
and IP agreements. It signed bilateral trade agreements with 42 countries between 1986 
and 2000.178 Furthermore, it has negotiated numerous regional trade agreements 
involving about 50 countries, such as the Andean Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the Free 
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Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the South African 
Customs Union Free Trade Agreement (SACU FTA).179 These agreements have 
extensive effects for affordable access to drugs not only in these regions but globally, 
since a number of developing countries with generic local production capabilities, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, will be obliged to comply with TRIP-plus IP rules.180 
  The import of TRIP-plus measures enshrined in FTAs is understood not just as a matter 
of international trade law but of international human rights law. These agreements 
considerably restrict government ability to achieve the human rights to health and life of 
their population.181 Forman argues “Given the urgent need for increased access to 
essential patented medicines (particularly for HIV/AIDS), there is no logical or palatable 
way to justify trading off the instrumental value of patent protection (to provide rewards 
and incentives for future innovation) at the present cost of the lives of millions of 
people.”182 Similarly, the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) articulates 
that, “there are no circumstances in which the most fundamental human rights should be 
subordinated to the requirements of IP protection.”183 It is pertinent to point out that IP 
rights are given by states for limited durations especially for patents and copyrights while 
in contrast human rights are inalienable and universal.184 
The United States attempts to procure or has already procured the inclusion of 
various detrimental intellectual property provisions in its regional and bilateral trade 
agreements.185 TRIPS-plus measures in FTAs usually comprise “limits on compulsory 
licensing; prohibitions on parallel imports; limiting market approval for generic drugs; 
data exclusivity; extended patent terms and evergreening provisions.186 A brief discussion 
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on TRIPS-plus provisions and the likely impact on affordable access to essential drugs 
for developing countries follow.  
Compulsory licensing 
The US FTAs restrict the bases or circumstances for issuing compulsory licenses 
on pharmaceuticals to national emergencies or other conditions of extreme urgency, the 
compensation of practices considered to be anti-competitive and use for public non-
commercial use.187 This implies exclusion of any other bases for issuing compulsory 
licenses, comprising “the denial of a voluntary license, or as a measure to protect public 
health under TRIPS Article 8 that fell short of a national emergency.”188 While FTAs as 
well restrict the recipients of licenses to government entities or legal entities, functioning 
under the government’s authority, TRIPS on the other hand, requires no such limitations, 
since licenses can be granted to independent private entities for commercial purposes.189 
Restrictions on compulsory licenses would imply that countries would not be able to use 
their basic right to grant a compulsory license in order to alleviate high prices that limit 
access to essential drugs and to promote generic competition in the private sector to 
increase affordable access to essential drugs.190 Compulsory licensing is as well being 
undercut through restrictions on data exclusivity and marketing approval for generic 
drugs.191 
 
Parallel importing 
FTAs such as with Singapore, Morocco and Australia authorize patent holders to 
block parallel importation. Similarly, the FTAA orders regional exhaustion within five 
years of being signed, and essentially excludes parallel importation from outside 
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countries. These measures will prevent countries from importing cheap patented drugs 
sold in other countries.192 
 
 Intellectual Property and Regulatory Authorities: Transforming Drug Regulatory 
Authorities into Patent Police  
The US has created a new role for national drug regulatory authorities (NDRAs) 
through negotiating measures in FTAs that will entrust enforcement of drug patents to 
NDRAs. They would be prohibited from approving or registering a generic drug that is 
still under patent in a country unless the patent holder gives permission. This implies that 
registration should not be granted to generic producer before the expiration of the 
patent.193 MSF argues that, “Linking a drug’s registration (also known as its marketing 
approval) to its patent status is an underhanded way of preventing generic 
competition.”194 It also undercuts the utilization of compulsory licenses, since a generic 
company that has been awarded a license would not be able to register that drug, 
essentially making the license useless.195  
 
Data Exclusivity: Preventing Competition to Non-Patented Drugs 
Data exclusivity creates a new type of monopoly by blocking the registration of 
generic drugs even for a drug that is non-patented.  It blocks NDRA from utilizing data 
offered by originator Company to approve the use of an equivalent generic drug, 
consequently providing as such the original manufacturer’s monopoly.196 Most FTAs 
make provisions for the protection of manufacturers’ drug testing data, that is, data 
exclusivity to pharmaceutical products for five years from the date of the originator’s 
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approval.197 The implication is that generic companies are discouraged from pursuing 
registration for their drugs due to the tedious task of generating their own test data. 
Generic manufacturers in developing countries would not be able to foot the bill for their 
test data due to the exorbitant costs and low margins of generic production. Furthermore, 
data exclusivity essentially blocks the use of compulsory licenses, because it prevents the 
registration of a generic drug equivalent for the duration of exclusivity.198 Some trade 
agreements such as the U.S.-Morocco and U.S.-Bahrain FTAs make provision for an 
extra three years of data exclusivity when patent holders pursue marketing approval for 
already unapproved uses of registered drugs, including older generic drugs with expired 
patents.199   
 
Extending Patent Life Beyond Twenty Years 
FTAs extend the protection of patents beyond the 20-year period guaranteed 
under TRIPS to compensate for delays in the process of awarding patents or marketing 
approval by a national drug regulatory authority, as well as for unreasonable delays. 
Some trade agreements such as the FTAA, U.S.-Singapore, U.S.-Australia, and U.S.-
Morocco FTAs as well make provisions for extending the patent life when delays in 
granting the patent exceeds five years from filling, or three years after a request for 
examination of the application, whichever is later. The idea of unreasonable delays is 
contentious particularly considering that NDRAs and patent offices in developing 
countries have resource constraints.200  
 
New Use or Evergreening Provisions 
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New use patent is a mechanism for prolonging the monopoly of pharmaceutical 
companies. Patent holders as well could utilize new use patents to harass competitors by 
arguing that they violated patent. TRIPS Agreement does not make any provision for 
granting patents on new uses of existing drugs, whereas FTAs do  make it possible for 
pharmaceutical companies to extend patent durations on existing drugs,  thus prolonging 
or evergreening their monopolies,201 and endlessly block generic competition. Apart from 
patent protection, there are also several non-patent factors that significantly impede 
affordable access to essential drugs particularly antiretroviral drugs for developing 
countries. 
 
B. 4. Non-Patent Factors and Access to Anti-retroviral drugs in Developing Countries 
It is pertinent to recognize that so many factors unconnected to the IP system play 
a critical role in determining affordable access to essential drugs in developing countries, 
including sub-Saharan Africa.202 Schuklenk and Ashcroft contend that, “It would be 
wrong to paint a simplistic picture of the evil industry versus the brave governments of 
developing countries trying to save the lives of their suffering peoples.”203  The 
pharmaceutical industry argued that significant limitations to affordable access to drugs 
in developing countries are not strong legal protection of patent, but the lack of spending 
in developing countries, and the lack of adequate health infrastructure to administer drugs 
safely and effectively.204 Similarly, a report by the US pharmaceutical industry 
association succinctly articulates, “Handicapped by limited financial resources, these 
nations’ ability to contain AIDS and address a host of other killer diseases is 
compromised by inadequate infrastructure, cultural barriers to care, and mismanaged 
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health care systems. Some developing countries also are hampered by political leadership 
that lacks the will to confront or even acknowledge their nation’s health care needs.”205 
The lack of political will contributes significantly to the denial of affordable access to 
essential drugs.206 Most African countries grapple with the failure of political leadership. 
The implication of this is usually the inability of their political leaders to step up to the 
responsibility of making critical decisions in order to identify and fight for public 
healthcare needs. However, there are some exceptions. For example, Senegal stood out 
regarding the existence of strong political will, which was contributory to the early 
identification of the HIV/AIDS crisis, the organization of financial resources, the 
utilization of mass media campaign to counteract cultural and religious taboos, the 
support for the use of condom, and the providing of universal access to anti-retroviral 
treatment. The significant result was that Senegal had one of the lowest rates of HIV 
infection in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the 1990s.207 
Poverty is also a critical factor limiting the ability of developing countries 
including sub-Saharan Africa to afford even the basic essential healthcare needs. Their 
poverty stems more from a combination of poor political leadership and an uneven 
international political-economic structure.208 For example, in 1991 28 out of 48 African 
countries had an average per capita income of less than $1 per day compared to 19 out of 
36 countries in 1981.209 Furthermore, most developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
spend less than an average of US$ 10 per person every year on healthcare, which is far 
less than $60 per capita recommended by WHO as the minimum level of expenditure on 
basic healthcare services, as well as, about 20 to 40% below the World’s Bank 
recommended minimum level of healthcare services.210  
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank imposed reforms 
known as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on African Governments as 
conditions for giving them loans in the 1980s, which exacerbated their poverty level and 
further impeded the ability of the populations to procure essential drugs including 
HIV/AIDS drugs. This scenario made them very vulnerable to deadly diseases, such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.211  
Large debt interest payments made by developing countries especially sub-
Saharan Africa also negatively impacted affordable access to essential drugs. For 
example, sub-Saharan African countries by 1997 were previously remitting to Western 
creditors more than four times the amount invested in their domestic healthcare systems. 
A typical instance was that only Senegal expended more than five times the amount 
expended on health in loan repayments.212 The total debt of Africa as of 2000 was US 
$230 billion, with annual repayments of US $15 billion, which amounts to about 5% of 
its income and 15% of its export earnings.213 This financial squash disordered the 
healthcare systems of Africa, and resulted in people gradually more vulnerable to 
diseases. The situation deteriorated with the privatization of healthcare supported by the 
World Bank, which resulted in the commercialization of health services, consequently 
impeding access to essential healthcare to more people.214 
The recent global financial crisis worsened the situation, as it compelled 
governments to reduce their already insufficient health budgets, notwithstanding the 
epidemic of infection from major diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and 
sleeping sickness. The global financial crisis as well undercut the activities of 
international donor agencies. For example, the global fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria in 
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2009 reported about US$ 4 billion deficit in what was required to adequately fund 
essential services for these diseases in 2010. This shortfall was in addition to a US$ 10.7 
billion deficit in the funding for the implementation of the Global Plan to Stop TB at 
regional levels.215 
Poor international media coverage of diseases prevalent in developing countries is 
another factor identified as impeding affordable access to essential drugs. HIV/AIDS in 
sub-Saharan Africa only got international spotlight in the 1990’s when it was viewed as a 
threat to U.S. national security.216 However, the media attention diminished when the 
fears of catastrophic impact of the disease both in the US and other Western world 
dispelled. The lack of international media coverage could significantly prevent or 
constrain the organization of the resources required to guarantee a timely and constant 
supply of drugs to assist people afflicted with the disease in sub-Saharan Africa.217 
Finally, other non-patent factors militating against affordable access to essential 
drugs in sub-Saharan include the brain drain of qualified medical professionals from sub-
Saharan Africa to overseas countries,218  tariffs and other forms of indirect taxation,219 
which could be as high as 30% in some circumstances.220 It is significant that national tax 
systems function in a way that promotes public health policies, in the same way that the 
patent system should.221 The adverse effects of the TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS-plus 
provisions and non-patent factors in limiting access to anti-retroviral drugs for 
developing countries create a context to address the issue of the social responsibility of 
the pharmaceutical companies. 
 
C. The Social Responsibility of the Pharmaceutical Companies 
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C.1. Preamble 
Two dominant perspectives emerge in the discussion of scholars about the social 
responsibility of pharmaceutical companies. The leading proponent of the first 
perspective known as Resnik argues that pharmaceutical companies are like moral agents 
who have obligations to avoid causing harm and to promote social welfare. They have 
social responsibilities and moral obligations to meet the health needs of the populations 
in developing countries.222 
On the other hand, the second perspective propounded by Brock argues that 
corporations are unlike moral agents as long as their responsibilities are to their 
shareholders. He appeals to an argument in support of role differentiation. He argues that 
corporations do not have similar moral obligations like individuals  due to the fact that 
they serve a different social role that entails shareholder primacy.223 The shareholder 
primacy view of corporations emphasizes maximization of shareholders wealth.224 
An inclusive view of the corporation’s responsibilities is currently supported by 
the enactment of corporate constituency statutes.225 The implication is that corporations 
have both shareholder and social responsibilities. A brief discussion of the theoretical 
approaches to the social responsibility of the pharmaceutical companies will be pertinent. 
 
C.2. Theoretical Approaches to the Social Responsibility of Pharmaceutical Companies 
The classical theory of the primacy of shareholder invoked by Brock maintains 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between directors and shareholders that 
prioritizes the interests of shareholders.226 This position is supported by persuasive 
statements from legal cases, scholars, and the economist Milton Friedman.227 The central 
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legal argument   supporting the shareholder primacy is focused on agency law, which 
considers shareholders as the owners or the principals of the corporation and managers as 
the agents. In this context, the agent must always act for the interest of the principal, 
excluding the interests of other constituencies, including the manager himself. The 
application of this line of thought to the modern cooperation falls short of a remote 
possibility. The modern corporation significantly departs from the principal-agent model 
because it is grounded on the separation of ownership and control of the corporation, with 
managers shouldering a very active role and shareholders a comparatively passive one.228  
The idea of the primacy of the shareholder has as well been defended on the basis 
that the shareholders own the corporation, that they are the principals, and that the 
directors are obliged to maximize their wealth.229 This notion of the modern corporation 
known as the property conception was originally articulated by authors such as Adolph 
A. Berle and Milton Friedman. Berle argues that “all powers granted to a corporation or 
the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for 
the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.”230 He further argues 
that corporations were solely mediums for advancing and protecting the interests of 
shareholders and that corporate law should be interpreted within the context of this 
principle. He contends that any other account of the function and purpose of corporations 
would “defeat the very object and nature of the corporation itself.”231  
Similarly, Friedman argues that in a free enterprise, private-property system, the 
primary responsibility of a corporate executive is to conduct business in conformity with 
the interests of the owners, which usually entails making as much money as possible 
while complying with the basic rules of the society.232 The idea of maximization of 
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stockholders’ wealth stems from the fact that they are considered as owners of the 
corporation. Nevertheless, the myth of shareholder primacy is debunked, because even if 
they are considered as owners of the corporation, there is nothing as such that validates 
that corporation must focus on shareholder profit, more especially when shareholders 
make very minimal contribution of only money. More so, the popular practice of 
extending stock options definitely undermines any assertion of shareholder ownership.233    
A newer concept with a significant change to the argument in support of 
shareholder primacy focuses on the agency costs’ view. This view broadens a 
corporation’s constituencies and consequently, its priority interests. The agency costs’ 
view emphasizes that “in the best of all possible worlds, it would be preferable if 
managers could consider the interests of all of a corporation’s constituencies (all those 
who affect the organization and are affected by it), including among others employees, 
clients, and the community.”234 In contrast, there is a conception that deviating from 
shareholder primacy would involve giving managers who are also mere humans too much 
discretion to the point that they become too opportunistic. A similar problem encountered 
in the principal-agent model could also be experienced when managers are given such 
discretion, because they would not necessarily act in the interests of society but instead 
act in their own interest.235 Roe articulates, “… a stakeholder measure of managerial 
accountability could leave mangers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue 
their own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employer, consumer, nor 
national wealth, but only their own.”236   
Another perspective known as the social entity conception views the corporation 
as a social construction, with social purposes.237 A leading scholar who originally 
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articulated this idea in response to Berle’s shareholder primacy position was E. Merrick 
Dodd, a professor at Harvard Law School. He argues that, “there is in fact a growing 
feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that our corporate 
managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal 
compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities.”238 He cited the 
heads of some major corporations, such as General Electric, to buttress his argument that 
business leaders had come to acknowledge that corporate managers are required to 
consider social responsibility when running their companies.239  
Dodd offered some interpretations of the social entity view in relation to corporate 
law. He argued that if social responsibility entailed that corporate managers focused more 
on the needs of their employees and consumers, this would in the long run result in the 
shareholders’ benefit. His reasoning was based on the fact that employee satisfaction 
results in greater productivity and eventually increased profits. The implication is that 
managers could actually increase profits by concentrating on the needs of groups other 
than shareholders.240  
Dodd further argued that courts had offered enough leeway to corporate 
managers, permitting them “a wide range of discretion as to what policies will best 
promote the interests of the stockholders . . .”241 For example, he indicated that corporate 
charitable giving, although may not directly increase shareholder wealth, but could 
engender good will in the community.242 This good will could lead to shareholders’ 
benefit, because consumers would be more likely to think positively of the corporation 
and purchase its products. By this logic, he thinks that corporations are “affected not only 
by the laws which regulate business but by the attitude of public and business opinion as 
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to the social obligations of business.”243 He asserted that the opinion of the society about 
corporation as a purely private enterprise was shifting, and that corporate managers 
should “recognize that the attitude of law and public opinion towards business was 
changing….”244  
He thinks the case for social responsibility is even more compelling with regard to 
companies that have strong public dimensions, such as railways and public utilities. 
Pharmaceutical companies may be classified under this category because of the strong 
public health dimension. The social entity conception takes into account that corporations 
have much broader social purposes and duties than merely maximizing the wealth of 
shareholders.245 A review of the three major theories of the corporation indicates that the 
duties of pharmaceutical companies will be determined by the particular theory one 
adopts. 
Allen highlights that the courts and legislatures have recognized the social entity 
view and the social obligations it supports.246 The legal system realized this objective 
with the enactment of corporate constituency statutes. These statutes have undercut 
shareholders’ primacy, in support of other constituencies, such as employees and the 
community. Currently, about 29 states have adopted corporate constituency statutes in the 
United States.247 For example, the New York statute’s provisions of 4 and 5 authorize 
directors to consider other constituencies when they act, and to act on behalf of these 
other constituencies.248 Corporate constituency statutes significantly modify a 
corporation’s duty of care to encompass others in addition to shareholders. This implies 
that managers may have a legal right to consider interests of other constituencies in 
addition to shareholders without infringing on their obligations to shareholders.249 The 
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responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies to their shareholders do not protect them 
from increased moral responsibilities for ensuring affordable access to anti-retroviral 
drugs for developing countries.250  
 
C.3. Global Pharmaceutical Companies and Social Responsibility 
Assigning social responsibilities to global pharmaceutical companies has been 
hotly contested by several authors. Resnik argues strongly in support of ascribing social 
responsibilities to global pharmaceutical companies, appealing to the view that business 
only functions well within the context of social values such as honesty, integrity, fidelity, 
diligence and fairness. Business would be undercut by corruption, theft, fraud and 
disloyalty without allegiance to such social values.251 In contrast, Daniels argues that 
Resnik’s argument falls short, because the specific obligations or responsibilities 
assigned to global pharmaceutical companies cannot be deduced from the list of social 
values identified by him.252  
Furthermore, Resnik argues that businesses have other social responsibilities 
because they exist within societies where people are concerned about the environment, 
public safety, public health and other values. Ignoring such social responsibilities 
grounded in what society cares about may incur the wrath of the public and eventually 
stringent regulations.253 On the other hand, Daniels argues that the specific 
responsibilities or obligations ascribed to businesses within a society result from a 
societal negotiation “in which the protection of business incentives and productivity are 
weighed against the consequences to the public of failing to impose specific – legal and 
administrative – duties and obligations.254  
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Daniels postulates moral responsibilities that conform to and possibly justify the 
legal duties and obligations that result from such a negotiation. However, he went further 
to argue that the specific nature of any of these duties or responsibilities should result 
from a kind of social contract that establishes them. They cannot be deduced simply from 
what society is concerned about or what it impends. Daniels contends that the duties and 
obligations we may impose on global corporations, internationally also result from both 
domestic and international negotiation. He thinks we can have more clarity and 
specificity regarding the social responsibilities that are ascribed to corporations in either 
the domestic or international case only when we have executed the appropriate 
negotiation within the appropriate social or inter-societal contract setting.255 Similarly, 
Brock disagrees with Resnik argument of facing the public’s wrath if pharmaceutical 
companies ignore their social responsibilities but for a different reasoning distinct from 
Daniels. He thinks that this is not the reason why they have any moral responsibilities, 
rather, it simply indicates that it is in their self-interest, not a moral obligation, to execute 
some responsibilities.256  
Resnik offered second reason for ascribing social responsibilities to 
pharmaceutical companies, articulating that they are like moral agents in that their 
decisions have significant consequences for people affected by them. Daniels agrees 
partially with him that we all get involved in moral blame of some of these consequences 
and some of these actions. However, he doubts the clarity of responsibilities that derive 
from the fact that corporate decisions have consequences on people outside the 
corporations. He thinks Resnik does not provide sufficient details regarding the 
derivation. Furthermore, he contends that both in different nations and globally, societies 
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and their legal institutions take these consequences into account, engage in evaluating of 
benefits in contrast to consequences, including the consequences of corporate decisions 
on the rights of other parties, and establish a legal and possibly moral framework for 
discussing social responsibilities. Noteworthy, is that the specifics do not derive from the 
nature of agency but from the kind of discussion he has identified.257 
On the other hand, Brock argues that corporations are unlike moral agents in 
many other ways, pointing to the fact that various social institutions are established for 
specific purposes and functions, which make them unlike persons and influence their 
responsibilities. More so, he contends that many people believe that the responsibilities of 
corporations go to their shareholders and that they do not have moral responsibilities of 
beneficence and justice similar to those of individuals. He thinks that Resnik too 
hurriedly supposes that corporations have the moral obligations like those of 
individuals.258 
Resnik argues that global pharmaceutical companies have social responsibilities 
or duties of beneficence and justice to developing countries. He appeals to such social or 
moral responsibilities as a solution for providing affordable access to essential drugs in 
developing countries. There are various ways that global pharmaceutical companies can 
exercise their social or moral responsibilities to developing countries, including 
sponsoring research and development for diseases that affect people in developing 
countries such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, providing free medications to 
them, and offering substantial discounts on drug prices. He argues that these social 
responsibilities are not absolute requirements and may be weighed against other 
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obligations and commitments with respect to economic, social, political, legal and other 
relevant conditions.259  
Furthermore, Resnik argues that the degree to which a global pharmaceutical 
company may exercise social responsibility in developing countries extensively hinges on 
two major factors: (1) the expectations of a reasonable profit and (2) the expectations of a 
good business environment.260 Developing countries can either assist or hinder the efforts 
of pharmaceutical companies to execute social responsibility through several policies and 
practices. They could guarantee a reasonable profit for pharmaceutical companies by 
honoring pharmaceutical patents. If they do not comply with the patents, the 
pharmaceutical companies will significantly lose some profits which will take away 
money that could be invested in projects or programs aimed at promoting affordable 
access to essential drugs in developing countries. Guaranteeing a good business 
environment for pharmaceutical companies entails that developing countries should make 
honest efforts “to promote the rule of law, ethical business practices, stable currencies, 
reliable banking systems, free and open markets, democracy, and other social, economic, 
legal and political conditions conducive to business.”261 
Conversely, Brock thinks that more argument is required to buttress that global 
pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to conduct business and exercise 
social responsibilities in developing countries.262 He thinks that fulfilling basic needs of 
individuals in a society is the responsibility of the government, citing Rawls’ concept of 
the function of basic social institutions. For example, fulfilling the basic needs of food 
and shelter is not a special responsibility of the food and real estate industries, but a 
governmental responsibility. He asserts that providing prescription drugs coverage for the 
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elderly acknowledged as a major political issue in the United States, has never been 
argued by any of the parties in the debate as the pharmaceutical companies’ social 
responsibility of beneficence and justice to fulfil the need.263  
Furthermore, Brock points to large income inequalities between developed and 
poorer developing countries, which impede the latter’s affordability of the prices of 
patented drugs, and is acknowledged as one of the most grave injustices in the world 
currently.     He argues that when developing countries fail to honor pharmaceutical 
patents, in order to provide drugs essential to save lives and protect their citizens’ health, 
it is debatably a step towards ensuring greater justice between developed and developing 
countries, as well as, a situation where the threat of overruling pharmaceutical patents 
may have greater influence on the voluntary efforts of pharmaceutical companies than 
arguments regarding their social responsibility.264 
Daniels also expresses some doubts regarding Resnik’s focus on social or moral 
responsibilities as a solution to the problem of affordable access to essential drugs in 
developing countries. He acknowledges that developing countries have endured for a 
long time, a situation in which global pharmaceutical companies have hardly exercised 
the social responsibilities that Resnik assigns to them. He contends that though debatable, 
developing countries do a better job of fulfilling the health needs of their populations by 
engaging in local manufacture of drugs as well as refusing to honor intellectual property 
rights. Resnik’s contention that such action by developing countries takes away some 
profits from pharmaceutical companies which they need in order to be competitive, falls 
short because it cannot be buttressed from existing facts, and Resnik himself indicates 
that they make a substantial profit regardless of renegade states.265 
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Daniels challenges Resnik’s argument that in the long run, the global 
pharmaceutical companies would better fulfill the health needs of developing countries if 
both global pharmaceutical companies and developing nations reciprocally fulfilled their 
social responsibilities. He indicates that Resnik may be right, but also recognizes that 
there is no assurance to developing countries that global pharmaceutical companies will 
fulfill their social responsibilities on a consistent basis, regardless of the abundant 
evidence that they fulfill other commitments. In the absence of resolving the problem of 
assurance which may rest on some reliable strategies for enforcement of those 
responsibilities, there is no way to effectively deal with the behavior of developing 
countries eager to resolve the problem of affordable access to essential drugs by their 
local production. In fact, the international agreements on intellectual property, such as 
TRIPS Agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions that establish international property rights 
fall short of implementing the social responsibilities of global pharmaceutical companies 
and concentrate only on the responsibilities of developing countries to honor property 
rights. Daniels forcefully argues that, “Without the quid pro quo, there is no solution to 
the assurance problem and so no basis for appealing to moral commitment to solve the 
problem of public goods lurking in the background.”266 Finally, Daniels contends that the 
solution to affordable access to essential drugs in developing countries rests on domestic 
and international action to control global pharmaceutical companies and to standardize 
their contributions towards fulfilling the needs of developing countries.267 
 
D. Current Strategies for Dealing with Access Problem 
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    Global pharmaceutical companies, international agencies and national governments 
exercise their social and moral responsibilities to ensure affordable access to essential 
drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for developing countries with the following 
strategies: private donations, price reductions and differential pricing, International 
collaborative initiatives and public-private partnerships and compulsory licensing. A brief 
discussion of the strategies follows.  
 
D.1. Private Donations 
  Several pharmaceutical companies embark on various programs to donate AIDS 
drugs free of charge to developing countries. For example, Boehringer-Ingelheim pledged 
to provide Nevirapene, an effective drug for significantly reducing the mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV, free of charge for a limited period of time. Pfizer also offered to 
provide Fluconazole free of charge to the people of South Africa affected by cryptococcal 
meningitis.268  
   `Various pharmaceutical organizations also have donated funds to developing 
countries aimed at ensuring affordable access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral 
drugs. For example, Merck donated US$3 million to the Harvard AIDS Institute for 
developing and implementing a care program in Senegal and Brazil. Similarly, Bristol-
Myers Squibb funded its own “Secure the Future Programme” with US$100 million, in 
order to establish a large number of programs in African Countries, as well as for training 
of health care professionals from Africa at US tertiary institutions.269 
Most authors have questioned the sustainability and effectiveness of donations by 
pharmaceutical companies in resolving the perennial issue of affordable access to 
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essential drugs for developing countries. Schuklenk and Ashcroft articulate, “The 
problem with these handouts is, of course, that such offers are fraught with conditions, 
time and quantity-based limitations and a continuing dependence of the developing 
country’s health care planning on the generosity of commercial organizations.”270                   
Philanthropic approaches to the issue of affordable access to essential drugs for 
developing countries have both advantages and disadvantages. In a way, they depict an 
acknowledgement by corporations that they possess the capacity to act morally and, 
probably, possess an obligation to help those affected by disaster. The positive aspects of 
such donations comprise that they take place, they are not coerced and they depict an 
assumption of moral agency and moral obligations by corporations. Conversely, there is 
recognition of the existence of moral distinction between charitable giving considered as 
voluntary and honorable and acting on duty. In this context, duty implies duty to prevent 
avoidable deaths where it is possible for one, is not optional but obligatory. Charity 
entails the freedom to turn away one’s giving elsewhere if one considers it appropriate, 
and to assume the right to cease if the recipient is not grateful or not deserving.271 
Another case against charity is that “it morally degrades the individual by 
fostering dependence, promoting an attitude of humility toward the giver, and depriving 
the recipient of the ability to set terms and negotiate the terms of receipt.”272 Counting on 
this argument presents serious problem because it may portray aid as such as wrong, 
instead of particular type of aid, such as supererogatory, discretionary, and conditional 
charity. However, donation of drugs has been argued as an improvised solution, which 
may partly solve the problem of affordable access to essential drugs for developing 
countries, but it comes with moral problem. This implies that on the one hand, from 
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aretaic point of view, it deals with the motives and character of donor and recipient, and 
on the other hand, from consequentialist viewpoint, the solution is not sustainable and it 
ignores the perspective in which pharmaceutical companies and states have a duty to 
prevent avoidable deaths when they possess the power to do so.273     
D.2. Price Reductions and Differential Pricing 
Price reductions and differential pricing or equity pricing are also ad hoc solutions 
used by pharmaceutical companies to tackle the issue of affordable access to patented 
essential drugs for people in developing countries. Initial efforts to reduce the exorbitant 
price of AIDS drugs were made by UNAIDS. In 1997, UNAIDS started a collaborative 
effort that engaged three pharmaceutical companies and health officials in Chile, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Uganda, and Vietnam. However, prices of anti-retroviral drugs continued to be 
very exorbitant for most people in these countries, despite this plan.274  
Pharmaceutical companies also embarked on reducing the price of life-
prolonging, health preserving anti-retroviral drugs for poor developing countries. For 
example, in February 2001, Oxfam launched a campaign to pressure multinational drug 
companies to cut prices in poor countries. The charity initiative was not restricted to 
HIV/AIDS, but encompasses other drugs such as effective antibiotics. More so, Oxfam 
challenged the patent laws that have hindered poor countries from importing inexpensive, 
generic drugs from other countries without fear of reprisal.275  
Merck, a big pharmaceutical company in March 2001 also offered to sell two of 
the AIDS drugs it produces to developing countries at much reduced prices than it 
charges in the United States. For example, Crixivan and Stocrin were sold for $600 and 
$500 per patient per year respectively, at a time when the US prices for these drugs were 
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$6,000 and $4,700, respectively. Merck also offered to reduce the prices of both drugs in 
Brazil, but at higher prices than it had provided other developing countries, $1,029 for 
Crixivan and $920 for Stocrin. Merck explained that its decision was based on the 
countries that would qualify for its lowest price on the United Nations Human 
Development index. The Brazilian government as well exerted pressure on Hoffmann-La 
Roche, which manufactures another AIDS drug to reduce its price.276   
Novartis, another pharmaceutical company based in Swiss in May 2001 also 
offered to cut the price of Riamet, a powerful drug to treat malaria. The price at the time 
in industrialized countries was about $12, but Novartis decided to sell the drug to WHO 
for $2 for a complete treatment. Overall, between March and May 2001, the companies 
that chose to sell their AIDS drugs at considerably reduced prices in developing countries 
were Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Bistol-Myers Squibb, and Abbott Laboratories.277 
Various pharmaceutical companies are also effectively advancing towards a 
solution to affordable access that entails differential pricing or equity pricing in 
developed and developing countries. Differential pricing or equity pricing is defined as 
“setting the price of essential drugs in a way that reflects countries’ ability to pay, as 
measured by their level of income.”278 Differential pricing uses a tiered pricing system 
with emphasis on market segmentation based on the economic profile of a country. 
Pharmaceutical companies provide countries with a differential pricing or an equity 
pricing scheme, based on the economic profile of the poorest buyer in a country. This 
utilizes the notion of price discrimination which allows a pharmaceutical company to sell 
the same drug to different buyers at different prices. Prices are specifically not based on 
the costs of production but on what the buyer would be able to pay.279  
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The notion of differential pricing is distinct from the circumstance seen in various 
countries where they price the same drugs differently. The latter condition stems the 
policies adopted by individual countries that help them to control the drug market for 
their own people. Differences are also traceable to taxes, import duties, whole-sale and 
mark-ups, and several other factors. Variations in prices of the same drugs in different 
countries are not usually accounted for by a deliberate and systematic international 
policy, but differential pricing focuses on that purpose and structure.280  
The purpose of differential pricing is to enable poor developing countries to 
achieve access to essential drugs for their populations.281 In most poor developing 
countries, both the government and the majority of the people are not able to afford 
essential drugs that are required for various treatable diseases. On the other hand, in 
affluent developed countries, public funding is the chief source for financing healthcare 
services, varying from over 95 percent in the U.K., more than 90 percent in Norway, to a 
low of less than 50 percent in the US. This implies that out of packet payments, instead of 
prepaid insurance, are the major means for financing healthcare services, including 
buying of essential drugs in most poor developing countries.282  Both price reductions and 
differential pricing present serious challenges to pharmaceutical companies by opening 
avenues for parallel trade or parallel importing, which undercuts their profits.283 They are 
also ineffective solutions to the issue of affordable access to essential drugs for 
developing countries. The failure of the market mechanism to guarantee affordable access 
to essential drugs, as well as the limitations imposed by intellectual property rights 
resulted in the establishment and growth of public-private partnerships.284  
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D.3. International Collaborative Initiatives and  Public-Private Partnerships 
An astronomical growth in the establishment of public-private partnerships, and 
numerous collaborations among international agencies was experienced in the 1990s.285 
Pharmaceutical companies, international agencies, developed and developing countries’ 
governments were more readily willing to collaborate in order to ensure affordable access 
to essential drugs for people in developing countries. Notable among those collaborative 
initiatives were the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), the 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. These initiatives function by utilizing funds to support 
research and development aimed at manufacturing new drugs that are badly needed for 
people in developing countries who cannot afford them. The pharmaceutical companies 
involved in these efforts benefit by utilizing patents that stem from their collaboration to 
develop drugs they can market more profitably in developed countries. In return for 
engaging in the partnership, they usually make a commitment to offer drugs to 
developing countries at reasonable prices.286 
GAVI was established in 1999 to guarantee the protection of children against 
diseases that can be avoided by vaccines. GAVI supports new vaccine development, 
organizes current immunization programs, and operates at international, regional, and 
national levels. Its special focus is to expedite research and development of vaccines for 
developing countries.287  
GAVI has broadened its intiative by attracting several public and private partners, 
comprising “the United Nations agencies, WHO, the World Bank, and UNICEF; private 
foundations, the Bill and Melinda Gates Children’s Vaccine Program and the Rockefeller 
 196 
Foundations; the industry group, International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association as well as public health and research institutions and national 
governments.”288 GAVI created the Vaccine Fund, which offers direct support to 
countries in two ways.The first is providing new and under-used vaccines, in addition to 
safe immunization equipment; the second is providing funds in order to help governments 
in fortifying their immunization services.289 
The Global Fund is one of the most recent intiatives by various United Nations 
agencies to establish private-partnerships for the purpose of ensuring affordable access to 
essential drugs in poor developing countries. The Global fund was established for the 
purpose of fighting AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria prevalent in development countries, 
where the local populations are unable to afford drugs for treating these diseases. The 
Global fund initiative was set in motion by the call from both Gro Harlem Bruntland, the 
former Director General of the World Health Organization, and Kofi Annan, the former 
Secretary General of the United Nations,  for establishment of a large fund to combat 
diseases that kill or disable millions of people in poor developing countries. Both leaders 
envisioned the necessity for obligations from affluent and poor countries’ governments, 
and also from private foundations, nongovernmental agencies, and the private sector, to 
embark on this initiative.290 The Global Fund was structured to raise funds for broad 
objectives, including the purchase of drugs from manufacturers, the launch of better 
educational and prevention programs, the construction of new clinics or improvement of 
current ones, training of healthcare workers, and fortifying the infrastructure in other 
ways.291  
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The Global Fund devised the strategy of supporting poor nations to buy generic 
drugs rather than more exorbitant brand-name drugs currently under patent protections by 
the global pharmaceutical companies. This strategy made it possible for countries such as 
India and Brazil, which are large manufacturers of generic drugs to market their products 
in other poor countries. Because, the Global Fund offers grants to countries that apply for 
them, such countries are required to purchase the lowest priced drugs of guaranteed 
quality, which is a more efficient and effective utilization of the fund’s money.292 One of 
the major challenges which hampered the progress of the Global Fund was meager 
funding from voluntary donations, which falls far short of its anticipated goal and the US 
was blamed for setting a poor example for other countries.293 The TRIPS Agreement also 
continued to impede the improved access to generic drugs by poor countries, making it 
more imperative for such countries to use compulsory licensing in order to address their 
public health emergency needs. 
 
D.4. Complusory Licensing 
The TRIPS Agreement makes provision for countries to respond effectively to 
public health emergency situations such as HIV/AIDS epidemics by issuing compulsory 
licensing. This provision authorizes countries to bypass patent protection and  
manufacture or import copies or versions of patented drugs in a case of national health 
emergency. The procedure for accomplishing this is to issue a compulsory license in 
order to produce a generic copy of a drug, and the patent-holder is paid an affordable 
royalty under this arrangement.294 Countries lacking manufacturing capacity were also 
allowed under this provision to import a generic copy of a patented drug.  
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A major contention among WTO member countries was the definition of what 
constitutes a national emergency. Countries were invested with the right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency and there were express indications that public 
health crises, such as HIV/AIDS,malaria, tuberculosis and other epidemics will be 
considered as national emergencies.295 
Another obstacle to countries issuing compulsory licensing was the pressure from 
big multinational pharmaceutical companies, US and other western governments who are 
opposed to invoking the provision. Their pressure sometimes resulted in litigations and 
retaliatory sanctions against such countries as evident in the South African case.296  
  The validity of complusory licensing approach has been defended by several authors on 
moral and pragmatic bases by elimination of other alternatives such as donation, ad hoc 
price reduction,  and  public-private partnerships.297 Schuklenk and Ashcroft argue that, 
“the effective prevention of avoidable deaths, the operation of efficient competitive 
markets through lowering of artificial barriers to entry, and the assertion of legitimate 
national sovereignty in the international arena are conclusive prima facie justifications of 
compulsory licensing.”298  
Some risks associated with compulsory licensing were also highlighted. 
Pharmaceutical companies may have less capacity to shoulder the risks of research and 
development (R&D), if their right to market their products with a substantial profit, in 
order to recoup research and development costs is significantly undermined by the risk of 
compulsory licensing. This scenario may also adversely impact their choice of drugs to 
develop. For example, they may focus on luxury high-cost drugs for lifestyle conditions, 
instead of essential drugs for life-threatening and chronic disease.299 Nevertheless, 
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Compulsory licensing has been argued as the most effetive means available to developing 
countries’ 
governments to  provide essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs to their people in 
a time-efficiently manner.300 
 
E. Conclusion 
  Concluding remarks on the affordable access to drugs in developing countries 
stress the compelling need and urgency for development of cheaper generic copies of 
anti-retroviral drugs for addressing HIV/AIDS epidemics. Conducting international 
clinical trials was considered as a primary strategy for providing affordable access to 
essential drugs in developing countries, but available evidence shows that participants 
and host populations usually do not share in the benefits that result from such trials. 
Merits and demerits of placebo-controlled trials were argued, and it was established that 
in the presence of other viable alternatives, it is no longer the best method for providing 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for poor populations in developing countries.  
  Most anti-retroviral drugs that result from international clinical trials conducted in 
developing countries are not marketed in that setting, because they are unable to afford 
them, rather they are usually sold in developed countries, where pharmaceutical 
companies recoup substantial profits on R&D. 
Three major factors were identified as contributing significantly to the problem of 
lack of access to essential drugs in developing countries. First, is the meager investment 
on R&D by pharmaceutical companies on diseases of poverty prevalent in developing 
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countries. Second, is the adverse effects of strict enforcement of patent protection. Third, 
is poverty and inadequate health infrastructure. 
The affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries was 
discussed within the broader contexts of intellectual property law, international trade 
agreements and non-patent factors. Intellectual property rights were defended from two 
different bases, rights-based and utilitarian justification. Rights-based justiciation of 
intellectual property emphasized exclusive rights to one’s creation of the mind, while 
utilitarian defenses stressed the protection of intellectual property rights which guarantees 
profits to the inventors.  
The tension between enforcement of strict patent protection and affordable access 
to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the poor people in developing 
contries was acknowledged. Pharmaceutical companies and Western governments 
attributed lack of affordable access to non-patent factors such as poverty, inadequate 
infrastructure, lack of trained healthcare officials and lack of political will for 
governments of developing countries to combat HIV/AIDS. 
On the other hand, human rights activists and developing countries blamed lack of 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs on strict enforcement of patent laws. A 
discussion on the analysis of the issue of affordable access to drugs established that both 
patent and non-patent factors adversely impede access to affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in 
developing countries. 
The severe impact of international trade agreements currently negotiated by 
United States, which further exacerbate impeded access to anti-retroviral drugs for people 
in developing countries was clearly recognized. Two key aspects of TRIPS agreement 
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was discussed, including strict patent protection in order to promote incentives for 
innovation and promotion of public health interests, and maintaining a delicate balance 
between them was considered imperative. Compulsory licensing and parallel importation 
were encouraged in order to assist countries with dealing effectively with national health 
emergencies. These provisions authorize countries to manufacture and import generic 
copies of patented drugs respectively in order to address a national health crisis situation 
such as HIV/AIDS.  
The social responsibility of pharmaceutical companies was also argued. 
Pharmaceutical companies were concluded to have broader responsibilities both to 
shareholders and to the society. The broad responsibilities of pharmaceutical companies 
were anchored in corporate constituency statutes currently enacted in some states in 
United States. Corporate constituency statutes allow or require directors to take into 
account the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in making business decisions. It 
was strongly argued that pharmaceutical companies have broader social objectives and 
responsibilities than simply maximizing shareholders wealth or profit. Pharmaceutical 
companies in this regard have grave obligations to improve affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs for poor people in developing countries. 
Finally, current strategies for dealing with the issue of affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs for developing countries were discussed, including private donations, 
price reductions and differential pricing, international collaborative initiatives and public-
private partnerships and compulsory licensing. Private donations and price reductions 
were viewed as improved solutions that are not effective and sustainable. Compulsory 
licensing was argued to be most effective stategy for countries to exercise their duty of 
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providing essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs to their citizens, as well as for 
preventing avoidable deaths from treatable conditions for millions of people in 
developing countries. The combined problems of clinical research protocols in 
developing nations (chapter two) and of affordable access to resulting drugs for host 
populations (chapter three) establish the context for the ethical analysis in the subsequent 
chapters: the issue of global justice to address affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RAWLS AND POST-TRIAL ACCESS OF PARTICIPANTS AND HOST 
POPULATIONS TO ANTI-RETROVIRAL DRUGS 
 
 
A.   Introduction 
 
There has been a contentious debate about the issue of global justice to address 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. Two major approaches 
have emerged in this regard, cosmopolitan and statist.1 Millum acknowledges that, “a 
central question that divides theorists writing about global justice, and that affects most 
directly problems in international bioethics, concerns what people and governments of 
rich countries owe to those outside their borders.”2 Cosmopolitans such as Pogge argue 
that distributive justice principles that apply in the domestic realm apply equally globally. 
The implication is that if Rawls’ difference principle were considered the right way to 
distribute primary goods within a country, there should as well be a global difference 
principle distributing primary goods among all people in the world.3 In contrast, statists 
such as Rawls argue that the principle of distributive justice applies only within domestic 
society, that is, individual nations.4 Underlying the approach of Rawls is the view that 
justice deals with the basic structure of the society.5 The implication of the statist 
approach of Rawls is to rely merely upon the duty of humanitarian assistance from the 
perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to drugs in developing nations. 
This chapter focuses on Rawls’s statist approach to the issue of access to anti-
retroviral drugs in developing countries. The first part of this chapter deals with Rawls 
major contribution to political liberalism which begins with his landmark book titled A 
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Theory of Justice (TOJ), first published in 1971 and later revised in 1999 that focuses on 
domestic justice, that is, justice within societies. He presents a conception of justice 
which he refers to as “justice as fairness.”6 Rawls’s conception of justice applied to a 
basic structure of a society has some limitations. He conceives a domestic basic structure 
which is fixed. He proposes a basic structure of society conceived as “a closed system 
isolated from other societies.”7 He also conceives the basic structure of the society as 
self-sufficient.8 Rawls’s idea of social justice focuses on establishing criteria for 
evaluating the distribution of the primary social goods in a society. 
The second part deals with health and essential drugs in a domestic society which 
focuses on Rawls’s view about their classification. Health and health care are not 
included among Rawls’s list of primary social goods. They are not regulated by the 
difference principle.9 Daniels develops a different conception of the position of health in 
Rawls’s theory. He argues that health care should be viewed as an essential contributor to 
fulfilling Rawls’s principle of equality of opportunity. He argues that maintaining fair 
equality of opportunity requires meeting health care needs of the individuals in a 
domestic society.10 
The third part of this chapter focuses on Rawls’s statist approach to providing 
anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries which restricts the principle of justice to the 
domestic society. Rawls’s principles on international justice discussed in “The Law of 
Peoples” (LOP) fall short of a commitment to global distributive justice.11 Rawls 
proposes that well-ordered societies have a duty to assist burdened societies to attain 
required level of economic and social development to become well-ordered.12  
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The fourth part tackles Rawls’s duty of assistance and access to anti-retroviral 
drugs. Rawls’s notion of international responsibilities focuses on assisting burdened 
societies to attain well-ordered societies. Providing affordable access to anti-retroviral 
drugs as a transition strategy is argued as an important component of Rawls’s duty of 
assistance to burdened societies in order to attain well-ordered societies. A more detailed 
analysis of Rawls’s position on affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing 
countries begins with a discussion of justice as fairness. 
   
B. Justice as Fairness 
B.1. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation 
Justice as fairness evolves from a political tradition that supports the public 
culture of a democratic society which emphasizes a basic idea of society as a fair system 
of cooperation.13 Rawls articulates that, “one practical aim of justice as fairness is to 
provide an acceptable philosophical and moral basis for democratic institutions and thus 
to address the question of how the claims of liberty and equality are to be understood.”14 
The notion of society as a fair system of cooperation establishes a foundation for 
developing a political conception of justice for a democratic regime.15  
In conjunction with the fundamental idea of society as fair system of cooperation, 
two other ideas are also considered central in understanding the concept of justice as 
fairness. These ideas comprise of the idea of citizens which denotes people involved in 
cooperation as free and equal persons; as well as the idea of well-ordered society, which 
indicates a society controlled effectively by a public conception of justice.16   
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Rawls identifies three important features of the notion of social cooperation. First, 
social cooperation is distinguished from an activity simply socially organized. The 
implication is that social cooperation is regulated by publicly acknowledged rules and 
procedures which cooperating members recognize as suitable to govern their conduct. 
Second, the notion of cooperation involves the idea of fair terms of cooperation, which 
implies the terms every cooperating member accepts as reasonable in all cases. Fair terms 
of cooperation stipulate an idea of reciprocity, and mutuality which entails that all those 
who played their role as required by the publicly acknowledged rules would benefit as 
stipulated by a public and consensus standard. Third, the notion of social cooperation 
involves an idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good. This idea of rational 
advantage stipulates what those involved in cooperation are looking to accomplish from 
the perspective of their own good.17  
The idea of reciprocity in social cooperation rests between “the idea of 
impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual 
advantage understood as everyone’s advantaged with respect to each person’s present or 
expected future situations as things are.”18 In the context of justice as fairness, reciprocity 
refers to a relation between citizens articulated by principles of justice that govern a 
social institution in which everyone benefits with regard to a suitable benchmark of 
equality delineated with respect to that institution.19 Furthermore, Rawls highlights that 
“reciprocity is a relation between citizens in a well-ordered society expressed by its 
political conception of justice.”20 For example, the idea of reciprocity is established 
between citizens when you consider the two principles of justice with the difference 
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principle emphasizing equal division as a benchmark.21 Noteworthy also is that the idea 
of reciprocity is distinct from the idea of mutual advantage.22 
Rawls also makes a distinction between two fundamental and complementary 
ideas, reasonable and rational as they relate to the basic idea of society as a fair system of 
social cooperation. In the context of persons involved in social cooperation and 
positioned as equals in several regards, “reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to 
acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen 
by all as fair terms of cooperation.”23 There is a consensus that reasonable persons also 
comprehend that they are to respect these principles, even when it is detrimental to their 
own interests but with the caveat that other members engaged in the cooperation may be 
required to respect them. It is deemed unreasonable not to be prepared to propose such 
principles, or not to respect fair terms of cooperation that other cooperating members may 
reasonably be required to consent to. Furthermore, it is worse than unreasonable if the 
person simply fakes to propose or respect the principles but is prepared to infringe on 
them to one’s advantage as the situation allows.24 
Conversely, what may be deemed unreasonable, may in general, be deemed 
rational. For example, we suggest this distinction in a situation when we concur that 
among persons engaged in cooperation, certain people due to their superior bargaining 
position, their proposal is clearly rational, but all the same unreasonable.25 
The critical role of the principles of justice is to stipulate the fair terms of social 
cooperation. These principles stipulate the basic rights and duties to be allocated by the 
key political and social institutions, and they control the allocation of benefits and 
burdens arising from social cooperation. The principles of a democratic conception of 
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justice may be seen as stipulating the fair terms of cooperation between citizens in a 
democratic society, where citizens are considered as free and equal persons from the 
perspective of political conception.26 Another critical feature of justice as fairness is the 
basic structure of the society which is considered as the primary subject of justice. 
 
B.2 The Basic Structure of the Society as the Primary Subject of Justice 
Rawls’s idea of the basic structure applies to a well-ordered society, which is a 
society controlled effectively by a public conception of justice.27 Rawls contends that 
“the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way 
in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.”28 The major institutions of 
basic structure of a society consist of political constitution, legal protection of freedom of 
thought and liberty of conscience, legally recognized forms of private property, the 
structure of the economy in the form of competitive markets and the monogamous 
family.29 The activities of associations and individuals occur within the context of the 
basic structure which is the background social framework. Thus, “a just basic structure 
secures what we may call background justice.”30 
The major institutions of the basic structure of a society specify rights and duties 
of the citizens and significantly impact their life prospects, aspirations and opportunities, 
as well as their ability to take advantage of them in order to be successful in the society.31 
Therefore, the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its impacts are 
pervasive and present from the start of life.32 Significant inequalities are acknowledged in 
the basic structure of the society, because of the impact of the natural and social lotteries. 
 226 
The purpose of the principles of justice applied to the basic structure of the society is to 
address these inequalities.33  
The principles of justice as fairness are limited to the basic structure and 
consequently regulate this structure, but they do not apply directly to or control 
institutions and associations internally within a domestic society. Constraints from the 
principles of justice apply only indirectly to private associations and institutions such as 
firms, labor unions, churches, universities and the family.  For example, the two 
principles of justice are not meant to regulate the internal organization of churches and 
universities. The difference principle does not regulate how parents should treat their 
children or distribute the wealth of the family among its members.34  
The principles of justice as fairness which may be deemed reasonable and just for 
the basic structure may not also be usually considered reasonable and just for institutions, 
associations and social practices. Although, the principles of justice as fairness impose 
restrictions on these social arrangements within the basic structure, the basic structure 
and the associations and social forms within it are separately regulated by different 
principles relative to their goals and their distinctive nature and peculiar requirements.35 
Rawls articulates, “Justice as fairness is a political, not a general, conception of justice: it 
applies first to the basic structure and sees other questions of local justice and also 
questions of global justice (what I call the law of peoples) as calling for separate 
considerations on their merits.”36  
The principles of justice that apply directly to or regulate associations and 
institutions within the basic structure may be termed principles of local justice. Rawls 
identifies three levels of justice, first, local justice that entails principles that apply 
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directly to institutions; second, domestic justice that implies principles that apply to the 
basic structure of society; and third, global justice that involves principles that apply to 
international law.37 Justice as fairness begins with domestic justice which is the justice of 
the basic structure. It moves outward to the law of peoples and then inward to local 
justice.38 
 
B.3. Essential Elements of Theory of Justice 
  Original Position 
The idea of original position is necessitated by the requirement to specify the fair 
terms of cooperation in a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. In 
the context of justice as fairness, the fair terms of cooperation are specified by an 
agreement arrived at by free and equal citizens engaged in cooperation, which is reached 
with the understanding of what they consider as their reciprocal advantage, or good.39  
Rawls indicates that, “the original position is the appropriate initial status quo which 
insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair. This fact yields the name 
“justice as fairness.”40 
The original agreement must be reached under certain conditions that are ideally 
fair if it is to be a valid agreement from the perspective of political justice. Specifically, 
these conditions must position free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some to 
possess unfair bargaining advantages over others.41 More so, certain impeding conditions 
such as “threats of force and coercion, deception and fraud must be excluded.”42 
  The original position is a thought experiment, an imaginary condition where every real 
citizen is represented and all these representatives reach an agreement on the principles of 
 228 
justice that would regulate the political institutions of the real citizens.43 In order to reach 
the most impartial situation, the parties who enter the agreement are deprived of salient 
information that might bias their choice of principles. This idea is captured by indicating 
that the parties are to choose under a veil of ignorance.44 The conditions of original 
position executed under the veil of ignorance “define the principles of justice as those 
which rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as equals 
when none are known to be advantaged by social and natural contingencies.”45 The veil 
of ignorance is introduced in order to nullify the influences of natural and social 
circumstances which could be exploited by some citizens to their own advantage. In this 
context of the veil of ignorance, the parties do not know how numerous options will 
impact their own specific case and they are bound to assess principles exclusively on the 
basis of general considerations.46  
Rawls argues that citizens should not be favored or disfavored by social 
institutions based on for example characteristics such as their race, class and gender. 
Each party in the original position is deprived of information regarding the race, class, 
and gender of the real citizen they represent. The parties in the original position are 
deprived of all particular facts regarding citizens that are irrelevant to the choice of 
principles of justice: not only their race, class, and gender but as well their age, natural 
assets and abilities, etc. The veil of ignorance also eliminates specific information 
regarding the society of the citizens in order to acquire a clearer opinion of the enduring 
features of a just social system.47 However, the parties know that citizens in the society 
possess different comprehensive doctrines and plans of life. They know as well that all 
citizens are interested in more primary social goods.48 The parties also know the general 
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facts about human society and whatever general facts influence the choice of the 
principles of justice.49   
The veil of ignorance is aimed at positioning the representatives of free and equal 
citizens fairly with regard to one another. Parties in the original position cannot push for 
agreement on principles that will randomly favor the particular citizen they represent, 
because they do not know the particular attributes of the citizen they represent. The 
condition of the parties therefore symbolizes reasonable conditions, within which the 
parties can enter a rational agreement. Each party makes honest efforts to agree to 
principles that will be most advantageous for the citizen they represent, which implies 
maximizing the share of the citizen’s primary goods. The implication is that because the 
parties are fairly situated, they will reach an agreement that will be fair to all actual 
citizens.50 The primary task of the parties in the original position is to choose the 
principles of justice that will regulate the social life and the basic structure of the society 
that are ideally fair. 
 
Principles of Justice as Fairness  
Rawls establishes principles that he thinks would be chosen in the original 
position. The principles are considered as ones that free and equal persons could accept 
as a fair basis for social cooperation. The principles are presented as guiding ideas of 
justice as fairness thus: “… Each Person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all (the equal liberty principle); … Social and economic 
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to offices and 
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positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (fair equality of 
opportunity principle); (b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged 
members of society (the difference principle).”51 These principles mainly apply to basic 
structure of society and rule the assignment of rights and duties and control the 
distribution of social and economic advantages.52  
The principles of justice as fairness in all consist of the equal liberty principle, fair 
equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle. The difference principle 
requires that any social and economic inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged. Fair equality of opportunity principle requires that all citizens of a domestic 
society have equal opportunities for obtaining position of power.53 Rawls’s difference 
principle and fair equality of opportunity principle provide protection and compensation 
for people who are disadvantaged by natural and social lotteries.54 
Rawls’s general conception of justice is that, “all social primary goods - liberty 
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect – are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the 
advantage of the least favored.”55 A brief discussion of the principles of justice as 
fairness follows. 
 
 Equal Liberty Principle 
The equal liberty principle guarantees equal basic rights and liberties for all 
citizens, including “political liberty, (the right to vote and to hold public office) and 
freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom 
of the person, which includes… the right to hold personal property; and freedom from 
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arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law.”56 The equal 
liberty principle requires equal rights for all in all normal conditions because unequal 
rights would not be to the advantage of those who would get a lesser share of rights.57  
The history of democratic thought reveals that emphasis has been on realizing certain 
specific rights and liberties as well as specific constitutional guarantees, as enshrined in 
various bills of rights and declarations of the rights of man. Justice as fairness conforms 
to this traditional view of human rights.58 
A list of basic liberties can be established in two different ways, historical and 
analytical.59 In the historical context, various democratic regimes are reviewed and a list 
of rights and liberties gathered that appear fundamental and firmly guaranteed in 
apparently more historically successful regimes. Obviously, cognizant of the veil of 
ignorance, the implication is that this type of specific information is not accessible to the 
parties in the original position. On the other hand, it is accessible to you and me in 
establishing justice as fairness.60  
In the analytical context, the focus is on what liberties offer the political and 
social circumstances critical for the sufficient development and full exercise of the two 
moral powers of free and equal persons. In line with this thought, some conclusions are 
made: first, that equal political liberties and freedom of thought make it possible for 
citizens to cultivate and to exercise these powers in evaluating the justice of the basic 
structure of the society as well as its social policies. Second, that liberty of conscience 
and freedom of association make it possible for citizens to cultivate and exercise their 
moral powers in establishing and reviewing and in pursuing rationally their notions of the 
good either individually or collectively.61 Rawls argues that, “those basic rights and 
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liberties protect and secure the scope required for the exercise of the two moral powers in 
the two fundamental cases just mentioned….”62 It is pertinent to point out that exercising 
our moral powers in these ways is important to us as free and equal citizens.63 
Noteworthy also is that the equal liberty principle of justice applies not only to the 
basic structure of society but more precisely to either written or unwritten constitution. 
Some of these liberties, such as the equal political liberties and freedom of thought and 
association, are securely protected by a constitution.64 Rawls argues that constituent 
power distinguished by Locke as people’s power to constitute the legislative as the first 
and fundamental law of all commonwealths, in contrast to ordinary power is to be 
enshrined in the bill of rights, in the right to vote and to occupy office and in the 
measures for amending the constitution.65 
Rawls stipulated the strict lexical priority of the equal liberty principle over fair 
equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle. This implies that one may 
not trade off one’s basic liberties for gains either in difference principle or in fair equality 
of opportunity. It is also important to note that fair equality of opportunity, the non-
discrimination principle, has strict lexical priority over the difference principle.66 
 
 Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle 
Fair equality of opportunity requires that not only that public offices and social 
positions be open in the proper sense, but that all should have a fair opportunity to 
achieve them.67  Fair equality of opportunity further requires that citizens with the same 
talents and abilities and the same disposition to utilize them should have the same 
educational and economic opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or 
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poor.68 Rawls argues that, “in all parts of the society there are to be roughly the same 
prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.”69 
The fair equality of opportunity principle specifies what types of inequalities are 
allowed in a domestic society. In this context, inequalities are regarded as “not any 
differences between offices and positions, but differences in the benefits and burdens 
attached to them either directly or indirectly, such as prestige and wealth, or liability to 
taxation and compulsory services.”70 Inequalities are understood here as differences 
stemming from distribution established by a practice or enabled by it, of the things 
citizens endeavor to achieve or avoid.71  
Rawls identifies fair equality of opportunity with liberal equality. Fair equality of 
opportunity achieves its purpose by imposing certain requirements on the basic structure 
of the society. For example, a free market system must be regulated by political and legal 
institutions in order to avoid excessive concentrations of property and wealth, which may 
likely result in political domination.72 
Fair equality of opportunity is linked to pure procedural justice.73 From this 
perspective, issues regarding distributive shares are handled as pure procedural justice. 
The implication is to establish a social system that guarantees just result.74 Rawls argue 
that, “pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right 
result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise correct 
or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed.” 75 The 
function of the principle of fair equality of opportunity is to guarantee that the system of 
cooperation conforms to pure procedural justice.76  
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The social and economic process is established within the appropriate framework 
of political and legal institutions. The result of the distributive process will not be just 
without a suitable system of these background institutions. This implies that background 
fairness is absent.77 The government attempts to guarantee equal opportunities of 
education and culture for those who are equally gifted and motivated either by funding 
private schools or by setting up a public school system. Moreover, it implements and 
guarantees equality of opportunity in economic activities and in the free choice of 
occupation.78 Inequalities of any sort can only be authorized by the government if they 
are to the greatest advantage of the least privileged. 
 
Difference Principle 
The difference principle requires that social institutions be arranged so that 
inequalities of wealth and income work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.79 
The emphasis here is that every party involved in the social cooperation must benefit 
from the inequality. The implication is that every person involved in the social 
cooperation “must find it reasonable to prefer his condition and prospects with the 
inequality to what they would be under the practice without it.”80 The principle in essence 
rules out the justification of inequalities on the basis that the disadvantages in one 
position are overshadowed by the greater advantages of those in another position.81 
The difference principle is established within the context that “social cooperation 
is always productive, and without cooperation there would be nothing produced and so 
nothing to distribute.”82 A system of cooperation is established mainly by how its rules 
organize productive activity, stipulate the division of labor and allocate various roles to 
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the members engaged in it. Beginning from an imagined baseline of equality, greater 
returns to the more advantaged can be produced by permitting inequalities in wages and 
salaries. In this context, higher wages can cover the costs of training and education, and 
can offer incentives to fill jobs that are in more demand.83   
The difference principle requires that inequalities which increase the total product 
work to the advantage of everyone, and precisely to the greatest advantage of those least 
favored. The difference principle does not permit the affluent in the society to get richer 
at the expense of the poor. The difference principle exemplifies “equality-based 
reciprocity: from an egalitarian baseline it requires inequalities that are good for all, and 
particularly for the worst-off.”84 
Rawls argues that inequalities of birth, natural endowment and historical 
circumstances are undeserved, and, in a fair system of cooperation where justice is 
promoted, every effort should be invested in compensating those who have been 
disadvantaged by the identified factors.85 He further argues that advantages that people 
have over others that are the outcomes of accidents of biology and history appear 
arbitrary from the moral point of view, and should then be redressed as far as possible.86 
He emphasizes the notion of redressing the bias of contingencies emanating from the 
inequalities of birth and natural endowment in order to maximize equality for the least 
privileged in the fair system of cooperation.87 Citizens endowed with different talents and 
abilities can use them for the benefit of everyone. In a society regulated by the difference 
principle citizens consider distribution of natural endowments as an asset that benefits all. 
Those better endowed are encouraged to utilize their talents and abilities to make 
themselves better off, but provided that they as well contribute to the good of those with 
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less endowments.88 Rawls contends that, “in justice as fairness men agree to share one 
another’s fate.”89 Daniels extends Rawls’s theory of justice to health care90 in the 
domestic society which will be the focus of the discussion in the next section of the 
chapter. 
 
C. Health and Essential Drugs in a Domestic Society  
C.1. Rawls’s Idealized and Simplified Index of Primary Goods  
The basic structure of society as contended by Rawls distributes certain primary 
goods which imply the things that every rational person is supposed to want. These goods 
usually play a significant role in a person’s rational plan of life.91 Rawls argues for index 
of primary social goods which is a truncated scale of well-being utilized by moral agents 
pursuing a hypothetical social contract.92 His list of primary social goods includes rights, 
liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and social bases of self-respect.93 
Evidently absent from his list of primary social goods are health and health care. He 
classified them as natural goods that can be influenced by the basic structure in their 
possession but are not considered to be regulated by the difference principle.94  
Rawls simplified the construction of his theory that he assumed individuals 
engaged in the social contract would be fully functional, active and normal over the 
course of their life span and that no one would become ill or die prematurely.95 Daniels 
argues that “Rawls index of primary goods seems to be too truncated a scale, once we 
drop the idealizing assumption that all people are normal. People with equal indices will 
not be equally well-off once we allow them to differ in health care needs.”96 Similarly, 
Kenneth Arrow argued that Rawls’s index of primary goods was inadequate because it 
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fell short in articulating for us how to compare the ill rich with the well poor.97 Amartya 
Sen also argued that the index is not sensitive to the way in which disease, disability, or 
other individual variations would produce inequalities in people’s capabilities for those 
who had the same primary social goods.98  
Arrow pointed out some shortcomings related to merely including health care to 
the list of primary goods. He argued that the import of Rawls’s difference principle which 
requires inequalities to work to the benefit of the least advantaged individuals, would be 
to invest all social resources into fulfilling special needs of persons with excessive health 
care needs, probably to a situation where the rest of society is impoverished.99 He further 
argued that including health care to the creation of the index, and permitting its exchange 
against income and wealth, would compel Rawls into interpersonal comparisons of utility 
he had intended his index would avoid.100 Nevertheless, Daniels argues that extending 
Rawls’s theory to include health care through the equal opportunity account undermines 
some of Arrow’s and Sen’s criticisms.101  
Despite Rawls simplified idealization of his theory, it still provided a clue about 
how to extend it to the real world of illness and premature death. The objective of public 
health and medicine is to restore people as close as possible to the ideal of normal 
functioning, within the reasonable constraints of the resources. Resources are essentially 
limited because maintaining health cannot be the society’s only social good or 
objective.102  
Daniels adopted a different conception of the place of health in Rawls’s theory as 
articulated in his theory of just health care discussed in his 1985 work Just Health 
Care.103 He argues that health care institutions should be regulated by a principle of fair 
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equality of opportunity, but under two conditions: (1) an adequate general theory of 
justice encompasses a principle which obliges basic institutions to guarantee fair equality 
of opportunity, and (2) the fair equality of opportunity principle functions as a control on 
allowable economic inequalities.104 Daniels strongly advocates for the fair equality of 
opportunity as a suitable principle to regulate macro decisions regarding the health care 
system’s design. He further articulates that, “such a principle defines, from the 
perspective of justice, what the moral function of the health-care system must be – to help 
guarantee fair equality of opportunity.105 A brief discussion of fair equality of opportunity 
and Daniels’s just health care theory follows. 
 
C.2. Fair Equality of Opportunity and Just Health Care 
The most viable strategy for extending Rawls’s theory in Daniels’s just health 
care entails adding health care institutions and practices to the basic institutions engaged 
in guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity.106 Daniels acknowledges that “meeting the 
health needs of all persons, viewed as free and equal citizens, is of comparable and 
special moral importance.”107 Daniels contends that since meeting health care needs has a 
critical influence on the distribution of opportunity, the health care institutions are 
governed by a fair equality of opportunity principle. He further argues for a special 
correlation between species functioning and the opportunity range open to an individual 
in a society.108 Daniels clearly writes “since meeting health needs protects the range of 
opportunities people can exercise, then any social obligations we have to protect 
opportunity imply obligations to protect and promote health for all.”109 
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Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress articulate that, “Daniels’s thesis is that social 
institutions affecting health care distribution should be arranged, as far as possible, to 
allow each person to achieve a fair share of the normal range of opportunities present in 
that society.”110 The normal range of opportunity entails the range of life plans that a 
reasonable person could pursue, taken into account his or her talents and skills in a given 
society. Daniels’s just health care theory, like Rawls’s acknowledges a positive 
obligation of the society to eliminate or reduce obstacles that prevent fair equality of 
opportunity, an obligation that encompasses programs to rectify or compensate for 
numerous disadvantages.111 Daniels writes “just health requires that we protect people’s 
shares of the normal opportunity range by treating illness when it occurs, by reducing the 
risks of disease and disability before they occur, and by distributing those risks 
equitably.”112 
Daniels contends that if it is critical to utilize resources to compensate for the 
advantages in opportunity some people suffer in the natural lottery, it is equally critical to 
utilize resources to compensate for the natural disadvantages caused by disease.113 
Disease etiology has been noted as significantly impacted by social conditions which 
varies with class and which refutes the conception that disease is a product of the natural 
lottery.114  Daniels et.al argue that health status is principally determined by choices 
regarding what are termed the social determinants of health. They articulate, “properly 
understood, justice as fairness tells us what justice requires in the distribution of all 
socially controllable determinants of health.”115 There is no intention to engage in a futile 
goal of eradicating all differences between people. Daniels highlights, “health care has 
normal functioning as its goal: it concentrates on a specific class of obvious 
 240 
disadvantages and tries to eliminate them. That is its limited contribution to guaranteeing 
fair equality of opportunity.”116 Disease and disability are seen as unjustified constraints 
on persons’ opportunities to fulfill basic goals. Health care is then necessary to attain, 
restore or maintain adequate or “species-typical” levels of functioning, in order to 
accomplish basic goals.117 
Another important point noted by Daniels in extending Rawls’s theory to health 
care is that Rawls’s contractarian theory requires a thick veil of ignorance in order to 
ensure the impartiality of free and equal moral agents. However, Daniels advocates for a 
thinner veil of ignorance in selecting principles to regulate health-care resource allocation 
decisions. This is important because in this context, parties involved in the negotiations 
must know about some essential features of the society, for instance, its resource 
limitations.118 It would be a futile effort for individuals to negotiate behind the veil of 
ignorance for benefits in the realm of health care that end up being completely 
unaffordable in real life. Health care is one of those contemporary societal benefits that 
cannot be available in any society without limitations.119  
Daniels identifies four levels of health care institutions that should be provided in 
order to reflect the original idealization under which Rawls’s theory was constructed. The 
idealization entails the ideal to enable normal, fully functioning persons to complete their 
normal life span. The four levels of health care institutions include: (1) Preventive health-
care institutions that reduce the prospect of departures from the normality assumption. (2) 
Institutions that deliver personal medical and rehabilitative services that restore normal 
functioning. (3) Institutions that provide more extended medical and social support 
services for people who are moderately chronically ill or disabled, comprising the frail 
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elderly. (4) Institutions that provide health care and related social services to people who 
are seriously ill and cannot be restored closer to the idealization comprising terminally ill 
people and mentally and physically disabled people.120 The implication is that forms of 
health care that have a substantial influence on preventing, limiting and compensating for 
declines in normal species functioning should be prioritized in designing health care 
institutions and distributing health care.121 Just health emphasizes the priority of 
preventive measures, since it is preferable to avoid the burdens of disease than to 
decrease them when they happen. Daniels argues that “it is more effective to prevent 
disease and disability than it is to cure them (or to compensate individuals for loss of 
function when cure is not possible).”122  Rawls proposes basic health care which 
encompasses essential drugs,123 as one of the five guarantees of any constitutional 
democracy.124 A related issue of Rawls’s view of the nature and scope of international 
responsibilities in providing affordable access to anti-retroviral in developing nations is 
discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
 
D. Rawls’s Statist Approach 
D.1. Rawls’s Concept of Statism 
Rawls briefly outlined some principles of international justice in A Theory of 
Justice. In this context, he talked about deriving justice within the state and used a second 
hypothetical contract at which representatives of states choose principles to govern 
international relations from behind a veil of ignorance. Rawls contends that such 
representatives would not choose any principles of international distribution.125 Rawls’s 
extensive discussion about international relations and international justice was presented 
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in The Law of Peoples (LOP). The central aim of The Law of Peoples is to explore how 
the content of a theory of international justice “might be developed out of a liberal idea of 
justice similar to, but more general than, the idea of justice as fairness.”126  
In the LOP, Rawls’s first task which is the first stage of his global project was to 
extend the idea of the social contract from the domestic society discussed in TOJ to 
society of liberal peoples, deriving what he dubbed the “Law of Peoples.”127 The LOP is 
described as a “political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and 
norms of international law and practice.”128 One of the key features in Rawls’s argument 
is his typology of societies. He distinguishes between the five kinds of regime including 
liberal peoples, decent hierarchical peoples, outlaw states, societies with unfavorable 
conditions, and benevolent absolutisms.129  
Rawls argues that representatives of liberal peoples ignore any knowledge of the 
people’s comprehensive conception of the good, because a liberal society with a 
constitutional regime does not have a comprehensive conception of the good.130  The first 
task of the parties in the second original position is “to specify the Law of Peoples – its 
ideals, principles, and standards – and how those norms apply to political relations among 
peoples.131 Rawls argues that both liberal and decent hierarchical societies would be able 
to agree to eight principles of justice. He contends that just principles are those that 
liberal and decent societies will approve. Among the principles avowed here is the duty 
of humanitarian assistance, which clearly states that “peoples have a duty to assist other 
peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political and social regime.”132 
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The second aspect of Rawls’s ideal theory which relates to one of the principal 
ideas of the Law of Peoples, focuses on how and why representatives of certain 
nonliberal but well-ordered societies would also approve the same set of principles. The 
nonliberal societies do not approve the standard range of liberal democratic rights such as 
the freedoms of expression and association, religious equality and the right to equal 
participation.133 Furthermore, individuals in nonliberal societies are “not regarded as free 
and equal citizens, nor as separate individuals deserving equal representation (according 
to the maxim: one citizen, one vote).”134 However, nonliberal societies respect basic 
human rights, including right to life, to the means of subsistence and security, to freedom 
from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and are respectful of other peoples135 as 
demanded by the law of peoples. Rawls points out that these nonliberal decent people 
qualify as “societies in good standing,” and are, thus, to be tolerated by liberal societies. 
The implication is that liberal societies are “to recognize these nonliberal societies as 
equal participating members in good standing of the society of peoples,” and not merely 
to “refrain from exercising political sanctions – military, economic, or diplomatic – to 
make a people change its ways.” 136 Kok-Chor Tan notes that “nonliberal peoples are 
tolerated as a matter of liberal principle, and not merely accommodated on account of 
practicality.”137 
The Law of Peoples aims to attain a global stability with regard to justice, and not 
stability as a way of life, that is, stability as a balance of forces.138 The first two aspects of 
Rawls’s ideal theory is critical to understanding his Law of Peoples, because it tries to 
show that the global principles adopted by liberal peoples conform to the principles that 
can be endorsed independently by decent nonliberal peoples. More so, it is important to 
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note that it is not the case that liberal peoples did not adapt their global principles 
precisely with respect to accommodating nonliberal peoples or existing global 
institutional arrangements.139 
The first two aspects just discussed conclude the ideal theory part of the Law of 
Peoples. The goal of ideal theory is to recognize the principles that should regulate the 
relationship between societies with the necessary political and economic conditions to be 
well ordered and to conform to the Law of Peoples. This implies that the goals of justice 
and stability for the right reason between societies can be accomplished in this ideal 
situation.140 
The Third part of the Law of Peoples focuses on societies without the economic 
resources to support well-ordered institutions or societies that deliberately refuse to 
conform to the principles of the law of Peoples. It grapples with the issues that arise from 
the “highly non-ideal conditions of our world with its great injustices and widespread 
social evils.”141 The nonideal theory part of the Law of Peoples therefore tackles (1) the 
issue of noncompliance, with reference to conditions when outlaw societies “refuse to 
comply with a reasonable Law of Peoples,”142 and (2) the issue of unfavorable 
conditions, which entails that burdened societies lack the basic resources to become well 
ordered.143 A comprehensive approach in the Law of Peoples has to deal with these 
nonideal issues, and provide direction on how well-ordered peoples may protect 
themselves against outlaw regimes and assist in establishing needed reform within these 
regimes in the long run.144 It needs to further address how they may assist burdened 
societies and help to bring them “into the society of well-ordered peoples.”145 
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Rawls’s focus on burdened societies and a duty of assistance clearly shows that he 
does not support an isolationist foreign policy which advocates for liberal and decent 
peoples’ indifference to the concerns of burdened societies. He stresses that societies that 
are better off have a duty of assistance towards burdened societies so as to help them 
attain the required level of economic and social development to become well ordered. 
The duty of assistance would stem from the principle avowing basic human rights which 
consist of the right to subsistence.146 The duty of assistance has been referred to as 
humanitarian duty because its goal is to fulfil individuals’ basic needs and their collective 
capacity to sustain decent institutions. However, Rawls also emphasizes that this duty of 
humanitarian assistance is clearly different from, and does not involve a duty of 
distributive justice.147 Tan also notes “so while a duty of humanitarian assistance is 
required by the Law of Peoples as part of its nonideal theory, a distributive principle has 
no place at all here.”148  
  Elucidating this point further, it implies that the principles in Rawls’s Law of 
Peoples are clearly principles of justice, but the LOP is a theory of justice exclusively for 
the society of peoples. Furthermore, the LOP cannot be regarded as merely advocating 
for the status quo, that is, the current state of affairs. The requirement of a duty of 
assistance by the LOP inevitably will result in a fundamental change in the contemporary 
world, where a fifth of the world’s population live in absolute poverty, 1.2 million people 
lack access to clean water, about 17 million people yearly die from curable diseases of 
poverty, and millions more lack access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs 
especially in developing countries. The requirement in the LOP’s nonideal theory that 
liberal and decent peoples assist burdened societies to attain the required level of 
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economic and political developments to be well-ordered institutions, entails a substantial 
change. More so, the requirement that liberal and decent peoples honor and defend basic 
rights, which encompass individuals’ access to subsistence, constitute fundamental 
departures from how individuals that are better-off currently understand their global 
responsibilities towards the poor.149 Nevertheless, Tan acknowledges that “what is 
lacking in Rawls’s account of global justice is the commitment to distributive justice. 
That is there are no ongoing distributive principles regulating the inequalities between the 
rich and the poor of the world beyond the duty of the better-off to ensure that the badly-
off are able to meet a certain threshold level of basic needs.”150 There is a contention that 
Rawls’s account of international justice discussed in the LOP made some progress in 
international relations and politics, but did not go far enough. The critical issue under 
consideration is “whether there should be distributive principles to regulate global 
relations, as many cosmopolitans think, or whether Rawls is right that there is no place 
for distributive principles in the global setting.”151 A brief discussion of the distinctive 
features of humanitarian duty and duty of justice is the task of the next section of this 
chapter. 
 
D.2. Humanitarian Duty and Duty of Justice  
Rawls provides two arguments for rejecting the concept of global distributive 
justice. The first is that global principles of distributive justice would be redundant, since 
a duty of humanitarian assistance is presently required by the Law of peoples as an 
integral part of nonideal theory. The second is that more so, global distributive principles 
would produce unacceptable results.152 The redundancy argument is defended in the first 
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instance by Rawls’s acknowledgement of gross injustices, huge inequality and dismal 
poverty in our nonideal world and the need for well-ordered societies to assist burdened 
societies to bring them into the society of well-ordered peoples.153 Furthermore, he argues 
these “goals of attaining liberal and decent institutions, securing human rights, and 
meeting basic needs … are (adequately) covered by the duty of assistance.”154 The 
implication is that a global distributive principle does not have any additional role to play 
in this context. 
Rawls’s redundancy argument obfuscates an essential distinction between duties 
of humanity and duties of justice, which is not merely a distinction in semantic. The 
implication is that if we agree that affluent countries have only duty of humanity to 
poorer countries, we are as well agreeing that the current criterion for resource and 
wealth distribution is fair, and that the global basic institutions established around and 
justifying the existing allocation of wealth and resources are satisfactory. In this context, 
duties to assist each other entail duties that occur within an institutional framework that is 
fair. Duties of humanity focus on how states should interact with one another without 
paying attention to the global basic structure including the norms regulating the allocation 
and ownership of resources and wealth where the interactions take place. On the other 
hand, duties of justice focus directly on the basic structure, hence, justice is related to the 
criterion for distribution of wealth and resources, and the basic institutions and principles 
that justify and rationalize this distribution.155 Tan writes, “to put it perspicuously, while 
duties of humanity aim to redistribute wealth, duties of justice aim to identify what 
counts as a just distribution in the first place.”156 Put succinctly, the goal of justice is not 
to transfer wealth per se, which entails taking it from its just owners and redistributing it 
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to others, but, rather to establish the conditions of just ownership, to reformulate “what 
justly belongs to a country.”157 Duties of justice would require us to reevaluate our 
current global basic structure, whereas duties of humanity regard this to be more or less 
sensible, and merely urge countries to do more within this particular framework. Brian 
Barry argues that justice is prior to humanity in that “we cannot sensibly talk about 
humanity unless we have a baseline set by justice. To talk about what I ought, as a matter 
of humanity, to do with what is mine makes no sense until we have established what is 
mine in the first place.”158 Barry also distinguishes the obligations of humanity and those 
of justice based on goals and rights respectively. He argues that “the obligations of 
humanity are goal-based, whereas those of justice are rights-based.”159  
On the other hand, the long-term goals of humanity and justice are entirely 
distinct, not only in their objective or duration, as indicated by Rawls, but as well in their 
scope and focus. The long-term goals of humanity require greater humanitarianism 
between countries within the present institutional framework, whereas the long-term 
goals of justice require a critical assessment of that framework. This distinction is critical 
because tackling issues of global dimension such as poverty, inequality, access to 
essential drugs etc. requires reforming global institutions and arrangements.160 
Furthermore, the distinction in focus has some implications for foreign policy. For 
example, if foreign aid is viewed from the perspective of humanitarian aid, it could be 
exposed to criteria compelled by donor countries. However, if foreign aid is seen as a 
matter of justice, it would not be subject to a redistribution which denotes a transfer from 
the rightful owner to poorer ones, but to an alteration of an initial unjust distribution.161 
Barry notes that discussing global inequality as a matter of humanity obfuscates the 
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fundamental point, “that if some share of resources is justly owed to a country, then it is 
(even before it has been actually transferred) as much that country’s as it now normally 
thought that what a country produces belongs to that country.”162  
There is a significant difference when distribution of wealth between countries is 
viewed as a matter of humanitarian assistance or as a matter of justice. Discussing duties 
between countries as a matter of justice emphasizes the proper place to be concerned 
about, which are the institutions and their fundamental norms. It also highlights that the 
critical issue is eventually the issue of rightful ownership instead of humanitarian 
contribution. In the context of nonideal case of burdened societies, it makes a significant 
normative distinction whether we are assisting from the point of view of humanitarian 
concern, or whether we are assisting as a result of acknowledging the current injustices in 
our global arrangements.163   
It is pertinent to note that humanitarian assistance within the context of the current 
global arrangement merely deals with the symptoms of injustice rather than deals with 
the fundamental cause of it.164 Tan writes, “Humanitarian assistance applies as long as 
there are burdened societies, but principles of justice would push us to assess the 
framework within which such assistance is being rendered.”165 Furthermore, justice 
focuses on structural equality of some kind, whereas humanitarianism emphasizes mainly 
fulfilling basic needs.166 
It is evident that Rawls’s concept of domestic egalitarianism aims at structural 
transformation of the basic structure of the society in such a way that his second principle 
offers a framework for evaluating and criticizing the basic institutions of society. In this 
context, institutional arrangements which preserve and justify inequality of opportunity 
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between citizens are disallowed. Therefore, it will appear that for Rawls to be consistent 
with his basic philosophical ideals that he should evaluate the basic structure of the 
society of peoples against his principles of justice, rather than take it as a given.167 
 Therefore, Rawls is cognizant of the significant distinction between humanitarian duties 
and duties of justice. His contention is that the global distribution of resources and wealth 
is not an issue of justice. He argues that a global distribution of wealth that does not fulfil 
the egalitarian requirement of his difference principle is acceptable provided that 
assistance is offered to help burdened societies.168 
Rawls’s second argument rejecting global distributive principles throws some 
light with respect to his position above regarding a global distribution of resources and 
wealth. He believes that in contrast to domestic distributive principle, global distributive 
principles would have unacceptable results. He argues that a duty of humanitarian 
assistance is a “principle of transition… (it) holds until all societies have achieved just 
liberal or decent basic institutions. (It is) defined by a target beyond which (it) no longer 
hold(s).”169 The implication is that the duty of assistance is accomplished when all 
societies have achieved the basic level of development adequate for establishing and 
maintaining decent institutions. On the other hand, distributive “principles do not have a 
defined goal, aim, or cut-off point, beyond which aid may cease.”170 Therefore, whereas, 
the duty of humanitarian assistance is aimed at improving the circumstance of societies 
burdened by unfavorable conditions, such assistance is not needed as part of ideal theory 
for societies that have achieved the basic level of development required for a decent 
society. Conversely, distributive justice principle is an essential component of ideal 
theory, and therefore would apply so long as there are inequalities, excessive injustices 
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and impairing poverty between societies, even “after the duty of assistance is fully 
satisfied.”171 
Rawls’s central argument is that upholding global distributive principle would 
have unacceptable results because we should not be able to distinguish between societies 
which have increased their wealth through foresight and prudence;172 or, societies which 
have succeeded to curtail their population growth through sound population policies and 
consequently boosted their wealth, and societies which have failed to control their 
population and consequently remain worse-off.173  He argues that in both cases identified, 
a global egalitarian principle without target would maintain that resources be transferred 
from the more affluent societies to the poor ones, despite the fact that both may have 
begun with an equal amount of wealth and resources. He contends that this is 
unacceptable because it would imply punishing some societies for their sound domestic 
policies so as to reward other societies for their imprudent policies.174  
Rawls is repudiating a situation where “distributive principles would insist on 
redistribution as long as there is inequality between peoples no matter what the cause of 
this inequality.”175 The underlying implication of Rawls’s argument is that there is a 
distinction between inequality due to choice and inequality attributable to circumstance. 
In the same way that we don’t want a domestic scheme to compensate individuals for 
their poor decisions by taking from those who have made good decisions, we also don’t 
want a global scheme to compensate societies for their poor governance by punishing 
other societies for their good governance.176 The goal of distributive justice is to offset 
the influences of unchosen inequality due to circumstances on persons, rather than to 
compensate them for their poor decisions.177 Rawls’s concern is that a global distributive 
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principle would not take into account the distinction between inequality as a result of 
either choice or circumstance, rather it would unfairly deal with citizens of properly 
managed economies by transferring their benefits to citizens of poorly managed 
economies unceasingly so long as global inequality persists.178 Tan articulates, “the 
choices a people make about its domestic arrangements would not be respected if the 
gains or losses due to these choices were annulled by a distributive principle between 
peoples.”179    
The fundamental premise of Rawls’s argument is that the reasons for a country’s 
inability to espouse good social and economic policies are mainly internal, and thus 
freely espoused by governments of worse-off countries. Rawls alludes to several 
domestic factors that are instrumental to society’s economic and social performance, 
consisting of its political culture and virtues (comprising a respect for basic human 
rights), its civic society, “its members’ probity and industriousness,” and its population 
policy.180 However, this premise which was dubbed “explanatory nationalism” was 
refuted by Thomas Pogge on the basis of empirical fact.181 Explanatory nationalism 
“present(s) poverty as a set of national phenomena explicable mainly as a result of bad 
domestic policies and institutions that stifle, or fail to stimulate, national economic 
growth and engender national economic injustice.”182 On the other hand, Pogge indicates 
that this explanation “leave(s) open important questions, such as why national factors 
(institutions, officials, policies, culture, natural environments, level of technical and 
economic development) have these effects rather than others”183 by disregarding the 
causal influences of global factors, for example, trade practices, patterns of consumption 
 253 
by wealthy countries, international law, etc. on a country’s domestic policies and their 
results.184 
If the distributive goal is to counter the impacts of these unchosen global factors 
and not the influences of chosen national policies on a people’s welfare, then, distributive 
arrangements between societies should not be indifferent to choice. A poorer country that 
benefits from a global distributive principle need not be viewed as a society that is being 
funded unfairly for the domestic decisions it has made, but is more accurately being 
compensated for the impacts of global factors imposed on it without its choice.185 So 
worthy of note is that “global distributive justice and national self-determination, the 
latter being the underlying premise in Rawls’s argument, are not incompatible goals.”186 
Despite Rawls’s lack of commitment to global distributive principles and his inherent 
flaws and inconsistency with his own moral individualism as argued in the domestic case, 
his statist approach implies relying merely upon humanitarian assistance from the 
perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to drugs in developing nations. 
The analysis will focus on the account of international responsibilities as 
presented in the LOP. Rawls’s notion of international responsibilities focuses on assisting 
burdened societies to attain well-ordered societies. Providing affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs as a transition strategy is argued as a critical component of Rawls’s duty 
of assistance to burdened societies in order to attain well-ordered societies. 
  
E. Rawls’s Duty of Assistance and Access to Anti-Retroviral Drugs 
Acknowledging Rawls’s imperative position that we have a duty to assist burdened 
societies, this part explores whether it is in consonant with a Rawlsian approach to extend 
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these duties to health care, and specifically to provision of essential drugs especially anti-
retroviral drugs. It examines three arguments regarding the claim that enhancing access to 
essential drugs is a desideratum for fulfilling Rawls’s duty of assistance. 
 
E.1. Argument Based on Rawls’s Defense of Minimal Human Rights  
The first argument focuses on Rawls’s defense of human rights. The human right 
to health is codified in the 1948 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Article 25 states that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and 
medical care and necessary social services….”187 The right to essential medicines is 
increasingly receiving support as a sub-right of the right to health. In Montreal Statement 
on the Human Right to Essential Medicines, Pogge writes, “we have a responsibility to 
achieve a social and international order in which human rights – including the right to 
essential medicines – are fully realized.”188 
An initial consideration about the duty of assistance is that it would strongly favor 
policy interventions supporting the human right to health, comprising the sub-right to 
essential medicines, based on three reasons. The first reason focuses on the sixth Law of 
Peoples which affirms: “Peoples are to honor human rights.”189 Second, Rawls stresses 
the importance of policies that support human rights over economic transfers.190 Third, 
Rawls emphasizes the importance of policy interventions supporting women’s basic 
rights and interests.191 Among the global poor, women and girl children 
disproportionately bear the burden of disease consisting of problems of unsafe abortion 
and childbirth. The health of women and children are significantly adversely affected by 
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HIV/AIDS pandemic especially in sub-Saharan Africa.  Data shows that they are 
increasingly among the victims of HIV/AIDS and disproportionately among many new 
HIV/AIDS infections especially in sub-Saharan Africa. In many poor countries, women 
and girl children lack access to treatment for various diseases because they are excluded 
due to gender discrimination.192 Gender-based violence and gender inequality are 
increasingly mentioned as critical determinants of women’s HIV risk.193 Maternal 
mortality also continues to be astronomically high especially in many developing 
countries, as a result of limited health infrastructure, inadequately trained birth attendants, 
and women’s unavoidable resort to illegal and unsafe abortions.194 Cognizant of these 
vast inequalities affecting women, a policy favoring access to drugs can be certain to 
possess a strong pro-female effect.195 
The argument in support of improving access to essential drugs based on Rawls’s 
restrictive notion of human rights does not go through, because his use of the term human 
rights is equivocal. Rawls refused to favor an expansive definition of human rights that 
might encompass all rights codified in international treaties in support of a minimum that 
he views as more reasonable basis for international consensus.196 The human rights 
supported by Rawls in LOP reveal a sub-set of human rights that he sees not only as 
widely supported by liberal democratic societies, but as well capable of receiving similar 
support in decent non-democratic societies. These human rights “express a special class 
of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) 
of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.”197 Rawls 
argue that societies whose political institutions and legal order fulfil this special class of 
human rights are well-ordered, and cannot justifiably be subjected to the use of sanctions 
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or military force. These urgent human rights establish a minimum framework for use 
among peoples that Rawls sees as non-ethnocentric.198  
There is a charge that Rawls’s account of minimal rights is ad hoc.  Rawls’s 
global minimum is not compatible with his views about domestic justice. It does not fulfil 
the condition of a theory of human rights – the criterion of domestic-compatibility. Rawls 
attempts to ground civil and political rights in persons’ moral powers and interests but at 
the same contradictorily refute that all persons enjoy these very same civil and political 
rights.199 Caney argues that “the force of the scope claim is that one cannot, as it were, 
apply these universalist arguments for citizens and not apply them to foreigners when the 
very terms of the arguments (the moral powers and interests of persons) do not justify 
this kind of domestic/international split.”200 One cannot logically support Rawls’s 
domestic theory and stick to his international theory. It fails short of the criterion of 
domestic-compatibility.201  
In short, Caney argues that “one cannot coherently both embrace the rights that 
Rawls does embrace and also reject some of the rights that Rawls rejects. The claim is 
that they stand or fall as a package.”202 There is an apparent contradiction between 
Rawls’s account of minimum rights and his domestic theory on the one hand, and a 
contradiction between his account of minimum rights and his rejection of other proposed 
human rights on the other hand. The charge is that his theory does not fulfil the criterion 
of coherence.203 Caney also employs what he termed rights holism in his criticism of 
Rawls’s minimal rights account. Rights holism “maintains that the acceptance of some 
specific rights implies the acceptance of some other specific rights. It claims that certain 
rights are interconnected.”204 Based on Rawls’s minimal rights account, the policy 
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supporting improving access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs would not 
be favored by Rawls’s duty of assistance. 
 
E.2. Argument Based on Redress for the Unjustified Distributive Effects of Cooperative 
Organizations 
The second argument is based on redress for the unjustified distributive effects of 
cooperative organizations. Rawls indicates that parties to the second original position in 
LOP would not only agree to the eight basic principles or laws, they would as well 
formulate guidelines for establishing cooperative organizations and criteria for fairness in 
trade. Rawls posits that three such organizations would be established: one to ensure fair 
trade among peoples, another to institute a cooperative banking system, and a third to 
play a diplomatic and coordinating role similar to that of the United Nations.205 With 
regard to fair trade, Rawls contends that the parties to the original position negotiating 
behind the veil of ignorance would agree to fair standards of trade to keep the market fair 
and competitive as well as to everyone’s mutual advantage in the long run, irrespective of 
whether its economy is large or small. He stressed that these standards must guarantee the 
fairness of market transactions, and guarantee that unjustified inequalities among people 
do not develop over time. Their function is therefore similar to that of the fair background 
structure in the domestic case discussed in TOJ.206 In a situation where these cooperative 
arrangements should lead to unjustified distributive effects between peoples, Rawls 
argues that “…these would have to be corrected, and taken into account by the duty of 
assistance….”207   
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The pharmaceutical industry and its advocates claim that the TRIPS agreement 
established by WTO signifies “the optimal balance between stimulating innovation and 
promoting access.”208 The impact of the TRIPS agreement is non-symmetrical and the 
distributive benefits accrue mainly to the high-income nations where pharmaceutical 
industry is concentrated.209 Rawls’s duty of assistance would support compensating those 
who have suffered the unintended distributive consequences of this situation. 
Interventions for providing affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral 
drugs for developing countries would constitute logical approaches for redress.210 
Rawls also includes another condition to his explanation of fair trade: “A further 
assumption here is that the larger nations within the wealthier economies will not attempt 
to monopolize the market, or to conspire to form a cartel, or to act as an oligopoly.”211 
Violating this condition of fairness implies violation of the ideal of reciprocity among 
peoples and which calls into question the legitimacy of trade arrangements.212 In the 
history of access to drugs debate, an abundance of evidence shows that government of 
wealthy countries and multinational pharmaceutical companies defend their own interests 
at the cost of access to essential drugs for the poor.213  
 
E.3. Argument Based on Access to Drugs as a Transition Strategy Favoring the 
Establishment of Politically Well-Ordered Nations 
The third and final argument is based on access to drugs as a transition strategy 
favoring the establishment of politically well-ordered nations. This implies considering 
whether a policy improving access to drugs can be viewed as an effective strategy that 
enables burdened societies to become politically well-ordered, and therefore as a policy 
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that should be supported by Rawls’s duty of assistance. The argument is presented in two 
aspects. The first focuses on the assertions that countries with a high burden of disease 
and severe lack of access to drugs do not fulfil Rawls’s criteria for well-ordered societies. 
The second contends that improving access to essential drugs would help in the transition 
to attaining politically well-ordered.214   
According to Johri et al. “ the principal correlates of a high burden of disease and 
lack of access to medicines are economic.”215 More so, poor and middle-income countries 
accepted various types of governance structures, ranging from democracies and 
dictatorships.216 
Clarifying the correlation between disease and being well-ordered requires a 
review of the characteristics of well-ordered societies. Well-ordered societies include 
liberal or decent societies. Rawls explains societies that satisfy a liberal conception of 
justice as fulfilling three characteristic principles. The first guarantees basic rights and 
liberties of the sort familiar to constitutional democracies. The second allocates a special 
priority to these rights, liberties and opportunities, with regard to claims of the general 
good and perfectionism values. The third guarantees for all citizens the required primary 
goods to assist them to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms.217 One 
preferred interpretation of these principles was presented by Rawls’s in the domestic case 
as justice as fairness. However, other interpretations that represent liberal perspectives 
can be accepted provided that they fulfil conditions consistent with the idea of the social 
contract that supports the freedom and equality of all citizens, and of society as a fair 
system of cooperation over time.218 
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Rawls in exploring why democratic nations are peaceful explains in a nutshell the 
five features of the basic structure of society that he views as important to a reasonably 
just constitutional democracy that can endure over time. He contends that, peace is made 
more secure internally among citizens and externally among states to the degree that 
these features are fulfilled. He delineates five institutions, without which “excessive and 
unreasonable inequalities tend to develop.”219 (1) A guaranteed fair equality of 
opportunity, particularly in education and training. (2) A decent distribution of income 
and wealth fulfilling the third condition of liberalism which assures all citizens the 
necessary means for intelligent and effective use of their basic freedom. (3) Society 
playing the role of employer of final recourse through general or local government, or 
other social and economic policies. (4) Basic health care guaranteed for all citizens. (5) 
Public financing of elections and means of guaranteeing the ability of public information 
on issues of policy.220 Furthermore, decent societies considered as well-ordered are 
required to fulfill strict conditions. Rawls sees them as jointly fulfilling the following two 
criteria: (1) lack of aggressive aims and means; and (2) a system of law guaranteeing 
human rights.221 In addition to these human rights that are principally political, Rawls 
stresses the importance of basic economic entitlements. He indicates that the right to life 
includes a claim “to the means of subsistence and security.”222 Therefore, decent societies 
must show a respect for human rights which includes economic subsistence. 
Based on these important preliminary clarifications, we will now discuss whether 
a high burden of disease constitutes a barrier to attaining a politically well-ordered 
society in Rawls’s perspective. Rawls’s account supports that all liberal societies have a 
domestic responsibility to ensure provision of basic health care that involves access to 
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drugs. Providing these basic health care services varies among liberal societies. 
Furthermore, there are also clear indications that some low and middle-income societies 
that guarantee political rights, liberties and freedoms, but have not been successful in 
providing basic health or access to essential drugs to all citizens. Countries like South 
Africa, India and Guatemala have been cited as examples.223  
The social determinants of health indicate that poor health is correlated with lower 
socio-economic status.224 Poverty is also established to have a correlation with health.225 
Based on the assertions, an inference could be made that health problems are 
concentrated excessively in population sub-groups that are disadvantaged and inability to 
provide access to essential drugs reveal and exacerbate social and economic inequalities 
between the members of these groups.226  
The implication of this situation is that the principle of equality of opportunity as 
argued by Rawls in TOJ is violated. The prevalence of high burden of disease in any 
situation results in very considerable mortality differentials between the members of 
different social groups. This in turn results in a situation where the chance to survive to 
the adult stage of life when freedom, liberties and opportunities can be achieved varies 
considerably across social classes and other group separations, comprising gender.227 
Similarly, “morbidity differentials aggravate this situation by compounding inequalities 
in the ability to flourish.”228    
Rawls’s explanation of the principle of equality of opportunity in LOP necessary 
to fulfil the criteria of a liberal society is less rigorous than that discussed in TOJ. 
Nevertheless, he still emphasizes some type of equality of opportunity particularly in 
education and training. Both childhood mortality and school performance are universally 
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predicted to be significantly affected by preventable and treatable conditions such as 
malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea and nemotodes and parasites.229  
Furthermore, LOP acknowledges the significance of fulfilling basic economic 
entitlements such as subsistence rights, in the absence of which one would have “not 
liberalism at all but libertarianism.”230 It is pertinent to note that “a high burden of disease 
contributes to the entrenchment of poverty and threatens subsistence rights.”231 Data 
shows that the influence of this burden is usually distributed among groups disadvantaged 
in other means, such as income, wealth, power and prestige.232 This situation is 
exacerbated by lack of access to essential drugs. There is an indication that calamitous 
illness is a major cause of household poverty in developing countries, and expenditure on 
drugs account for the biggest out-of-pocket costs.233 
Some authors argue that there are many societies in Europe, the Americas, Asia 
and Africa that have lively democracy and thus in the process of becoming well-ordered, 
but unfortunately lack of the social determinants of health and health care consisting of 
access to essential drugs continues to be an impediment to accomplishing this political 
goal.234 Johri et al. further argue that societies confronting these problems fall short of not 
merely to correspond to the formal characteristics of liberal democracies articulated by 
Rawls, but as well to fulfil spirit of the criterion of reciprocity which entails not 
embodying principles of social organization that is reasonable to consent to as free and 
equal persons behind the veil of ignorance. These problems as well endanger the ability 
of societies to comply with the conditions argued by Rawls for decent societies, 
especially by jeopardizing subsistence rights.235  
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On the other hand, Johri et al. argue “that where the burden of disease is still high, 
guaranteeing effective access to medicines would speed the process of transition to well-
ordered societies, by making it possible for individuals to enjoy real exercise of rights, 
liberties and opportunities and to avoid destitution.”236  More so, decreasing the burden of 
disease in low- and middle- income countries would provide these countries with an 
opportunity to advance economically which is a critical condition to be satisfied if a basic 
standard of living is to be offered to all, without external aid.237 Policies supporting 
access to drugs and other health sector interventions may then be more effective than 
monetary transfers in promoting sustainable economic growth and relieving poverty.238 
This policy as well would deal with threats to international peace which can be 
significantly reduced by the international community. For example, situations such as the 
spread of HIV/AIDS pandemic may be linked with food security, drought and famine,239 
and act as a harbinger to war. The magnitude of this threat was acknowledged by the 
2001 UN Special Session on HIV/AIDS, which indicated the first time that the General 
Assembly convened specifically for an issue related to a disease. This meeting led to the 
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS with the international community favoring 
provision of antiretroviral treatment for the first time, which as well improves prevention 
efforts in developing countries as one strategy to fight the pandemic, as well as a matter 
of social justice.240  
Well-ordered societies have an obligation to assist burdened societies in becoming 
well-ordered. Johri et al. writes “…we believe that there are good empirical grounds for 
seeing a policy of improving access to medicines as an effective transition strategy that 
should be favored by Rawls’s duty of assistance to burdened societies. Commitment to 
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this policy is to be seen as a duty of charity, and is highly circumscribed.”241 This policy 
would be appreciated in view of its contribution to the aim of promoting a society of 
well-ordered peoples, and may not relate to individuals living in outlaw states, or 
benevolent absolutisms. The commitment will terminate as soon as burdened societies 
become well-ordered. Furthermore, improving access to drugs has a potentially critical 
role in attaining the goals established by Rawls in LOP. Essentially, this is the case even 
if obligation for present lack of success to ensure access to drugs or to guarantee a 
favorable distribution of the social and economic determinants of health is thought to rest 
at the national level as Rawls’s account proposes.242  
 
F. Conclusion 
Concluding remarks recapitulate the analysis of Rawls’s post-trial access of 
participants and host populations to antiretroviral drugs. The analysis began with a 
controversial debate between two major approaches, including cosmopolitan and statist in 
the issue of global justice to address affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries. The focus of the chapter was on Rawls’s statist approach in dealing 
with the issue of post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries 
especially for trial participants and host populations. 
Rawls’s two different approaches to justice both in the domestic society and in the 
international arena were discussed. His account of domestic justice was dubbed justice as 
fairness which emphasizes the idea that fundamental agreements of the parties to the 
original position were fair. The concept of veil of ignorance which implies depriving the 
 265 
parties of the information that might bias their choice of principles was introduced in 
order to ensure impartiality and to maximize fairness in mutual bargaining.  
A constellation of ideas critical to understanding justice as fairness were 
discussed. The notion of society as a fair system of cooperation is characterized by a 
political conception of justice in which citizens involved in the cooperation are regarded 
as free and equal persons. The idea of reciprocity which emphasizes the ideas of 
impartiality and mutual advantage in social cooperation was discussed. The idea of 
impartiality focuses on altruism and being motivated by the general good, while that of 
mutual advantage pertains generally to everyone’s advantage relative to his or her present 
and future conditions. The notion of a well-ordered society explained in the context of 
being effectively regulated by a political conception of justice was also discussed. 
The idea of the basic structure of the society which applies to a well-ordered 
society was considered fundamental because it is the primary subject of justice. The basic 
structure of the society consists of the primary social institutions responsible for 
distributing fundamental rights and duties, as well as for determining the division of 
advantages from social cooperation. Rawls argues for a basic structure of a society that is 
fixed, sufficient, as well as closed and isolated from other societies. The background 
justice for a well-ordered society is considered guaranteed by a just basic structure. The 
major institutions of the basic structure of a society have exclusive role to specify rights 
and duties of the citizens and to considerably impact their life prospects, aspirations and 
opportunities. The basic structure of the society accommodates significant inequalities 
stemming from natural and social lotteries. Principles of justice were considered 
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imperative in order to address the inherent inequalities in the basic structure of the 
society. 
Essential elements of theory of justice including original position and two 
principles of justice were highlighted and discussed. The notion of original position was 
considered necessary because of the requirement to specify the fair terms of cooperation 
in a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons. The original position 
guarantees no leverage for any of the parties involved in the mutual bargaining, and thus, 
entrench fairness in the fundamental agreements reached. The object of the original 
agreement is argued to be principles of justice aimed at regulating the political 
institutions of the real citizens. Impartiality was guaranteed for the parties in the original 
position by executing the agreement under the veil of ignorance. This essentially nullifies 
the effects of natural and social conditions which could be ordinarily exploited by some 
citizens to their own advantage. The primary task of the parties in the original position 
was to choose the principles of justice that will regulate the social life and the basic 
structure of the society that are ideally fair. 
Rawls identified two principles of justice as fairness. The first principle is called 
equal liberty principle. The second principle is divided into two parts, including the 
difference principle and fair equality of opportunity principle. Equal liberty principle 
guarantees equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens. The difference principle 
requires that any social and economic inequalities work to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged. Fair equality of opportunity requires that all citizens of a domestic society 
have equal opportunities for obtaining positions of power. Rawls argued that the 
difference principle and fair equality of opportunity principle offer protection and 
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compensation for those who are disadvantaged by natural and social lotteries. Strict 
lexical priority of the first principle that is, equal liberty principle over the second 
principle was stipulated. Similarly, strict lexical priority of fair equality of opportunity 
over the difference principle was emphasized. These principles primarily were applied to 
the basic structure of the society and they governed the allocation of rights and duties and 
control the distribution of social and economic advantages. 
In the analysis about health and essential drugs in a domestic society, Daniels 
extended Rawls’s theory of justice to health care in the domestic society. Rawls classified 
health and health care as natural goods that are not regulated by the difference principle. 
Rawls simplified the construction of his theory and made unrealistic assumption that all 
people are normal and as a result made no provision for people who would become ill or 
die prematurely in his hypothetical social contract. On the other hand, Daniels argues that 
health care institutions should be regarded as basic institutions that have exclusive 
responsibility of guaranteeing fair equality of opportunity. He further argues that health 
care institutions should be regulated by fair equality of opportunity principle, since 
meeting health care needs has a significant impact on the distribution of opportunity. He 
contends that fulfilling health care needs protects people’s normal opportunity range and 
helps them to maintain or restore normal species-typical functioning.  
Rawls’s statist approach discusses the two aspects of Rawls’s account of 
international relations and international justice, including ideal theory and non-ideal 
theory. The ideal theory focuses on how the laws of peoples should regulate the political 
relations among liberal and decent hierarchical peoples. It also emphasizes that well-
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ordered societies such as liberal and decent hierarchical societies would independently 
adopt the same global principles of justice and basic human rights. 
On the other hand, the non-ideal theory focuses on burdened societies that lack 
basic resources to become well-ordered. Rawls argues that well-ordered societies have a 
duty of assistance to burdened societies in order to help them attain required level of 
economic and political developments to become well-ordered. The aim of duty of 
assistance also involves securing basic human rights and fulfilling basic needs.  
However, Rawls’s account of global justice lacks a commitment to distributive 
justice. He did not commit to distributive principles that would regulate global 
inequalities and global relations among countries because he thinks that such principles 
would be redundant and would produce unacceptable results. Rawls argues that such 
principles should be rejected because they often lack a clear target and a cutoff point. He 
further argues about the significant role that the political culture of a society plays in its 
development. Rawls’s restrictive vision on the role of distributive principles in global 
relations obscures the critical distinction between duties of humanity and duties of 
justice. Duties of humanity focus on redistribution of wealth and resources, while duties 
of justice emphasize the criterion for the distribution and the basic institutions and 
principles involved in justifying and rationalizing the distribution. 
In analyzing Rawls’s duty of assistance and access to anti-retroviral drugs, three 
arguments were explored, including argument based on Rawls’s defense of human rights, 
argument based on redress for the unjustified distributive effects of cooperative 
organizations and argument based on access to drugs as a transition strategy favoring the 
establishment of politically well-ordered nations. The argument based on Rawls’s 
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defense of human rights did not go through because of Rawls’s minimal and ad hoc 
account of human rights. Regarding the argument based on redressing the unjustified 
distributive effects of cooperative organizations, there is a consensus that interventions 
for providing affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for 
developing countries would constitute logical approaches for redress. The third argument 
based on access to drugs as a transition strategy that favors the establishment of 
politically well-ordered nations was validated. It was argued that countries with a high 
burden of disease and severe lack of access to drugs do not fulfil Rawls’s criteria for 
well-ordered societies. Furthermore, it was argued that improving access to drugs would 
help as an effective transition strategy that would enable burdened societies to become 
politically well-ordered. Therefore, Rawls relies upon the duty of humanitarian assistance 
from the perspective of global justice to provide affordable access to antiretroviral drugs. 
This reliance is merely a transition strategy until the nation can develop its own resources 
as a well-ordered society. In contrast, as discussed in the next chapter, Pogge’s 
cosmopolitan approach adopts a more robust and expansive international perspective to 
global justice to justify access to antiretroviral drugs in developing countries.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POGGE AND POST-TRIAL ACCESS OF PARTICIPANTS AND HOST 
POPULATIONS TO ANTI-RETROVIRAL DRUGS 
 
A. Introduction 
Post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries is argued also 
from the perspective of another dominant approach to global justice, cosmopolitanism.1 
Pogge argued for a stronger interpretation of global responsibilities for providing 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in 
developing countries. His work establishes that we have a critical duty of justice to take 
action on the issue of affordable access to essential drugs including, anti-retroviral drugs. 
This duty is grounded on human rights, and extends universally to all individuals.2 
In his landmark work on World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms published in 2002, Pogge develops a perspective on global 
justice that challenges Rawls’s account on several dimensions. He contends that severe 
poverty and global inequality persist because citizens of affluent countries do not 
consider their eradication compelling. He offers two common prejudices for the 
complacency of the citizens of affluent countries: (1) that the persistence of poverty in 
developing countries does not require the moral attention of more wealthy countries and 
(2) that there is nothing seriously wrong with their conduct, their policies, and the global 
economic institutions they establish and support.3 Pogge challenges the thesis of 
explanatory nationalism propounded by Rawls, which indicates that the persistence of 
world poverty and inequality is adequately explained by appeal to local factors.4 Rawls 
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insists that the significant factor in how a country fares in general is its political culture 
rather than factors such as poor luck in its share of natural resources or external factors 
linked with interactions between states.5 On the other hand, Pogge’s primary contention 
to Rawlsian perspective relates to the “suggestion that the causes of severe poverty lie 
within the poor countries themselves.”6 Rawls’s duty to assist encompasses positive 
duties of action in an attempt to help those who are in need. Pogge contends as unjust the 
way the global institutional order regulates global policy. He further argues that in view 
of this injustice, “the institutional order perpetuates harm, and so violates negative rights 
or human rights.”7 Pogge articulates, “if the global economic order plays a major role in 
the persistence of severe poverty worldwide and if our governments, acting in our name, 
are prominently involved in shaping and upholding this order, then the deprivation of the 
distant needy may well engage not mere positive duties to assist but also more stringent 
negative duties not to harm.”8  
Pogge develops a theory motivated by human rights that emphasized negative 
rights and duties not to be harmed or not to harm.9 Pogge crafts his theory of global 
justice on a minimalist account of negative duty not to harm. He contends that the 
violation of the negative duty not to harm represents an injustice. The implication is that 
this injustice entails the act of harming without appropriate compensation or reform to 
institutions and policies to protect the victims that suffered the harm.10 
Pogge succinctly presents his general hypothesis in his paper Severe Poverty as a 
Human Rights Violation, “that any institutional order that foreseeably produces a 
reasonably avoidable excess of severe poverty and of mortality from poverty-related 
causes manifests a human rights violation on the part of those who participate in 
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imposing this order.”11 He draws a causal relationship between the developed and the 
developing world, which asserts that citizens of affluent countries cooperate in imposing 
an unjust institutional order and in the long run responsible for the government they vote 
into power. These governments in turn are responsible for establishing the policies, 
guidelines, and institutions that, Pogge argues avoidably perpetuate injustice through the 
violations of human rights. The emphasis here is that the developed world avoidably 
imposes policies that violates negative rights, and ultimately, perpetuate severe poverty.12  
 Pogge acknowledges his inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which does not simply propose social and economic human rights: “Everyone has the 
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care.”13 He further stresses the 
significance of such social and economic human rights in relation to the design of the 
national and global institutional order: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.”14 Pogge argues that the critical requirement of any coercive institutional 
scheme constitutes being designed, as reasonably as possible, to ensure human rights. He 
explains this to imply that “such a scheme should afford each human being secure access 
to minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms of participation, of drink, clothing, 
shelter, education and health care.”15  
However, in his paper Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program, 
Pogge presents a very bleak picture of massive incidence of mortality and morbidity 
especially in many poor countries.16 Data shows that about eighteen million people perish 
yearly from curable medical conditions, which amounts to about fifty thousand avoidable 
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deaths each day, or one third of all human deaths.17 Furthermore, hundreds of millions 
suffer gravely especially among the global poor due to communicable diseases.18 The 
lives of other hundreds of millions are critically affected by severe illnesses or premature 
deaths in their family. The astronomical increase in the global burden of disease 
adversely impacts the economies of many poor countries, and invariably perpetuates their 
poverty, which on the other hand, contributes to the ill health of their populations.19 
Poverty was seen as the most critical causal determinant of global burden of disease, such 
that nearly all the avoidable mortality and morbidity happens in the poor countries,20 
predominantly among their poorer populations.21 
Pogge presents two different strategies for dealing with the increasing global 
burden of disease particularly in many poor countries which results in massive mortality 
and morbidity rates. The First approach emphasizes the eradication of severe poverty.22 
In this sense, the very poor are narrowly defined as “those who suffer the deprivations 
(such as) lack of access to safe food and water, clothing, shelter, basic medical care, and 
basic education.”23 This narrow and absolute definition of severe poverty approximately 
tallies with the World Bank’s $2.50 per day current international poverty line, which 
entails a household complete consumption, per person per day, having less purchasing 
power than $2.50 had in the United States in 2005. Data shows that an estimate of about 
48 percent of the world’s population, that is, about 3,085 million people were living 
below poverty line as at 2005,24 so averagely, 45 percent below it – denoting their 
collective shortfall from poverty line represents only 2 percent of global household 
income.25 Based on this data on the moral significance of global poverty, Pogge argues 
that, “A 2 percent shift in the distribution of global household income could wholly 
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eradicate the severe poverty that currently blights the lives of nearly half of the human 
population.”26  
The second strategy identified by Pogge for tackling the massive mortality and 
morbidity rates is guaranteeing improved access to medical treatments, including 
preventive and remedial.27 Pogge articulating the complementary nature of both strategies 
in tackling the issues of severe poverty and global disease burden writes, “Just as the 
eradication of severe poverty would greatly reduce the global disease burden, so 
improved access to essential medicines would greatly reduce severe poverty by 
enhancing the ability of the poor to work, and to organize themselves for their own 
economic advancement.”28  The focus of this chapter is on the second strategy and in line 
with this, Pogge delineates that significant reduction of global disease burden can be 
attained by providing medical innovators with stable and reliable financial incentives to 
tackle the medical conditions of the poor.29 Pogge argues that his primary goal is to 
“develop a concrete, feasible, and politically realistic plan for reforming current national 
and global rules for incentivizing the search for new essential drugs.”30 Pogge argues that 
the reformed plan will be cost effective and fairly distribute the cost of global health-care 
spending among countries, generations, and between healthy and unhealthy people. He 
also argues that the implementation of the new plan would be overseen by national 
parliaments and international organizations, such as WTO and the WHO.31  
This chapter focuses on Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach to the issue of access to 
anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. The first part of the chapter deals with 
meaning of cosmopolitanism and four different approaches of cosmopolitanism with their 
nuances on the application of global distributive principles. The four approaches to 
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cosmopolitan justice focuses on contractarian, consequentialist, rights based and duty 
based. 
The second part deals with current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical research 
which focuses on seven problems identified by Pogge in the current globalized patent 
regime. Pogge also argues that the TRIPS agreement is responsible for avoidable death 
and disease on a massive scale by pricing advanced essential drugs beyond the reach of 
the poor and encouraging neglect of diseases concentrated among them.32 The problems 
created by the current patent system led Pogge to propose new rules for reforming and 
incentivizing pharmaceutical research. 
The third part of this chapter focuses on Pogge’s new rules for reforming and 
incentivizing pharmaceutical research in which he proposes two basic reform strategies 
for dealing with monopoly pricing issues of the current patent system, a differential 
pricing strategy and a public good strategy. Pogge argues that a differential pricing 
strategy may not be able to yield a plan of reform to make a significant improvement on 
the current patent system. On the other hand, he argues that a public good strategy is 
more promising to yield a reform plan that will circumvent the major failings of the 
current monopoly patent regime and retain most of the benefits.33  
The fourth part tackles the critical role of the Health Impact Fund (HIF), a global 
institution proposed by Pogge for the implementation of his new plan for reforming and 
incentivizing pharmaceutical research. The HIF is proposed as a global agency financed 
primarily by governments of various countries that would give pharmaceutical innovators 
the option to register any new drug. Pogge clearly describes the HIF as “a pay-for-
performance mechanism.”34 In this context, pharmaceutical companies are rewarded 
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based on the global health impact of their registered drugs, which would be measured in 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) saved. The HIF would estimate to what extent this 
drug has added to the length and quality of human lives. Making the registered drugs 
available as widely as possible to the world’s global poor is also a critical component of 
this plan. The five chief advantages of the HIF over conventional innovation prizes, 
encompassing advance market commitments and advance purchase commitments will be 
discussed. The HIF’s solution to the current seven failings of the current patent system 
will be addressed. Critics’ demerits of Pogge’s HIF will also be discussed. A more 
detailed analysis of Pogge’s position on affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries begins with a discussion of the meaning of cosmopolitanism. 
 
B. Pogge’s Cosmopolitan Approach 
B.1. Meaning of Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism emphasizes that everyone should be treated as equals regardless 
of nationality and citizenship. Tan articulates, “from the cosmopolitan perspective, 
principles of justice ought to transcend nationality and citizenship, and ought to apply 
equally to all individuals of the world as a whole.”35 Succinctly put, “cosmopolitan 
justice is justice without borders.”36   
One of the major interpretations of cosmopolitan justice is that this impartiality 
with regard to nationality and citizenship as well relates to distributive justice in such a 
way that a person’s lawful material entitlements would be independently regulated by his 
or her national and state membership.37 From this perspective, Tan explained that Charles 
Beitz and Thomas Pogge took their inspiration from John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice to 
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contend that Rawls’s arguments for social and economic equality should apply as well to 
the global setting.38 Tan writes, “Just as Rawls considers a person’s race, gender, talents, 
wealth, and other natural and social particularities to be “arbitrary from a moral point of 
view,”39 so too, they argue, are factors like a person’s nationality and citizenship morally 
arbitrary.”40 Furthermore, it was argued that in the same way that the influences of 
contingencies of the natural and social lotteries on a person’s life chances were 
invalidated in the domestic realm by specific principles of distributive justice, conversely, 
the influences of global contingencies should be diminished by specific principles of 
global distributive justice. The implication is that Rawls’s principles of justice 
comprising the principle regulating social and economic equality “should apply between 
individuals across societies and not just within the borders of a single society.”41  
Cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice defend some basic claims. Pogge 
claims that all cosmopolitan views share three essential features. The first is 
individualism which emphasizes that the ultimate units of moral concern are human 
beings, or persons, rather than, units such as family lines, tribes, or ethnic, cultural, or 
religious communities, nations, or states. The Second is universality which stresses that 
the status of ultimate unit of concern ascribes equally to every living human being, not 
simply to some subgroup, such as men, aristocrats, whites, or Muslims. The third is 
generality which emphasizes that the special status identified has global force. Here, the 
ultimate units of moral concern for everyone are persons.42   Similarly, Charles Jones 
points out that the cosmopolitan perspective is “impartial, universal, individualist, and 
egalitarian.”43 It is pertinent to note that there are seemingly some extreme positions 
among cosmopolitans. For example, some authors liken giving priority to members of 
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one’s nation to racism44 or to “bad faith.”45 More so, some authors contend that we have a 
duty to engage in getting rid of nations and national identification completely.46 Some 
cosmopolitans as part of advancing the aim of decreasing the significance of national 
identities have argued for the establishment of a world state, or at least strengthening of 
the power of international political structures.47 There is an acknowledgement by some 
cosmopolitans that one severe flaw of the cosmopolitan perspective is its apparent 
inability to recognize and appropriately explain the significance of the special ties and 
commitments that typify the lives of ordinary men and women.48  
On the other hand, other cosmopolitans advocate for the strengthening of 
international political institutions without getting rid of national attachments and 
loyalties.49 In this context, more moderate cosmopolitans acknowledge that in some 
instances there are special duties owed to co-nationals and citizens provided that they 
promote realization of the global justice. Robert E. Goodin endorsed this idea in his 
efficiency argument. He argues “that we all have general duties to all persons, but these 
duties may be effectively fulfilled through a system of special responsibilities towards 
compatriots.”50 He discussed assigned responsibility model which entails that special 
responsibilities are in his own perspective “merely devices whereby the moral 
community’s general duties get assigned to particular agents.”51 In a similar vein, Jones 
articulates “It can be morally permissible, even required, that one be patriotic and loyal to 
one’s country, but such permissions and requirements can never override the demands of 
impartial justice.”52  Moral obligations are recognized beyond the requirements of justice. 
There is a consideration that various local attachments may engender some of these 
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supplementary moral obligations, but that they are not the basic foundation of any 
obligations of justice.53 
Another important basic claim of cosmopolitans deals with who is owed the 
goods transferred. There is a consensus among most contemporary cosmopolitans that 
obligations of justice are owed to individuals and not states.54 Addressing global 
inequality between states without any focus on the well-being of the individuals falls 
short of an effective global justice theory. Tan writes, “It is myopic to think that the 
problems of global injustices that impact on individuals can be settled by focusing solely 
on justice between states. A “morality of states” approach does not go far enough if we 
are interested in improving individual lives.”55 A contrary perspective was at a time 
espoused by Brian Barry who argued that states were entitled to receive resources.56 
However, in his later works he discards this earlier view and aligns his position with 
cosmopolitanism’s individualist claims.57 
Another important point worth noting regarding cosmopolitanism is the various 
classifications in the literature. Millum provides two distinctions of cosmopolitan 
perspectives based on the foundations that are considered to motivate them. The first is 
humanitarian cosmopolitans who assert that obligations of justice do not stem from 
associations like the state, but from persons’ characteristics per se, irrespective of their 
associations with other persons. He cites an example with any utilitarian theory of global 
justice, which emphasizes that the ultimate justification for justice principles is their 
contribution to aggregate utility, and it is immaterial in whom that utility is situated.58 
The second is political cosmopolitans who claim that some associations’ characteristics 
like those exemplified by the state are the bases for applying justice requirements, but 
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contend that these characteristics are actually located as well in international 
associations.59 A typical example is to argue that mutually beneficial cooperation 
between individuals is necessary and adequate to establish justice requirements in the 
distribution of the cooperation’s products. The global trade based on its magnitude and 
significance has been cited as an indication that mutually beneficial cooperation goes 
completely beyond national borders. The implication is that the requirements of justice 
go beyond national borders as well.60 
Pogge also offered two distinctions of cosmopolitan perspectives. He 
distinguishes first between legal and moral cosmopolitanism. Legal cosmopolitanism 
focuses on a global order in the political realm which grants equal legal rights and duties 
to all persons considered to be fellow citizens of a universal republic. On the other hand, 
moral cosmopolitanism claims that all persons are in moral associations with one another, 
and in this context, there is a requirement to respect one another’s status as ultimate units 
of moral concern, which imposes restrictions on our conduct and on our attempts to form 
institutional schemes. The dominant notion of moral cosmopolitanism entails that every 
human being possess a global stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern.61 
Pogge’s second distinction of cosmopolitan positions is between institutional 
cosmopolitanism and interactional cosmopolitanism. Institutional cosmopolitanism holds 
that principles of justice apply to institutions which encompass schemes of trade, 
communication, and interdependence largely. On the other hand, interactional 
cosmopolitanism holds that principles of justice apply still without a common 
institutional setting.62 In this context, principles of justice apply directly to the conduct of 
persons and groups.63 Pogge argues that “interactional cosmopolitanism assigns direct 
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responsibility, for the fulfilment of human rights to other individual and collective agents, 
whereas institutional cosmopolitanism assigns such responsibility to institutional 
schemes.”64 The institutional approach also establishes a shared responsibility for all 
persons not only to refrain from cooperating in imposing a harmful institutional order that 
impedes fulfillment of human rights, but also to promote institutional reform. Pogge 
argues that “our negative duty not to cooperate in the imposition of unjust social 
institutions triggers obligations to promote feasible reforms that would enhance the 
fulfillment of human rights.”65 A discussion of the four different approaches of 
cosmopolitanism is the next task of this chapter. 
 
B.2. Four Approaches of Cosmopolitanism 
The four different approaches of cosmopolitanism with their nuances on the 
application of global distributive principles comprise contractarian, consequentialist, 
rights based and duty based. A detailed discussion of the four approaches follows. 
 
Contractarian Approach to Cosmopolitanism 
The two major proponents of the contractarian approach to cosmopolitanism are 
Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. Beitz and Pogge applied Rawls’s Original Position to 
the world stage. Martha C. Nussbaum writes, “for both of them, the right way to use 
Rawlsian insights in crafting a theory of global justice is to think of the Original Position 
as applied directly to the world as a whole.”66 Pogge and Beitz contend that the only way 
to adequately recognize the individual as a subject of justice, within the framework of 
Rawls’s perspective, is to envisage that the whole global scheme is available, and that the 
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parties are bargaining for a just global structure as individuals. Both argue in different 
ways that the outcome of a global original position will be a global structure that 
maximizes the advantage of the least well off.67 Different specific arguments offered by 
Beitz and Pogge in defense of cosmopolitan view of justice are presented as follows. 
Beitz unlike Rawls proposes principles of distributive justice that apply globally 
rather than within states. He presents two arguments to support his defense of 
cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. The first argument focuses on the arbitrary 
distribution of natural resources. Beitz defended the view that the distribution of natural 
resources is morally arbitrary and that the representatives at the global original position 
will adopt a condition that will favor equal distribution of the natural resources. He 
supports a global principle of distributive justice which outlines the criteria for the 
distribution of natural resources.68 He forcefully argues, “not knowing the resource 
endowments of their own societies, the parties would agree on a resource redistribution 
principle that would give each society a fair chance to develop just political institutions 
and an economy capable of satisfying its members’ basic needs.”69  
Beitz’s second argument defends the existence of a global system of cooperation, 
drawing on an extensive amount of empirical research.70 He argues that “international 
economic interdependence constitutes a scheme of social cooperation like those to which 
requirements of distributive justice have often been thought to apply.”71 Beitz discounts 
the importance of domestic original position, but forcefully defends only the global 
original position, where the participants will adopt a global difference principle. Caney 
writes, “So whereas Rawls’s domestic contract delivers a difference principle with a 
domestic scope, Beitz’s global contract delivers a global difference principle.”72 The 
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strength of Beitz’s argument is based on the premise that global distributive principles 
apply to schemes of social cooperation. 
Beitz’s position was criticized by some authors. Barry refuting Beitz’s position 
argues that there is no global interdependence of the suitable type. Barry writes, “Beitz’s 
argument for extending the Rawlsian difference principle is in essence that the network 
of international trade is sufficiently extensive to draw all countries together in a single 
cooperative scheme. But it seems to be that trade, however multilateral, does not 
constitute a cooperative scheme of the relevant kind.”73 While, Barry’s major contention 
is that principles of distributive justice apply only to schemes of cooperation that are 
mutually beneficial,74 Beitz on the other hand, argues that they apply to groups of people 
who are engaged in interdependence of some kind,  even if their interdependence  is not 
mutually advantageous or cooperative.75 Beitz clearly notes that “everyone need not be 
advantaged by the cooperative scheme in order for requirements of justice to apply.”76 
Another criticism of Beitz’s position comes from David A.J. Richards who 
defends an original position that encompasses all persons in the world not on the bases of 
social cooperation but merely on the bases that persons are entitled to be involved in the 
contract as a result of their rights and interests as human beings. Richards argues that fair 
principles are the ones that would be adopted in a contract that involves all persons and in 
which people are behind a veil of ignorance.77 He validates the utilization of such a 
global hypothetical contract on the bases that “ones membership in one nation as opposed 
to another and the natural inequality among nations may be as morally fortuitous as any 
other natural fact.”78 The implication is that all persons as such are entitled to be involved 
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in the hypothetical contract. A consideration of everyone being a member of a common 
institutional system is basically irrelevant.79 
Beitz reformulated his position following Richards’ criticism. He maintains that 
the morally pertinent aspects of persons are the “two essential powers of moral 
personality – a capacity for an effective sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise, 
and pursue a conception of the good.”80 This entails that all those who possess these 
universal properties are eligible to be represented in a global original position.81 
The second exponent of contractarian approach to cosmopolitanism is Pogge who 
defends the assertion that the global distributive principles apply to a scheme of 
international cooperation. Pogge who is usually considered as an unrestricted 
institutionalist argues that all principles of justice apply only within schemes of 
cooperation.82 An institutional perspective maintains that persons have obligations to 
defend the civil and political rights of people who are members of the same scheme, 
rather than those who are not part of the cooperation.83 Darrel Moellendorf argues within 
the framework of an institutionalist when he insists both that justice applies within 
schemes of cooperation84 as well as that there is a global scheme.85 
Pogge distinguishes between positive and negative duties in his institutional 
approach to cosmopolitan justice. He contends that principles of justice require that 
persons possess a negative duty not to support an unjust socio-economic structure. He 
clearly articulates that persons have a “negative duty not to uphold injustice, not to 
contribute to or profit from the unjust impoverishment of others.”86 Membership of 
institutions is imperative because each member is bound by a negative duty not to support 
unjust institutions. In interpreting justice as requiring a negative duty not to uphold unjust 
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institutional structures to which one belongs we come to the inference that duties of 
justice apply to, and among, members of institutions. On the other hand, if we assert that 
there are global institutional structures we can also come to the inference that persons are 
bound by a negative duty not to impose unjust global institutional structures on the rest of 
the world.87 Critics argue that Pogge’s unrestricted institutionalist perspective focuses a 
lot more on duty bearers without adequate attention to entitlement bearers which include 
the needy, the hungry and the sick.88 
Pogge proposes what he calls a global resource dividend (GRD) which requires 
that people should be taxed for utilizing the resources in their territory and the proceeds 
expended for improving the poor all over the world.89 He proposes a global resource tax 
(GRT) as a way for controlling global inequality. He maintains that the proceeds from the 
global resource tax will be invested in alleviating the global poverty. Pogge argues that 
proceeds from GRD are to be utilized for improving the lives of the global poor through 
provision of “access to education, health care, means of production (land) and/or jobs to 
sufficient extent to be able to meet their own basic needs with dignity and to represent 
their rights and interests effectively against the rest of humankind: compatriots and 
foreigners.”90 Revenues from GRD would assist poorer governments in providing people 
with education, health care, microloans, infrastructure, and maintaining lower tax rates 
and higher tax exemptions.91 A discussion of the outcome-based approach to 
cosmopolitan justice is the task of next section of this chapter. 
 
Consequentialist approach to Cosmopolitanism 
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The second approach to cosmopolitanism is consequentialist approach to 
cosmopolitan justice.  Consequentialist approach to global justice focuses on the 
consequences and results of actions and structures.  The major proponents are utilitarians.  
Consequentialists assert that “the present global economic order has stark consequences: 
it leaves hundreds of millions in profound poverty, with all its associated insecurities, ill-
health and powerlessness.”92 Consequentialists support cosmopolitan principles of 
distributive justice. Some proponents of consequentialist approach to cosmopolitan 
justice include Peter Singer, Robert Goodin and Martha Nussbaum. A brief discussion of 
their different perspectives follows. 
Singer proposes a utilitarian approach to global inequality in his article titled 
Famine, Affluence and Morality published in 1972. He argues that the richer nations in 
the developed world have obligations to aid the poorer nations in the developing world.93   
Singer begins with the assertion that poverty is evidently a bad.94 He argues that we all 
have an obligation to prevent bad things from happening.  Singer posits two versions of 
this claim.  The first claim, which is pretty strong states, “if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”95  The second claim which is a weaker 
claim states, “if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without 
sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it”96 In the second 
claim which is a weaker one, a person can be relieved of the duty if it imposes a 
substantial moral cost on him or her. On the other hand, in the first claim which is a 
stronger one, a person can only be relieved of the duty if that moral cost is comparable to 
the cost to the poor person that the person involved would otherwise assist.  Singer 
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acknowledges only an important point that our rendering assistance need not make a bad 
situation worse or bring about a comparable harm.97 Based on these premises, Singer 
proposes that wealthy persons have obligations to aid the needy regardless of where they 
live and what country they come from.98  The implication is that special attachments like 
nationality and citizenship are irrelevant when we consider our obligations to others. 
Singer further argues that the obligation of the affluent towards the poor is not minimized 
by the physical distance between rich and poor, or by the fact that there are many other 
people likewise able to assist.99 He argues that giving to the distant poor generally 
regarded as an act of charity and/or supererogatory, is rather a matter of duty or 
obligation.100 
Singer’s claim regarding our obligation to assist has been criticized on the 
grounds that it is unrealistically overdemanding.101  Deborah Zion citing John Arthur, for 
instance, proposes that “Singer’s formulation produces a duty for healthy people to 
donate one eye or one kidney, on the grounds that the inconvenience caused to the 
donating agent is seriously outweighed by the good such organs might do to the blind or 
dying.”102 Singer’s obligation to assist which is characterized by its 
“overdemandingness” has been strongly criticized by Michael Slote when he proposes 
that persons should not have their major life plans disturbed by the obligation to help 
others.103  The important point established by critics is that there is need to set limits to 
beneficence.104  Singer was also criticized for equating actions with omissions.  Caney 
acknowledges that someone may contend that not saving a person’s life is not the same as 
killing them. However, it is still pertinent to argue in consonant with Singer’s perspective 
that we are bound by an obligation to distribute resources to the needy.105   
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In order to mitigate the overdemanding claim of Singer, Robert Goodin proposes 
a modest consequentialist theory of cosmopolitan distributive justice which does not 
oblige the sacrifice of people’s own commitments. Goodin insists that we have an 
obligation to aid the vulnerable106 and he further argues that this principle authorizes 
international aid.107 He contends that this is required by justice,108 even though he thinks 
it can be explained a lot better in terms of humanity.109  The implication is that Goodin 
argues for a global application of his duty to aid the vulnerable and rebukes the present 
world order but does not endorse Singer’s overdemandingness.110 Goodin also 
acknowledges the significance of collective action in his discussion of foreign aid and 
world hunger.111 He indicates that personal donations to schemes that focus on 
individuals, such as sponsor a child, do not account for massive restructuring required in 
needy communities. Therefore, Goodin argues that when contemplating aid to the 
severely impoverished, giving money is not adequate, but rather individuals must as well 
engage in political action to organize effective schemes.112 Zion articulates, “the main 
advantages of collective action are, therefore, efficacy and an easing of the burden on 
individual donors, thus once again answering to some degree the “overdemandingness” 
objection.”113 
Another exponent of consequentialist approach to cosmopolitanism is Martha 
Nussbaum who proposes an Aristotelian and modest version of consequentialism. Her 
version is termed Capabilities approach, which is outcome based.  Nussbaum writes, 
“Some theories, such as Rawls, begin with the design of a fair procedure. My capabilities 
approach begins with outcomes: with a list of entitlements that have to be secured to 
citizens, if the society in question is a minimally just one.”114  She argues that we have a 
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collective obligation to ensure adequate protection of human entitlements.  Her emphasis 
is to promote capabilities that will enhance living a fulfilled and dignified life for every 
human person irrespective of one’s nationality or citizenship. She writes, “Humanity is 
under a collective obligation to find ways of living and cooperating together so that all 
human beings have decent lives.”115  Caney noted that Nussbaum convincingly advocates 
for global principles of distributive justice that defends persons’ capacity to flourish and 
lead fulfilling lives.116  Nussbaum clearly articulates, “We insist that a fundamental part 
of the good of each and every human being will be to cooperate together for the 
fulfillment of human needs and the realization of fully human lives.”117 She describes 
fully human life as comprising of “adequate nutrition, education of the faculties, 
protection of bodily integrity, liberty for speech and religious self-expression and so 
forth.”118 
Nussbaum argues that justice requires that we have entitlements to a minimum of 
each of these basic goods.119  Capabilities approach defends providing people with the 
necessary conditions to lead lives with human dignity. Consequentialist accounts of 
cosmopolitan justice fall short in providing a criterion for distributing the benefits and 
burdens of the society.120 It is pertinent to note that an emphasis on capabilities naturally 
evokes the notion of human rights approach to cosmopolitan justice which is discussed 
next.     
 
 Rights-Based Approach to Cosmopolitanism 
The third approach to cosmopolitanism is rights-based approach to cosmopolitan 
justice.   Some key proponents of rights-based approach to cosmopolitanism are Henry 
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Shue, Charles Jones, David Held and Thomas Pogge.  Shue121 and Jones122 defend the 
human right to subsistence. Shue argues that the right to subsistence is necessary for 
persons to enjoy other rights. As such it is a basic right.123 He articulates that subsistence 
is one of several inherent necessities for the exercise of any right.124 The implication is 
that for Shue to enjoy other civil and political rights you must first of all exercise the 
right to subsistence. He contends that the right to subsistence is logically a necessary 
component of other rights.125  Shue argues that every human person has a basic right to 
minimum economic security or subsistence which encompasses “unpolluted air, 
unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal 
preventive public health care.”126  
Jones proposed a similar version of right to subsistence. He argues that civic and 
political rights should protect important human interests. He reasoned that civil and 
political rights should not be indifferent to what people care about but should protect 
fundamental human interests.127 These basic assumptions support the claim that persons 
have a right to subsistence.128  An important human interest was identified as a person’s 
interest in good health as well as preventing malnutrition, starvation, and disease.129 
Caney writes, “Any credible account of people’s rights reflects what is important to 
persons – their fundamental interests.”130  Taking into consideration that subsistence is an 
important interest and taking into account this interpretation of rights, an inference is 
drawn that persons have a right to subsistence.131 
Held proposed an expansive set of human rights in his discussion of global 
justice. He proposes seven types of rights that should be defended based on an ideal 
autonomy.132 He identifies three types of rights which focus on economic entitlements, 
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including health rights, social rights and economic rights. Health rights encompass the 
right to good health and non-harmful environment.133 Social rights entail the right to child 
support and education.134 Economic rights involve the right to a minimum wage and the 
opportunity to be economically independent.135   
 
Pogge also proposed a rights-based approach to global justice, which persuasively 
defends Articles 25 and 28 of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights.136  Pogge 
defends an institutional conception of rights.  He argues that a just world order is one that 
secures peoples enjoyment of their human rights, which includes economic rights. His 
defense of an institutional conception of rights disposes him to support Article 28 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which emphasizes institutional full realization of 
these rights.137 
The pitfall of the rights-based approach to global justice is that it does not give 
account of the persons who have corresponding obligations to fulfill the right. Onora 
O’Neill forcefully articulates, “Rights are demands on others.  Liberty rights demand that 
others not interfere with or obstruct the right-holder, rights to goods and services that 
others provide for the right-holder.”138 A global principle of distributive justice requires 
both an account of people’s entitlements as well as an account of people who have 
obligations to provide them.  A rights-based approach therefore needs to be 
complemented by a duty-based approach.   
  
Duty-Based Approach to Cosmopolitanism 
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Some cosmopolitans favor a duty-based approach to global justice as against a 
rights-based approach.139 O’Neill is one of the major proponents of duty- based approach 
to cosmopolitanism. In international politics, the focus on duties over rights is articulated 
in some countries’ proposal for a “Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities” to 
complement the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”140  Advocates of this proposal 
argue that a biased emphasis on rights has resulted in minimizing the fact that rights are 
complemented by corresponding duties, comprising economic and social ones.141 
There is a contention that a duty-based approach presents a different, and 
certainly superior, conceptual view on global justice.142 In this context, Tan writes that 
O’Neill articulates that “rights theories are conceptually incomplete because while rights 
must have certain corresponding duties, not all rights correspond to an assigned duty-
bearer and a clearly specified duty.”143 The implication is that every right has a 
corresponding obligation. Furthermore, a right is ineffective and unclaimable when there 
is no agent clearly assigned to bear the responsibility for the right.144  
O’Neill defends the view that a right is effective only when a corresponding 
obligation is clearly specified and allocated. She argues, “When obligations are 
unallocated it is right that they should be met, but nobody can have an effective right –an 
enforceable, claimable, or waiveable right-to their being met. Such abstract rights are not 
effective entitlements.”145 She distinguishes between perfect obligations and imperfect 
obligations.  Obligations are perfect when they are assigned and specified and therefore 
claimable and in theory enforceable.146 Obligations are imperfect when no particular 
agent has been recognized, when there is substantial leeway on how an agent may fulfill 
the obligation, and when it is unstipulated for whom the act is to be performed147. O’Neill 
 304 
writes, “Imperfect obligations can be enforced only when they are institutionalized in 
ways that specify for whom the obligation is to be performed.”148 
A right without a corresponding obligation is an empty right. For example, if the 
claimants of a particular right such as right to food or development are unable to locate 
where to settle their claims, these are construed as empty manifesto rights.149 O’Neill 
argues that manifesto rights are only claimed when corresponding obligations are 
specified and allocated.  The enforcement of a right requires a corresponding duty which 
needs to be institutionalized.  She pointed out a relationship between a meaningful right 
and an enforceable duty.  She clearly stressed the need to institutionalize the duties of 
justice so as to allocate, stipulate, and enforce them.150 She asserts that institution- 
building is required to specify and allocate obligations to the needy.151 
O’Neill argues that the goal of such institutions is to regulate the actions of 
powerful investors who are given “excessive tax concessions” and to curb the 
vulnerability of poor nation states who frequently agree to terms of trade that are 
harmful.152 She favors establishing a global institutional structure which will bear the 
obligations of fulfilling economic rights.  O’Neill clearly states “…without one or other 
determinate institutional structure, these supposed economic rights amount to rhetoric 
rather than entitlement.”153 
At the international level, no institution exists that has adequate power to coerce 
the states, societies and investors to agree  to the Rawlsian “difference Principle” on 
global scale.154 Therefore, the organizations that are focused on are networking 
institutions such as banks, corporations, NGO’s, internet etc. which are frequently outside 
the bounds of the state and consequently escape the bounded justice of the state, 
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particularly in the less developed state.155  Jones-Pauly notes that “the solution is not to 
bring these institutions back into the state. Rather, the state has to deal with them as being 
within the bounds of a global, rather than national system of justice.”156 This entails 
negotiation between the bounded state and the “boundary-less”157 non-state agents who 
are influencing the vulnerable in the global context.158 While O’Neill argues for 
establishing of determinate institutional structure in order to fulfill economic rights of the 
vulnerable especially in developing countries, the current institutional arrangements and 
international practices are considered unjust so long as they significantly contribute to 
human rights violation of the poor.159 Pogge in line with this thought argues that “… the 
existing medical-patent regime (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights – 
TRIPS – as supplemented by bilateral agreements) is severely unjust – and its imposition 
a human-rights violation on account of the avoidable mortality and morbidity it 
foreseeably produces.”160  A review of current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical 
research is discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
 
C. Current Rules for Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Research 
C.1. Globalized Patent System as an Institutional Failure 
The WTO contends that the crucial issue in authorizing patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products is to entrench a balance between two complementary public 
health goals, that of offering incentives for future inventions of new drugs, and that of 
guaranteeing affordable access to existing drugs.161 But, unfortunately affordable access 
to essential drugs has not been realized for the global poor especially in developing 
countries. Data from WHO shows that in 2003, more than one-third of the population of 
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the world continued to lack access to the drugs on the WHO Model List. The statistics 
was very bleak in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia that it increases to more than 
50%.162 Pogge attributes this morally troubling situation to a global institutional 
failure.163   
Pogge calls attention to the huge challenge of the responsibility that wealthy 
countries’ citizens might shoulder regarding the persistence of severe poverty and 
inequality in developing countries, and especially, on the correlation between their 
persistence and current decisions regarding the avenue for globalization.164 Pogge 
articulates, “my focus is… on the present situation, on the radical inequality between the 
bottom half of humankind, suffering severe poverty, and those in the top seventh, whose 
per capital share of the global product is 180 times greater than theirs (at market 
exchange rates).”165 He identified two ways of perceiving severe poverty as a moral 
challenge.  First, is as a positive duty when we fail to accomplish our positive duty to 
assist persons in severe distress. Second, is as a negative duty when we fail to accomplish 
our stricter negative duty not to support injustice, not to promote or benefit from the 
unfair impoverishment of others.166  
Pogge offers two reasons why the new global economic order is so cruel on the 
poor. First, is that the governments of the affluent nations have an overwhelming edge 
relative to bargaining power and expertise. Second, is that the representatives in 
international negotiations seek to advance the best interests of the people and 
corporations of their own country. The consideration of the needs of the global poor is 
excluded as part of the mandate of any of the influential parties to the negotiation. The 
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cumulative result of such negotiations and agreements with vast power differentials is 
obvious: a grossly unjust global order in which benefits flow largely to the affluent. 167 
The features of vast unjust global institutional order detrimental to the global poor 
are shown in the history of the debates regarding the design and interpretation of the 
TRIPS agreement, and in concerted attempts to strengthen intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) beyond TRIPS requirements. IPRs are further strengthened through TRIPS-plus 
provisions established in the current Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).168 The distinct 
characteristic of many of the bilateral trade agreements currently negotiated by US is that 
they go beyond the multilateral standards required by the TRIPS agreement.169 Some 
authors indicate that developing countries consented to the TRIPS agreement with 
predictable disadvantage on public health so as to obtain concessions in other aspects of 
economic relevance to them, such as the reducing of subsidies in agriculture in high-
income countries. Economic considerations are essentially fundamental in countries in 
which poverty is extreme and prevalent, and critical to realizing subsistence rights of 
their citizens.170 
Pogge offers rebuttal to the claim that consent to the WTO and consequently 
TRIPS is voluntary, for four different reasons. First is that the appeal to consent can 
surmount the charge of violation of rights, as long as the rights under consideration are 
alienable and, more precisely, can be waived by consent. However, in the context of the 
common notion of human rights, they cannot be thus waived.171 Pogge argues that, 
“persons cannot waive their human rights to personal freedom, political participation, 
freedom of expression, or freedom from torture.”172  Second is that an appeal to consent 
obstructs the complaint of people who lack guaranteed access to the objects of some of 
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their human rights only as long as they have themselves acceded to the government that 
continues their impoverishments. However, most people who are threatened by diseases 
or are severely deprived reside in countries that are not profoundly democratic, and 
consequently consent to the current global economic order by their despotic rules cannot 
be considered as consent by their citizens. A typical example was Nigeria’s accession to 
the WTO in 1995 which was achieved by its ruthless military dictator Sani Abacha.173 
Third is that consent to an onerous global regime can be justified only if it was not 
provoked by the danger of even more burdens. Therefore, one’s consent cannot validate 
one’s enslavement when one’s consent was one’s only option to evade continued torture 
or, certainly, accidental drowning. Pogge argues that, “an appeal to consent thus blocks a 
complaint by the poor against the present global economic order only if, at the time of 
consenting, they had an alternative option that would have given them secure access to 
the objects of their human rights.”174 Fourth is that an appeal to consent cannot validate 
the severe deprivation of children who are considerably overrepresented among people 
experiencing serious poverty and represent about two-thirds of all deaths from causes 
associated with poverty estimated at about thirty-four thousand daily.175 Pogge argues 
that, “the claim that the present global economic order foreseeably and avoidably violates 
the human rights of children cannot be blocked by any conceivable appeal to consent.”176   
A vast body of literature indicates that IPRs as enforced in the TRIPS agreement 
and numerous US FTAs result in a number of ethical problems. The ethical problems 
highlighted by IPRs are most relevant when it involves socially valuable goods such as 
life-saving or essential drugs and genetically modified seeds that are granted Intellectual 
Property (IP) protection. The focus of the discussion in this chapter is on life-saving or 
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essential drugs in order to explore the broader moral problems or issues precipitated by 
the enforcement of IPRs.177  
Pogge presents a good synopsis of how innovation is currently incentivized within 
the context of TRIPS agreement and how this agreement might result in significant 
morally problematic results.178 The advent of the AIDS crisis in developing countries 
especially in Africa has shown that the current TRIPS agreement set the critical needs of 
poor patients against the need of pharmaceutical companies to recover their research and 
development investments.179 Producing new, safe and effective life-saving or essential 
drugs for the market is an exorbitant, time consuming and financially risky enterprise. 
This involves undertaking long clinical trials for the research and development of new 
drugs as well as lengthy testing and approval process. Furthermore, newly developed 
drugs regularly end up to be unsafe or not adequately effective, to have severe side 
effects, or to be unsuccessful with obtaining government approval for a specific reason, 
which may result in the loss of the whole investment.180 Taken into account that 
pharmaceutical companies must shoulder all the costs associated with development 
process, it is no astonishment that such companies are hesitant to carry out research and 
development (R&D) of new drugs unless there are clear indications of positive financial 
prospects of doing so. However, such positive financial prospects cannot be realized 
without strict enforcement of IPRs on pharmaceutical innovations.181 
The reason for this situation is that whenever an inventor firm brings a new 
innovation to the market, other companies would copy the innovation usually through 
reverse engineering, and considering that these other companies did not incur any costs 
relative to R&D, they would be able to charge a price for the product that is considerably 
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lower than the one charged by the inventor firm. As a result, the market price for the 
product would be driven down to simply above marginal costs of production, and the 
inventor firm would not be able to recover its R&D costs. A macroeconomic arrangement 
for the buying and selling of drugs that does not grant innovators IPRs to their 
innovations is thus probably to result in a market failure of undersupply of 
pharmaceutical innovations.182 
The solution to a market failure of undersupply of pharmaceutical innovations 
was enshrined in the TRIPS agreement established under the auspices of WTO in the 
Uruguay Round. The TRIPS agreement grants patent protection usually for twenty years 
to inventor firms on their inventions from the period of filing a patent application to 
protect them from free riding and to encourage medical innovation.183 Furthermore, 
strengthening of IPRs has been continued by US through a series of bilateral FTAs that 
encompass additional TRIPS-plus provisions. These TRIPS-plus measures authorize 
patent holders to extend, or evergreen, their monopolies and they as well suppress, 
obstruct, and delay the production of generic drugs in various ways: through enforcement 
of data exclusivity, and through limitations on and political pressure against the effective 
utilization of compulsory licenses.184 IPRs are construed as a socio-economic tool that 
establish a temporary monopoly for inventor firms and authorize such firms to charge 
prices for their innovations that are considerably higher than the marginal cost of 
production of the innovations. This enables the inventor firms to recoup their R&D costs 
and obtain a profit on their innovations. Therefore, in terms of increasing the financial 
appeal of participating in the process of producing pharmaceutical innovations, IPRs are 
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frequently influential in rectifying the market failure of undersupply of pharmaceutical 
innovations.185  
On the other hand, the introduction of IPRs for pharmaceutical innovations 
frequently results in another market failure that involves excluding several mutually 
beneficial transactions between seller and buyer. The reasonably high price of an IP 
protected drug drives out particular potential buyers out of the market: specifically those 
buyers who are able and willing to buy the product at a price fairly above its marginal 
costs of production but cannot afford to pay the profit-maximizing sale price that obtains 
during the period in which the product is patented.186 This scenario is dubbed deadweight 
losses in economic theory, which describe the type of losses that take place when 
someone is able and willing to pay more fairly above the marginal cost of production for 
a product but unwilling or unable to pay the patent price for it.187 The characteristic of 
IPRs that they drive out particular potential buyers from the market establishes what 
might be dubbed the “exclusion problem” or “access problem.”188 Pogge contends that 
the exclusion or access problem is morally disturbing especially when a group of people 
usually the global poor are excluded from life-saving or essential drugs and not simply 
from computer software, music CDs or movie discs.189  
In the advent of the TRIPS agreement which enforces strong IPRs on all product 
types, the exclusion or access problem is not the only outcome. A distinct problem that 
also emerges is “availability problem.”190 This problem is successfully established in the 
context of R&D of drugs for diseases that are prevalent among people in low-income 
countries. Diseases which primarily result in suffering and death in low-income countries 
comprise malaria, leishmaniasis and Chagas’ disease.191 R&D of drugs for diseases that 
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are prevalent among people in low-income countries is very restricted. Available data 
shows that less than 1% of the 1223 new drugs introduced to the international market 
between 1975 and 1997 were designed precisely for tropical communicable diseases.192 
The principal reason for the prevalence of this situation among the global poor especially 
in developing countries is that many poor people basically do not have adequate money 
to pay for drugs for their sicknesses. Based on this information, for-profit pharmaceutical 
companies then have limited or no incentive for investing resources into the R&D of 
drugs for these diseases usually referred to as “neglected diseases.”193 
The availability problem stems from the fact that the incentivizing method for 
innovation instituted by IPRs establishes a correlation between the incentive to innovate 
and the price of the innovative product. In the context of TRIPS agreement, profits accrue 
entirely from sales, so that the greater a price a product can be marketed, the greater is the 
incentive to invest resources into the R&D of the product.194 Sonderholm articulates that, 
“the TRIPS agreement with its strong protection of IPRs is therefore not an agreement 
that is conducive to the investment in R&D of products that are socially valuable to 
predominantly poor populations or populations that are small.”195 Socially valuable goods 
comprising life-saving or essential drugs are readily available abundantly for the global 
rich far more than they are available for the global poor.196   
Pogge argues that the TRIPS agreement has radically limited the access to 
inexpensive generic copies of advanced drugs to the global poor. The lack of generic 
competition multiplies the prices of advanced drugs frequently 10-15 times and so 
effectively excludes the global poor.197 Pogge further identified and extensively discussed 
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the seven shortcomings of the current pharmaceutical innovation regime which is the next 
task of this chapter. 
 
C.2. Shortcomings of the Current Pharmaceutical Innovation Regime 
Pogge insists that the quest for a systematic solution to pharmaceutical innovation 
regime can begin from an analysis of the key disadvantages of the current globalized 
monopoly patent regime.198 He identified seven failings of the current pharmaceutical 
innovation regime, including high prices, neglect of diseases concentrated among the 
poor, bias toward maintenance drugs, wastefulness, counterfeiting, excessive marketing 
and the last-mile problem.199 A brief discussion of the seven failings of the current 
pharmaceutical innovation regime follows. 
 
High Prices 
A patented drug is sold close to the profit-maximizing monopoly price which is 
essentially determined by the demand curve of the rich. In situations where many rich or 
well insured people certainly need a drug, the tendency has been to significantly raise the 
price of the drug far above the cost of production. Pogge acknowledges that mark-ups 
exceed 1000% for the most part when dugs are still under patent.200 For example, Sanofi-
Aventis sold its cardiovascular disease drug in Thailand for $2.20 each pill, which is 
about 6000% above the price the Indian generic company Emcure agreed to sale the same 
drug.201 The implication is that the exorbitant prices for drugs result in significantly 
limiting access to just a few of the poor who can receive aid from others.202  
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Neglect of Diseases Concentrated Among the Poor 
Rewarding innovators with patent-protected mark-ups results in lack of appeal 
and focus by pharmaceutical companies on diseases concentrated among the poor for 
pharmaceutical research regardless of the severity and prevalence of these diseases. This 
is obvious, since the demand for such a drug drops off sharply as the patent holder 
broadens the mark-up. The implication is that there is likely no prospect for realizing 
huge sales volume and a large mark-up. More so, the potential risk of driving down the 
price of a successful new drug to the marginal cost of production or even free of charge 
which results in a big loss of the innovator’s investment was acknowledged as 
detrimental. In virtue of these concerns, pharmaceutical companies certainly target drugs 
for the affluent for pharmaceutical research considerably more than those of the poor. 203   
The problem of neglected diseases is as well recognized as the 10/90 gap, indicating that 
only 10% of all pharmaceutical research is being concentrated on diseases that represent 
90% of the global burden of disease.204  
 
Bias towards Maintenance Drugs 
Drugs are classified into three categories, including curative, maintenance and 
preventive drugs. Curative drugs deal with getting rid of the diseases from the patient’s 
body. Maintenance drugs focus on improving well-being and functioning but without 
eliminating the disease. Preventive drugs focus on decreasing the probability of becoming 
infected with the disease from the onset. The maintenance drugs are considerably the 
most lucrative under the current patent regime, since patients would continue to buy the 
drugs without being cured and do not die until after the expiration of the patent. The 
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pharmaceutical companies gain a huge profit from such patients more than they would if 
they drew the same health benefit from a cure or vaccine. Vaccines are far less profitable 
because they are usually bought in big quantities at discounted prices by governments.205 
Pogge argues that current regime directs pharmaceutical research in the wrong direction 
to the disadvantage of both the poor and the rich.206  
 
Wastefulness 
Within the current regime, innovators must shoulder the patents’ filing cost in 
several national jurisdictions as well as the cost of checking these jurisdictions for likely 
breaches of their patents. Enormous amount of money are also expended on expensive 
litigation in many jurisdictions against patent holders who want to extend and prolong 
their patent-protected mark ups.207 A more significant loss is incurred from the 
deadweight loss which stems from obstructed sales to buyers who are willing and able to 
pay some price between the marginal cost of production and the greater monopoly 
price.208  
  
Counterfeiting 
Big mark-ups promote the illegal production of counterfeit products that are 
watered down, contaminated, inactive or even lethal. Such fake products frequently 
jeopardize patient health. They as well significantly contribute to the emergence of drug-
specific resistance, when patients consume very limited active ingredient of a watered 
down drug to exterminate the more resilient pathogenic agents. For example, the 
emergence of greatly resistant disease strains of tuberculosis presents risks to all of us.209  
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Excessive Marketing 
Pharmaceutical companies usually make frantic efforts to increase their sales 
volume through frightening patients or by recompensing doctors especially when they 
keep up with very huge mark-ups. This result in fighting over market share among 
similar “me-too” drugs as well as incentives that persuades doctors to prescribe drugs 
even when they are contra-indicated or when competing drugs are expected to do better. 
Given big mark-ups, it is profitable to sponsor huge direct-to-consumer advertising that 
induces people to take drugs they don’t actually need for diseases they don’t actually 
have, usually referred to as invented pseudo diseases.210 
 
The Last-Mile Problem 
Whereas the current regime offers strong incentives to sell unwanted patented 
drugs to people who can pay or possess insurance, it offers no incentives to guarantee that 
poor people benefit from drugs they need immediately. This problem is exacerbated in 
poor countries, which frequently do not have the infrastructure to dispense drugs as well 
as health care professionals to prescribe them and to guarantee their appropriate 
utilization. There is an understanding that the current regime offers incentives to 
pharmaceutical companies to discount the medical needs of the poor. A pharmaceutical 
company that assists poor patients to benefit from its drug under patent undercuts its own 
lucrativeness in three different ways: by paying for the attempt to make the drug available 
to them in a proficient way, by curbing a disease that its profits hinge on, and by losing 
rich customers who discover means of buying from inexpensive drugs intended for the 
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poor.211 The problems created by the current patent system led Pogge to propose new 
rules for reforming and incentivizing pharmaceutical research. 
 
D. Pogge’s New Rules for Reforming and Incentivizing Pharmaceutical Research 
Pogge proposes two basic reform strategies for dealing with monopoly pricing 
issues of the current patent system, including the differential pricing strategy and the 
public good strategy.212 A brief analysis of the two strategies follows. 
 
D.1. The Differential Pricing Strategy 
The differential pricing strategy usually comes in three different forms. The first 
form entails going back to the era before the TRIPS agreement, when IPRs, that is, patent 
monopolies for advanced drugs were granted and implemented in rich countries, but not 
in most of the poorer countries. The second form involves that inventor firms offer 
different prices of their patented drugs to different customers such as affluent buyers and 
poor buyers. In this way, the firms will realize a big profit margin from sales to the more 
affluent customers, without giving up sales to poorer buyers at a lower margin.213 
Theoretically, pricing the product this way enables the inventor firms to obtain the best of 
two worlds. The firms would secure high profits on the products in markets with a high 
buying power without forfeiting the medium to low profits that originate from selling the 
product in markets with a reasonably low buying power. Furthermore, the significantly 
reduced price of the product in low-income countries implies that the populations of these 
countries would have an easier access to the product than they would have if the product 
was priced at high-income countries’ level.214 In this context, access problem which has 
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been regarded as morally problematic especially relative to life-saving drugs may have 
been fairly alleviated, because this feature of differential pricing makes the strategy “a 
prima facie attractive pricing scheme for life-saving medicines.”215 
The third form of differential pricing strategy involves the rights conferred on 
governments as acknowledged under TRIPS rules, to issue compulsory licensing for 
drugs that are urgently needed in public health emergency situations.216 For example, 
with the advent of the devastating impact of HIV/AIDS pandemic in Sub-Saharan Africa 
which has been considered a public health emergency for several countries in that region, 
the governments of these affected countries might authorize the manufacture and 
marketing of cheaper generic copies of patented HIV/AIDS drugs on the condition that 
the authorized generic firms pay a little license fee to the patent holders. The market entry 
of pharmaceutical companies manufacturing generic copies of HIV/AIDS drugs will most 
probably drive down the price of these drugs to simply above their marginal cost of 
production, and this will invariably improve access to the drugs.217 The US has always 
recognized this right under 28 USC 1498, especially for cases where the licensed 
manufacturer is either an agency or contractor affiliated with the government, but has 
also been unwilling to invoke the right in the context of life-saving drugs, apparently to 
refrain from setting an international example disadvantageous to its pharmaceutical 
industry.218 Poor countries have been encouraged in the wake of AIDS pandemic to 
invoke their rights to compulsory licensing in order to deal with their public health crises, 
but the pressure from the US and other affluent countries has barred most of them from 
not utilizing this alternative.219 
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Implementing differential pricing and compulsory licensing in the real world to 
deal with the problem of access to essential drugs has several limitations. Ravvin offers 
an overview of some of the problems that relate to these solutions to access problem. 
With regard to differential pricing, the principal concern is that of leakage of 
inexpensively sold drugs from poor countries to affluent ones through parallel trade and 
smuggling.220 This view is as well stressed by other authors.221 Pogge also discusses the 
risk of diversion and parallel trade.222 He further indicates that cognizant of this risk that 
patent holders usually don’t make efforts to defeat the second market failure through 
differential pricing, rather they refuse to give in to pressures to do so, and wrestle efforts 
to impose compulsory licensing upon them.223 He contends that consequently, differential 
pricing has not gained traction and several poor buyers who would be willing and able to 
buy the drug at a price reasonably above the marginal cost of production are excluded 
from this drug because they are not willing and able to pay the much higher monopoly 
price.224 Pogge argues that differential pricing strategy cannot stop the neglect of diseases 
that are prevalent among the poor. Differential pricing can assist in improving access to a 
drug at competitive market prices for the poor but only on the condition that this drug is 
available. However, this drug will only be available if there is adequate market demand 
for it, in order to make investment in its development attractive and profitable.225 Pogge 
stresses that, “nearly all diseases and research avenues neglected under the current regime 
would continue to be neglected under a differential pricing regime.”226  
More so, an issue of social justice was also highlighted, because, the affluent 
people in low-income countries will have access to a specified drug at a reasonably low 
cost, while poor people in high-income countries will have to pay a high price for exactly 
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the same drug. Love and Hubbard indicate that 50 million customers in India have 
comparable incomes to that of Europeans, and to some people it is contentious that this 
section of people would have access to a specified drug at a low price while uninsured, 
poor people in, for instance in the US would have to pay a high price for exactly the same 
drug.227   
Compulsory licensing also has several limitations. First, the WTO initially just 
authorized national governments to issue compulsory licenses to generic producers that 
would manufacture products exclusively for domestic consumption. It was immediately 
acknowledged that this entailed that compulsory licensing cannot be utilized by countries 
that had no domestic capacity to manufacture generic drugs.228 Most low-income 
countries except Brazil, India and China do not have such capacity. In 2003, the WTO 
General Council developed a decision that grapples with the export of pharmaceutical 
drugs to countries that lack domestic manufacturing capacity. In this context, countries 
with a domestic drug manufacturing capacity were authorized to issue a compulsory 
license to a domestic manufacturer which would in that case be legally allowed to export 
the specified drug to a low-income country that urgently need the drug to  deal with a 
national health emergency. Some literature on compulsory licensing indicated that the 
2003 WTO amendment to TRIPS has been a debacle because the judicial process 
involved in obtaining an export license is complicated and pervaded with practical 
obstacles and red tape.229 Rimmer acknowledging this fact and based on a study of 2007 
Rwanda’s effort to import HIV/AIDS drugs under the WTO General Council Decision 
2003 and the resulting process involving Apotex, a Canadian generic drug manufacturer, 
writes that it is objectionable to codify the WTO General Council Decision 2003, because 
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it has been unsuccessful to offer a swift, efficient, and cost-effective distribution of 
essential medicines.230  
Second, compulsory licensing has social costs that may counteract the short term 
benefits it engenders relative to improving access to life-saving medicines.231 Paramount 
among these social costs include: (1) a risk of reduced direct investment in countries that 
turn to compulsory licensing because proprietors of patented products will look up more 
business-friendly legal environments, (2) a risk that the pharmaceutical company which 
gets a compulsory license will shadow price the original price of the patented product and 
so engender dead weight loss of its own in search of profits, (3) a risk that compulsory 
licensing will decrease the incentives of the research-driven pharmaceutical sector to 
innovate, (4) a risk that the governments of countries that accommodate pharmaceutical 
companies  whose products have been bound by a compulsory license by a foreign 
government will hit back with trade sanctions that could gravely hurt the economy of the 
nation that has issued the compulsory license.232 Bird’s third point was also reiterated by 
Pogge as the likely long-term drawback of compulsory licensing. Pogge argues that if 
compulsory licenses are extensively utilized, then pharmaceutical companies are 
probably to be discouraged from investing in R&D of drugs that are likely to be bound by 
compulsory licensing. For-profit pharmaceutical companies are as a result likely to avoid 
this type of R&D completely. From this perspective, compulsory licensing will be 
tantamount to a further obstacle to R&D of drugs for diseases that predominantly exist in 
developing countries.233 Since differential pricing and compulsory licensing could not 
provide an attractive and effective means for easing the access problem engendered by 
IPRs, Pogge proposed the public good strategy as a more effective and promising strategy 
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for improving access to essential drugs especially for the global poor in developing 
countries.  
  
D.2. The Public Good Strategy for Improving Access to Essential Drugs 
Pogge contends that the public good strategy is more promising to yield a reform 
plan that would circumvent the major failings of the current monopoly patent regime 
while simultaneously retaining most of its significant benefits.234 The public good 
strategy has three critical components comprising “open access, alternative incentives, 
and funding.”235 A brief discussion of the three components follows. 
The first component focuses on providing successful and approved new drug as a 
public good that all pharmaceutical companies may use free of charge. This component 
of the reform plan will drastically reduce the exclusion or access problem created by 
monopoly pricing issue. Since the new essential drugs can be freely reproduced by all 
pharmaceutical companies and launched in the market, the price of such drugs will most 
probably drop to a level simply above their marginal cost of production. Pogge argues 
that if this component known as open access is implemented in isolation, all economic 
incentive to attempt to develop new essential drugs will be destroyed.236  Such an 
unpleasant situation is, nevertheless, circumvented implementing the second component 
of the reform plan which entails offering some alternative reward to inventors. This 
involves the notion that the inventor firms should be qualified to take out a multiyear 
patent on any essential drug they invent, and during the life of the patent, the companies 
should be rewarded from a centralized public fund in proportion to the impact of their 
invention on the global disease burden.237  
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Pogge contends that the second component of the reform plan can be identified 
clearly and definitely in distinct ways. These ways can be generally classified as “push” 
and “pull” programs. A push program chooses and finances some particular innovator 
such as a pharmaceutical company, maybe, or a university or a national health agency to 
embark on a specific research endeavor. The implication here is that, given sufficient 
funding, the chosen innovator will develop the required innovation, which can 
subsequently be made available freely for production by rival pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in order to guarantee broad availability at competitive market price.238  
On the other hand, a pull program is addressed to all potential innovators, hopeful 
to reward whoever is the first to accomplish a valued innovation. Pull programs possess 
two interconnected advantages over push programs: first, they never fund failed research 
endeavors and second, they produce strong financial incentives for innovators to toil 
towards early success. The reverse of these advantages is that, in order to evoke such a 
considerable research attempt, the reward must be adequately big to recompense for the 
risk of failure. The risk is bifold, as a research endeavor may fail either because the 
required drug proves evasive or because some rival innovator gets there first. Potential 
innovators have incentives to attempt to develop a new drug simply if the reward for 
success, disregarded by the likelihood of failure, is considerably greater than the 
anticipated cost of the research and development endeavor. From these perspectives, a 
pull program is akin to the current regime.239 
Pogge contends that pull programs can be more effective than push programs 
because of three reasons. Push programs are more probably to fail because they obtain 
just one rather than several rival innovators to work on a problem. Push programs are 
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more probably to fail because the innovator is selected on the grounds of the confidence 
of some outsiders in it while in pull programs the decision of each innovator to attempt is 
based on its own, more capable and better stimulated evaluation of its capacities. Push 
programs are more probably to fail because the selected innovator has much weaker 
incentives to toil and cost-effectively toward early success. The drawback that push 
programs are more probably to fail is exacerbated in reality that such failures are fully 
paid for, contrary to pull programs, which pay nothing for unsuccessful efforts. This 
reality has propensity to make push programs harder to maintain politically.240  
Pogge further indicated that the second component of the reform plan has a 
number of attractive consequences. First, it will engender a strong incentive for any 
inventor firm to (1) sell its innovative drug inexpensively, frequently below the marginal 
cost of production, and (2) authorize, and even promote, other pharmaceutical companies 
to copy the drug.241 Taking these steps, an inventor firm guarantees that its innovative 
drug would be accessible to a greater number of people in the low-income bracket, and as 
a result of this, the drug will have a greater impact on the global disease burden. Second, 
the component will establish a condition in which an inventor firm has incentives to 
ensure that patients are completely instructed in the proper use of its drug, including 
dosage and compliance. The implication is that ensuring that its product is utilized 
properly assists an inventor firm to circumvent the adverse situation in which its product 
is widely utilized but fails to make a considerable impact on the global disease burden. 
Third, the component will establish a condition in which an inventor firm has incentives 
to work hard to enhance the health systems of the low-income countries as well as to 
generate a lucrative market for pharmaceutical companies. Strong economic incentives 
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would be established for pharmaceutical companies to attempt to develop drugs for 
neglected diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis and pneumonia. Taken into account that 
these diseases predominantly affect the global poor in the most grisly of ways, an 
effective drug for any of these diseases would possess an enormous impact on the global 
disease burden. An inventor firm that could manufacture an effective and safe drug for 
any of these diseases would as a result be the recipient of a reward of significant 
proportions.242 This characteristic of the Health Impact Fund (HIF) is likely to ease the 
availability problem that exists under the current IPR driven TRIPS regime.243 
A major task related to the second reform component involves establishing a set 
of principles that can guide the reward process. Pogge argues that “when two or more 
different medicines are alternative treatments for the same disease, then the reward 
corresponding to their aggregate impact must be allocated among their respective 
inventors on the basis of each medicine’s market share and effectiveness.”244 However, 
Pogge recognized that things get more complicated when an essential drug is not a single 
product but a drug cocktail that combines a variety of drugs that have been developed and 
manufactured by different pharmaceutical companies.245  
The third component of Pogge’s reform plan involves developing a fair, feasible, 
and politically realistic allocation of the costs associated with the second component.246 
Pogge and Hollis contend that effective implementation of the reform entails that much 
of its cost be shouldered by high-income countries. A reasonable estimate for minimum 
funding level for the reform plan is about US$ 6 billion which approximately amounts to 
0.01 percent of global income.247 To make this increased spending for the reform plan 
realistic, it is pertinent to offer convincing reasons for supporting it to taxpayers and 
 326 
politicians of the high-income countries. Pogge opines that his plan can be substantiated 
by prudential considerations.248  
First, the new incentivizing regime will result in considerably lower prices for 
essential drugs for consumers in high-income countries. Under the current free-market 
regime, consumers in these countries pay high prices for essential drugs either directly or 
through contributions to commercial insurance companies.249 Second, giving the poor 
citizens of low-income countries no charge on the pharmaceutical research carried out for 
the advantage of citizens in the rich countries, the latter citizens are establishing goodwill 
toward themselves in the developing world by showing in a concrete way their concern 
for the terrible public-health problems these populations are encountering.250 Third, the 
reform plan will create excellent medical-research jobs in high-income countries. Fourth, 
it will allow these countries to respond more effectively to public-health crises and 
problems in the future by securing them more briskly increasing medical knowledge 
combined with a stronger and more diverse arsenal of medical interventions.251 Pogge 
proposes a global institution known as the Health Impact Fund (HIF) for the effective 
implementation of his new plan for reforming and incentivizing pharmaceutical research 
and innovation. 
 
E. The Health Impact Fund 
E.1. Meaning of the Health Impact Fund 
Pogge describes the HIF as “a proposed pay-for-performance mechanism that 
would offer innovators the option – no obligation – to register any new medicine or, 
under certain conditions, also a traditional medicine or a new use of an existing 
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medicine.”252 The HIF is a proposed global agency that would be primarily financed by 
governments of various countries. The innovator of a product would register the product 
at the time of marketing approval, which entails accepting responsibility to make it 
available, during its first 10 years on the market, wherever it is needed at the lowest 
possible cost of production and distribution. The innovator would additionally commit to 
authorizing, free of charge, generic manufacture and distribution of the product at the end 
of the 10 year reward period, especially if the innovator’s patent has not expired on the 
product. In return, the registrant would receive, during those ten years, yearly reward 
payments based on the assessed health impact of its product. Each reward payment would 
be a piece of a huge yearly pay-out with every registered product getting a share equal to 
its share of the assessed health impact of all HIF-registered products in a given year. If 
the HIF would function effectively, its annual reward pools could go up to draw an 
increasing share of new drugs.253   
The HIF can be viewed as maintaining a lasting competition among innovators 
that spans over all countries and all diseases, with earnings linked to impact on health.254 
Health impact can be calculated in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) saved. The 
QALY metric has been improved in the past 20 years and is already widely utilized by 
insurers in determining the new drugs to cover. The baseline is usually taken as the 
pharmaceutical arsenal before a registered drug was launched, then the HIF would 
measure to what extent this drug has increased the length and quality of human lives.255 
The assessment would depend on clinical and practical trials of the product, on tracking 
down random samples of the product to end-users made easier by serial numbers, and on 
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statistical analysis of associations between sales data and variations in the occurrence of 
the target disease.256  
The projected fund for the HIF annually would be $6 billion at the minimum, 
which is less than 1% of current global spending on pharmaceuticals and about 5% of 
current global investment in pharmaceutical research. If all countries were to participate, 
each would need to contribute about 0.01% of its gross national income (GNI). However, 
if countries representing about a third of the global product were to participate, each 
would need to contribute at least a fairly small 0.03% of its GNI, which is significantly 
reduced by enormous cost savings their governments, firms and citizens would enjoy 
from low-cost HIF registered drugs.257  
Providing stable incentives entails that the HIF would need assured financing for 
the next 15 years in order to guarantee pharmaceutical innovators that, if they sponsor 
costly clinical trials now, they can receive a full decade of health impact rewards after 
market approval. Such a firm guarantee is as well for the advantage of the funders who 
would not want the incentive power of their contributions to be weakened through 
doubtful disregarding by potential innovators. The guarantee may be in the form of an 
agreement which requires each participating country to commit to the HIF a fixed part of 
its future gross national income (GNI). Supported by such an agreement, the HIF would 
naturally adjust the contributions of the different partner countries to their variable 
economic possessions. Furthermore, it would refrain from prolonged struggles over 
contribution sizes, and would guarantee each country that any additional cost it agreed to 
shoulder through an increase in the contribution schedule would be balanced by an 
equivalent increase in the contributions of all other partner countries.258  
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Kathleen Liddell presented several distinctive features of the HIF as argued by 
Hollis and Pogge: (1) It is committed to the sale of drugs at marginal cost production, 
which is the cost price. This significantly decreases the number of people priced out of 
the market as a result tackling the critical issue regarding cost. (2) The size of the reward 
is contingent on the extent to which a new drug decreases disease, rather that the 
affluence of the patient, which is likely to make research on neglected diseases a more 
appealing proposal and, more commonly, to assess rewards in accordance with objective 
measure of value rather than a market-based measure. (3) The scheme is scalable. It can 
be extended to diagnostics, devices, mechanical inventions and Western disease research, 
after conducting a pilot with drugs useful in the treatment of neglected disease research. 
(4) It offers an incentive not just for the creation and production of new drugs, but as well 
private investment in health-service infrastructure. Taking into account that HIF 
payments are commensurate with clinical impact, pharmaceutical companies should 
guarantee that the correct drug gets to the correct patient, in the correct dosage, at the 
correct time. (5) It does not involve any considerable changes to the structure of 
intellectual property protection or licensing. (6) It will supposedly result in more co-
operative, and then cost-efficient, relationships between patent proprietors and 
manufacturers of generic versions of drugs. Patent proprietors will be less probably to 
refuse reasonable licenses and manufacturers of generic versions of drugs less probably 
to violate the rights of patent proprietors by manufacturing without permission. (7) Its 
normative bases are both moral and prudential.259  
The HIF has five major advantages over conventional innovation prizes, 
comprising advance market commitments and advance purchase commitments. First, it is 
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a structural reform creating a lasting source of high-impact pharmaceutical innovations. 
Second, it is not disease-specific and consequently much less susceptible to lobbying by 
firms and patient groups.260 Third, conventional prizes must elucidate the exact finish 
line, stating clearly at least which disease the new drug must attack, how effective and 
suitable it must slightly be, and how severe its side effects may be. Such precision is 
difficult because it presumes the very knowledge that is currently not available and 
whose attainment is yet to be supported. As sponsors lack this knowledge in advance, 
their specifications are probably to be severely suboptimal. They may be too challenging, 
in order that firms capitulate the effort, albeit something close to the desired drug is 
within their reach, or they may be inadequately challenging, in order that firms, to save 
time and expense, provide a drug that is just hardly good enough to win even when they 
could have done much better at small additional cost.261 The HIF refrains from the 
problem of finish line through adaptable rewarding of any new registered drugs in 
proportion to its impact on the global health. Fourth, designed to avert failure and in 
ignorance of the real cost of innovation, specific prizes are usually much too large and 
therefore overpay for innovation. The HIF resolves this problem by allowing its health 
impact rate to adjust itself through competition. For example, a high reward rate would 
rectify by bringing extra registrations, engendering an increase in the number of 
registered drugs, and an unappealingly low reward rate would rectify by discouraging 
new registrations, engendering a decrease in the number of registered drugs. Fifth, the 
HIF offers each registrant powerful incentives to encourage the optimal end-use of its 
product: to seek its extensive and effective utilization by any patients who can benefit 
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from it.262 The HIF provided a complete systematic solution to the major disadvantages 
of the current globalized patent regime which is the task of the next theme.  
 
E.2. The HIF’s Systematic Solution to the Disadvantages of the Current Globalized 
Patent Regime. 
Pogge contends that all seven disadvantages of the current globalized patent 
regime can be significantly alleviated by supplementing the patent regime with a 
complementary source of incentives and rewards for developing new drugs.263 The HIF is 
that mechanism Pogge argues that would provide a complete systematic solution to the 
seven drawbacks engendered by the current globalized patent regime. A discussion of the 
systematic solution by the HIF follows. 
High Prices 
High prices would be nonexistent for HIF registered drugs. Innovators would 
usually not even desire a higher price as this would decrease their health impact rewards 
by obstructing access to their product by most of the world’s population especially the 
global poor. The HIF considers health benefits to the poorest of patients as equally 
important as the health benefits of the richest.264 
 
Diseases Concentrated Among the Poor 
As long as diseases concentrated among the poor considerably exacerbate the 
Global Burden of Disease (GBD), they would no longer be neglected. Actually, the more 
catastrophic ones among them would constitute some of the most profitable R&D 
opportunities for biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. This would occur 
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without undercutting the profit opportunities such companies currently have by 
developing interventions for the diseases prevalent among the affluent.265 
 
Bias towards Maintenance Drugs 
Bias towards maintenance drugs would be non-existent in the HIF-promoted 
R&D. The HIF measures the health impact of each registered drug related to how its 
utilization decreases mortality and morbidity globally – without consideration of whether 
it realizes this reduction through cure, symptom relief or prevention. This would help 
pharmaceutical companies to determine how potential research projects would maximize 
global public health especially as regards the expected global health impact of the new 
drug corresponding to the cost of developing it. The lucrativeness of research projects 
would be in order with their cost-effectiveness related to global public health.266 
 
Wastefulness 
Wastefulness would be drastically less high for HIF-registered products. Dead-
weight losses from large mark-ups would not exist. There would be very limited 
expensive litigation since generic competitors would be deficient of incentives to 
compete and innovators would lack incentives to restrain generic products because they 
improve the health impact reward of the innovator. Innovators may thus usually not even 
worry to acquire, police, and protect patents in many national jurisdictions. Registering a 
drug with the HIF, just involves that innovators demonstrate simply once that that they 
have an effective and innovative product.267 
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Counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting of HIF-registered products would be unappealing. With the real 
item extensively available close to or even below the marginal cost of production, there is 
little to be obtained from manufacturing and selling forged products.268  
 
Excessive Marketing 
Excessive marketing would as well be greatly decreased for HIF-registered drugs. 
Since each innovator is rewarded for the health impact of its addition to the medical 
arsenal, incentives to produce “me-too” drugs to compete with a current HIF-registered 
drug would be feeble. Under the current patent system, getting a patient to switch from a 
competitor’s product to one’s fairly good product is very lucrative. However, if the latter 
product is HIF-registered, then the switch is not lucrative because it produces no health 
improvement. Moreover, innovators would have incentives to recommend an HIF-
registered drug for doctors and patients simply as long as such marketing leads to 
calculable therapeutic advantages for which the innovator would afterward be 
rewarded.269  
   
The Last-Mile Problem 
The Last-mile problem would be alleviated since each HIF-registered innovator 
would have powerful incentives to guarantee that patients are completely instructed and 
appropriately provisioned so that they maximize the use of its drugs with focus on 
dosage, compliance etc., which will in that case, through extensive and effective 
utilization, have their best possible public-health impact. Instead of ignoring poor 
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countries as unlucrative markets, pharmaceutical companies would, furthermore, have 
incentives to collaborate with one another and with national health ministries, 
international agencies and NGOs towards improving the health systems of these countries 
so as to increase the impact of their HIF-registered drugs there.270 Despite Pogge’s 
breathtaking HIF proposal for resolving the flaws of the current globalized patent system 
and incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in order to significantly improve affordable 
access to the essential drugs for the global poor especially in developing countries, critics 
still raised some objections to the HIF.    
 
E.3. Criticisms of the HIF 
Several objections have been raised by some authors regarding the HIF. The first 
major criticism focuses on its practical barriers to effective implementation.271 First, the 
second component of the reform plan makes provision for the involvement of an 
international agency with the responsibility of assessing the impact of various HIF-
registered drugs on the global burden of disease and implementing pay rewards to 
pharmaceutical companies. The participation of such an agency in the macroeconomic 
arrangement increases transaction costs and offers abundant opportunity for corrupt 
behavior with respect to the staff of the agency and those who can influence them.272 The 
current system for incentivizing research and development of essential drugs also 
involves transaction costs. More so, this system requires both patent offices and patent 
courts, but, as Alex Rosenberg articulates, “a patent system’s greater reliance on 
individuals to pursue their own interests directly, instead of through an intervening 
government, is generally more effective than any alternative.”273 It is projected that about 
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10% of the monetary resources being invested in the reform plan will be expended on 
administration and assessment.274  
In respect to the issue of corruption, it is pertinent to point out the bleak empirical 
evidence that corrupt behavior is a critical issue prevalent among government officials in 
numerous developing countries in which data collection needs to be carried out.275 Pogge 
has maintained that data regarding the global burden of disease and the health impact of 
various drugs collected in the context of the reform plan would be beneficial beyond the 
precise purposes of this plan.276 The susceptibility of the assessment process to corruption 
would, then, undermine the value of the collected data in contrast to data generated by 
standard academic and governmental research programs.277 
Second, it will be hard for the identified agency to obtain accurate and valid 
information regarding the assessed impact of various drugs on the global disease burden. 
The problem does not rest simply on establishing a reasonable metric that can be utilized 
to ascertain a drug’s impact on the global disease burden.278 There is a general consensus 
among the supporters of the HIF that the most favorable metric candidate is the QALY 
system which is presently being utilized by national health systems in Australia, Canada, 
the UK and US to assess the health impact of pharmaceuticals.279 Additional practical 
concern is also highlighted with regard to applying the metric and conducting the actual 
field work of visiting vast, poor and frequently geographically remote populations and 
obtaining and an accurate summary of what the disease burden is in the region and how 
various drugs are contributing to its decrease.280  
On the other hand, Liddell raised a practical barrier issue of the HIF that focuses 
on inadequate commitments and contributions from participating countries. She 
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acknowledges that the authors are mute regarding the number of partners that must 
participate to make this a feasible proposal. If some of the more affluent countries decline 
to participate, the contributions at 0.03% for each country will be inadequate. She also 
asserts that US$6 billion estimated as projected annual fund for the HIF  appears to be a 
small sum, considering that the estimate of the total global spending on pharmaceuticals 
in 2008 was about US$735 billion. More so, she indicates that it is revealing that the total 
operating budget for the United Nations’ initiative is estimated at US$4.19 billion, and 
even at this rate numerous countries are late in their payments. From this perspective, she 
inferred that the HIF proposal is an enormous sum of money, and may not likely be 
fulfilled by foreign aid budgets.281   
Another concern raised by Liddell relates to the issue of the relationship between 
the HIF and the patent system. She acknowledges that it is not clear whether it is essential 
to attach the HIF system to patent protection, because it establishes eligibility criteria of 
uncertain assistance and the territorial nature of patent protection introduces a lot of 
difficult policy questions for a system with global ambitions.282  
On the other hand, Liddell also notes that there is an unnerving feeling that the 
HIF proposal plays right into the hands of the pharmaceutical companies. She argues that 
“it fuels their search for profits, offering them yet another optional method to increase 
their existing profit margins at the expense of the public purse, when they are already 
amongst the very wealthiest industries.”283 The explanation is that there is a general false 
assumption that anything that falls short of an appealing profit stands little opportunity of 
being endorsed by the politically influential pharmaceutical companies and their 
governments.284  
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Furthermore, Liddell identifies another issue which recognizes that there is 
inadequate empirical evidence to support the crucial premises in the HIF proposal or to 
demonstrate that the benefits of the HIF validate such a substantial policy enterprise. She 
indicates that this offers an uncomfortable contradiction in the sense that “the HIF is a 
proposal that seeks to organize the cost and direction of scientific research on the basis of 
proven utility, yet the regulatory tools enlisted to achieve this lack an equivalent evidence 
base.”285  
Sonderholm on the other hand, raised concerns regarding the prudential appeal of 
the HIF.286 He cites an example with two distinct drugs with varying cost of production 
and impact on the global disease burden. The first drug decreases the symptoms of 
diarrhea in infants and averts the symptoms for four weeks. It is effective in 40% of cases 
and sales in the form of two pills at the cost of production of $2. The second drug also 
decreases the symptoms of diarrhea in infants and averts the symptoms for four weeks. It 
is effective in 90% of cases and sales in the form of a powder that requires to be 
dissolved in 25 centiliter of clean water. It should also be stored at refrigerator 
temperature. The cost of production is one quarter of the first drug.287.  
In this situation it is expected that the manufacturer of the first drug would receive 
a greater reward than the manufacturer of the second drug. This is based on the analysis 
that the first drug is probably to have a greater impact on the global disease burden than 
the second drug. This results from the fact that the effectiveness of the first drug does not 
require something which is frequently lacking in developing countries and which the 
second drug requires so as to be effective, including clean drinking water and cooled 
storage capacity. Therefore, specific infrastructure features of the regions in which 
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infants with diarrhea generally live contribute in a very substantial way to the fairly small 
reward that the manufacturer of the second drug would receive under Pogge’s reform 
plan.288  
The implication is that pharmaceutical companies that are motivated by the profit 
would recognize that the economic prospects of developing high-tech essential drugs 
intended for the medical needs of the populations in developing countries are 
inadequate.289 A high-tech drug means a drug that needs clean drinking water, electricity 
and/or educated health professionals to be effective. On the other hand, a low-tech drug 
does not need any of these things to be effective.290 From this perspective, 
pharmaceutical companies would inevitably reorganize some of their R&D efforts 
towards low-tech drugs. There would also inevitably be a rise of new pharmaceutical 
companies that would exclusively focus on the development of low-tech essential drugs 
that tackle the medical needs of the populations in developing countries.291  
Sonderholm indicates that Pogge would embrace these developments, but, 
however, he challenges the prudential reasons for citizens of high-income countries to 
support a reform plan that engender these developments.292 It is pertinent to note that the 
rise of this new opportunity of drug development will probably generate new jobs, but the 
funding of these jobs would come from the fund that pays for the second component of 
the reform plan. This implies that the huge resources that are required to fund these new 
jobs in developed countries would come from these developed countries.293 
The final issue was raised by Michael Selgelid which emphasized a problem of 
causal attribution for the reimbursement process critical to the HIF.294 This is the problem 
that focuses on assessing the extent to which any decrease in the global disease burden, or 
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the burden of any particular disease, is the outcome of one intervention in contrast with 
another.295 The causal attribution problem is considered a serious danger to the feasibility 
of health impact measurement by either QALYs or Disability-Adjusted-Life Years 
(DALYs). Successively, it is also a danger to the feasibility of the HIF per se. This is as 
result of the fact that the critical reimbursement process of the HIF is precisely premised 
on the notion that pharmaceutical companies are rewarded proportionate to the effect of 
their products on the size of the global disease burden. The import of the problem is 
additionally highlighted by the fact that numerous successful medical interventions are 
ones that include a number of different active ingredients.296 
 
F. Conclusion 
Concluding remarks on this chapter focuses on a recapitulation of Pogge’s 
contention for a stronger interpretation of global responsibilities for providing affordable 
access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing 
countries. This dominant approach invoked by Pogge in arguing for post-trial access to 
anti-retroviral drugs is called cosmopolitanism. He forcefully argues that our critical duty 
of justice to take effective action on the issue of affordable access to essential drugs, 
including anti-retroviral drugs is grounded on human rights which extend universally to 
all individuals. 
In contrast to Rawls, Pogge challenges the thesis of explanatory nationalism 
which appeals to domestic factors as engendering persistent severe poverty and global 
inequality. He insists that global factors perpetuate severe poverty and global inequality 
and calls for moral responsibility on the part of affluent countries to redress this situation. 
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He contends that unjust global institutional order imposed on the global poor perpetuates 
harm and consequently violates their negative rights. He argues then, that citizens of 
affluent countries have not merely positive duties to assist, but also more stringent 
negative duties not to harm the global poor. 
Pogge argues for a correlation between poverty and the global disease burden and 
acknowledges the prevalence of avoidable mortality and morbidity mostly in poor 
countries. He contends that increasing massive mortality and morbidity rates prevalent in 
developing countries can be addressed through guaranteeing improved access to essential 
drugs.  To accomplish this objective of significantly reducing the global disease burden 
especially among the global poor in developing countries, Pogge proposes a concrete, 
feasible and politically realistic plan for reforming current globalized patent rules for 
incentivizing pharmaceutical research. 
In discussing Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach to the issue of access to anti-
retroviral drugs in developing countries, meaning of cosmopolitanism and four different 
approaches to cosmopolitanism were explicated as prelude. Cosmopolitanism was argued 
as justice without borders, in which principles of justice go beyond nationality and 
citizenship, and apply equally to all individuals globally. The four approaches to 
cosmopolitan justice discussed comprises contractarian, consequentialist, rights-based 
and duty-based. Contractarian approach to cosmopolitanism defends global principles of 
distributive justice based on international scheme of social cooperation and the rights and 
interests of all persons as human beings. Consequentialist approach to global justice 
focuses on the consequences and results of actions and structures. The proponents 
emphasize that richer nations in the developed world have obligations to aid the poorer 
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nations in the developing world. Giving to the distant poor was argued by Singer as a 
matter of duty or obligation. Rights-based approach to global justice vigorously defends 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs as a basic human right. An account of people’s 
rights or entitlements must be complemented with an account of people who have 
obligations to provide them. Duty-based approach to global justice argues that a right is 
effective only when a corresponding obligation is clearly specified and allocated. O’Neill 
advocated for establishing a global institutional structure which bears the obligations of 
realizing economic rights. 
The current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical research were discussed. In this 
context, the current globalized patent system was argued as an institutional failure, 
because the TRIPS agreement and the TRIPS-plus provisions significantly impede 
affordable access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the global poor in 
developing countries. The TRIPS agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions created access 
problem and essentially excluded the global poor from life-saving or essential drugs. 
Generic manufacture of essential drugs was drastically suppressed in the wake of TRIPS 
agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions. The lack of generic competition results in the 
astronomical increase of the prices of essential drugs which effectively excludes the 
global poor. The TRIPS agreement and TRIPS-plus provisions also created availability 
problem because there was very limited R&D of drugs for diseases prevalent among low-
income countries. Seven major problems of the current globalized patent regime were 
identified and discussed, comprising high prices, neglect of diseases concentrated among 
the poor, bias towards maintenance drugs, wastefulness, counterfeiting, excessive 
marketing and last-mile problem. 
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Pogge’s proposed new rules for reforming and incentivizing pharmaceutical 
research were discussed in response to the problems engendered by the current patent 
system. He proposed two basic reform strategies for dealing with the monopoly pricing 
issues and for improving access to essential drugs, including the differential pricing 
strategy and the public good strategy. The differential pricing strategy comes in three 
forms. First, focuses on the era before the TRIPS agreement when patent protection was 
enforced only in rich countries excluding most poor countries. Second, involves inventor 
firms offering different prices of their patented drugs to affluent buyers and poor buyers. 
Third, entails invoking the right to issue compulsory licensing by governments in order to 
address public health emergency. Differential pricing and compulsory licensing were 
argued as falling short in resolving the drawbacks from the current patent system and in 
providing an attractive and effective means for improving affordable access to essential 
drugs.  
The public good strategy was defended as more promising in generating a reform 
plan that would prevent the chief failings of the current monopoly patent regime, while at 
the same time, preserving most of its important benefits. The three crucial components of 
the public good strategy were discussed, including open access, alternative incentives, 
and funding. The first component focuses on providing successful new products such as 
essential drugs as a public good by pharmaceutical companies. The second component 
entails offering some alternative reward to inventors. The second component makes 
provision for the inventor firms to take out about 10 years of patent protection as in the 
current patent system. The firms also will be rewarded from the public funds in 
proportion to the impact of their invention on the global disease burden. The third 
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component focuses on developing a fair, feasible and politically realistic allocation of the 
costs involved. 
The HIF was discussed as a global institution for the effective implementation of 
Pogge’s new plan for reforming and incentivizing research and innovation. The HIF’s 
significant structural reform of the current globalized patent system was discussed. Five 
key advantages of the HIF were discussed. Furthermore, the HIF’s systematic solution to 
seven disadvantages of the current globalized patent scheme was discussed. Some key 
objections by some authors were also discussed. The objections focus on practical 
barriers, corruption, prudential appeal, causual attribution for reimbursement process, 
relationship between the HIF and the patent system and inadequate empirical evidence to 
support the critical premises in the HIF proposal. Just as the weakness of the statist 
approach of Rawls is its exaggerated emphasis upon each individual nation, similarly the 
weakness of the cosmopolitan approach of Pogge is an exaggerated emphasis upon 
international relations. The strengths of each approach, avoiding the main weaknesses in 
each, can be combined to establish a paradigm of global health justice to provide 
affordable access to drugs in developing nations, as discussed in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 A PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL HEALTH JUSTICE: A SLIDING SCALE OF 
NATIONAL AND GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
A. Introduction 
  The World Health Organization (WHO) views health in the 21st century as “a shared 
responsibility, involving equitable access to essential care and collective defense against 
transnational threats.”1 Lawrence O. Gostin et al. articulate that these two critical aspects 
of global health identified by the WHO “require global leadership, sustainable resources, 
collaboration, and mutual support among states, businesses, philanthropy, and civil 
society.”2 The Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health emphasizes that, 
“Global partnership and the sufficient and effective provision of aid and financing are 
essential.”3 In essence, improved global health governance is a desideratum for global 
health.4 
  A logical and consistent system of global health governance can be rooted on the 
common interests of states and their partners. All states possess self-interests in 
promoting global health governance as a collective protection from transnational health, 
controlling infectious diseases where they arise and preventing global spread of health 
hazards.5 More so, states possess self-interests in guaranteeing equitable access to 
essential services which involve “health systems, including cost-effective drugs and 
vaccines, and other human health needs (e.g., safe water, nutrition, sanitation, vector 
control, and tobacco reduction) to all people.”6 There is a contention that guaranteeing 
essential health services and goods establishes safer, more secure, and more prosperous 
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conditions for all countries and that a foreign policy grounded on enhancing the global 
health is an effective type of diplomacy.7 
Every person has a basic human right to the highest attainable standard of health8 
and, thus, has a legitimate belief that the state would guarantee essential health goods and 
services for all its citizens, in spite of its constraint on resources, and broaden beyond this 
core requirement as resources allow.9 Recognizing the right to health is a necessary 
criterion for any community to function. If individuals cannot secure access to health 
goods and services essential to function and achieve wellbeing, they cannot be 
instrumental to social and economic wellbeing – “generating wealth, educating children, 
creating art, providing for the common security – and they will feel abandoned by their 
community, national and international.”10 The right to health is crucial to guaranteeing 
human security and defending people from “critical and pervasive threats to human lives, 
livelihoods and dignity, and to enhancing human fulfillment.”11 
The responsibility for guaranteeing the right to health for all rests not exclusively 
with states and their obligations to their own people, but as well with the global 
community.12 About half of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) tackle basic 
human needs, indicating an understanding that all states possess an interest in 
guaranteeing that crucial needs are fulfilled for all human beings everywhere.13 The 
Millennium Declaration affirms, “We recognize that, in addition to our separate 
responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold 
the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we 
have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable, and in 
particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.”14   
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Nevertheless, more than a decade following the endorsement of the MDGs, 
notwithstanding some progress, such as the decrease in child mortality15 and broadening 
of AIDS treatment16 the global community has not attained essential improvements in 
global health or considerably reduced health inequalities.17 The devastating impact of 
HIV/AIDS is still significantly evident in developing countries especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where millions are not yet able to afford anti-retroviral drugs for treating 
HIV/AIDS. The global community has fallen short of effectively achieving basic human 
needs. There are profound structural reasons for the lack of substantial progress, such as 
“the absence of leadership, fragmentation and lack of coordination of multiple actors, 
persisting inadequate levels of domestic and international health spending, and foreign 
aid and programs that do not match national priorities.”18 
However, the international community has recorded some progress in tackling 
these challenges. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness19 and the Accra Agenda for 
Action,20 for instance, appeal for clearer targets and indicators of success for 
harmonization among partners, calibration of country strategies, and mutual 
responsibility for development results.21 The International Health Partnership and related 
initiatives22 attempts to implement these principles.23 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria is motivated by country insistent request and obtains funding 
proposals from inclusive Country Coordinating Mechanisms, whose members comprise 
government officials, civil society, development partners, and the private sector.24 
Meantime, both domestic and global health investments have increased.  Spanning from 
2000 to 2007, sub-Saharan African governments expanded their health sector spending 
from 8.7% to 9.6% of their budgets, resulting in more than a doubling of their per capita 
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health spending, rising from an average of $15 to $34 per capita in nominal dollars and 
encompassing external assistance.25 Official development assistance for health grew from 
$7.6 billion in 2001 to $26.4 billion in 2008 in nominal dollars and encompassing water 
and sanitation.26 
It is pertinent to indicate that core changes in global health were not realized even 
with these innovative approaches and the increased spending.27 Preventable and treatable 
injuries and diseases continue to devastate sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian subcontinent, 
and other poor areas of the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, healthy life expectancy is 45 
years, a full quarter-century beneath in high-income countries.28 Furthermore, the 
diseases and health issues that are the emphasis of the MDGs including child and 
maternal mortality, and serious diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria continue 
as critical health threats, as neglected tropical diseases do. More so, new infectious 
diseases continue to arise, despite the fact that the huge burden of non- communicable 
diseases, comprising mental illness, and of injuries, increasingly persist.29 
Rawls’s and Pogge’s approaches for global health justice as discussed in chapters 
four and five respectively are insufficient. Rawls’s statist version of relational justice 
emphasizes the national responsibility of each country to fulfill the right to health of all 
its citizens and effectively excludes the global responsibility of individual nations. 
Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach focuses too much on global responsibility without a 
sufficient attention to the national responsibility of individual societies.30 
The paradigm proposed in this chapter combines these two approaches by 
adopting their strengths and avoiding their weaknesses. The paradigm refers to a sliding 
scale of national and global responsibilities about the right to health in general and 
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affordable access to drugs in particular. This combined approach considers “global 
responsibility as supplementing, not replacing national responsibility for health.”31  The 
implication is that the primary responsibility for realizing the right to health is a national 
responsibility. However, when poor countries exhaust their domestic resources and are 
still not able to fulfill the right to health of their citizens, rich countries can step in to 
exercise their global responsibility as a secondary responsibility for the realization of the 
right to health.32  
The first part of the chapter deals with the theoretical framework for a paradigm 
for global health justice: a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities. This 
involves discussing Daniels’ critique of Rawls’s statist version of relational justice and 
Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach, highlighting areas of agreements and disagreements 
with the proposed paradigm for global health justice. Justification of the focus on 
government programs to deal with the affordable access to essential drugs including anti-
retroviral drugs for participants and host populations rather than requiring pharmaceutical 
companies to fund the cost of these programs will be discussed. The obligation of 
researchers and their sponsors to participants and host populations and whether such 
obligation can be transferred for example, by building hospitals for host populations will 
be explored. 
The second part deals with four critical issues of global health as well as the 
global responsibility for increasing health inequalities. The third part focuses on the 
global capacity to redress health inequalities which consists of the health development 
paradigm, the medical relief paradigm and the new global health paradigm. The new 
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global health paradigm evolved from the global AIDS response and is at the intersection 
of health development paradigm and medical relief paradigm.  
The fourth part focuses on international human rights law as a foundation for 
global health justice which involves discussion of meaning and scope of the right to 
health, progressive realization of the right to health, core obligations and the obligation to 
provide assistance and the sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the 
realization of the minimum level of the right to health which involves illustration of how 
a sliding scale would work. The fifth part of the chapter addresses Global Health Fund 
and affordable access to essential drugs which includes discussion regarding impeding 
factors to the Global Health Fund and functions of Global Health Fund which result in 
the effective realization of the core content of the right to health including affordable 
access to essential drugs for all. A more detailed explanation of a paradigm for global 
health justice will begin with the theoretical framework for a paradigm for global health 
justice: a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities. 
 
B. The Theoretical Framework for a Paradigm for Global Health Justice: A Sliding Scale 
of National and Global Responsibilities. 
 
B.1. Daniels’ Critique of Approaches of Rawls and Pogge to Global Health Justice 
In his landmark work, Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly published in 
2008, Daniels develops a complicated theory of justice with a concluding challenge 
regarding International health inequalities and Global Justice.33 He made a compelling 
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case for national health justice which involves a case for obligations of mutual assistance 
to decrease health inequalities at the national level. However, Daniels doubts whether he 
can extend his theory to the global level to as well make a convincing case for obligations 
of mutual assistance beyond state borders. He concedes that arguments of relational 
justice which serve as the foundation of his theory of health justice cannot simply be 
extended to the global level. Nevertheless, in his call for action, he articulates, “Despite 
the lack of closure on these matters, the account developed here provides an integrated 
theory that helps us see the path to pursue in promoting population health and distributing 
it fairly, globally as well as domestically.”34  
This chapter in response to Daniels’ challenge for action pursues the path to 
global health justice by developing a paradigm for global health justice which emphasizes 
a sliding scale of national and global Responsibilities. The paradigm combines 
approaches of Rawls and Pogge to global health justice by adopting their strengths and 
avoiding their weaknesses. Rawls’ strength is his acknowledgement of the national 
responsibility of each country to fulfill the right to health of all its citizens. Pogge’s 
strength is his recognition of the global responsibility of individual nations. The paradigm 
also builds on Daniels’s several arguments but goes further to develop a thesis that 
emphasizes the global responsibility for health.35 The implication is that global 
responsibility is viewed as augmenting, not substituting, the national responsibility. Other 
areas of agreements and disagreements with Daniels in developing the paradigm will be 
highlighted in this chapter. 
Daniels thoroughly investigates two approaches of attempting to resolve the 
impasse between the statist and cosmopolitan perspectives. One approach which is 
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cosmopolitan involves a minimalist strategy that emphasizes an international obligation 
of justice to avoid harming people by engendering deficits in fulfilling their human 
rights.36  The minimalist nature of this perspective stems from the fact that people may 
concur on negative duties not to harm even if they are not in agreement regarding 
positive duties to aid. Daniels contends that this approach deals with some international 
health issues better than others, but its limitations were clearly exposed in relation to 
sources of international health inequalities, some of which are not tackled by negative 
duties.37 Daniels as well explores a more encouraging relational justice approach that 
requires that we determine a more intermediary conception of justice suitable for 
developing international institutions and rule-making bodies, leaving it open simply how 
fundamental issues of equality would be in such a context.38 Such an approach if 
appropriately developed could tackle broader sources of international health 
inequalities.39 Therefore, the broader sources of inequality can only be tackled by more 
robust accounts of global justice.40 
Daniels argues that Pogge’s minimalist strategy articulated in his harms to health 
argument has severe limitations. There is no clarity for identifying the baseline for 
measuring harm. Determining when there is a deficit in a human right to health is also not 
clear. There is no clear way of specifying what to utilize as a baseline in measuring a 
deficit in the right to health.  Pogge’s minimalist strategy was applied to the brain drain 
of health personnel from low-income countries to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.41 Shortcomings were also identified in 
applying the minimalist strategy to some international health issues. For example, the 
issue of international property rights and the incentives they generate goes beyond the 
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problem of access to existing drugs, such as the anti-retroviral cocktails that have been 
the emphasis in recent years. Patent holders on anti-retroviral drugs championed a fight to 
limit access to generic copies of their drugs. The consequence was direct harm to people 
who could have benefited from anti-retroviral drugs and died in alternative. However, 
these generics that apparently save other lives would not have surfaced without the 
incentives engendered by the current patent system. Furthermore, large multinational 
pharmaceutical companies have been faulted for a research and development bias against 
drugs needed in developing countries. They have responded to current incentives by 
focusing on “blockbuster” drugs for more affluent markets, encompassing many “me too” 
drugs that slightly enhance the effectiveness of older drugs or decrease their side effects 
marginally.42 
Daniels contends that despite the issue of vagueness, Pogge’s proposal cannot be 
defended by appealing exclusively to the “no-harm” principle. He articulates that, “the 
proposed incentive fund would better help to realize human rights to health as Pogge 
argues, but “not optimally helping” is not the same as “harming,” and so the justification 
has shifted.”43 There may be cogent reasons for an account of global justice to take into 
consideration the interests of people impacted by existing property right protections more 
meticulously than those agreements currently do, but that leads us into more disputed 
area than the minimalist strategy.44  
International harming is complicated in several ways. The harms are usually not 
deliberate and occasionally benefits were debatably intended. Harms are frequently 
mixed with benefits. At any rate, great caution must be employed to explicate the 
baseline in measuring harm. Daniels argues that, “such a complex story about 
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motivations, intentions, and effects might seem to weaken the straightforward appeal of 
the minimalist strategy, but the complexity does not undermine the view that we have 
obligations of justice to avoid harming health.”45 
Gorik Ooms and Rachel Hammonds indicate that Daniels presents the differences 
between global and national responsibilities in health justice as characterized by “an 
innate tension, with the path to a successful integration being one that requires careful, 
constant negotiation between dangerous but opposing alternatives.”46  The proposed 
paradigm discussed in this chapter on the other hand, envisages the space between these 
alternatives which implies the space to devise and establish global health justice. Ooms 
and Hammonds figuratively compare this scenario to the narrow strait between Scylla 
and Charybdis, the two great sea monsters in Greek mythology that Odysseus had to hold 
equally distant to guarantee the security of his journey through the strait, even when the 
equally distant,  the adjacency of each endangered his ships and its sailors.47 The 
implication in the context of the two extreme poles of the debate on global health justice 
refers to the pull of the cosmopolitan intuition of Pogge and strongly statist versions of 
relational justice of Rawls which carry severe risks. Daniels in response to this situation 
advocates for an intermediary ground that resists the pull of two opposing alternatives. 
He contends that investigation should concentrate on a middle ground between strongly 
statist claims which indicate that egalitarian requirements of social justice are exclusively 
the realm of the nation-state and its well-defined basic structure as articulated by Rawls 
and Thomas Nagel and strongly cosmopolitan claims that principles of justice apply 
globally to individuals, despite the relations in which they stand or the institutional 
structures that provide framework for them to interact.48  He calls for some explanations 
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of what it would imply for these intermediary institutions to make decisions or enforce 
practices that tackle gross global health inequalities as issues of justice.49  
The paradigm of global justice proposed in this chapter also acknowledges the 
risks of both of these claims highlighted by Daniels. The paradigm also supports Daniels’ 
call to resist the pull of Pogge’s cosmopolitan intuition which focuses too much on global 
responsibility, without a sufficient attention to the preeminence of national responsibility 
that could easily and significantly undermine the latter.50 Daniels acknowledges the lack 
of institutions from the cosmopolitan perspective that can provide just outcomes in a 
consistent and sustained fashion for individuals. He thinks that the cosmopolitan theory 
inherently does not offer any meaningful clue to how a commitment to justice can be 
maintained by global institutions. It also does not make provision for any difference in 
justice concerns that may be suitable to institutions of different types.51 He considers 
justice as a “stable product of institutions structured in certain ways.”52 There is a 
consensus that the global institution essential to regulate the relationship between 
national and global responsibility is deficient, and that this lack should offer adequate 
motivation to establish such an institution.53   
Similarly, it is critical to resist what Daniels regards as “strongly statist versions 
of relational justice.”54 There is a contention that beyond the state that a moral order 
exists, but it is restricted to more basic humanitarian obligations to help those grappling 
with serious risks and possessing pressing needs. More so, it must as well not infringe on 
some basic human rights, and the agreements must be complied with.55 There are no 
obligations of justice to “distribute health fairly, or to protect equality of opportunity, or 
to assist other societies to become as well off as they can be in satisfying rights to health 
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or education or political participation.”56  Actually, if States were seen exclusively as 
institutions that could regulate health justice, the lack of a “global state” would absolve 
states from all responsibility for the consequences of their behaviors outside their 
borders.57    
Daniels rejects the idea of anchoring the global health justice on international 
human rights law. He writes, “Recasting the problem as one of human rights, specifically 
a human right to health and health care, does not help us answer these questions about 
international justice for two reasons.”58 First, the international legal obligation to obtain a 
human right to health for a population rests primarily with each state for its own 
population. In spite of the fact that international human rights agreements and 
proclamations postulate international obligations to assist other states in fulfilling human 
rights,59 the international obligations cannot constitute the principal elements of the 
human right to health and health care.60 Second, health inequalities may persist, even 
when a right to health is obtained to the extent possible in different states.61 In contrast, 
the new paradigm proposed in this chapter grounds the global health justice on 
international human rights law. In this context, the international human rights law 
provides a theoretical framework for national and global responsibility for health.            
Establishing a global institution to govern the relationship between national and global 
responsibility for health forms a critical part of the paradigm. Ooms and Hammonds 
consider the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) that 
already is in existence as a prototype.62 The structure of the Global Fund is currently 
explained more by its practical action than by any theoretical foundation of global health 
justice established in advance. Envisaging the Global Fund as a paradigm effective for 
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realizing the global health justice based on a middle ground can as well offer a theoretical 
basis to fortify the work of the Global Fund itself.63 A critical component of the paradigm 
for global health proposed in this chapter is the focus on government programs to resolve 
the problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries which is 
discussed next. 
B.2. The Justification of the Focus on Government Programs to Resolve the Problem of 
Affordable Access to Anti-retroviral Drugs in Developing Countries. 
The paradigm proposed in this chapter advocates for affluent developed countries 
to fund government programs for resolving the problem of affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs in developing countries. There is a contention that this view is in contrast 
to the perspective argued by article 34 of the recent version of the Declaration of 
Helsinki, which stipulates, “In advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers and host 
country governments should make provisions for post-trial access for all participants who 
still need an intervention identified as beneficial in the trial. This information must also 
be disclosed to participants during the informed consent process.”64 A discussion 
regarding the justification of the emphasis on government programs to address the 
problem of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations 
in developing countries is therefore imperative here. 
The affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for 
participants and host populations of clinical trials in developing countries falls within the 
scope of right to health. Realizing the right to health belongs to the state. The state still 
has the primary responsibility to fulfill the progressive realization of the right to health of 
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its citizens including affordable access to essential drugs even after the initiation and 
execution of clinical trials by multinational pharmaceutical companies. The State would 
not abdicate its responsibility to multinational pharmaceutical companies but can 
collaborate with pharmaceutical companies at the end of clinical trials to enhance 
affordable access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for participants and 
host populations in developing countries. Daniels writes, “Primary responsibility for 
realizing rights to health and health care in a population should rest with each state.”65 
Despite the fact that the primary responsibility for population health is shouldered by 
each state, this does not imply that the state has sole responsibility.66  Other actors such as 
multinational pharmaceutical companies, international agencies or institutions and 
governments of various countries especially affluent countries could also contribute 
significantly in improving the population health, but they simply supplement the efforts 
of the state in fulfilling the rights to health of its citizens. Ashcroft argues that realizing 
the requirement of post-trial provisions of successful products to participants and host 
populations would inevitably involve a more pronounced “collaboration between 
researchers, funders, hosts, and health systems, if this part of the Declaration is to be 
more than simply aspirational.”67 Pharmaceutical companies can assist in providing 
access to anti-retroviral drugs to participants and host populations in developing 
countries, but this does not mean that the state is relieved of its primary responsibility to 
provide access to essential drugs including anti-retroviral drugs for its citizens. Improving 
the population health of each state falls to state’s ability to establish and implement good 
health policy.68 Ruger also articulates that, “Individual nation-states have primary and 
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prior obligations to deal with health inequalities.”69 The implication is that states have 
obligations to maintain health equity at the state level.70   
On the other hand, Grady discusses broadened possible strategies for guaranteeing 
continued post-trial access of successful products to participants and host populations. 
The first strategy emphasizes that various stakeholders in a clinical research including 
investigators, sponsors, communities, national health systems, and international 
organizations should shoulder responsibility for guaranteeing continued post-trial access 
of beneficial treatment to participants and host populations. Possible strategies of dealing 
with continued post-trial access should be discussed and negotiated before starting a 
clinical research. Researchers and sponsors are instructed not to ignore this critical issue. 
Similarly, it is pertinent to note that researchers and sponsors cannot be burdened with 
the exclusive responsibility of treating people who should be obtaining treatment through 
the regular health care infrastructure.71 Grady articulates that, “expecting researchers and 
sponsors to fill that gap is not only an unrealistic expectation but would also act as a 
powerful negative disincentive.”72 The clinical research for possible prevention of HIV in 
Cambodia was cited as an example in which the research was stopped because the 
Women’s Network for Unity, a Cambodian sex workers union insisted that participants 
would receive health care for thirty years at the end of the clinical trial.73 
Stakeholders involved in research and health care delivery should continue to 
collaborate in order to devise creative strategies to provide continued treatment for 
participants and host populations at the end of the clinical research. A typical example of 
a creative strategy with multiple stakeholders is “the HIV Netherlands, Australia, 
Thailand Research Collaboration (HIV-NAT) co-payment and sliding scale drug fund 
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program.”74 HIV-NAT is a non-government, non-profit organization that involves three 
collaborators including the Thai Red Cross AIDS Research Center in Thailand, the 
National Center in HIV Epidemiology and Clinical Research in Sydney, and the 
International Antiviral Therapy Evaluation Center in Amsterdam.75 The HIV-NAT drug 
fund program at first assess all patients who applied and thereafter reassess them yearly 
by experienced social workers to ascertain their ability to pay, and the case is at that 
moment reviewed by the drug fund committee who determines an amount to be 
subsidized. The committee is entrusted with the responsibility of exploring possible ways 
to decrease costs without endangering the patient as well as supervising the bulk purchase 
of drugs to get low prices. The support provided to patients might be in the form of cash 
or drugs or a combination of the two.76  
The second strategy stresses that the problem of post-trial access to beneficial 
treatment for participants should be examined in the context of other considerations for 
ethical research. Providing treatment to a few individuals during or at the end of a 
research does not completely remove or tackle concerns regarding exploitation. 
Negotiating fair benefits in the context of research in order to minimize exploitation of 
participants and host populations is a critical part of collaborative research.77  
The third strategy emphasizes that the world health community must continue to 
be dedicated to discovering strategies to encourage improved access to required health 
care and treatment globally. This involves the energy and creativity of policymakers, 
scientists, clinical providers, politicians, and communities.78 
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The fourth strategy stresses that sponsors and researchers should shoulder 
responsibility for certain short-term solutions when suitable. For instance, it would be 
essential to offer medications to participants while waiting for the approval of the tested 
drug, or to establish or promote patient assistance programs for costly treatments. 
Continued focus on reducing the costs of treatments for people who need them is as well 
demanded.79  
Justifications that would put the burden or responsibility on government programs 
such as beneficence and justice entails that the governments would have similar 
responsibilities to people not enrolled in the clinical research. They would not usually 
justify merely moving resources from non-participants to participants. Conversely, 
justifications that would entail an obligation owed exclusively to research participants 
such as compensation for harm or the research-participant relationship have a tendency to 
be those that oblige simply the researchers and their sponsors.80   
Justifications given for providing post-trial anti-retroviral drugs need to coincide 
with mechanisms proposed for providing it. Joseph Millium offered several justifications 
for providing post-trial antiretroviral drugs to participants and host populations of clinical 
research. Six different justifications offered for providing post-trial antiretroviral drugs 
for participants and host populations include harm to participants, fiduciary relationship, 
reciprocity, duty of rescue, imperfect duty of beneficence and global justice.81 
Justifications focused on obligation owed only to participants such as harm to 
participants, fiduciary relationship and reciprocity place obligation on researchers and 
their sponsors. On the other hand, justifications focused on obligation owed to people in 
urgent need, people in need and people in unjust situations such as duty of rescue, 
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imperfect duty of beneficence and global justice respectively place obligation on all those 
who can help82 including researchers, sponsors, host country governments, international 
governmental or non-governmental aid agencies and governments of affluent developed 
countries. 
Duties of beneficence are general duties that might be shouldered by everyone. 
Moral agents have general duties simply as a consequence of their agency, and general 
duties are owed to moral patients simply as a consequence of their moral status.83 Millum 
argues that, “… unlike, say, duties arising from the researcher-participant relationship, a 
duty of beneficence to supply (antiretroviral) ART could fall to governments or 
international bodies who are entirely independent of the research enterprise.”84 The 
implication is that all the mechanisms that have been proposed for providing ART to 
research participants would be valid strategies to fulfill a duty of beneficence.85 
Similar to duties of beneficence, the duty to promote global justice is probably to 
be general which implies that everyone is responsible and not simply those people who 
are actively involved in the research and in the interaction with the global poor. 
Therefore, “there is no reason to think that researchers working in the developing world 
have any greater duty to promote justice than people who are not, where those people 
could also make a difference.”86 The implication is that similar to beneficence, that all the 
proposed mechanisms for providing ART could be valid strategies to accomplish a duty 
to promote justice. Duties of beneficence and duties to correct injustice are based on the 
unfortunate condition of the beneficiaries; they are not contingent on the beneficiaries 
engaging in clinical trials.87      
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The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights allude to resources 
within the state as well as “those available through international cooperation and 
assistance”88 in fulfilling the core obligations of the right to health. From this perspective, 
it is evident that developed countries have obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation for access to essential drugs89 including anti-retroviral drugs to participants 
and host populations in developing countries. Another component of the proposed 
paradigm is the special obligations of researchers and their sponsors to participants and 
host populations and whether such obligations can be transferred to other benefits other 
than just providing anti-retroviral drugs is discussed next. 
B.3. Obligations of Researchers and Sponsors to Participants and Host Populations in 
Developing Countries.  
There is a general consensus that researchers and sponsors have obligations to 
participants and host populations at the end of a clinical trial. However, there is a 
contentious debate regarding what exactly is owed to participants and host populations, 
whether it is the successful product or intervention or whether it is other benefits 
negotiated by the stakeholders. Furthermore, there is a controversy regarding whether 
providing a successful intervention adequately and fairly compensates the participants 
and host populations of the clinical research. 
International ethical guidelines and comprehensive reports on international 
research address the post-trial obligations of sponsors and researchers to participants and 
host populations. All of the guidelines and reports indicate the common notion that 
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research must be responsive to the health needs and priorities of the population where the 
research is executed and should likely benefit that population.90  
Previous versions of the Declaration of Helsinki (DoH) did not mention a 
requirement regarding making successful products available to participants or to host 
populations at the conclusion of a trial. However, the 2000 revision of DoH tackles the 
issue in paragraphs 19 and 30. Paragraph 19 indicates that, “Medical research is only 
justified if there is a reasonable likelihood that the populations in which the research is 
carried out stand to benefit from the results of the research.”91 The rendering of this 
paragraph presents some limitations such as difficulty to ascertain the criteria for the 
likelihood of benefit and the degree of likelihood necessary. DoH as well tackles in a 
strong requirement the issue of benefits that accrue to the participants in paragraph 30: 
“At the conclusion of the study, every patient entered into the study should be assured of 
access to the best proven prophylactic, diagnostic and therapeutic methods identified by 
the study.”92  The strong requirement articulated by DoH coincides with Guidance Point 
2 of the UNAIDS Guidance Document for preventive vaccine research, about what 
should be made reasonably available to research participants: “Any HIV preventive 
vaccine demonstrated to be safe and effective… should be made available as soon as 
possible to all participants in the trials in which it was tested as well as to other 
populations at high risk of HIV infection …plans should be developed at the initial stages 
of HIV vaccine development to ensure such availability”93 Unlike DoH, UNAIDS 
Guidance document stresses the importance of extending the benefits to others in the 
community or country at the end of successful trials. It also emphasizes the discussion 
regarding making a successful vaccine available before the commencement of the trials.94 
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The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in its 
2002 version emphasizes two important aspects of international research including the 
research being responsive to the health needs and priorities of the community in which it 
is conducted and making any successful product reasonably available to the population or 
community that hosted the trial.95 
The US National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report and the 
Nuffield Council report tackle two significant points concerning availability of successful 
products at the conclusion of a trial: “availability to the research participants themselves 
(the only point addressed in the Declaration of Helsinki), and availability of successful 
products to others in the country or community.”96 The NBAC recommends that research 
proposals must incorporate an explanation how effective new interventions would be 
made available to some or all the populations of the countries that are hosting the 
research, simultaneously with research participants themselves at the conclusion of the 
research.97 The Nuffield Council report stresses that researchers must commit before 
beginning a trial, to guarantee post-trial access to effective interventions to participants 
and host populations at the end of the trial. The research proposals are also required to 
incorporate an explanation of how new proven interventions would be made available to 
both research participants and the host populations. The report also acknowledges that 
post-trial access to effective interventions would be contingent on several factors, such as 
the result of the research, the cost of providing the intervention and overseeing its 
provision, threat engendered by the disease and the obligation of making a successful 
intervention available is primarily shouldered by national government.98 The Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights signed by 191 countries articulated in Article 
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15 that “benefits resulting from any scientific research and its application should be 
shared with society as a whole and within the international community, in particular with 
developing countries.”99 However, the benefits can take several forms, in agreement with 
the principles of the Declaration, but not essentially continuity of treatment.100 
A vast number of available literature endorsed post-trial obligations of researchers 
and sponsors to participants and host populations at the conclusion of a clinical trial. A 
survey conducted in developing countries, with researchers in the HIV/AIDS area, 
endorsed that the participant population of the studies should benefit from the study, and 
about more than half of the researchers from U.S. and developing countries surveyed 
endorsed that interventions proven effective should be provided to the host population at 
the conclusion of the study for two to five years.101  
A qualitative study, conducted through focal groups in Kenya, with 89 research 
participants comprising potential patients for HIV/AIDS studies, researchers and 
administrators concluded that it would be unreasonable to stop providing therapy after 
HIV/AIDS studies to patients, except in cases where it is completely justified.102 Zhiyong 
Zong also discussed the issue of post-trial provision of beneficial experimental 
interventions especially in developing countries citing international guidelines and 
recommendations that addressed the subject. Zong endorses planning in advance and 
establishing a collaborative partnership among pertinent parties such as sponsors, 
researchers, local healthcare system, the Research Ethics Committee and participants as a 
viable strategy for addressing the issues concerning post-trial provision.103 
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A study published in 2009 by Seema Shah, Stacey Elmer and Christine Grady 
discusses planning for posttrial access to antiretroviral treatment for research participants 
in developing countries with focus on the implementation process. The study investigated 
whether the National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines have been implemented in 
ART trials funded by NIH in developing countries. The 18 studies identified in the 
database of the Division of AIDS (DAIDS) included plans for post-trial access for 
participants. More than 70% that is, about 13 of 18 trials had specific mechanisms for 
realizing posttrial access, but none of them ensured long-term access. Half of the trials   
incorporated explanations of post-trial access that involved collaboration with outside 
sources or national access programs, established by the governments of the countries 
hosting the trials. None of the studies advocated for priority access for trial participants in 
connection to other patients in the country. The authors contend that the strength and 
form of the NIH guidelines support researchers to explore alternatives and collaboration 
to expedite access to antiretroviral treatment. Similarly the flexibility of the guidelines 
expedites and promotes the learning of practical difficulties, a more effective strategy 
than establishing stringent requirements that researchers may be unable to fulfill.104  
Two competing paradigms have been proposed regarding providing benefits to 
participants and host populations at the conclusion of a trial including reasonable 
availability and fair benefits framework. The concept of reasonable availability is 
ambiguous. CIOMS recognizing this ambiguity of reasonable availability indicates that 
“the issue of reasonable availability is complex and will need to be determined on a case- 
by-case basis and then enumerates countless “relevant considerations.”105 Four primary 
issues require stipulation: “(1) the nature of the commitment; (2) who is responsible for 
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fulfilling the requirement; (3) what constitutes making something reasonably available; 
and (4) who must have access.”106 Each of these issues has attracted a variety of answers. 
Therefore, regardless of the consensus on reasonable availability requirement, there is a 
considerable controversy on how it should be stipulated and essentially implemented.107  
Nevertheless, proponents of reasonable availability consider it as a requirement of 
ethical research in developing countries that is critical to avert exploitation of 
communities.108 CIOMS articulates, “If there is good reason to believe that a product 
developed or knowledge generated by research is unlikely to be reasonably available 
to…the population of a proposed host country or community after the conclusion of the 
research, it is unethical to conduct the research in that country or community.”109  
Reasonable availability requirement has been criticized for several reasons. First, 
it grapples with a mistaken conception of exploitation, because, while reasonable 
availability concentrates on a type of benefit such as a proven intervention, exploitation 
concentrates on a fair level of benefits. The emphasis is not on what people obtain but 
how much they obtain. Second, reasonable availability struggles with a narrow 
conception of benefits, because it considers only access to a drug, vaccine or intervention 
as a benefit, and disregards others benefits such as training, infrastructure, or health 
services. Third, reasonable availability deals with excessively broad group of 
beneficiaries. It requires post-trial access for host community or country. On the other 
hand, tackling exploitation requires benefits just for those shouldering risks or burdens of 
research, without any justification to bestow benefits on a whole country that does not 
shoulder a burden or risk of research. Fourth, reasonable availability grapples with the 
issue that no single trial is conclusive. It requires access to a drug, vaccine, or 
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intervention after a single trial. However, it frequently requires many confirmatory trials 
to justify the safety and efficacy of an intervention. Fifth, reasonable availability that 
entails providing one drug can be “golden handcuff” because if research demonstrates 
that another intervention is more effective, the community may be assured the old drug 
not the newer and more effective one.110 Sixth, it is not within the scope of the authority 
of researchers and numerous sponsors to ensure reasonable availability. Clinical 
researchers as well as some sponsors in developed countries, such as the NIH and the 
Medical Research Council of the United Kingdom (MRC), do not regulate drug approval 
processes in their own countries, let alone other countries. In the same way, they do not 
regulate budgets for health ministries or foreign or development aid in order to put into 
practice research results such as provision of  drugs or vaccines, and may be, by law, 
prohibited from providing successful interventions at the conclusion of trials as in the 
case of NIH. Seventh, the requirement of reasonable availability implies that the 
population is deprived of making its own autonomous decisions regarding what benefits 
merit the risks of a research trial.111 Due to numerous shortcomings of reasonable 
availability requirement, the fair benefits framework was proposed by the participants of 
the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries at 
Malawi.112 
The fair benefits requirement was highlighted by the DoH paragraph 33 with its 
reference to “access to interventions identified as beneficial in the study or to other 
appropriate care or benefits”113 at the conclusion of the trial. The UNESCO Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights also makes allusion to sharing various forms 
of benefits from scientific research with the entire society especially in developing 
 383 
countries. It provides a comprehensive list of benefits such as: (a) special and continuous 
aid to, and recognition of, the individuals and groups that have participated in the 
research; (b) affordable access to quality health care; (c) provision of new therapeutic 
interventions originating from scientific research; (d) assistance for health services; (e) 
access to knowledge generated from science and technology; (f) capacity-building 
facilities for research goals; (g) other types of benefits in consonant with the principles 
established in this declaration.114  
The fair benefits framework enunciates two basic assumptions. First, the solution 
to avoiding exploitation is to guarantee that people who shoulder the risks and burdens of 
research obtain fair benefits through the conduct and/ or results of research. Second, all 
forms of benefits that accrue from research, not only access to a tested drug, vaccine or 
intervention, must be examined in ascertaining the fair benefits.115 The population at risk 
for exploitation is the pertinent group to obtain benefits; this encompasses the participants 
in the clinical research and any members of the community who might as well shoulder 
burdens and risks for conducting the research.116 Providing benefits just to research 
participants would broaden health inequalities in the resource-poor host country and 
consequently highlight issues regarding causing injustice.117 Therefore, providing 
benefits to the host country should be executed in a fashion that improves rather than 
exacerbates health inequalities.118   
The fair benefits framework maintains that “there should be a comprehensive 
delineation of tangible benefits to the research participants and the population from both 
conduct and the results of research.”119 Some of the benefits consist of: (a) Improved 
health of research subjects; (b) Posttrial access to medications for research subjects; (c) 
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Health services and public health measures accessible to the population; (d) Employment 
and economic activity; (e) Availability of interventions at the conclusion of research; (f) 
Improvements to the health care infrastructure, training of health care and research 
professionals and research capacity; (g) Long-term research collaboration; (h) Sharing of 
financial rewards, including intellectual property rights.120  Such benefits guarantee that 
community where the research is conducted will obtain benefits in return for engaging in 
the research. Building infrastructure has been identified as a good way, researchers can 
help offer sustainable improvements that will assist to shrink health inequalities between 
rich and poor nations.121 
The form and amount of such collateral or secondary benefits to participants and 
communities should be negotiated among the sponsors, researchers, and host-country 
partners before the research is initiated. Overcoming disparities in negotiating power 
requires that agreements should be made public in order that other communities and 
countries will know what benefits might be realized.122  
The fair benefits framework would seem to be effective at averting exploitation at 
the level of the individual research participants and the level of the host population, 
community, or country, and it provides more understandable guidance than DoH or 
CIOMS guidelines.123 Nevertheless, some authors contend that someone could give a 
justification for any research with human participants as long as other benefits, not 
connected to the research itself, can be utilized to justify unneeded research. Most people 
agree that research on male pattern baldness and cosmetic surgery, currently, should not 
be considered to be highly significant, but it might be justified in the context of fair 
benefits approach.124 Some authors argue that fair benefits framework does not go far 
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enough to tackle issues of exploitation or benefit for the host population.125 Alex John 
London points out the shortcoming of the fair benefits framework on the basis that its 
idea of exploitation and justice are too restricted. He contends that to comprehend 
exploitation and justice one must examine beyond specific transactions or relationships 
and examine the larger social, economic, cultural, and political context. For London, the 
fair benefits framework is contingent on a fair agreement between researchers/sponsors 
and a host population, community, or country. The agreement is fair if both parties give 
their assent and benefits are fairly distributed. He contends that the issue with this notion 
is that it disregards the broader context in which the agreement is established, such as 
extreme poverty, famine and disease in the host country, or the history of relationship 
between two countries which may involve racism, slavery, theft, or exploitation. He 
argues that an agreement cannot be really fair without one tackling this broader context. 
Accomplishing this goal requires that researchers and sponsors do more than merely 
providing fair benefits. They must engage in rectifying past injustices and support social, 
economic, and political development in the host country. This perspective was dubbed 
the human development approach by London.126 In a nutshell, he contends that “a better 
approach will reframe the question of justice in international research in a way that makes 
explicit the links between medical research, the social determinants of health, and global 
justice.”127 
Several criticisms were leveled against the human development approach. 
Shamoo acknowledges London’s human development approach being admirable in 
several ways, but argues that it is as well too idealistic and unrealistic. It overly requires 
researchers and sponsors to do a lot more for the host countries than they can probably be 
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expected to do. The human development approach if implemented would make 
biomedical research in developing countries exorbitant and complex. Sponsors would opt 
to refrain from research in developing countries to circumvent paying the exorbitant costs 
of nation building.128 In as much as promoting economic, social, and political 
development in developing countries is a valuable goal, it is a responsibility best 
entrusted to the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
other organizations whose primary goal is development. The primary goal of research is 
research. Researchers and sponsors should offer meaningful and fair benefits to the 
population hosting the research, but they need not overextend themselves in what they 
do.129   
On the other hand, Emmanuel criticized the human development approach in 
various areas. He highlights the abstract nature and ambiguity of the human development 
that makes it hard to be sure what it requires. The human development approach 
misconstrues the problem that guaranteeing benefits to host countries is intended to 
tackle. The majority of people agree that global injustice and exploitation are critical 
ethical issues in the world. Nevertheless, the aim of identifying clearly the extent of the 
obligation to provide benefits to developing countries that participate in biomedical 
research is to reduce the possibility of exploitation by developed country researchers and 
sponsors. Such benefits are not intended to tackle fundamental background global 
injustice. The human development approach is therefore pointing to a different problem 
from that being tackled by the reasonable availability requirement or fair benefits 
framework. There is a detach between the ethical challenges presented by conducting 
clinical trials in developing countries and the issues the human development approach 
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considers itself to be tackling.130 Furthermore, the human development approach appears 
most pertinent in helping to identify clearly what research questions are being pursued in 
developing countries, rather than the benefits that result from particular research 
protocols.131 Another critical issue addressed in the context of a paradigm for global 
justice is the global responsibility for growing health inequalities discussed in the next 
part of this chapter.  
C. The Global Responsibility for Growing Health Inequalities 
C.1. Four Critical Challenges of Global Health  
The increasing global health inequalities resulting in poor health outcomes 
especially among the world’s global poor in developing countries created an urgent need 
for “fair and effective global governance for health – the organization of national and 
global norms, institutions, and processes that collectively shape the health of the world’s 
population.”132 The relevance of global governance for health extends beyond the health 
arena. It entails rectifying the presently unfair and harmful health effects of international 
regimes such as international trade, intellectual property and finance, and establishing 
secure, active, democratic political institutions.133  
The Joint Action and Learning Initiative on National and Global Responsibilities 
for Health (JALI) was established by a coalition of civil society and academics, with a 
shared vision of the right to health.134 JALI attempts to establish a post-Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) framework for global health, one entrenched in the right to 
health and intended for obtaining universal health coverage for all people.135 JALI 
establishes an international agreement regarding solutions to four critical challenges of 
global health: (I) explaining essential health services and goods; (II) elucidating 
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governments’ obligations to their country’s populations; (III) investigating the 
responsibilities of all governments towards the global poor; and (IV) introducing a global 
structure to enhance health as a matter of social justice.136 A brief discussion of the four 
critical challenges of global health follows. 
I. Essential Services and Goods Ensured to Every Person under the Human Right to 
Health 
The first crucial challenge for JALI is to ascertain essential health services and 
goods that every person has a right to anticipate. Gostin et al. writes “without articulating 
these, it is impossible to define each state’s obligation to its own inhabitants, as well as 
the duties of high-income countries towards low- and middle-income countries.”137 The 
World Health Organization (WHO) has highly prioritized the place of universal health 
coverage on the global health agenda,138 expounding three dimensions of coverage: “(1) 
the proportion of the population served; (2) the level of services; and (3) the proportion of 
health costs covered by prepaid pooled funds.”139 Universal coverage is defined “as 
access to key promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interventions for 
all at an affordable cost.”140 
The human right to health which is an international treaty obligation offers crucial 
understanding about how states should work towards realizing universal coverage.141 
Core obligations provide criteria to evaluate progress towards universal coverage, for 
example “non-discrimination, equitable distribution of health facilities, and essential 
services for all, including those addressing underlying determinants of health.”142 
States are required by the core principle of equality to emphasize covering 100% 
of their populations. Even though 100% coverage of all health services may not be 
 389 
feasible right away, full coverage of essential health interventions should be an initial 
standard or criterion towards universal coverage.143 The right to health framework works 
against a restricted definition of essential services. The essential services should entail 
WHO’s   building blocks for health services such as “services, workforce, information 
and financing and governance; essential vaccines, medicines and technologies; and 
fundamental human needs (e.g., sanitation, nutritious food, potable water, safe housing, 
vector abatement, tobacco control, and healthy environments).”144  
The provision of each of these essential services should signify just one critical 
step towards attaining the highest attainable standard of health. States, including affluent 
ones will need to continue to work towards achieving universal coverage.145 The right to 
health requires these essential services to be universally available, acceptable, accessible 
and of good quality.146 
II. States’ Responsibilities for the Health of their Populations      
  States possess the primary responsibility to fund and guarantee all the essential 
goods and services within the context of the right to health.147 The estimate of the WHO 
as the minimum annual cost for providing all the essential goods and services under the 
right to health is US$ 40 per person,148 with the exclusion of basic survival needs. 
Nevertheless the obligation of states should not be restricted just to their populations, but 
also to the global community to control health threats that jeopardize other countries and 
region. Gostin et al. argue that in most cases, “state obligations should extend to fostering 
a functioning inter-dependent global community, in which everyone recognizes that our 
mutual survival is a matter of common concern.”149  
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There is no consensus on the level of health sector funding sufficient to fulfill the 
population’s needs. African heads of state pledged to allocate at least 15% of national 
budgets to the health sector in 2001, in Abuja, Nigeria.150 More so, about 32 African 
countries established an aspirational target of public sector budget allocations for 
sanitation and hygiene programs to attain at least 0.5% of gross domestic product.151 In 
2007, the average per capita of government health investment in Africa is US$ 34, 
corresponding to a mean of 9.6% budget allocation, which is compared with US$ 1374 
and 17.1% in the Americas.152 This encompasses 15 African countries that invest as small 
as US$ 2-10 per capita, which cannot start to fulfill the population’s health needs.153 
Furthermore, numerous low- and middle-income countries decrease domestic health 
spending for every dollar they obtain in foreign health assistance.154   
Additionally, States have a responsibility to “govern well – honestly, 
transparently and accountably – with the full participation of civil society.”155 However, 
data shows that health systems among low-income countries are among the ones that are 
most badly governed.156    
 
III. Responsibilities of All Countries to Guarantee the Health of the World’s Population. 
  Resource-limited countries lack capacity to guarantee all of their populations even 
the essential health goods and services, let alone a fuller realization of the right to health. 
Countries well-placed to assist are required to do so in the context of the principles of 
international law and global social justice.157  The Committee on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights has affirmed that cooperation towards fulfilling the right to health is “an 
obligation of all states,” especially those “in a position to assist others.”158 All countries 
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have mutual responsibilities towards guaranteeing the health of the most disadvantaged 
population of the world.159  
Formulating global health funding as “aid” is basically faulty because it presumes 
an intrinsically unequal benefactor – dependent relationship. Essentially, global 
collaboration obliges a collective response to shared risks and basic rights, where all 
states possess mutual responsibilities.160  Charitable giving generally signifies that “the 
donor decides how much to give, and for what and to whom.”161 Therefore, “aid” is “not 
predictable, scalable or sustainable.”162  It undercuts ownership of and responsibility for 
health programs of the host country.163 
Apart from development assistance, coordination and coherence is desperately 
needed across sectors, as global health can be enhanced or harmed through state and 
international policies and rules that regulate areas such as international trade, intellectual 
property, health worker migration, international financing, and debt relief. These 
responsibilities include the use of state authority and influence over global institutions 
such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization.164 
Furthermore, high-income countries have not come nearer to realizing their pledge made 
in 1970 to spend 0.7% of their gross national product annually on Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).165 After four decades, their average contribution is at 0.31%. 
Exploring innovative strategies to guarantee sufficient and lasting funding with agreed-
upon priorities, will be critical in guaranteeing that poor countries obtain the capacity to 
realize the right to health.166   
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IV. Global Health Governance Required to Guarantee that All States Live up to their 
Mutual Responsibilities  
Global health governance is necessary because states will not embrace 
international norms without true global partnerships, fair burden sharing and efficient 
programs that enhance health outcomes.167 Gostin et al. writes “translating a shared 
understanding of national and global responsibilities into new realities requires effective 
and democratic governance for health.”168 Despite the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, global health grapples with grand challenges of poor leadership, poor 
coordination and underfunded priorities, and a deficiency in transparency, accountability, 
and enforcement.169 More so, political, legal and economic challenges obstruct effective 
governance. Health ministries of various countries frequently lack fundamental 
knowledge of, and control over, foreign-supported programs. Gostin and Mok contend 
that we need a system of governance that promotes effective partnerships and coordinates 
initiatives to establish collaborations and circumvent destructive competition.170 
More importantly, global health governance should strengthen the leadership and 
normative function of WHO which, as a United Nations agency, must have the 
legitimacy, authority and resources to assist all countries in ensuring the right to health.171 
Furthermore, state policies such as agricultural subsidies, intellectual property, and 
foreign affairs can effectively impact health in resource-poor countries. Consequently, 
states should endorse a “health-in-all-policies” approach where all ministries deal with 
the health effects of their policies and programs.172 Effective governance must encompass 
active participation of the citizen to guarantee “transparency, collaboration, and 
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accountability while maximizing creativity, and resource mobilization by states, 
international organizations, businesses, and civil society.”173 
The global health structure should make provision to hold stakeholders 
accountable, with clear criteria for success, monitoring progress and enforcement all of 
which have been deficient.174 Lack of adequately exact obligations and compliance 
mechanisms in the context of the right to health impedes accountability, although 
encouraging signs of better approaches abound.175 Human rights organizations and UN 
special rapporteurs are increasing the clarity of state obligations in the context of the right 
to health, which is imperative for meaningful accountability, just as are constitutional 
court decisions affirmed in Argentina, India, and South Africa.176 Establishing the global 
responsibility for growing health inequalities among nations is discussed next. 
 
C.2. The Global Responsibility for increasing Health Inequalities between Nations 
  Ooms and Hammonds argue that there is global responsibility for global health 
and there are obligations of justice to help fulfill the right to health in other countries, 
because of the increasing wealth inequality between nations which has significant direct 
impact on health inequity.177 Health inequity is explained as the “unjust distribution of 
the socially controllable factors affecting population health and its distribution,”178 The 
concept of “health-related goods” introduced by John Arras and Elizabeth Fenton has 
been used as short hand of Daniels’ “socially controllable factors affecting population 
health and its distribution”179 in the discussion of growing health inequalities between 
nations.  
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  There is a direct correlation between wealth inequalities and health inequalities 
between nations. Health-related goods are associated with costs in money. Health-related 
goods such as health care, prevention, water, sanitation, and nutrition involve a 
substantial spending for any nation. The implication is that what governments can spend 
on the distribution of health-related goods is exclusively determined by their revenue, 
which is invariably affected by their wealth.180  
  Studies on the evolution of global wealth inequalities conducted by Branko 
Milanovic showed that wealth inequalities between countries, articulated as an inter-
country Gini coefficient, are progressively growing.181 A Gini coefficient of zero utilized 
for inter-country wealth distribution would signify that all countries have precisely the 
same average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, which denotes complete inter-
country equality. Additionally, Gini coefficient of one used for inter-country wealth 
distribution would signify that one single country would have the whole GDP of the 
world’s economy, which denotes maximum inequality. Milanovic examines the inter-
country Gini coefficients between countries from 1980-2000 and indicates how wealth 
inequality between countries is actually increasingly moving toward maximum inequality 
and away from maximum equality.182  
The increasing inter-country inequality is attributed to several factors. The long-
lasting effects of slavery and colonization183 which constitute a significant factor in the 
inter-country inequality should not be minimized. Nunn attributes Africa’s poor 
economic performance and underdevelopment in the second half of the twentieth century 
to its history of extraction, characterized by the events of slave trades and colonialism.184 
Nunn argues that there is a strong negative correlation between the number of slaves 
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exported from a country and current economic performance. He argues further that 
evidence indicates that slave trades had an adverse effect on economic development of 
various countries in Africa.185 Another important factor is that rich countries use their 
economic and political power to negotiate unequal or unfair trade agreement.186 Stiglitz 
argues that the WTO rules governing international trade are extremely unfair because 
they have been intended to benefit the developed countries, to a certain extent at the 
expense of the developing countries.187 Another factor worth noting is the shift of 
financial resources from poor to rich countries that are traced to illegal or at least illicit 
activities and causes, that is, “illicit financial flows” that significantly contribute to 
increasing inter-country inequality and can obfuscate international assistance from rich to 
poor countries.188 The report findings show that developing countries lost an estimated 
$858.6 billion-$1.06 trillion in illicit financial outflows in 2006.189 
  Robert Merton’s “Matthew Effect”190 can as well be utilized in explaining the 
increasing inter-country inequality. This alludes to a verse in the biblical Gospel of 
Matthew – “For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an 
abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken 
away,”191 – Merton highlights the improper allocation of credit for contributions in 
science. He explicates how scientists with significant reputation in their field are more 
likely to be acknowledged and awarded for their scientific work than scientists who have 
not created any impression, even when both equally contribute to a scientific 
advancement.192  
Gunnar Myrdal built on the same biblical quotation to explicate his theory of 
“circular and cumulative causation,” which estimates growing inequalities within and 
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between countries engaging in a free market.193 Myrdal’s theory contends “that the play 
of the forces of the market normally tends to increase, rather than decrease, the 
inequalities between regions.”194 Centers of strong economic growth draw capital and 
skills, and can fund an efficient logistical infrastructure, as a result growing even faster. 
In their direct outskirts, they may engender “spread effects,” that is, benefits for regions 
that are within the direct outskirts of economic growth centers. On the other hand, further 
from the center, the existence of these “economic growth centers” engenders “backwash 
effects,” as far away regions experience the flight of their capital and skills toward 
economic growth centers. Within affluent countries, spread effects can be stronger than 
backwash effects, and “state policies have been initiated which are directed toward 
greater regional equality: the market forces which result in backwash effects have been 
offset, while those resulting in spread effects have been supported.”195 Conversely, poor 
countries are inclined to mainly experience the backwash effects from economic growth 
centers, since such growth centers are frequently situated in other countries. Myrdal 
indicates that if from one perspective the explication of the current and ever-increasing 
global inequalities is the cumulative propensity intrinsic in the unimpeded play of the 
market forces in circumstances where the effectiveness of the spread effects is feeble, 
from another perspective the explication is the lack of a world state which could 
intervene in the interest of equality of opportunity.196  
It is pertinent to note that the influence of apparent global misconduct such as 
colonization and slavery, unfair trade rules, and illicit financial flows should not be 
underrated.197 Pogge posited various ways in which affluent countries are contributing to 
both the continued severe poverty of poor countries and severe poverty within poor 
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countries. He contends that obligations of global justice are primarily obligations of 
rectification to recompense for failure to accomplish the negative duty of doing no 
harm.198 Ooms and Hammonds assert the crucial importance of rectifying the apparent 
harm that is being done by affluent countries to the world’s poor. However, even if it 
were feasible to rectify or recompense for all past and prior apparent misconduct, even if 
an equal opportunity could be created for global free trade, global free trade would 
nonetheless engender some winners and some losers.199 They further argue that “…if 
winners are allowed to invest their present gains in future comparative advantages 
without global corrective measures, the Gini coefficient for inter-country wealth 
inequality will continue to grow toward one and away from zero.”200 The global-level 
Matthew Effect is apparently a less type of harm and may then not require rectification 
on the basis of the negative duty of doing no harm. However, it requires rectification 
from the point of view that it decreases the capacity of some countries to distribute 
health-related goods. From this perspective, Daniels argues that obligations of mutual 
assistance at the national level are imperative. He emphasizes the special moral 
significance of health “because protecting normal functioning helps to protect the range 
of exercisable opportunities open to people and because various theories of justice 
support the idea that we have an obligation to protect opportunity and thus health.”201 
Obligations of mutual assistance beyond borders are desiderata, to defend equal 
opportunity globally and taking the Matthew Effect into consideration at the global 
level.202    
Another option for addressing inter-country wealth inequalities which undercuts 
the ability of poor countries to buy health-related goods for its populations was proposed 
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by Robert Archer. Archer describes the great inequalities that occurred between rich and 
poor over a century ago in the industrialized nations. As a result of this difficult and 
challenging situation, “many governments in richer countries came to realize, or were 
pressured to accept, that extreme social and economic inequities were unsustainable.”203  
To surmount these inequalities, Archer insists that “systems of universal health care, 
social security, unemployment insurance and public housing were put in place.”204 These 
social protection schemes fundamentally function by collecting financial resources in 
conformity with participants’ means and directly redistributing them “in the form of 
health-related goods, education-related goods, or other social rights related goods, in 
accordance with participants’ needs.”205 The just distribution of these goods was not 
ensured by the primary distribution of wealth, ensuing from free markets. It was then 
imperative to introduce a secondary system for redistribution of wealth, through 
redistribution that included either money transfers or social rights-related goods transfers, 
such as funding of health care services for individuals who need it by the government.206 
Some societies rather than establishing a secondary redistribution to correct the primary, 
attempted to change the primary distribution of resources, and espoused communism. 
These attempts seemingly resulted in establishing other types of injustice.207 Ooms and 
Hammonds argued for an analogous system of secondary redistribution of wealth at the 
global level which could favorably counteract the Matthew Effect, and authorize a less 
unfair distribution of health-related goods to occur.208 They further articulate “it is 
precisely because a secondary redistribution of wealth system fails to occur at the global 
level, as Myrdal notes, that we argue for the need to recognize and support global 
responsibility for growing health inequalities.”209 Essentially, the global free market 
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should not be abrogated but rather attuned to tackle and rectify the inequalities on the 
global level that impede the ability of poor countries to buy and distribute health-related 
goods for their citizens.210 Critical to the solution of redressing growing global health 
inequalities is to establish the global capacity for the needed intervention which is 
discussed in the next part of this chapter.  
 
D. The Global Capacity to Redress Health Inequalities  
There are two global elements drawn from the World Health Organization 
mandate, “a globally shared responsibility for the health of all people, and global threats 
posed by infectious diseases.”211 These two global elements seen as critical components 
of an emerging global health paradigm are considered not mutually exclusive. The fact 
that infectious diseases do not respect national borders significantly contributes to a 
consciousness of global responsibility for the health of all people. More so, the risk of 
uncontrolled pandemic increasing rapidly from low-income to middle- and high-income 
motivates the more affluent to assist poor people because the more affluent do not want 
to contract diseases of the poor people.212 This explains most likely why Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) for health appears to concentrate excessively on 
infectious diseases.213  
Nevertheless, a global responsibility for the health of all people should go beyond 
a readily disposition to address the global threats presented by infectious diseases and 
guarantee that there is equal focus and solidarity for non-infectious diseases.214 Ooms 
argues that “there is some trans-national solidarity to promote the health of all people, but 
it is limited and it is most often intended to be temporary: the objective is to help other 
 400 
countries assume their responsibilities towards their inhabitants, within a foreseeable 
future.”215 He acknowledges basic differences between the way people residing in high-
income countries exercise solidarity for health within their countries’ borders, and the 
way those same people exercise solidarity in health beyond the borders of the countries 
they reside in.216  
First, there is an enormous difference in quantity. It is not unusual for people in 
high-income countries to expend higher than 10% of their Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) on health. For example, in 2005, people in Germany spent equal to 10.7% of their 
GDP on health.217  
The Second significant difference refers to the intention guiding the exercise of 
solidarity. Solidarity in health, within the borders of a country does not have an objective 
to be temporary, its objective entails continuing reciprocal solidarity. Concluding the 
solidarity is not the intention guiding the act of solidarity in this context. The intention is 
to help the beneficiary to recover soon and possibly become prolific in such as a way as 
to contribute to continuing reciprocal solidarity. On the other hand, the intention guiding 
solidarity changes basically beyond the borders of a country. The intention of trans-
national solidarity does not entail that the beneficiaries would turn into contributors to a 
continuing reciprocal solidarity mechanism between countries. The intention is that all 
beneficiaries would turn out to be self-sufficient within a foreseeable future, and 
consequently trans-national solidarity could terminate, as solidarity within countries 
would be adequate.218 Ooms points out that “for some reason, we can endorse the 
metaphor of a “single global market,” but not the metaphors of a “single global hospital” 
and a “single global school.”219   
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The consequences of dealing with trans-national health solidarity as a temporary 
issue and invariably a rejection of a Global Health paradigm can be far-reaching 
especially for the 1.3 billion people residing in low-income countries. In low-income 
countries which had the total GDP of US$810 billion for 1.3 billion people, or US$600 
per person per year, domestic public health expenditure of US$18 per person per year is 
certainly a severe challenge. It involves government revenue except for grants of 20% of 
GDP, and 15 % of government revenue for public health expenditure. The identified two 
targets are fairly challenging.220 Provision of universal access to primary health care at 
US$18 per person per year is considerably a huge challenge, and thus considered a 
“mission impossible.”221 Data from the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
(CMH) shows that governments are required to spend at least US$40 per person per year 
on basic health, and this does not completely include comprehensive primary health 
care.222  
The domestic public health expenditure can be complemented by ODA for health, 
but providing ODA for health within the context of the present development paradigm 
which implies without a global health paradigm, constitutes a severe problem, primarily 
because ODA has been in the past unreliable. The unreliability of ODA for health is 
actually expected as ODA is meant to be temporary and thus not reliable in the long 
run.223  
One critical consequence that is identified regarding the unreliability of ODA for 
health in the long run is that occasionally the fund is being poorly utilized, which may 
mean not being used where it is greatly needed or could offer the largest benefit, or even 
not used at all. Moreover, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
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deter low-income countries’ governments from growing the levels of recurring health 
expenditure, including health professionals’ salaries, utilizing ODA for health since ODA 
for health is ultimately unreliable.224 Information from the Independent Evaluation Office 
of the IMF, indicates that more ODA is rechanneled to grow the foreign exchange 
reserves of low-income countries, than is utilized for the objective for which it was 
meant, which is to grow public expenditure.225   
Furthermore, Nancy Birdsall explains Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) 
as guilty of “seven deadly sins.”226 She identifies seven deadly sins associated with ODA 
as (i) “impatience”- in relation to institution building and possessing a restricted 
commitment to longer-term support; (ii) “envy” – focuses on lack of success to 
effectively coordinate and at other times to conspire with one another and not essentially 
in the involved developing countries’ interests; (iii) “ignorance” and a lack of success to 
effectively assess development interventions; (iv) “pride” – refers particularly to a lack of 
success to exit when suitable; (v) “sloth” – refers to carelessness with concepts and their 
application, and notably feigning that participation is the same with developing country 
ownership; (vi) “greed” – distinguished by unreliable and insufficient “stingy transfers” ; 
and (vii) “foolishness” – distinguished by insufficient obligations to funding global and 
regional public goods.227  
Despite the inherent impediments associated with the ODA for health, the global 
AIDS response which is a synthesis of medical relief and health development paradigms 
creates a promising global health paradigm. Hammonds and Ooms argue that “the 
approach adopted by AIDS activists – and their ability to remain outside the development 
paradigm, often termed “AIDS exceptionalism” – is at the root of their success.”228 A 
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brief discussion of the three paradigms, including the health development paradigm, the 
medical relief paradigm and the new global health paradigm for redressing the health 
inequalities follows. 
 
D.1. The Health Development Paradigm  
The health development paradigm aims for sustainability which is usually defined 
within the context of self-sufficiency.229 The Office of Sustainable Development of the 
Bureau for Africa of the United States Agency for International Development provides 
the definition of sustainability as “the ability of host country entities (community, public 
and/or private) to assume responsibility for programs and/or outcomes without adversely 
affecting the ability to maintain or continue program objectives or outcomes.”230 It 
describes financial sustainability as “having enough reliable funding”, meaning funding 
“generated from a country’s own resources.”231 The International development 
organizations, such as the World Bank, are motivated by global solidarity but their 
emphasis is on sustainable interventions that result in self-sufficiency. They focus on 
guaranteeing an exit plan. Development practitioners concentrate on enhancing health or 
education for all within a country for a restricted time and view the long-term 
sustainability of an intervention a critical factor in establishing the goal, design, 
implementation and evaluation of a project.232  
In the area of international assistance for health, Enrico Pavignani and Sandro 
Colombo remark: “Sustainability is continuously invoked as a key criterion to assess any 
aid-induced activity or initiative. Sometimes, the concept is given the weight of a 
decisive argument. Thus, to declare something “unsustainable” may sound as equivalent 
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of “worthless” or even “harmful”, in this way overruling any other consideration.”233 
Akin to this perspective is the observation of Pablo Gottret and Georges Schieber that 
“Sustainability has generally been described in terms of self-sufficiency.”234 The 
implication is that from this context, international assistance would not promote any 
distribution of health-related goods that could not be sustained by the beneficiary 
country. Therefore, international assistance would merely endorse distribution of health-
related goods endeavors that the beneficiary country could sustain on its own, and if it 
could sustain these endeavors on its own, the international assistance then would not be 
required. This explains why the international assistance has not made a significant impact 
in some areas of global health especially in “maternal and child health.”235  
More so, if US$40 per person per year is needed for equitably providing a basic 
set of required health services, in that case, sustainability in the sense of financial self-
sufficiency might not be practical.  First, let us suppose that developing countries can 
raise government revenue equivalent to 20% of the GDP and assign 15% of government 
revenue to health expenditure, both of which are fairly ambitious. Second, if a 
comparison of these assumptions was made with current levels of government revenue 
and allocation to health expenditure, just countries with a GDP of US$1,333 per person 
can attain government revenue of US$266 per person per year and government health 
expenditure of US$40 per person per year. It is quite evident that low-income countries 
cannot attain this, based on the categorization of the World Bank in which their Gross 
National Income (GNI) is just US$935 or less.236 Ooms also observes that “All trendy 
development approaches point out that sustainable health care – narrowly defined as 
independent from international aid – is illusionary in the world’s poorest countries.”237 
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Therefore, public health budgets in low-income countries must be grown and critically 
need more guaranteed national and international financial commitments.238 
Sustainability in the sense of self-sufficiency is then not compatible with an 
equitable provision of a basic set of health services for the 1.3 billion people residing in 
low-income countries. It makes it hard to associate medical relief with health 
development.239 Ooms contends that “In the field of health care, the issue of 
sustainability creates a dichotomy between medical relief and health development, 
because relief is unaffected by the condition of self-reliance.”240 The dichotomy creates 
turf battles between the proponents of medical relief and the proponents of health 
development.241  Essentially, sustainability as the criterion is not actually taken into 
account when ascertaining the appropriateness of the medical relief response, due to the 
fact that the crisis is supposed to be temporary and consequently there is an assumption 
that long-term response would not be required. It is not completely accurate that 
sustainability in the sense of self-sufficiency is appealed to as a criterion for all aid-
induced activities. Definitely, it is not needed in humanitarian or medical relief 
interventions.242  
 
D.2. The Medical Relief Paradigm   
The medical relief paradigm was initially established to respond to severe health 
crises. In the event of a natural disaster or war that significantly devastates a population, 
emergency humanitarian organizations such as the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement or Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) usually respond. They typically 
appeal also to global solidarity in requesting for funds and their commended work 
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responds to the pressing desire that the majority of people feel to “do something” to assist 
those they perceive suffering.243 Until lately, humanitarian organizations were controlled 
by the notion of “temporary disruption of a pre-existing equilibrium”, or as humanitarian 
aid opponents explain, to “help populations get back to where they were before disaster 
struck.”244 From this perspective, the issue of sustainability is not taken into consideration 
when ascertaining the scope of the medical relief response. For example, one can utilize 
helicopters to rescue people following severe incidents of floods in countries that would 
not be able to fund a helicopter fleet themselves; since the incidents of floods are 
exceptional, the response is then not supposed to be sustainable.245  
Nevertheless, numerous humanitarian crises continue for decades and in such 
cases some type of sustainability is then needed. In such cases, the sustainability of 
medical relief depends on sustained international aid as an alternative type of 
sustainability different from self-sufficiency.246 
The practitioners of medical relief paradigm have been seriously challenged by 
chronic health crises especially the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, but as 
well as recurring occurrences of malnutrition, or still prevalent lack of access to the most 
basic level of health care.247 The World Disasters Report 2008 of the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescents Societies (IFRC) concentrates on the AIDS 
epidemic, as “a disaster in many ways.”248 Data shows that more people are currently 
dying in Mozambique as a result of these chronic crises than during its 20 years of war, 
and average life expectancy has decreased from 40 to 27 years.249 In some areas of the 
Democratic of Congo not ravaged by conflict, mortality goes beyond emergency 
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thresholds.250 Taking into account these prevalent situations in developing countries, the 
goal to “help populations get back to where they were before disaster struck” is futile.251 
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) describes 
“humanitarian crises” or “emergencies” as “any situation in which there is an exceptional 
and widespread threat to life, health or basic subsistence, that is beyond the capacity of 
individual and the community.”252  If the lack of capacity of the affected individuals, 
communities or countries to deal with a situation is what changes a development problem 
to a humanitarian crisis, therefore 1.3 billion people residing in low-income countries are 
experiencing a permanent humanitarian crisis as neither they nor their communities are 
capable to offer what it takes to deal with the situation.253  
This widespread state of emergency is not merely rhetoric because it has resulted 
in humanitarian actors and providers of medical relief such as the IFRC and Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF) broadening their meanings of humanitarian crises or disasters to 
intervene in the fights against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.254  More so, there is a 
contention that if the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 
established by the United States, includes “relief” in its name, it is not simply because 
“PEPFAR sounds better than PEPFADA – which could have been the acronym of a 
President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Development Assistance – but because PEPFAR 
was conceived as a medical relief programme: not aiming for self-reliance within a 
foreseeable future, but an emergency response to a crisis.”255  
It is pertinent to note that some people are not contented with this situation. 
Firstly, the more expanded meaning of humanitarian crises establishes a field of 
intervention that is too huge for humanitarian organizations. Consequently, criteria for 
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intervention unavoidably encompass some arbitrary choices.256 Alan Whiteside and Amy 
Whalley condemn humanitarian actors for their lack of success to “provide clear 
guidelines as to when an event is severe enough to be declared an emergency” and 
“recognize change in the nature of disasters”, and consequently for not addressing the 
real humanitarian crises.257  It might be possible that basically, humanitarian 
organizations were not designed to respond to chronic crises because their dependence on 
expatriate implementers and parallel management systems and their need to remain 
independent from governments which coincidentally are all strategies intended for acute 
crises in armed conflicts especially, severely restricted their potential as a mobilizer to 
respond to chronic health crises and to improve primary health care for all.258 In fact, the 
two health paradigms namely the health development paradigm and the medical relief 
paradigm were not sufficiently designed to effectively redress global health 
inequalities.259 Ooms and Hammonds articulating their limitations write, “One is too 
focused on domestic self-reliance; the other has to remain independent from the 
governments of the countries in which it operates.”260 It was then imperative to introduce 
another health paradigm known as Global Health paradigm which is designed to 
effectively redress global health inequalities. 
 
D.3 Global AIDS Response – A New Global Health Paradigm   
The global AIDS response started with a medical relief paradigm because of 
necessity, not only because the HIV/AIDS pandemic produced a crisis situation in 
developing nations with high prevalence, but also because the health development 
paradigm could not contain the costs of AIDS treatment.261 The global AIDS response 
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constitutes a new global health paradigm which is at the intersection of health 
development paradigm and medical relief paradigm.262  
Pavignani and Colombo remark: “Sustainability tends to be employed as an all-
encompassing term, but it seems useful to distinguish between technical sustainability, 
which relates to the capacity to carry out certain functions, and financial sustainability, 
which results from resource availability, fiscal capacity and the relative priority of health 
care provision.”263 Exploring a clear distinction between technical sustainability and 
financial sustainability is critical to establishing the foundation of a Global Health 
paradigm. The Global Health paradigm would aim for operational sustainability in the 
conventional sense of self-sufficiency at the national level borrowed from the health 
development paradigm. It would also give authorization for unlimited reliance on 
international financial support like the medical relief paradigm.264 Ooms argues that “In 
doing so it would recognize a globally shared responsibility for the health of all people 
and respond to the need for a new approach to providing basic health care to people in 
middle-income and low-income countries.”265     
Actually, the Global Fund is already implementing this: it has discarded financial 
sustainability in the conventional sense as a criterion for support, but unlike PEPFAR it 
does oblige technical or operational sustainability of the interventions it endorses. 
Therefore, the Global Fund did not discard financial sustainability entirely; rather it 
coined a new concept of sustainability, sustainability at the international level, depending 
on sustained international solidarity as well as on domestic resources. This implies that 
when countries utilize their grants from the Global Fund judiciously and effectively, they 
can depend on continued support from the Global Fund.266 Michel Kazatchkine, the 
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executive director of the Global Fund, highlighted the invented new concept of 
sustainability in his closing speech at the XVII International AIDS Conference: “The 
Global Fund has helped to change the development paradigm by introducing a new 
concept of sustainability. One that is not based solely on achieving domestic self-reliance 
but on sustained international support as well.”267  
The Global Fund did not coin this new concept of sustainability without prior 
concerted efforts from the global community. The United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on HIV/AIDS of June 2001 resulted in a declaration in which member 
states pledged to “make every effort to provide progressively and in a sustainable 
manner, the highest attainable standard of treatment for HIV/AIDS.”268 Furthermore, the 
follow-up assembly of June 2006 also resulted in a declaration, in which member states 
committed themselves “to supporting and strengthening existing financial mechanisms, 
including the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as relevant 
United Nations organizations, through the provision of funds in a sustained manner.”269  
The WHO’s 2008 report recognizes that the sudden increase in external funds aimed at 
health through bilateral channels or through the new generation’s global financing 
instruments has improved the energy or enthusiasm of the health sector.270 However, the 
report highlights immediately that “these additional funds need to be progressively re-
channeled in ways that help build institutional capacity towards a longer-term goal of 
self-sustaining, universal coverage.”271  
The Global Health paradigm with its emphasis on the new concept of 
sustainability within which the Global Fund functions was established out of necessity 
rather than theory. Establishing a theoretical framework will be necessary to ground the 
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practice of the global fund and other associated practices in realizing global health 
justice.272    
   
E. International Human Rights Law as a Foundation for Global Health Justice 
The Global Health paradigm is argued as grounded on international human rights 
law. Ooms and Hammonds articulate that “Ethics and value lie at the heart of the formal 
framework of international human rights law.”273 This part of the chapter discusses the 
scope to which the formal framework of international law offers a basis for a different aid 
paradigm, particularly the Global Health paradigm, in which international assistance 
becomes an obligation, responding to an entitlement, and hence unlimited rather than 
temporary, under specific conditions.274 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights275 is the basis of the modern 
human rights movement, and despite the fact that it is not a legally binding document in 
itself, later international human rights treaties that are established on the values originated 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights engender legally binding obligations on 
governments.276 Sofia Gruskin and Daniel Tarantola explicate that “in practical terms, 
international human rights law is about defining what governments can do to us, cannot 
do to us and should do for us.”277 
The two crucial treaties ensuing from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights278 and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights279 include legally binding obligations for the 
states that approve them.280 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is the most pertinent and the focus for this discussion because it explicates states 
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obligations with respect to the right to health. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that 
human rights cannot be achieved separately, which basically implies the right to health 
cannot be realized without improving the right to education and respect for civil and 
political rights.281 A more detailed discussion of international human rights law as a 
foundation for global health justice begins with the definition and scope of the right to 
health. 
 
E.1. Definition and Scope of the Right to Health 
Clearly, the right to health does not imply “the right of everyone to be healthy or 
to be provided with health.”282 Asbjorn Eide argues that “No state and no institution can 
guarantee our health, but more or less optimal conditions for the enjoyment of good 
health can be created, and this is what the rights to health is all about.”283  States can 
neither guarantee good health nor provide defense against every likely cause of human 
disease. Genetic factors, individual vulnerability to disease and the acceptance of 
unhealthy or perilous lifestyle may play critical roles with regard to an individual’s 
health.284  Eide writes “The right to health is therefore a right to have optimal conditions 
for as many as possible to live a long and healthy life.”285  
Furthermore, article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights defines the right to health as “the right to the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health”286 and the associated obligations of the state encompass 
the provisions of medical services and the underlying preconditions necessary to health, 
comprising of things such as clean water, sanitation, hospitals, clinics, trained medical 
and professional officials and essentials drugs.287 This basic definition of the right to 
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health has been endorsed and broadened in later international conventions, comprising 
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as other national and 
international legislation.288 Additionally, numerous United Nations Committees have 
engaged in an active role in more explication of essential elements of the right to health 
in their General Comments and in assessments of States’ compliance with obligations in 
the context of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as 
well as other more current treaties. Therefore, there is a dynamic development of the 
understanding of the right to health in international law; “it is not just frozen in the bare 
bones definition from the mid 1960s.”289 
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been approved by all 
States with the exception of the United States and Somalia, can be seen as a sign of 
global intentions on the development of understanding of the right to health and the 
obligations it requires.290 Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child offers 
more direction in understanding what the right to health implies as well as creating norms 
for governments concerning the right to health of children.291 A typical example of how 
these legal documents help form government policy stems from the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child which has elucidated Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child as obliging governments to take some particular actions to guarantee the 
right to health of children. First, a government must offer reliable data on the health of 
children to the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Second, a government must 
demonstrate that it is taking necessary steps to guarantee that it sufficiently funds the 
health of children. Third, a state must take necessary steps to guarantee that the health of 
all children is respected. Individual government conformity to these actions and other 
 414 
obligations is examined by the Committee on the Rights of the child, when governments 
turn in their periodic reports.292  
A further significant development took place in 2000 when the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights released a General Comment 14 on the right to 
health, tackling the scope of the right to health and the significance of international 
cooperation in realizing the right to health.293 The general comment on the right to health 
elucidates the scope of national and international obligations which was not clearly 
addressed by the language of article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
The scope of the right to health was addressed with the introduction of the 
concept of the progressive realization. A critical element of economic and social rights is 
that they can simply be realized in a progressive fashion, in due course and not 
immediately, as it relates to numerous civil and political rights.294 With respect to the 
right to health the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights remarks: “The 
concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization 
of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a 
short period of time.”295 The principle of progressive realization is “critical for resource-
poor countries that are responsible for striving towards human rights goals to the 
maximum extent possible.”296  
Furthermore, the concept of progressive realization should not be misunderstood 
as validating incessant delays in the achievement of economic, social, and cultural rights, 
while expecting for economic growth and adequate domestic resources to become 
accessible.297 It is not to be seen as “an escape hatch (for) recalcitrant states.”298  Such an 
elucidation would divest economic, social, and cultural rights of any meaningful value, 
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particularly for the deprived and vulnerable.299  Hence, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights comments that States parties have “an obligation to move as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible.”300 Pertinent to note is that progressive 
realization as well applies to resource-rich countries.301  
To refute the notion that “progressive realization” may entail “no immediate 
obligations,” the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stresses a variety 
of principles that explicate the nature of obligations of States parties: the principle of non-
retrogression which entails that a State should not take steps backwards, the obligations 
to provide international assistance and the principle of core obligations.302 The focus here 
is on the principle of core obligations and the obligation to provide international 
assistance because they engender obligations of global health justice as well as offer 
useful framework for grounding a Global Health paradigm.303   
  
E.2. Core Obligations and the Obligation to Provide Assistance       
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explained the core 
content of the right to health within the context of its explanation of the core obligations 
that stem from the right to health.304 Esin Orucu in 1986 provided a detailed explanation 
of the notion of the “core content” of a human right: the essential substance of a right, its 
reason for being, in the absence of which it would be devoid of meaning.305 The 
Maastricht Guidelines prepared in 1997 by international legal experts further broadened 
on this idea with reference to requirements for the fulfillment of a minimum core 
obligation.306 The concept of “core content” was approved by the Committee in General 
Comment No. 3. It elucidated that there are limits to the compromises that states can 
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make with respect to achieving economic, social and cultural rights by appealing to the 
clearly acknowledged unfeasibility of achieving all of them entirely and at once. More so, 
there is a minimum threshold, a minimum essential level or core content, which must be 
achieved without further delay.307 The Committee further explained that neither resource 
constraints nor progressive realization can justify non-conformity to the core obligations 
remarking that the burden lies with the State to show that it has utilized all available 
resources to fulfill its core obligations, which are non-derogable.308 
Brigit C.A. Toebes explaining the core content of the right to health categorized 
the elements that contribute to the health status of persons separating them into two sub-
groups: elements of healthcare and the underlying preconditions for health.309 In 2000, 
the Committee’s General Comment No. 14 on the right to health acknowledged the 
existence of a minimum essential level of the right to health.310 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights explains the minimum 
essential level of the right to health indirectly, through the explanation of the core 
obligations of States parties concerning the right to health. Core obligations encompass 
obligations to ensure access to essential health services and support for preconditions of 
health. The core obligations also entail the obligation to provide essential drugs, as 
defined by the WHO. The fundamental significance of non-discrimination is stressed all 
through, since it is the obligation for a state to focus particularly on vulnerable or 
marginalized groups.311 
Basing on their experience, most health practitioners in developing countries 
think that this definition of the minimum essential level of the right to health is a distant 
dream. Public health expenditure was less than US$10 per person per year in 2004, in 
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about 37 of the world’s low-income countries.312 The implication is that low-income 
countries are just very poor to provide a basic package of health services, including AIDS 
treatment which is estimated to cost US$40.00 per person per year by WHO.313  Taken 
into consideration the principle of ultra posse nemo obligatur, which implies in this 
context that no person (or country) can be obligated beyond what he, she or it is able to 
do, there is then some doubts whether it is reasonable to define core obligations that 
cannot be afforded in low-income countries. It is perfectly relevant to do so appealing to 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which notes that “Each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the 
maximum of its available resources.”314 To consider the ability or inability of low-income 
countries to realize their core obligations, it is pertinent that one should not simply 
consider their national resources, but as well resources they obtain from international 
assistance.315 
At the May 2000 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights session 
Paul Hunt noted: “if the Committee decided to approve the list of core obligations, it 
would be unfair not to insist also that richer countries fulfill their obligations relating to 
international cooperation under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant. The two sets of 
obligations should be seen as two halves of a package.”316 It is important to note that if 
the right to health is considered meaningless without the achievement of at the minimum 
its core content, and if some countries lack resources required to achieve the core content 
of the right to health, then the right to health itself cannot exist in the absence of 
international obligations to provide assistance.317 Ooms and Hammonds argue that 
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“Without international obligations to provide assistance – without global responsibility, 
that is – the right to health is not a right but a privilege reserved for those who are born 
outside of the world’s poorest countries.”318 However, it would not be misunderstood that 
such global responsibility does not imply that low-income countries have an 
unconditional and unlimited claim to international assistance in order to achieve the core 
content of the right to health.319 Philip Alston succinctly writes, “The correlative 
obligation would, of course, be confined to situations in which a developing country had 
demonstrated its best efforts to meet the (Millennium Development) Goals and its 
inability to do so because of a lack of financial resources.”320 Although, Alston makes 
reference to Millennium Development Goals, instead of core content of socioeconomic 
human rights, there is a contention that the same argument can as well be made for the 
achievement of the core content of socioeconomic human rights.321 Therefore, any claim 
to international assistance would be contingent on countries that show their best 
efforts.322  
Ooms and Hammonds further contend that “a claim to international assistance 
would not only be conditional, but also limited.323 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the ICESCR 
endorses both domestic obligations and international obligations of assistance but doesn’t 
show clearly the difference between both. If international obligations of assistance result 
only when domestic obligations have been entirely realized, actually they would never 
result because the right to health is a dynamic goal and the fact is that “the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health” would never be fully realized. In this 
context, high-income countries could incessantly contest international obligations of 
assistance, alluding to their domestic obligations. The concept of core content actually 
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dictates a hierarchy which stresses that it is more pressing to achieve the minimum 
essential standard of health for all humans, in the absence of which the right to health 
itself becomes meaningless, than to strive for the very highest attainable standard of 
health within the domestic setting. The hierarchy would cease to exist as soon as the 
minimum essential standard of health were achieved everywhere. At that moment, in 
consonant with the concept of core content, affluent countries could appeal to the 
primacy of domestic obligations to contend a change from offering international 
assistance to give preference alternatively to the highest attainable standard in domestic 
setting.324 Ooms and Hammonds argue that “interpreting the core content of the right in 
this way would also provide for the possibility of a sliding scale of responsibility, one 
that falls between exclusively national responsibility and wholly global responsibility.”325 
The combination of national and global responsibilities in realizing the right to health in 
poor developing nations establishes the context for a sliding scale of responsibility which 
is discussed next. 
 
E.3. The Sliding Scale of National and Global Responsibilities for the Realization of the 
Minimum Level of the Right to Health. 
A general consensus on making necessary efforts to guarantee for everyone 
globally the core components of the right to health, makes it imperative to examine the 
costs involved and how those costs should be allocated between the various nations and 
the international community, and among those nations that are well positioned to 
assist.326 Eide however acknowledges the difficulty associated with the calculation of 
costs for numerous reasons. There is currently a prevalent recognition of the social 
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determinants of health, which implies that convincing efforts towards global health must 
take into consideration factors that are frequently not incorporated in the calculation of 
health expenditure.327  
The rough calculation by the Commission on Macroeconomics of Health deduced 
that the minimum expenditure obligation within the health sector narrowly explained 
would come to US$ 40. These rough calculations are currently about ten years old and 
the amount would have to be likely increased. The calculations simply incorporated the 
expenditures on health within the health sector narrowly defined, and thus did not 
encompass the costs of guaranteeing access to preconditions of health.328  
Critics including Ooms indicated that the calculations provided by the 
Commission on the Macroeconomics of Health were seriously flawed.329 Ooms however 
endorses that the figures provided by the Commission may be helpful as a point of 
departure for reflections on how the costs, narrowly restricted to the health sector, could 
be allocated as well as a recognition that many developing countries could not realize the 
core content of right to health for their citizens without foreign assistance.330  In 
consonant with this perspective, Ooms and Hammonds proposed the creation of a Global 
Health Fund, in line with the current Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria which will be extensively discussed in the next part of the chapter. 
As a basis for the sliding scale of national and global responsibilities for the 
realization of the minimum level of the right to health, Ooms and Hammonds made some 
critical proposals in relation to the costs of core obligations for global health justice. First, 
they assume that achieving the content of the right to health would require that 
governments must be able to spend at least US$40 per person per year on health-related 
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goods recognized by WHO as essential for an “adequate package of healthcare  
interventions” (taking into account an adjustment for inflation).331 Second, they also 
assume that government revenue, with the exclusion of grants could reach the target of 
20% of GDP in low-income countries.332   
The sliding scale paradigm proposed by Ooms and Hammonds requires each 
country to spend at least 3% of average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person on 
health related goods distribution. The 3% approach to GDP refers to a benchmark for 
spending on national health by developing countries that would qualify them to receive 
global assistance. Each developing country would need to spend 3% of its GDP in order 
to show that it has exhausted its efforts and resources in realizing the core content of the 
right to health.333 This 3% approach to GDP is worth US$40 per person per year as 
proposed by the World Health Organization. They proposed using GDP per capita as the 
starting foundation for allocation and then calculating the domestic responsibility as well 
as global responsibility that would be required to fulfill the target of US$40 per person. 
For example, an identified country has a GDP per person of US$333 and is supposed to 
be able to spend 3% of this amount, or US$10 per person per year, on health-related 
goods distribution. Then, the global responsibility towards the identified country is 
restricted to guaranteeing that it can realize the distribution of health-related goods valued 
at US$40 per person per year, presuming that this level of financing is what it entails to 
achieve the core content of the right to health, or the equivalent of US$30 per person per 
year.334 The implication is that if a country can only afford US$10 per person as its 
national responsibility, then evidently the global responsibility towards the country is 
US$30. 
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Based on their calculation, the amount required for funding the cost of global 
responsibility for the right to health, or the cost of obligations of global health justice is 
estimated at US$50 billion per year. This is an estimate of the amount of assistance that 
would be required by about 59 low-income and lower-middle-income countries with a 
population of 2.5 billion.  The 66 countries classified by the World Bank as high-income 
countries have a collective GDP of US$43 trillion in 2008, and US$26 trillion in 2000. It 
is projected that they will reach a collective GDP of US$49 trillion in a moment, despite 
setbacks from global financial crisis. It implies then that to discharge their global 
responsibility, affluent countries would need to allot just about 0.1% of their GDP to 
international assistance for health.335  This is considered “a modest share of their 
wealth.”336 It is pertinent to note that as a result of the revised assessment by WHO ten 
years following the Commission’s report, from US$40 to US$44, the total amount would 
be accordingly higher.337 
 Eide contends that the figures demonstrate that it should be feasible for the global 
community constituting primarily the high-income countries to provide the funds needed 
to supplement the resources of poor nations, in order that the minimum core of the right 
to health can be guaranteed globally.338 He further calls for significant efforts “to 
establish the institutions and the procedures necessitate determining the scope of 
contributions, the allocation between donors, and the supervision of compliance both by 
the home state and by the external contributors.”339 The analysis further deals with an 
explanation of how a Global Health Fund can be established and operated in order to 
affirm the feasibility of the Global Health paradigm for improving affordable access to 
drugs. 
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F. Global Health Fund and Affordable Access to Drugs  
The critical need for an international agency for the distribution of health-related 
goods that would rectify the injustice arising from the current global system has been 
forcefully argued by Ooms and Hammonds.340  This global basic institution that may 
govern the distribution of health-related goods in a fair approach could take a number of 
forms. Ooms and Hammonds suggest two different forms: a Framework Convention on 
Global Health proposed by Lawrence Gostin341 and a Global Health Fund proposed by 
Gorik Ooms and Rachel Hammonds.342 This implies that some type of conventional 
global institution is imperative for enforcing “the interactive and practical applications of 
national and global responsibility.”343 A Global health fund in line with the current 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is viewed as one way to effectively 
handle an agreement between most of the countries  on critical parameters regarding 
realizing the core content of the right to health which involves improved access to 
essential drugs.  A more detailed discussion on the Global Health Fund and affordable 
access to drugs begins with addressing impeding factors to the Global Health Fund. 
 
F.1. Addressing Impeding Factors to the Global Health Fund 
The international community was pressured by AIDS activists to establish the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which when examined from a 
human rights framework is nothing except a tool for conformity to the transnational 
obligation to realize a critical component of the core content of the right to health. The 
existence of the Global Fund applied more pressure on governments of countries in need 
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of assistance to develop AIDS intervention plans and on government of countries well 
positioned to assist to offer the required assistance.344 It established entitlements for 
individual countries and to a reasonable extent the “equitable contributions framework” 
already alluded to, that is, duties for individual countries.345  
It is almost an impossible mission to realize progress in the fight against a single 
disease or even three diseases without effectively tackling the weakness of the public 
health systems in developing countries.346 Ooms and Hammonds argue that “to address 
this fundamental problem the world needs a Global Fund to fight poor health, including 
AIDS treatment but not excluding other essential health care, or a Global Health Fund to 
realise the core content of the right to health.”347  
The approach utilized by the Global Fund involves a serious limitation.  It 
primarily concentrates on deadly diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa such as AIDS, 
tuberculosis and Malaria and supports simply interventions to deal with those diseases. 
This situation does not create any problem for most middle-income countries which can 
fund their public health systems from domestic resources. Nevertheless, the same 
situation which is Global Fund’s limitation creates a significant problem for low-income 
countries which results in a two-tier system: the fight against AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria is not impeded by the limitation of financial self-sufficiency, while the fight for 
primary health care in general is.348  Ooms contends that “the result is the current 
paradox; international health aid to strengthen the backbone of the health systems is 
much harder to find (because of the financial self-sufficiency restriction) than 
international health aid for extra muscle to fight AIDS, tuberculosis or malaria.”349     
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This two-tier system has engendered an increasing difference between adequately 
funded muscle to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and heavily under-funded 
backbone of the health systems.350 Global Fund has been criticized on this ground. Roger 
England argued that “HIV is receiving relatively too much money, with much of it used 
inefficiently and sometimes counterproductively.”351 He further raises objections to the 
cost-effectiveness of HIV interventions and calls for utilizing money intended for HIV 
interventions for other health needs.352 He ends his argument with a passionate call for 
transforming the Global Fund into a Global Health Fund. He writes “A global basket 
fund is needed to transfer sustainable and predictable funding to countries, avoiding 
hugely unpredictable aid flows from fickle donors that make planning impossible. The 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria could abandon disease dedicated 
support to become this fund... Improving health systems should form the platform for 
action and research now, transcending HIV and other disease-specific programmes.”353  
It is pertinent to note that while most critiques essentially faults the Global Fund 
for having a very restricted mandate, none of them faults the conventional health 
development approach and its aim of self-sufficiency, which is actually the crux of the 
problem. These critiques are apparently condemning the Global Fund for the favorable 
outcomes of its exceptional approach partly because they prefer this exceptional approach 
to be employed for primary health care generally.354 Ooms further contends that they 
should be pressing for expanding the Global Fund mandate rather than preoccupying 
themselves with condemning its success.355 The Global Fund is counteracting these 
critiques by assuming or reestablishing its responsibility in funding the backbone of 
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health systems. However, this would involve more funding, which would invariably just 
occur if donor countries entirely support an expanded mandate for the Global Fund.356 
The IMF application of the concept of fiscal space to health financing in 
developing countries was very detrimental to Global Health Fund. Peter Heller from the 
IMF defines fiscal space as “room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial 
position or the stability of the economy.”357 He claims that fiscal space is a more urgent 
issue in developing countries than in developed countries or advanced economies due to 
more urgent needs for expenditure currently. Nonetheless, longer-term issues are as well 
included, still for lower-income countries, because of the need to guarantee that there 
would be room to deal with unexpected challenges.358 Thus, he articulates “Countries that 
receive significant flows of foreign resources for a specific sector (such as health care) 
may, as a result of the associated expansion of the sector, face additional future spending 
needs that may essentially preempt a share of the growth of future domestic budgetary  
resources.”359  
The IMF presumes that aid-driven health sector growth would unavoidably 
forestall a share of domestic resources. It is not disposed to envisage that international 
health aid could finance the growth of the health sector ultimately.360 Hence, it 
incessantly warns countries against utilizing excessive international aid for broadening 
the health sector, a warning also reiterated by the World Bank: “Obviously, then, it is not 
prudent for countries to commit to permanent expenditures for such items as salaries for 
nurses and doctors on the basis of uncertain financing flows from development assistance 
funds.”361  
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The IMF presses for its message about the unreliability of international solidarity 
with the objective of scaring recipient governments regarding growing expenditures. It 
carries out this by continuously reechoing the findings of Ales Bulir and A. Javier 
Hamann who discovered that international aid is “substantially more volatile than 
domestic revenues.”362  It vehemently refuses to pay attention to another pair of relevant 
data on the issue by Paul Collier who discovered that international aid is, actually, more 
reliable than domestic revenue363 and by Oya Celasun and Jan Walliser who discovered 
that whereas international aid is to some extent less reliable than domestic revenue, 
international aid deficits previously did not compel recipient countries to decrease 
recurrent expenditure, as these deficits were compensated by decreased investments.364        
A report published in March 2007 by the Independent Evaluation Office of the 
IMF showed that only 27% of the extra international aid to sub-Saharan Africa from 1999 
to 2006 was in fact permitted or authorized to be spent.365 The remaining 73% was placed 
in savings. This practice permits the IMF to impose conformity to fiscal space 
constraints: whenever a country is in danger of going beyond fiscal space, the IMF can 
program international aid to be saved by the recipient nation rather than being spent, for 
instance, to broaden health services to vulnerable populations. This obviously falls short 
of an incentive for donors to grow international aid.366  
Pertinent to note also is that the global AIDS response discovered a breakthrough 
strategy at the intersection of the medical relief and health development paradigms. 
International aid in the type of medical relief is not impeded by fiscal space 
constraints.367 This issue may have prompted Peter Piot, the former general director of 
the United Nations Joint AIDS Programme (UNAIDS), to clearly compare countries 
 428 
affected by AIDS with countries in or emerging from conflict, when he requested for a 
general exception for AIDS expenditure from fiscal space constraints.368  
Nevertheless, the unreliability of international aid over a long period of time 
constitutes a problem. It is hard for health ministries of various low-income countries to 
commit to long-term salaries for more health workers, for instance, if those commitments 
are simply supported by short-term international health aid commitments. On the other 
hand, the practice of fiscal space austerity establishes a vicious circle: it is defended by 
the unreliability of international aid over a long period of time; it engenders international 
aid being saved instead of being spent, hence generating frustrations for donors who do 
not observe the expected outcomes; which results in a feeling that “all that aid is not 
helping anyhow” and hence increases the unreliability of international aid.369  
It has been forcefully argued by Ooms that “a Global Health paradigm – in the 
sense of a globally shared responsibility for the health of all people – would solve this 
problem, or turn it into a merely technical matter.”370 Some technical solutions are 
already in place in order to address the issue of the unpredictability and unreliability of 
international health aid: the “replenishments” of the International Development 
Association (IDA) – as well known as the soft loan arm of the World Bank – are 
grounded on the principle of burden-sharing between affluent countries,371 and at least 
some of those countries regard them as mandatory.372 Ooms contends that “if we would 
copy this practice of burden-sharing and mandatory contributions to the financing of 
primary health care in low-income countries, we would not need to place limits on 
increases in recurrent health expenditure in low-income countries that are funded by 
increased international health aid.”373 Despite these impeding factors, a Global Health 
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Fund that effectively discharges its functions would enhance the realization of the core 
content of the right to health including affordable access to essential drugs which is 
discussed next. 
 
F.2. Functions of Global Health Fund  
First of all, a Global Health Fund would establish a convention that extensively 
outlines the scope of national and global responsibilities for all the nations involved. It 
would pool and monitor contributions from high-income nations and redistribute to low-
income nations that need assistance in realizing the right to health which includes 
affordable access to drugs.374  
Furthermore, a Global Health Fund would work out a burden-sharing mechanism 
between all high-income nations. The level of the contribution for each nation would 
reflect the nation’s capacity based on the relative wealth of its economy. The solidarity of 
all high-income countries would have to continue, if they accept mutual accountability 
for the health compacts they assisted in endorsing.375 
A Global Health fund would have to recognize that the primary responsibility for 
achieving the right to health lies with the state. It would have to establish a double 
benchmark for domestic contribution to health care that can be required from developing 
nations. One benchmark would focus on the amount of domestic resources a developing 
nation can adequately mobilize for government expenditure. A second benchmark would 
focus on the amount of domestic resources a developing nation can adequately allot to 
health care, which includes affordable access to drugs.376 These benchmarks without 
much emphasis on the details and the figures represent a method, not exact estimates. The 
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figures simply need to be adequately pragmatic to show the feasibility of a Global Health 
Fund, as “a method to transpose collective entitlements and duties into individual states’ 
entitlements and duties, and not to provide precise estimates.”377 
To make a pragmatic proposal for the first bench-mark involves examining 
current levels of government revenue with the exclusion of grants in low-income 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, as roughly calculated by IMF in its October 2007 
Regional Economic Outlook report for Sub-Saharan Africa.378 These countries succeeded 
in increasing government revenue with the exclusion of grants from 15.6 per cent of GDP 
in 2003 to 17.8 per cent of GDP in 2008. This is obviously an increase of 0.44 percent of 
GDP per year. It is projected that progressing at this rate, by 2015, government revenue 
with the exclusion of grants might be 20 per cent.379  
Regarding the second benchmark, allocating 15% of government revenue to 
health care could be established as condition for international aid for developing 
nations.380 This idea coincides with the pledge made by African Heads of state and 
government in the 2001 Abuja Declaration.381 Ooms remarks that “this idea may sound 
like “patronising conditionality”, but it should be understood as “emancipating 
conditionality”: a human rights approach, considering both national and international 
responsibilities and duties, or simply mutual accountability.”382 Combining these two 
benchmarks results in a general benchmark which requires low-income countries to 
mobilize and allot 3% of their GDP to healthcare in order to demonstrate that they have 
made their best efforts to achieve the core content of the right to health.383 
A Global Health Fund would involve civil society as a watchdog to detect and 
fight corruption and misuse of funding disbursed to developing nations.384 The success of 
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a Global Health Fund would considerably be contingent on the involvement of civil 
society. Civil society will play a critical role in pressuring low-income countries’ 
governments to allot the equivalent of 3% of their GDP to health. Civil society will as 
well play a significant role in guaranteeing that the increased health expenditure is 
utilized judiciously; that is primarily for broadening essential healthcare to remote rural 
districts and not simply for additional, exorbitant and non-accessible health services in 
low-income countries’ capitals.385  
On the other hand, civil society would assume the responsibility of ensuring that 
the Global Health Fund receives adequate funding to finance the approved proposals. It 
would launch campaigns to push high-income countries’ governments to increase their 
contributions during every replenishment cycle.386 Ooms aptly describes this as “a rare 
example of mutual accountability at the level of civil society: civil society of the “Global 
North” mobilising to generate the international health aid needed; civil society of the 
“Global South” mobilising to generate increased domestic health financing and to make 
sure that all health financing is well spent.”387  
A Global Health Fund rooted in the new concept of financial sustainability would 
result in a considerable increase in international health aid.388 Ooms argues that “it would 
also change the nature of international aid for health: it would change from temporary to 
ongoing and from charity to a collective obligation corresponding to a collective 
entitlement, or a global dimension to social protection.”389 The sustained domestic and 
international financial support through a Global Health Fund would help in realizing the 
right to health including affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for developing nations. 
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G. Conclusion 
Concluding remarks on this chapter focuses on a summary of a proposed 
paradigm of global health justice which emphasizes a sliding scale of national and global 
responsibilities in realizing the core content of the right to health, including affordable 
access to anti-retroviral drugs. Essentially, improved global health governance was 
considered a desideratum for global health. There was a consensus that health is a shared 
responsibility especially in relation to affordable access to essential health services and 
collective defense against transnational threats, including communicable diseases. Hence, 
it was forcefully argued that the responsibility for guaranteeing the right to health for all 
does not rest exclusively with states and their obligations to their populations, but as well 
with the global community. 
It was argued using Daniels’ works that Rawls’s and Pogge’s approaches for 
global health were insufficient. Rawls’s statist version of relational justice narrowly 
stresses the national responsibility of each country to realize the right to health of all its 
citizens and effectively excludes the global responsibility of individual nations. In 
contrast, Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach concentrates too much on global responsibility 
without adequate focus on the national responsibility of individual nations. Daniels 
criticizes the two extreme positions of Rawls and Pogge and advocated for a middle 
ground that resists the pull of the two opposing alternatives.  Hence, the proposed 
paradigm combines these two approaches by espousing their strengths and avoiding their 
weaknesses. The paradigm refers to a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities 
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concerning the right to health in general and affordable access to drugs in particular. This 
combined approach emphasizes that global responsibility supplements rather than 
replaces national responsibility for health. 
From this perspective, it was argued that the primary responsibility for realizing 
the right to health rests with every nation. However, cognizant that most developing 
countries are too poor and that they could exhaust their domestic resources without still 
able to realize the right to health of their citizens, affluent countries can intervene to 
exercise their global responsibility as a secondary responsibility for the realization of the 
right to health. 
The justification of the focus on government programs to address the issue of 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations rather than 
requiring multinational pharmaceutical companies to fund the cost of these programs was 
extensively discussed. The duty to promote global justice justifies broad collaboration of 
all stakeholders involved in the clinical research, including researchers, sponsors, 
governments of the host country, governments of affluent countries and international 
governmental and non-governmental aid agencies to provide anti-retroviral drugs to 
participants and host populations at the conclusion of the clinical research. The reference 
to available resources through international cooperation and assistance buttressed that 
developed countries have obligations of international assistance for access to essential 
drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs to participants and host populations. 
The obligations of researchers and sponsors to participants and host populations 
was argued to be transferable in the form of building healthcare infrastructure, 
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contributing health care and research equipments, training local health care workers, 
researchers and members of the research ethics committee,  and providing basic health 
services. Three different approaches for sharing benefits of clinical research with 
participants and host populations were discussed in conjunction with their shortcomings, 
including the reasonable availability requirement, the fair benefits framework and the 
human development approach. 
The four critical challenges of global health were discussed consisting of 
explaining essential health services and goods, elucidating government’s obligations to 
their country’s populations, investigating the responsibilities of all governments towards 
the global poor and introducing a global structure to enhance health as a matter of social 
justice.  It was discussed that the focus of the Joint Action and Learning Initiative (JALI) 
was on establishing post Millennium Development Goal (MDG) framework for global 
health which is rooted in the right to health and intended for obtaining universal health 
coverage for all people. 
It was further strongly argued that there is a global responsibility for global health 
and that there are obligations of justice to realize the right to health in other nations due 
to increasing wealth inequality between nations which has considerable direct impact on 
health inequity. A direct correlation between wealth inequalities and health inequalities 
between nations was also defended. The increasing inter-country inequality was 
attributed to several factors, including the long lasting effects of slavery and colonization, 
unfair trade agreements negotiated by rich countries and illicit financial flows from poor 
to rich countries. The inequalities on the global level impede the ability of poor countries 
to buy and distribute health-related goods for their citizens. 
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The global capacity to redress health inequalities was discussed, consisting of the 
health development paradigm, the medical relief paradigm and the new global health 
paradigm. The health development paradigm focuses on sustainable interventions that 
lead to self-sufficiency. The medical relief paradigm concentrates on responding to 
severe health crises in order to assist those perceived as suffering. It was argued that due 
to the generally unending nature of crises in the contemporary era as in the case of 
HIV/AIDS epidemics, that medical relief would require some kind of sustainability in the 
sense of sustained international aid as an alternative type of sustainability different from 
self-sufficiency. The health development paradigm and the medical relief paradigm were 
argued as not sufficiently designed to effectively redress global inequalities, and thus the 
need to introduce a global health paradigm was imperative. The global health paradigm 
evolved from the global AIDS response and is at the intersection of health development 
paradigm and medical relief paradigm. The new concept of sustainability introduced by 
the global health paradigm entails sustainability at the international level, relying on 
sustained international support as well as on domestic resources. 
International human rights law was argued as a foundation for global health 
justice and global health paradigm. International human rights law was defended as 
providing a theoretical framework for national and global responsibilities for realizing the 
core obligations that arise from socio-economic human rights and for addressing global 
health inequalities. The critical role of the principle of core obligation and the obligation 
to provide international assistance in realizing the core content of the right to health and 
consequently engendering obligation of global health justice was emphasized. The 
progressive realization of the right to health was recognized which establishes the need to 
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realize at least the minimum essential level of the right to health without delay. It was 
emphasized that without international obligations to provide assistance as well as without 
global responsibility, the right to health would simply be a privilege meant for the 
affluent. Any claim to international assistance would be based on countries that showed 
their best efforts. 
The combination of national and global responsibilities in realizing the right to 
health in poor developing countries establishes the context for a sliding scale of 
responsibility.      The sliding scale paradigm requires each developing country to spend 
at least 3% of average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person on health related goods 
distribution. The 3% approach to GDP alludes to a benchmark for spending on national 
health by developing countries that would qualify them to receive global assistance. This 
3% approach to GDP is worth US $40 per person per year as proposed by the World 
Health Organization. If a country can only afford US $10 per person per year as its 
national responsibility, then, the global responsibility towards the country is US $30 per 
person per year. A projected estimate for funding the cost of global responsibility for the 
right to health, or the cost of obligations of global health justice was US$50 billion per 
year. 
There was a consensus for a crucial need for an international agency such as 
Global Health Fund for the distribution of health-related goods that would rectify the 
injustice stemming from the current global system. The existing Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria was viewed as a prototype, but required expansion of its 
current mandate in order to include interventions for other diseases as well as addressing 
the weakness of the public health systems in developing countries. It was argued that the 
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Global Health Fund would be designed to effectively fight for primary health care and to 
realize the core content of the right to health, including affordable access to essential 
drugs. The fiscal space constraints imposed on low-income countries by IMF due to the 
unreliability of the international aid was seen as detrimental to their public health systems 
and invariably to the proposed Global Health Fund. Several critical functions of the 
Global Health Fund were discussed, including working out burden-sharing mechanisms, 
pooling, monitoring and redistributing contributions, establishing a double benchmark for 
domestic contribution to health care and involving the civil society as a watchdog in 
order to detect and fight corruption and misuse of funding disbursed to developing 
countries. A well constituted and efficiently operated Global Health Fund rooted in the 
new concept of financial sustainability would enhance the realization of right to health 
and affordable access to drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries. A 
brief summary of the entire debate on the ethical justification of post-trial access to anti-
retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing country anchored on 
the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights which links human rights and 
bioethics, and  emphasizes the principles of human dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedom in its efforts to promote responsible biomedical research and 
clinical practice is discussed in the final chapter and the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION – Anchoring A Paradigm of Global Health Justice: A Sliding Scale of 
National and Global Responsibilities on the UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights 
The concluding reflections of this dissertation is anchored on the UNESCO 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, because the aim of the 
Declaration coincides with the critical aspect of the dissertation which is guaranteeing the 
protection of the participants and host populations of developing countries in clinical 
research under the auspices of International Human Rights Law. The Declaration aims to 
accomplish this singular objective by setting “global minimum standards in biomedical 
research and clinical practice.”1 The Declaration, ipso facto, aims “to guide the actions of 
individuals, groups, communities, institutions and corporations, public and private.”2 
Most importantly, the Declaration prioritizes the principles of “human dignity, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” in its efforts to promote responsible biomedical 
research and clinical practice. It further emphasizes the priority of the individual over 
science or society.3  
The dissertation extensively discussed an ethical justification for post-trial access 
to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries 
within the context of global justice, emphasizing the combination of national and global 
responsibilities in realizing this objective. Drawing on the strengths of Rawls’ statist and 
Pogge’s cosmopolitan theories and on the International Human Rights Law, the 
dissertation argued for a paradigm of Global Health Justice involving a sliding scale of 
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national and global responsibilities for the realization of the right to health in general and 
access to drugs in particular.  
The dissertation began the discourse by identifying the ethical issues in global 
health inequalities and global health research which established the context of the debate. 
It highlighted the alarming ethical issue of global health inequalities between developed 
and developing countries which was exacerbated by the advent and calamitous impact of 
HIV/AIDS in developing countries, where many people living with HIV/AIDS lacked 
access to anti-retroviral drugs.  
The dissertation also acknowledged the critical role of two major ethical issues, 
including distributive justice and responsiveness of research to the needs and priorities of 
host populations in evaluating the ethical justification of any global health research 
especially in developing countries. 
The dissertation also discussed the regulatory infrastructure and ethical oversight 
of international clinical research which emphasizes the priority of safeguarding the rights 
of research participants and host populations in the design and implementation of 
research protocols. Obtaining voluntary informed consent from research participants and 
thorough review of research protocols by well constituted and competent ethics review 
committee were considered desiderata in conducting clinical trials in developing 
countries. 
Cultural and language barriers were acknowledged as critical challenges in 
conducting clinical research in developing countries especially with regard to complying 
with substantive ethical standard of voluntary informed consent, but were not justified as 
grounds for deviating from it. On the other hand, the Declaration acknowledges the 
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significance of “cultural diversity” and “pluralism” but emphasizes that “such 
considerations are not to be invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms ….”4 Researchers and sponsors from developed countries were 
encouraged in the dissertation to respect the local culture and values of research 
participants and host populations and to adapt standards of informed consent to the 
cultural norms and practices of developing countries. A milestone which was realized 
with the legal enforcement of informed consent was the elevation of the violation of 
rights of research participants in developing countries by researchers and sponsors from 
developed countries to crime against humanity.  Capacity building and collaborative 
partnership in the design and conduct of international clinical research were viewed as 
crucial components for the successful completion of international clinical research. 
The dissertation as well discussed the affordable access to drugs in developing 
countries with emphasis on the compelling need and urgency for development of cheaper 
generic versions of anti-retroviral drugs for fighting HIV/AIDS pandemic. The affordable 
access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries was discussed within the broader 
contexts of intellectual property law, international trade agreements and non-patent 
factors. The tension between enforcement of strict patent protection and affordable access 
to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the poor people in developing 
countries was recognized. A discussion on the analysis of the issue of affordable access 
to drugs established that both patent and non-patent factors adversely impede access to 
affordable HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries. 
The severe impact of international trade agreements currently negotiated by 
United States, which further exacerbate impeded access to anti-retroviral drugs for people 
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in developing countries was clearly acknowledged. Two key aspects of TRIPs agreement 
were discussed, including strict patent protection in order to promote incentives for 
innovation and promotion of public health interests, and maintaining a delicate balance 
between them was considered imperative. Compulsory licensing and parallel importation 
that authorize countries to manufacture and import generic versions of patented drugs 
respectively in order to address national health crises like HIV/AIDS were encouraged. 
Some current strategies for addressing the issue of affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs for developing countries were discussed, including private donations, 
price reductions and differential pricing, international collaborative initiatives and public-
private partnerships and compulsory licensing. Private donations and price reductions 
were viewed as improved solutions that are not effective and sustainable. 
The dissertation also discussed Rawls’s statist approach in dealing with the issue 
of post-trial access to anti-retroviral drugs in developing countries especially for trial 
participants and host populations. Rawls’s two different approaches to justice both in the 
domestic and in the international arena were discussed. His account of domestic justice is 
known as justice as fairness emphasizing the idea that fundamental agreements of the 
parties to the original position are fair. The idea of the basic structure of the society 
which applies to a well-ordered society was considered fundamental because it is the 
primary subject of justice. The principles of justice as fairness were discussed, including 
equal liberty principle, difference principle and fair equality of opportunity principle.  
Daniels’s extension of Rawls’s theory of justice to health care in the domestic 
society was discussed. He argued that health care institutions should be regulated by fair 
equality of opportunity principle, since meeting health care needs has a significant impact 
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on the distribution of opportunity. He further contended that fulfilling health care needs 
protects people’s normal opportunity range and helps them to maintain or restore normal 
species-typical functioning. 
Rawls’ statist approach discussed the two aspects of Rawls’s account of 
international relations and international justice, including ideal theory and non-ideal 
theory. The ideal theory focuses on how the laws of peoples should regulate the political 
relations among liberal and decent hierarchical peoples. The non-ideal theory focuses on 
burdened societies that lack basic resources to become well-ordered. Rawls argued that 
well-ordered societies have a duty of assistance to burdened societies in order to help 
them attain required level of economic and political developments to become well-
ordered. His account of global justice lacks a commitment to principles of distributive 
justice, because according to him such principles would be redundant and would produce 
unacceptable results. He argued further that they often lacked a clear target and a cutoff 
point. 
The dissertation explored three arguments in analyzing Rawls’s duty of assistance 
and access to anti-retroviral drugs, including argument based on Rawls’s defense of 
human rights, argument based on redress for the unjustified distributive effects of 
cooperative organizations and argument based on access to drugs as a transition strategy 
favoring the establishment of politically well-ordered nations. The argument based on 
Rawls’s defense of human rights did not go through because of his minimal and ad hoc 
account of human rights. Concerning the argument based on redressing the unjustified 
distributive effects of cooperative organizations, there was a consensus that interventions 
for providing affordable access to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for 
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developing countries would constitute logical approaches for redress. The argument 
based on access to drugs as a transition strategy that favors the establishment of 
politically well-ordered nations was justified. More so, it was argued that improving 
access to drugs would help as an effective transition strategy that would enable burdened 
societies to become politically well-ordered. 
The dissertation in contrast also discussed Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach which 
is a more robust and expansive international perspective to global justice for providing 
affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in 
developing countries. He forcefully argued for a stronger interpretation of global 
responsibilities grounded on human rights for providing affordable access to anti-
retroviral drugs for participants and host populations in developing countries. 
Pogge’s challenge of Rawls’s thesis of explanatory nationalism which appeals to 
domestic factors as engendering persistent severe poverty and global inequality was 
discussed. He insisted that global factors perpetuate severe poverty and global inequality 
and urged moral responsibility on the part of affluent countries to redress this alarming 
situation. He contended that unjust global institutional order imposed on the global poor 
perpetuates harm and consequently violates their negative rights. He further argued that 
citizens of affluent countries have not merely positive duties to assist, but also more 
stringent negative duties not to harm the global poor. 
The current rules for incentivizing pharmaceutical research were discussed.  The 
current globalized patent system was argued as an institutional failure, because the 
TRIPS agreement and the TRIPS-plus provisions significantly impede affordable access 
to essential drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs for the global poor in developing 
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countries. Seven major problems of the current globalized patent regime were identified 
and discussed, comprising high prices, neglect of diseases concentrated among the poor, 
bias towards maintenance drugs, wastefulness, counterfeiting, excessive marketing and 
last-mile problem. 
The dissertation also discussed Pogge’s proposed new rules for reforming and 
incentivizing pharmaceutical research in response to the problems engendered by the 
current system. He proposed two basic reform strategies for addressing the monopoly 
pricing issues and for improving access to essential drugs, including the differential 
pricing strategy and the public good strategy. Differential pricing and compulsory 
licensing were argued as inadequate in resolving the disadvantages of the current patent 
system. The public good strategy was defended as more promising in engendering a 
reform plan that would prevent the major disadvantages of the current monopoly patent 
regime, while at the same time, preserving most of its important benefits. The three 
critical components of public good strategy were discussed, including open access, 
alternative incentives, and funding. 
The HIF was discussed as a global institution for the effective implementation of 
Pogge’s new plan for reforming and incentivizing research and innovation. The HIF’s 
significant structural reform of the current globalized patent system was discussed. 
Additionally, the HIF’s systematic solution to seven disadvantages of the current 
globalized scheme was discussed. Some key objections by some authors were also 
discussed. 
The dissertation finally discussed a proposed paradigm of global health justice 
which emphasizes a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities in realizing the 
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core content of the right to health, including affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs. 
Improved global health governance was essentially considered a desideratum for global 
health. There was a consensus that health is a shared responsibility especially in relation 
to affordable access to essential health services and collective defense against 
transnational threats, including communicable diseases. Hence, it was forcefully argued 
that the responsibility for guaranteeing the right to health for all does not rest exclusively 
with the states and their obligations to their populations, but as well with the global 
community. The Declaration recognizes and encourages “solidarity among human beings 
and international cooperation”5 at the global level in tackling global challenges.   
It was argued using Daniels’ works that Rawls’s and Pogge’s approaches for 
global health justice were insufficient. Rawls’s statist version of relational justice 
narrowly stresses the national responsibility of each country to realize the right to health 
of all its citizens and effectively excludes the global responsibility of individual nations. 
Conversely, Pogge’s cosmopolitan approach focuses too much on global responsibility 
without adequate attention to the national responsibility of individual nations. A middle 
ground that resists the pull of the two opposing alternatives of Rawls’s and Pogge’s 
extreme positions was advocated for by Daniels. Therefore, the proposed paradigm 
combines these two approaches by espousing their strengths and avoiding their 
weaknesses. The paradigm refers to a sliding scale of national and global responsibilities 
concerning the right to health, including affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs. The 
sliding scale paradigm requires each developing country to spend 3% of its GDP on 
national health in order to qualify to receive global assistance. This combined approach 
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emphasizes that global responsibility supplements rather than replaces national 
responsibility for health.  
The dissertation also discussed its justification of the focus on government 
programs to address the issue of affordable access to anti-retroviral drugs for participants 
and host populations. The obligations of researchers and sponsors to participants and host 
populations were argued to be transferable. The global capacity to redress health 
inequalities was discussed, comprising the health development paradigm, the medical 
relief paradigm and the new global health paradigm. 
International human rights law was argued as a foundation for global health 
justice and global health paradigm. International human rights law was also defended as 
providing a theoretical framework for national and global responsibilities for realizing the 
core obligations that arise from socio-economic human rights and for addressing global 
health inequalities. The critical role of the principle of core obligation and the obligation 
to provide international assistance in realizing the core content of the right to health and 
consequently engendering obligation of global health justice was emphasized. 
A consensus for a crucial need for an international agency such as Global Health 
Fund for the distribution of health-related goods that would rectify the injustice stemming 
from the current global system was discussed. Expanding the mandate of the current 
Global Fund in order to include interventions for other diseases as well as addressing the 
weakness of the public health systems in developing countries was argued as a good start 
for establishing the Global Health Fund. An effective Global Health Fund rooted in the 
new concept of financial sustainability would significantly improve the realization of 
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right to health and affordable access to drugs, including anti-retroviral drugs in 
developing countries.  
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